Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

Olavo Williams-Cordeiro was convicted of careless driving causing death in the context of a street race on Highway 403, where his vehicle was driven at speeds between 141-193 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone.

The race culminated in a fatal collision involving a motorcycle driven by Mr. Chen.

The court considered aggravating factors including the street racing context, the defendant’s troubling driving record with multiple speeding convictions post-incident, and the need for general and specific deterrence.

Mitigating factors included the defendant’s remorse, youth, difficult upbringing, and positive family support.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 9 months, followed by 18 months probation with conditions including a prohibition on driving, and a four-year driving prohibition.

The defendants were convicted under the Conservation Authorities Act and sentenced to fines, incarceration, and a rehabilitation order.

They sought a stay of these orders pending appeal.

The court applied the test from R. v. Smug, considering whether the appeal was frivolous, whether continuation of the sentence was necessary in the public interest, and whether granting a stay would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court granted a stay of the incarceration and rehabilitation order but refused to stay the payment of fines, finding that the defendants had not demonstrated sufficient hardship and that allowing them to avoid payment would undermine public confidence given their history of similar violations and ongoing apparent non-compliance.

The defendants, as registered owners of a residential property in Brampton, were charged with two offences: (1) using or permitting the use of lands for purposes not permitted by the City of Brampton Zoning By-law by establishing an illegal second dwelling unit in their basement, contrary to the Planning Act; and (2) failing to register their two-unit house with the City of Brampton as required by the Second Unit Registration By-law.

The court found that the defendants had established a self-contained basement apartment with separate kitchen, bathroom, and sleeping areas, which constituted a second unit.

The prosecution was not required to prove the existence of a tenant or a stove in the basement kitchen to establish the existence of a second unit.

The defendants were convicted on both counts.

A corporate defendant charged with animal cruelty offences brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process due to the Crown's refusal to provide first-party disclosure.

The defendant sought investigative files and internal correspondence from the OSPCA relating to the key witness and the investigation.

The court held that while the defendant, as a corporation, could not invoke section 7 of the Charter, it retained jurisdiction to address disclosure obligations under common law and the Provincial Offence Act.

The court distinguished between first-party disclosure (fruits of the investigation and obviously relevant material) and third-party disclosure, finding that most of the requested materials fell outside the Crown's disclosure obligations.

The court declined to grant a stay of proceedings but ordered the OSPCA to disclose investigative files and agent notes related to the specific investigation within 30 days prior to trial.

Three appellants appealed dismissals of their Charter section 11(b) applications for stays of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in Part I Provincial Offences Act prosecutions.

The central issue was whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applies to Part I offences or whether a lower ceiling should apply given the simplicity of such proceedings.

The court held that the 18-month ceiling applies to all provincial court matters, including Part I offences.

The court also addressed the test for demonstrating unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the requirement for meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and the circumstances in which summary dismissal of frivolous applications is appropriate.

The appellant was charged with driving while holding a handheld communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the Justice of the Peace found the appellant not credible and convicted him, categorizing the offence as one of absolute liability.

The appellant appealed on six grounds, with three main grounds being: (1) the Justice of the Peace erred in categorizing the offence as absolute liability; (2) the Justice of the Peace erred in failing to consider the hands-free exception under section 78.1(3); and (3) the Justice of the Peace erred in applying the test for credibility.

The appeal court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Forest Fires Prevention Act: failing to tend, control, and extinguish an outdoor fire before leaving the site, and starting an outdoor fire without a permit.

The fire occurred on May 10, 2017, on the defendant's property and expanded to approximately 0.1 hectares.

The defendant denied starting the fire and claimed someone else was responsible.

The court found that all elements of both offences were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the defendant was responsible for the fire, and convicted on both counts.

The appellant, a small family-run grocery store, was convicted of operating food premises in a manner permitting a public health hazard contrary to Ontario Food Premises Regulation 562.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $6,255.

The appeal concerned sentence only.

The Crown conceded that the sentence was based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration of the violation.

The parties jointly requested a reduction to $1,500 payable over two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had misapprehended the evidence, ignored the fact that the store had been sold, failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay, and lacked information about previous convictions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

A retired police officer discovered a vehicle in a ditch and spoke with two women at the scene.

The Crown's case rested primarily on eyewitness identification by the witness, circumstantial evidence, and alleged admissions by the accused.

The defence conceded the accused had been drinking but contested whether she was the driver.

The court found the eyewitness identification unreliable due to poor observation conditions, lack of corroborating details, and material discrepancies between the witness's description and the accused's appearance.

The charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt as to identity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for stunt driving contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal: (1) the officer should not have reviewed his notes prior to testimony; (2) the Justice of the Peace erred in finding the officer had sufficient independent recollection; (3) the Justice of the Peace erred in accepting speedometer evidence without independent certification; (4) the prosecution failed to prove the vehicle's speed exceeded 50 km/hr over the posted limit; and (5) the Justice of the Peace pre-judged the case.

The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144.18.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The evidence consisted solely of red light camera photographs and encoded data.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) no photograph showed the vehicle in the intersection during the red light; (2) the court referred to outside knowledge not in evidence; (3) the prosecutor gave evidence via submissions; and (4) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence from the photographs reasonably supported the inference that the vehicle entered the intersection on the red light.

The defendant was charged with speeding 21 kilometers per hour over the posted speed limit on Wellington Road West in Guelph.

A police officer using a properly calibrated and tested Ultralyte laser speed detection device measured the defendant's vehicle traveling at 81 kilometers per hour in a posted 60 kilometers per hour zone.

The defendant testified he was traveling at 60 kilometers per hour based on his vehicle's speedometer.

The court accepted the officer's evidence over the defendant's, finding the laser device to be a scientifically and legally recognized instrument.

The court also addressed the defendant's argument regarding speed sign spacing under Regulation 200, finding that the speed zone was properly established and the offense occurred within the enforceable zone.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced to a fine of $94.50 plus victim surcharge, payable within 15 days.

A landscaping company was convicted of operating a pit without a licence under the Aggregate Resources Act after removing rocks and boulders from farmland to facilitate the construction of a fence.

The company appealed, arguing that the excavation was for the purpose of building a structure (a fence) and therefore fell within the statutory exemption.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding that the primary purpose of the excavation was to facilitate the building of a fence, which constitutes a structure within the meaning of the Act's exemption.

The offender pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm was caused, contrary to section 252(1.2) of the Criminal Code.

The offender struck a pedestrian with her vehicle on January 1, 2015, causing serious injuries including a fractured skull and dental damage, then fled the scene without offering assistance.

The central sentencing issue was whether incarceration was appropriate.

The Crown sought a jail sentence in the range of six to nine months based on sentencing precedents emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence sought a suspended sentence with probation and community service.

The court imposed a non-custodial sentence consisting of a $1,000 fine, a two-year probation order with 200 hours of community service, and a two-year driving prohibition, finding that jail was not the only viable sentencing option despite the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding (117 km/hr in an 80 km/hr zone) and failure to surrender his driver's licence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on both counts following a trial where the Crown called the investigating officer and the appellant testified on his own behalf.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the speeding conviction on the basis that the trial judge improperly restricted cross-examination regarding potential flaws in the radar unit as identified in the manufacturer's manual.

The appellant also challenged the failure to surrender licence conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting his evidence that he had eventually produced his licence.

The appeal court allowed the appeal on the speeding charge and dismissed the appeal on the licence charge.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial focused on the identity of the driver and whether the evidence proved care and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's case relied on a McDonald's employee's observations, the arresting officer's testimony, and Breathalyzer results.

The defence called the accused's brother and cousin who testified regarding the evening's events.

The court found the accused guilty of care and control over 80 but acquitted on the impaired charge and found insufficient evidence regarding the McDonald's incident.

The accused was sentenced to the minimum fine of $1,000 plus a $150 surcharge and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian contrary to section 140(1)(a) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred at the intersection of Kingston Road and Brock Road in Pickering, where the defendant struck a pedestrian in a channelized right-turn lane.

The central issue was whether the collision location constituted a "pedestrian crossover" as defined by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found conflicting evidence regarding the presence of white painted pedestrian crossing lines at the location.

Applying the R. v. W.(D.) test for credibility, the court found the pedestrian and civilian witness more credible than the investigating officer and defendant.

The court determined the location was an "uncontrolled crosswalk" rather than a "pedestrian crossover" and found the defendant not guilty of the charged offence but guilty of the included offence of failing to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk contrary to section 144(7) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after a motor vehicle collision on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The defendant struck the rear of another vehicle while momentarily taking her eyes off the road to grab her purse, which contained a sentimental glass object that was slipping out.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of a prudent driver, it constituted only inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving was either reckless or indicative of indifference to the safety of others.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and assault with a weapon (a motor vehicle) arising from an incident on December 15, 2010, in a Thornhill community centre parking lot.

During a physical altercation between two groups of youth, the defendant drove his red Mazda in a circular pattern toward the area where the fighting was occurring, allegedly to scare the combatants away from his employee who was being attacked.

While eyewitness accounts were inconsistent regarding whether the vehicle actually struck anyone, the court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving based on his deliberate decision to drive toward the group despite having a direct exit available.

The court also found him guilty of assault with a weapon, as the defendant used his vehicle as a weapon by threatening force through his driving conduct.

One charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm had been caused.

The incident occurred when the accused operated an ATV in a public park in a dangerous manner, performing donuts and driving at high speed through a skateboard park where members of the public were present.

The accused struck a person, causing a fractured femur.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing bodily harm but not guilty of the aggravated failure to stop charge, instead finding him guilty of the lesser included offence of simple failure to stop.