Andrew Clifford Burgess

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for dangerous driving that was upheld on summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that neither proposed ground of appeal met the merits threshold.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's rejection of expert evidence regarding reaction time, which the trial judge was entitled to reject and which was irrelevant to the facts as found.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, which also failed the merits test.

The court noted that dangerous driving law is well-settled and each case turns on its own facts.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police discovered drugs and cash following an anonymous call reporting a break-in at his residence.

The appellant sought to exclude the evidence, alleging that police had staged the break-in and made the anonymous call in breach of his Charter rights.

The pre-trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant had not met the burden of proving the illegality of the warrantless entry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in finding he lacked authority to permit the defence to record testimony with a high-quality microphone for voice identification analysis; and (2) the trial judge erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant rather than the Crown to justify the warrantless entry.

The appellant was convicted of arson under sections 433 and 434 of the Criminal Code for deliberately setting fire to his two-storey building in Espanola with the intent to collect insurance proceeds.

The Crown's case relied on evidence of motive, planning, preparation, forensic evidence linking the appellant to the fire, and testimony from a disreputable witness who was likely an accomplice.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge improperly used neutral evidence to confirm the accomplice's account, misused the appellant's exculpatory statements as evidence of guilt, improperly excluded relevant evidence through misapplication of the collateral fact rule, and engaged in speculative reasoning inconsistent with the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made some errors, they were not material to the conviction given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity and participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and acquitted of possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life in association with a terrorist group.

He was sentenced to a global sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for conspiracy, 7 years consecutive for participation in terrorist group activities).

The Crown appealed seeking a 20-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility.

The appellant cross-appealed seeking a 5-8 year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the gravity of the offences, application of sentencing principles including parity and totality, treatment of mitigating factors including rehabilitation and remorse, and determination of parole eligibility.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove he was presented to a breath technician 'as soon as practicable' following the breath demand.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that presenting an accused to a breath technician 'as soon as practicable' is not an essential element of a valid demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code for the purposes of a refusal charge.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after stabbing a neighbour during a physical altercation on her driveway.

The fight was instigated by the neighbours over noise from a leaf blower.

The appellant claimed she acted in self-defence to protect her husband, who was involved in the melee.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the victim was not applying force or engaged with the husband at the moment of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the law of self-defence and did not impermissibly weigh the appellant's response to a nicety.

The appellants, a father, mother, and son, were convicted of four counts of first-degree murder after four family members were found drowned in a submerged vehicle.

On appeal, the son sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming he was a young person at the time of the offences, thereby challenging the adult court's jurisdiction.

The appellants also appealed on grounds relating to the admission of expert evidence on honour killings, instructions on post-offence conduct, the admission of ante-mortem hearsay statements, and the Crown's theory of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed documents lacked threshold reliability.

The Court also dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant, Andrew Wilby, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The conviction arose from an incident where he drove his police cruiser onto a sidewalk, colliding with a fleeing suspect, Cammalleri, during an apprehension attempt.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by using speculation, applying a harsher standard of scrutiny to defence evidence, and rendering an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court found that the trial judge was entitled to reject certain defence evidence and draw inferences that logically flowed from the accepted facts, including that the appellant deliberately drove onto the sidewalk to obstruct the suspect's path.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or the application of the dangerous driving test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his conviction for the sexual exploitation of a student.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to his testimony, and erred in admitting similar act and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were fair, the admission of similar act evidence from another student was reasonable, and the post-offence conduct evidence was properly used to assess credibility and the trajectory of the relationship.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an on-ice collision during a recreational no-contact hockey game.

The trial judge rejected the defence's evidence that the collision was accidental, finding instead that it was a deliberate blindside hit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculative reasoning by relying on her own personal knowledge of hockey strategy and on-ice injuries to reject the defence witnesses' testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of drugs and cash found in the accused's condominium unit under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police violated the accused's s. 8 rights by surreptitiously entering the common areas of the building without a warrant to gather information for a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of his small condominium building and that the trial judge did not err in excluding the evidence.