Alexandre Kaufman

The applicant sought a declaration that he is the beneficial owner of two properties and all common shares of a corporation, claiming he was in a 31-year common-law relationship with the respondent during which he provided funds for purchases registered in her name.

The respondent moved for summary judgment, asserting they were never in a common-law relationship.

The court declined summary judgment on that ground but found the applicant lacked standing to pursue the application due to two prior bankruptcies.

The applicant had made false statements in his bankruptcy filings, declaring no assets while allegedly holding beneficial interests in the properties.

The court found the transfers were made with intent to defeat creditors and that allowing the claim to proceed would condone fraudulent conduct in bankruptcy.

The applicant sought an order requiring the return of the parties' two children to Ottawa and prohibiting the respondent from removing them from Canada.

The respondent requested that the application be stayed in favour of proceedings she commenced in Brampton.

The court determined that while the older child's habitual residence was Ottawa, the younger child's habitual residence was Mississauga.

The court stayed the Ottawa application in favour of the Brampton proceeding, which was commenced first, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and potential inconsistent judgments.

The respondent's agreement to surrender her passport and NICOP card to her counsel adequately mitigated concerns about international removal.

The defendant Rhonda Niles brought a motion under Rule 42.02 to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) registered against her property at 55 Avenue Road, Toronto.

The CPL was obtained ex parte by the plaintiff in December 2017.

Ms. Niles argued that the plaintiff failed to provide full and frank disclosure of material facts when obtaining the CPL.

The court found three instances of material non-disclosure: (1) the affiant asserted personal knowledge when the evidence was based on information and belief; (2) the affiant mischaracterized the defendant's financial independence and income sources; and (3) the affiant failed to disclose material facts regarding the property's acquisition and financing.

Although Ms. Niles delayed seven years before bringing the motion, the court exercised its equitable discretion to grant relief, considering the plaintiff's failure to make full and frank disclosure, the plaintiff's lack of diligence in prosecuting the action, and the tenuous connection between the defendant's property and the alleged misappropriated funds.

The CPL was discharged and costs awarded to the defendant.

The applicant sought a temporary order requiring the parties' two children to attend École Élémentaire Catholique Édouard-Bond in Ottawa and a declaration confirming the children's ordinary residence in Ottawa.

The respondent opposed the school choice and sought retroactive child support.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that a school change was in the children's best interests.

The court ordered the children to continue attending Édouard-Bond and declared that the children have their ordinary residence in both provinces due to equal time-sharing arrangements.

The applicant was awarded partial costs of $7,000.

The appellants appealed an order made at a case conference holding them liable for tax penalties and interest resulting from their oppressive conduct.

They argued the application judge lacked authority to make a substantive order at a case conference and denied them procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court held that Rule 50.13(6) permits judges to issue directions, including substantive orders, at case conferences in appropriate circumstances to promote efficiency.

The court found no procedural unfairness, as the appellants were informed of the conference's purpose and had the opportunity to submit materials.

The appeal was allowed in part only to correct an agreed-upon calculation error.

The decision addresses three mid-trial motions in a solicitor’s negligence action.

The plaintiffs sought leave to admit late-served expert reports and to call Ms. Tara Sweeney as a participant expert.

The defendant sought to limit the plaintiffs’ claim to damages arising from an alleged improvident settlement and objected to the plaintiffs calling multiple experts on the same issue.

The court held that the plaintiffs are precluded from advancing any theory of liability beyond the improvident settlement claim, denied leave to rely on the late-served expert reports, found Ms. Sweeney is not a participant or non-party expert, and permitted the plaintiffs to call both Mr. Will and Ms. Maitland-Carter as experts on Mr. Cardill’s standard of care, but not both Mr. Will and Ms. Sweeney on Mr. Good’s standard of care.

The applicant, a family-owned trucking school, sought judicial review of the Superintendent of Career Colleges' decision to immediately forfeit its $97,000 security bond without notice, following proposals to suspend and refuse to renew its registration.

The Divisional Court found the forfeiture decision was both procedurally unfair and unreasonable, as the Superintendent failed to provide notice or consider the specific circumstances of the case before exercising her discretion.

Given the Licence Appeal Tribunal's subsequent findings that the applicant had no history of non-compliance and the investigation was tainted by confirmation bias, the court quashed the decision and ordered the return of the funds.

The respondents in a defamation appeal brought a motion for security for costs and an interlocutory injunction against the appellant.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for security for costs, finding the appeal appeared frivolous and vexatious, and the appellant likely had insufficient assets to pay costs.

The appellant was ordered to post $10,000.

The motion for an injunction to prevent alleged harassing behaviour was dismissed because there was no pending or intended proceeding claiming a permanent injunction.

The court dismissed a motion to certify a class action brought by Rodney Wilson against the Ontario Provincial Police for alleged privacy breaches arising from video recording detainees using the toilet in OPP cells.

The court found that the proposed common issues, including alleged Charter breaches and damages, required individualized adjudication and were not suitable for certification.

The court also addressed the evolution of OPP privacy policies and the balance between detainee privacy and institutional security.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The appellant sought to rescind a 2000 settlement agreement for statutory accident benefits, arguing the insurer failed to comply with disclosure obligations under Regulation 664 by not providing a commuted value for Attendant Care Benefits.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the rescission claim, finding the insurer was not required to provide a commuted value for benefits that were never claimed.

On appeal and judicial review, the Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, concluding it was not an error of law or unreasonable to find the settlement valid where the missing commuted value was for an unclaimed benefit and could not have reasonably affected the decision to settle.

The applicant, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) upholding a screening committee's order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education or remediation program (SCERP).

The applicant argued the remedy was overbroad as the committee's concerns were limited to record-keeping and communication.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that HPARB reasonably concluded the committee had wide-ranging concerns about the applicant's practice, including post-surgical management, which justified the broader remediation program.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 23, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $2,200 to the responding party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of McCarthy J. dated October 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the all-inclusive amount of $3,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $3,000.

The plaintiffs brought a mid-trial motion seeking to prevent the defendant, John Cardill, from relitigating whether their former solicitor, Donald Good, breached the standard of care in settling their personal injury actions.

The plaintiffs argued that this issue had already been determined in a prior costs assessment by Justice Hackland.

The court reviewed the doctrine of abuse of process and concluded that it did not apply in this case, as Mr. Cardill was not a party to the prior proceeding and it would be unfair to bar him from making a full defence.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision addresses whether Anne Meehan, a plaintiff in the action, is competent to testify at trial.

The court held a voir dire to determine her testimonial competence, considering her ability to understand the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation and her capacity to communicate evidence.

Despite inconsistencies and some cognitive limitations, the court found that Ms. Meehan demonstrated the necessary capacities to perceive, recollect, and communicate, and ruled that she may testify on a promise to tell the truth.

This ruling addresses whether Anne Meehan, a plaintiff, is competent to testify at trial.

The court reviews medical assessments of Ms. Meehan’s capacity, the statutory requirements under the Ontario Evidence Act, and the parties’ arguments regarding the necessity and form of a competency examination.

The court concludes that a voir dire is required to determine Ms. Meehan’s competency, as mandated by section 18(2) of the Evidence Act, and clarifies that such an examination need not occur in a formal courtroom setting.

The defendants, Dude Mitshabu and Isabelle Kayakeza, sought to set aside a default judgment issued against them in a motor vehicle accident case.

The court reviewed the relevant factors for setting aside a default judgment, including promptness, explanation for default, arguable defence, prejudice, and the effect on the administration of justice.

The court found the defendants did not act promptly, provided implausible explanations, and failed to present an arguable defence.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitral award under section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and moved for leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The court found that the fresh evidence was not relevant to the issues before the arbitrator and would not have affected the outcome.

The application was dismissed as an impermissible appeal of the merits of the arbitration, as the parties had excluded any right of appeal in their agreement.

The court confirmed that section 46 provides only limited grounds for setting aside an award and is not a substitute for an appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.