Bruce John Daley

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

On September 13, 2011, the offender's vehicle failed to stop at a red light and collided with a vehicle at an intersection in Oakville, causing a chain-reaction collision involving approximately four vehicles.

Three individuals suffered serious bodily harm, including broken bones, facial injuries, and persistent pain and psychological trauma.

The offender's blood alcohol level was 188 and 182 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, placing him in the statutorily aggravating range.

The offender was a 23-year-old first-time offender with no criminal record, strong family support, and demonstrated genuine remorse.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 90 days, an 18-month driving prohibition, and 12 months probation with conditions including substance abuse counselling and an alcohol consumption prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and in finding that the roadside screening demand was made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also held that the 13-minute delay for the arrival of the screening device was reasonable, and even if a section 10(b) Charter breach occurred, the breath sample evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2).

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision on the QEW highway.

The trial addressed two key issues: whether the lab technician had lawful authorization to take a blood sample, and whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found that the accused's job description, stored electronically, constituted valid written authorization under the Criminal Code.

The blood sample analysis revealed a BAC of 258 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a stay entered on the impaired driving count at the Crown's request.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving entered after trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where a $500 fine was imposed.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the actus reus and mens rea of dangerous driving and raised additional issues regarding judicial notice of the roadway and the disclosure of settlement discussions during trial.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably accepted the police officer’s evidence describing excessive speed and running a red light in a busy urban area and rejected the appellant’s contradictory testimony.

The court also found no prejudice arising from the trial judge’s inquiry about potential settlement discussions.

The conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and no reversible error occurred.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The appeal judge had ruled that the arresting officer should have waited 15 minutes before administering an approved screening device test to rule out the possibility of residual mouth alcohol, as the accused had just left a bar parking lot.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that an officer is not required to delay the test if they honestly and reasonably believe they cannot form an opinion about whether the driver consumed alcohol within the prior 15 minutes.

The officer was entitled to rely on the accuracy of the screening device and administer the test forthwith.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that overturned the accused's conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in admitting the certificate of a qualified technician, applying the criminal standard of proof to whether the accused received a true copy under s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of proof for admissibility under s. 258(7) is a balance of probabilities.

The arresting officer's evidence that he read through the copy to ensure it matched the original was sufficient to support the trial judge's finding.

The conviction and sentence were restored.