Boris Bytensky

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused drove a Honda Odyssey van to his wife's workplace while impaired by alcohol.

The defence argued that the accused did not drive the vehicle; rather, his cousin drove it while the accused sat in the passenger seat.

The trial judge found that the Crown's evidence was internally inconsistent and contradictory regarding whether the accused was in the driver's seat or had care or control of the vehicle.

The Crown witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the accused's position when first observed by police.

The trial judge preferred the credible testimony of the accused's wife and the defence witnesses, which established that the accused's cousin drove the vehicle.

The trial judge found reasonable doubt on the issue of care or control and acquitted the accused.

The accused was convicted of offences contrary to sections 172 and 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

Following conviction, the accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court considered whether the Jordan presumptive ceiling applies to post-verdict entrapment applications and whether the overall delay breached section 11(b).

The court held that the Jordan ceiling applies only to the end of trial and does not extend to post-trial proceedings.

The court further found no breach of section 11(b) rights after verdict, as the accused retains the right to have post-trial applications heard within a reasonable time.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with communicating via telecommunication with a person he believed to be under 16 for the purpose of facilitating an invitation to sexual touching, and communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services of a person under 18.

The charges arose from Project Raphael, an undercover police investigation targeting purchasers of sexual services from minors.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing the police engaged in random virtue testing.

The court dismissed the entrapment application, finding the investigation was a bona fide investigation conducted at a location where juvenile prostitution was active and reasonably suspected to be ongoing, and that the accused was not induced to commit the offence.

The defendant was charged with five Criminal Code offences involving sexual misconduct against his stepson (A.B.) and biological son (C.D.) over a period spanning 1995-2010.

The Crown alleged sexual interference and sexual assault against both complainants.

The trial proceeded on credibility and reliability of the two complainants' evidence, as the defendant did not testify.

The court found the defendant guilty of sexual assault against A.B. (Count 3) but acquitted on the sexual interference charges against both complainants.

The court found the defendant guilty of simple assault (not sexual assault) against C.D., finding reasonable doubt as to the sexual nature of the contact.

The court rejected the Crown's similar fact evidence application and found no collusion between the complainants despite opportunity for such.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from his communication via text message with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl offering sexual services.

The charges were: communicating with a person believed to be under 18 to facilitate obtaining sexual services for consideration; communicating with a person believed to be under 16 to facilitate invitation to sexual touching; and communicating to obtain sexual services from a person under 18.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was communicating with a minor.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and contradicted by the text message record.

The court concluded the accused made a detailed agreement to purchase sexual services from a person he believed was 15 years old and acted upon that agreement until arrested.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control and over 80.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that a "realistic risk of danger" is not a required element where the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control, in unreasonably finding a realistic risk of danger in obiter, and in assessing his evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's analysis of de facto care or control and that the findings were not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault against his wife, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to provide meaningful reasons, misapprehended evidence, inappropriately took judicial notice of injuries, and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence by conflating two separate incidents (the alleged morning assault and a later computer struggle) and by accepting an explanation for inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony that was not in evidence.

This misapprehension undermined the credibility assessment, which was central to the case.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt quashed, and a new trial ordered.

This decision concerns a reconsideration hearing in an extradition proceeding, specifically addressing the effect of police failure to report to a warrant-issuing justice under section 489.1 of the Criminal Code, as clarified by R. v. Garcia-Machado.

The applicant, Yvette Mathurin, sought broader disclosure and challenged her committal for extradition.

The court reaffirmed its earlier denial of the disclosure request and upheld the committal, finding that while a section 8 Charter breach was established due to the reporting failure, it would not lead to the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court emphasized that the impugned evidence was not relied upon for extradition and the applicant's Charter-protected interests were minimally impaired.

The applicants, charged with bookmaking and criminal organization offences, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of the gaming and criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code and related regulations.

They argued that the gaming provisions were ultra vires Parliament's criminal law power, that the regulation deeming gaming offences as 'serious offences' violated section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and that the bookmaking prohibition violated freedom of expression and association under section 2 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provisions were a valid exercise of the criminal law power, did not violate the Charter, and in any event, would be saved under section 1.

The applicant challenged the validity of two search warrants executed at his residence on Charter section 8 grounds.

The applicant was originally convicted of possession of child pornography following a nine-day trial.

Upon reopening the trial, the court examined whether the police exceeded the scope of the first warrant by seizing CDs and DVDs that the issuing justice had expressly prohibited.

The court found that the issuing justice's oral directions limiting the search to digital cameras and memory cards were binding on the police, and that the seizure of the Montreal CD and other storage devices constituted over-seizure in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court further found that the second warrant could not have been issued without the information derived from the unlawfully seized Montreal CD.

The court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control of a motor vehicle on September 22, 2013.

The vehicle, a silver BMW, was stuck on a tree on a boulevard after being driven by another person.

The accused attended the scene and attempted to move the vehicle by pushing it with another car.

The Crown relied on both the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) and de facto care or control.

The court found the accused guilty on both bases, rejecting his testimony that he only entered the vehicle to look for keys and finding instead that he was attempting to put the vehicle into reverse.

The court also found de facto care or control based on the accused's actions in attempting to move the vehicle while impaired.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for alleged violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The charges arose from a search warrant execution that resulted in drug trafficking and proceeds of crime allegations.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was approximately 23 months.

The court held that most delay prior to committal was inherent or attributable to co‑accused difficulties in retaining counsel and scheduling pre‑trial proceedings, which was neutral delay.

The institutional delay of approximately 10 months in the Superior Court was within acceptable guidelines and the alleged prejudice from the death of a potential defence witness was not causally connected to any Crown or institutional delay.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained from extensive computer searches conducted during a child pornography investigation arising from purchases linked to the AZOV website.

The court held that although the search warrant was validly issued and police were entitled to investigate, the method of execution violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police conducted a sweeping file‑by‑file search of approximately 40 terabytes of digital storage without first using targeted search parameters tied to the specific information known to them.

The court found the search overly intrusive given the narrow investigative grounds and concluded that police failed to pursue the least intrusive means available.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court excluded most of the discovered child pornography evidence under s. 24(2), admitting only evidence directly tied to the specific AZOV downloads known to investigators.

The requesting state sought the committal of the person sought for extradition to the United States to face prosecution for fraud arising from a large-scale fraudulent debt collection scheme targeting U.S. law firms.

The court considered whether the certified Record of the Case and Supplemental Records disclosed evidence sufficient to justify committal under the Extradition Act.

Although the case against the person sought was largely circumstantial, the court held that the evidence linking email accounts, IP addresses, and communications with co-conspirators created reasonable inferences that the person sought directly participated in verifying counterfeit cheques during the scheme.

Applying the low committal threshold for extradition proceedings, the court concluded that a properly instructed jury could convict on the Canadian equivalent offence of fraud.

The court therefore ordered committal for extradition.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for impaired driving, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and refusing to provide breath samples following a multi-vehicle collision on the Gardiner Expressway.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on an out-of-court statement, and rendered unreasonable verdicts.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals for those offences, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by evidence, including the appellant's feigned attempts to provide breath samples.

The court allowed the appeal solely to enter an acquittal on a stayed dangerous driving charge.

The appeal against the sentence of four months' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine was dismissed as fit.

This is a preliminary inquiry into charges of indecent assault and gross indecency arising from alleged sexual conduct between the accused, a 27-year-old adult, and the complainant, a 15-year-old boy, in the summer of 1970.

The Crown sought committal on two counts of indecent assault and two counts of gross indecency.

The court found insufficient evidence of non-consent for indecent assault, as the complainant's participation, though hesitant and reluctant, was voluntary with no threats, coercion, or abuse of authority.

However, the court found evidence sufficient for committal on gross indecency charges, considering the acts themselves (anal intercourse and fondling between males) were per se grossly indecent under 1970 law, and the significant age difference and power imbalance between the parties constituted additional relevant circumstances.

The appellant appealed convictions for care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit under the Criminal Code.

He was found asleep in the driver’s seat of his parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition after a night of drinking and argued that he had no intention of driving and had planned to obtain a ride home.

The trial judge found that although the presumption of care or control had been rebutted and there was no risk of accidental movement, there remained a real risk that the appellant might change his mind and drive while still impaired.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s inference of a realistic risk of a change of mind was supported by circumstantial evidence including the appellant’s level of impairment, inconsistent plans, and access to the vehicle’s controls.

The appellate court further found no error in the application of the burden of proof under W.D. and concluded that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate.

This is a ruling on an application by the accused in a sexual assault trial for production of the complainant's school records pursuant to section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that the accused had sexual intercourse with her without consent while she was in a paralytic state induced by alcohol consumption.

The trial had commenced and the Crown had concluded examination in chief.

The accused sought production of the complainant's Ontario Student Record, attendance records, and school social worker records.

The court applied the two-stage test under sections 278.3-278.5 of the Criminal Code, considering likely relevance and whether production was necessary in the interests of justice, while balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy and equality rights.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder and faced three previous trials.

The first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal due to a Charter breach.

The second and third trials resulted in hung juries.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings to prevent a fourth trial.

The court considered factors including the length of time elapsed, the time the accused spent in custody, the strength of the Crown's case, and the presumption of innocence.

The court concluded that requiring a fourth trial would stretch the community's sense of fair play and decency beyond the breaking point, constituting an abuse of process under section 7 of the Charter.

A stay of proceedings was granted.