Employment and Labour Law

The appellants, former employees whose employment was terminated following a corporate restructuring, appealed the dismissal of their application for supplementary retirement benefits under a supplementary executive retirement plan (SERP).

Following a partial wind-up of the registered pension plan, the appellants became entitled to statutory 'grow-in' benefits, allowing them to retire at age 55 with unreduced pensions.

The dispute centered on whether the SERP's formula required excluding these grow-in benefits when calculating their supplementary entitlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation, which relied on expert actuarial evidence to conclude that the SERP's proviso mandated the exclusion of grow-in benefits from the base calculation but not from the deduction of earned registered benefits, resulting in a nil supplementary entitlement.

The appellant private school terminated the respondent teacher's employment for cause after discovering he had falsified student grades and lied to cover up the improprieties.

The trial judge found the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed and awarded damages, including lost long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the trial judge erred in his application of the McKinley test.

The Court found the teacher's intentional misconduct and academic fraud struck at the heart of the employment relationship, justifying summary dismissal.

The respondent, a union president, commenced a representative action claiming the appellant employer failed to provide employees with their share of employment insurance premium reductions under the Employment Insurance Act.

The employer moved to dismiss the action, arguing exclusive jurisdiction lay with a labour arbitrator.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, relying on previous case law.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by not properly applying the Supreme Court's decisions in Weber and Parry Sound.

The Court held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement, as informed by the substantive rights in the Employment Insurance Act, giving an arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the action stayed.

The union and the employers' association failed to reach a new collective agreement for the residential construction sector.

An arbitrator was appointed under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The employers' association argued the arbitrator's jurisdiction was limited to the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), while the union argued for a province-wide award.

The arbitrator determined he had jurisdiction to make a province-wide award to avoid fracturing the bargaining unit.

The Divisional Court quashed the award for areas outside the GTA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for the arbitrator's jurisdictional decision was reasonableness.

The Court found the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and restored the province-wide award.

The respondent was assaulted by the appellant and his brothers at the butcher shop where they worked.

At trial, the appellant admitted to the assault but argued the respondent provoked it.

The trial judge rejected the provocation defence, made favourable credibility findings for the respondent, and found the brothers were joint tortfeasors.

On appeal, the appellant challenged these factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to disturb the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual conclusions regarding provocation and joint liability.

The appellants, a terminated insurance agent and his company, appealed the dismissal of their claim against Sun Life for post-termination commissions under the Commissions on Release (CORe) program.

The CORe agreements stipulated that payments would cease if the agent induced clients to replace their policies.

The appellant transferred over 600 clients to a new business, prompting Sun Life to terminate the payments.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination clause was an enforceable forfeiture provision, not a penalty, and that the appellants were not entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture given their flagrant breach of the agreement.

The appellant School Board appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's finding that it failed to accommodate the respondent employee's disability and ordering her reinstatement.

The employee had developed a psychiatric impairment due to the stress of her position and was unable to return to her previous role.

The Tribunal found that the School Board failed to accommodate her by not placing her in available alternative positions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decisions on both liability and the remedy of reinstatement were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act.

The hearing officer, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, and the Divisional Court all applied a balance of probabilities standard of proof.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Penner, which established that the standard of proof in PSA hearings is a higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence', not a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the Commission.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The appellant was terminated for cause after making violent threats to fellow employees.

He appealed, arguing his conduct was influenced by a mental disability and his termination violated the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer was unaware of the disability at the time of termination and fired him solely for workplace violence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the termination for just cause was upheld.

The appellants, representing regional airline pilots, sued Air Canada pilots for unlawful act conspiracy, alleging they unlawfully prevented the implementation of a merged seniority list.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that some defendants committed no unlawful acts due to their right to dissent, and that the unlawful acts of others did not cause the loss of a chance to implement the list because Air Canada would never have agreed to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the rank-and-file members did not breach their union contracts and that the chance of implementing the merged list was de minimis.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

The Toronto Chief of Police issued an order requiring suspended officers to report twice daily at police headquarters.

The Toronto Police Association filed a policy grievance challenging the reasonableness of the order.

The arbitrator concluded the order was not arbitrable as it fell within the Chief's exclusive statutory authority over operational matters.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Board's appeal, agreeing that the arbitrator's interpretation of the Police Services Act and the collective agreement was unreasonable, particularly her failure to apply established jurisprudence regarding the balance between management rights and working conditions.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action for long-term disability benefits.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis of a contractual one-year limitation period, failure to meet qualifying conditions, and the statutory two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in relying on the contractual limitation period without making necessary findings under section 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal because the appellant failed to meet the policy's qualifying conditions and her action was barred by the statutory two-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action and the judgment against him on the respondents' counterclaim for expense account monies.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing two witnesses to testify who were not on the pre-trial report, finding just cause for termination without progressive discipline, and calculating the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion regarding the witnesses, and that the appellant's unauthorized trades and dishonesty justified termination without progressive discipline.

The trial judge's calculation of the counterclaim was supported by the facts.

The appellant school board appealed an order requiring it to indemnify the respondent employee for legal costs incurred during a workplace investigation into alleged expense fraud.

The employee's contract contained an indemnity clause for costs related to any 'proceeding', excluding cases of dishonesty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prima facie evidence of dishonesty was presented, the merits of the allegations were for arbitration, and the formal workplace investigation constituted a 'proceeding' under the broad wording of the contract.

The appellant appealed an order granting the respondent employment agency's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claim.

The motion judge found no evidence that the agency was contractually obliged to forward her application for a specific position.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the claim was based on bare allegations.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs of $4,500.

The appellants sought to certify a class action claiming unpaid overtime on behalf of Investment Advisors and Associate Investment Advisors employed by the respondents.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the certification motion, finding that eligibility for overtime pay could not be determined as a common issue because it required an individual assessment of each employee's duties, autonomy, and managerial responsibilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the lower courts correctly applied the legal principles governing the common issue requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The appellants, unionized masonry contractors, appealed an order staying their action against the respondents and denying injunctive relief.

The appellants sought to challenge the legality of a Memorandum of Agreement and collective agreements that prohibited independent contractor arrangements with individual bricklayers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and that the appellants had avenues within the labour relations regime to challenge the agreements.

The appellant appealed a finding of contempt of court and a sentence of 20 days' imprisonment for breaching an injunction.

The injunction prohibited the appellant from releasing a disparaging press release containing confidential business information and ordered her to provide a list of persons to whom she had disclosed the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had knowingly and deliberately breached both the letter and spirit of the injunction by failing to instruct her agent to halt the distribution of the press release and by refusing to provide the required list.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error in principle was demonstrated.