Brian McGuire

The court ruled on whether to provide a Vetrovec caution to the jury for three witnesses (Mr. Borden, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, and Mr. Watts) in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected to cautions for Mr. Borden and Mr. Moy-Lingomba, arguing that such cautions are for the Defence's benefit and should be omitted if the Defence requests.

The Crown conceded that a caution was not needed for Mr. Watts.

The court determined that a trial judge's duty to ensure trial fairness and assist the jury supersedes a tactical decision by the Defence when a Vetrovec caution is necessary or mandatory.

Given Mr. Borden's overwhelming credibility issues and the centrality of his evidence to the Crown's case, a Vetrovec caution was deemed mandatory.

For Mr. Moy-Lingomba, who also had overwhelming credibility issues and whose evidence was critical to both the Crown (motive) and Defence (third-party suspect), a "mixed Vetrovec" caution was deemed mandatory to assist the jury in assessing inculpatory and exculpatory statements.

The defendant, Sheldon Ranglin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a proposed application to exclude evidence related to a three-way phone call.

The defence challenged the validity of a production order for Maplehurst Correctional Facility phone records, opposed the introduction of July 3, 2015 phone records due to alleged inconsistencies with witness testimony, and sought an adjournment of cross-examination due to outstanding disclosure.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Maplehurst pay phone records and thus no standing to challenge their admission.

The other issues were deemed matters for cross-examination or future application.

The court ruled on the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act during a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence from a witness, Mr. Watts, that another witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, had previously identified the defendant as the shooter.

The court initially precluded this evidence during the Crown's examination-in-chief of Mr. Watts, finding that the precondition of s. 11, requiring the alleged statement to be squarely put to Mr. Moy-Lingomba during cross-examination, had not been met.

The ruling emphasized the rationale of s. 11 concerning trial economy, fairness to the adversary, and fairness to the witness, and also noted the limited probative value and substantial prejudicial value of the evidence in question.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

The applicant, charged with three counts of first-degree murder relating to the deaths of her former spouse and his parents, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed the application on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown had a strong circumstantial case and that the proposed plan of supervision, which included electronic monitoring, was insufficient to mitigate the risks of flight and interference with the administration of justice.

The court also concluded that the applicant's release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with three counts of first degree murder relating to her former husband and his parents, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the applicant posed a flight risk, a threat to the administration of justice, and that her release would undermine public confidence.

The court reviewed the strong circumstantial case against the applicant, her history of breaching court orders, and the proposed plan of supervision involving electronic monitoring.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to show cause for release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, and dismissed the bail application.

The Crown applied for a ruling that a post‑arrest statement made by an accused during a police interview was voluntary and admissible at trial in a first‑degree murder prosecution.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged physical intimidation, suggestions that the accused needed to speak, implied threats regarding the accused’s girlfriend, and inducements suggesting a robbery admission could avoid a murder charge.

The court reviewed the full interview and applied the voluntariness principles from leading Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

It held that the accused had been properly cautioned, had consulted counsel, and chose to speak despite knowing his right to silence.

The court concluded the will of the accused was not overborne and that the statement, except for a later portion conceded by the Crown as induced, was voluntary and admissible.

During a murder trial involving allegations that a child died following assaults and a failure to provide necessaries of life, the court considered whether the defence of duress should be left with the jury for one accused.

Evidence was led of a long history of domestic violence and threats by the co‑accused spouse.

The Crown argued there was no evidence that threats were made for the purpose of compelling the accused to commit the underlying unlawful acts.

Applying the air of reality test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the evidence was capable of supporting an inference that the accused’s failure to act was compelled by ongoing threats and violence.

The defence of duress was therefore left to the jury in relation to omissions arising from a legal duty, though not for acts of commission.

During a joint trial for the murder of a child, the co-accused's counsel produced previously undisclosed photographs depicting the victim chained to a bed.

The applicant sought a severance of his trial, arguing the late disclosure undermined his cross-examination strategy and created fundamental unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the late production was a natural response to the applicant's cutthroat defence tactics and did not violate Crown disclosure obligations or create an injustice requiring separate trials.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during a pre-arrest telephone call and a post-arrest interview.

The accused argued the telephone statements were involuntary because she was not cautioned, and the post-arrest statements were the product of oppressive circumstances, including continued questioning after she requested counsel.

The court found that the accused had an operating mind and made a meaningful choice to speak during the telephone call.

The court also held that the post-arrest interview was not oppressive, as the accused had already consulted with counsel and the police were not required to facilitate further contact.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry decision that committed two accused to trial for second‑degree murder rather than first‑degree murder and discharged another accused.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence and improperly rejected inferences supporting constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code based on unlawful confinement.

The reviewing court held that the justice committed a jurisdictional error by failing to address evidence of unlawful confinement of a second victim, which could support first‑degree murder within the same transaction.

Mandamus issued requiring committal of two respondents to trial for first‑degree murder.

The application regarding the third respondent was dismissed because the justice properly applied the limited weighing permitted for circumstantial evidence and committed no jurisdictional error.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a pretrial application to admit the videotaped police interviews of the eight-year-old brother of the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The child had returned to Jamaica and his mother refused to permit him to testify.

While the necessity requirement was met, the court found the statements lacked threshold reliability due to material inconsistencies, the child's tendency to guess or make assumptions, and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

The Crown's application to admit the hearsay evidence was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary motion in a homicide prosecution, the accused sought to exclude several items of proposed Crown evidence on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The court applied the common law balancing test governing admissibility and considered whether the evidence would undermine trial fairness or invite improper jury reasoning.

Several graphic autopsy photographs and circumstantial forensic evidence were permitted where they illustrated the nature of the injuries or were relevant to the location and manner of the assault.

Evidence consisting of a written message on a pacifier package was excluded from the Crown’s case due to minimal probative value and risk of prejudice, though it could be used in cross‑examination if the accused testified.

A baseball bat potentially linked to the killing and a partial fingerprint found at the scene were admitted, with concerns about evidentiary weight left for the jury.

In a joint first‑degree murder prosecution, one accused brought a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the police statements of a co‑accused or, alternatively, to sever the trials.

The applicant argued that the statements implicated him in the killing and would be highly prejudicial because the jury might improperly use them as evidence against him despite limiting instructions.

The court held that the statements were highly probative against the co‑accused and formed an important part of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles governing severance under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code and the presumption favouring joint trials, the court concluded that any prejudice could be managed through editing of the recordings and strong jury instructions.

The motion to exclude the statements or order severance was dismissed.

In a pre‑trial voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude a police interview conducted the day the victim’s body was discovered.

The court considered whether the accused was detained during questioning at the police station and therefore entitled to rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the detention factors from R. v. Moran and the objective test for psychological detention articulated in R. v. Grant, the court found the accused was effectively detained when interviewed after being transported in a locked police cruiser and held in an interview room for hours without a caution.

Because the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, his Charter rights were breached.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court noted that it would also have had a reasonable doubt regarding voluntariness.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings during a jury trial for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering threats, arguing that the police lost key seized items including the complainant’s nightgown and the accused’s underwear which could have contained potentially exculpatory forensic evidence.

The defence alleged the loss breached the accused’s s. 7 Charter rights by preventing full answer and defence.

The court applied the framework from R. v. La and R. v. Bero concerning the Crown’s duty to preserve relevant evidence and whether its loss resulted from unacceptable negligence.

The judge found the evidence was misplaced after many years but not due to unacceptable police negligence, noting the items were properly logged and secured and that much of the delay was attributable to the accused fleeing the jurisdiction for extended periods.

The court further held that the defence failed to demonstrate actual prejudice or that the missing evidence would materially assist the defence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.