Arieh Abraham Bloom

The applicant, an estate trustee and beneficiary, moved to appoint an institutional estate trustee during litigation for her father's substantial estate.

The motion was opposed by the other estate trustees (the applicant's mother and siblings) and another sibling.

The court found that the mother, Ida Rubin, likely lacked capacity, and the other estate trustees had engaged in questionable transactions, including retroactively characterizing assets as jointly held to avoid probate fees, making large gifts from the spousal trust to themselves, and failing to provide proper disclosure or pass accounts despite repeated requests.

The court emphasized its inherent jurisdiction to supervise estates and appoint an estate trustee during litigation to ensure neutral stewardship, protect beneficiaries' interests, and maintain a level playing field, especially given the conflicts of interest and animosity among the parties.

The court heard urgent applications and a cross-application for the appointment of a guardian for personal care and property for an incapacitated individual.

The primary applicant sought guardianship to challenge a doctor's life support plan at the Consent and Capacity Board, while the cross-applicant (spouse) intended to consent to the plan if appointed.

The court dismissed both applications for guardianship of personal care, finding that the need for decisions could be met by a less restrictive alternative, specifically by allowing the Consent and Capacity Board to determine the appropriate substitute decision-maker.

The court emphasized that the Board is the expert body for such life-and-death decisions.

Applications for guardianship of property were adjourned.

The primary applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the spouse and a statutory fee to the Public Guardian and Trustee, partly due to the inappropriate conduct of counsel and the lack of admissible evidence.

The court addressed costs following the dismissal of a motion by certain respondents to disqualify the applicant's counsel.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the motion was tactical and based on unsubstantiated allegations.

The court agreed, finding the respondents' claims of confidential information misuse were disingenuous, particularly given their deliberate disclosure of the "Memo" in question.

The court also noted the tactical use of a summons to witness.

Applying section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the applicant $25,500 in full indemnity costs against the moving respondents (excluding the Office of the Children's Lawyer and Arsandco Investments Limited), emphasizing that such motions, when brought for illegitimate tactical reasons or with unsubstantiated allegations of unethical conduct, warrant enhanced costs.

The applicant sought to invalidate a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property granted by his mother to his brother, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence.

The applicant also sought to replace his brother with a professional interim guardian.

The court found that the mother had the requisite capacity to grant the power of attorney and that there was no evidence of coercion or suspicious circumstances to establish undue influence.

The application to replace the attorney was dismissed, but the brother was ordered to pass his accounts annually to ensure transparency.

BMO Trust Company, as Estate Trustee and Guardian of Property, applied to pass its accounts.

The objector, Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections, leading to a contentious hearing.

Following the judgment which passed the accounts with a minor reduction in BMO's compensation, the court heard submissions on costs.

The total costs claimed exceeded $300,000, disproportionate to the summary nature of the proceeding.

The court applied principles of reasonableness, fairness, proportionality, and access to justice, limiting the costs awarded to BMO, payable by Lillian Sawchuk, to $69,000 plus disbursements, finding that an award of the full amount would be excessive and unreasonable.

No other costs were awarded.

BMO Trust Company applied to pass its accounts for the Estate of Pauline Medynski and the Guardianship of Andrew Medynski.

The adult daughters of the deceased, particularly Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections.

The court found some deficiencies in BMO's administration, including a failure to claim a $3,800 benefit and communication shortcomings.

While most objections were not monetarily quantifiable, the court ordered a modest reduction in BMO's compensation, specifically $3,800 plus a 6% reduction from the remaining compensation sought.

The court emphasized avoiding turning a passing of accounts into a full trial.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.