Alexandre Kaufman

The plaintiff, a former Minister of State, brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused during the examination for discovery of the defendants, a lawyer and his law firm.

The defendants had refused to answer questions based on solicitor-client privilege and parliamentary privilege.

The court held that asserting privilege was not a collateral attack on a previous order refusing to strike the claim.

The court upheld the assertion of parliamentary privilege regarding testimony before a parliamentary committee.

However, the court found the assertion of solicitor-client privilege to be overbroad and ordered the defendants to answer certain questions that did not reveal privileged communications.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion under Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules for the return of his 16-month-old daughter to Ottawa.

The respondent mother had unilaterally moved to France with the child on March 8, 2022, without advising the father, despite the child being ordinarily resident in Ontario.

The court found the motion urgent, citing established jurisprudence that child abductions are urgent matters and that self-help remedies are to be discouraged.

The mother failed to provide the required 60 days' notice of relocation under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court granted the applicant leave to bring the urgent motion and set a schedule for materials and hearing.

The defendant, Co-operators General Insurance Company, brought a motion for partial summary judgment and security for costs.

The plaintiff, 1923731 Ontario Ltd., had a commercial plaza damaged by fire, and the loss amount was determined by an appraisal process under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff subsequently sued for additional damages, including those already appraised, and for bad faith.

The court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages already determined by the binding appraisal award, emphasizing that such awards can only be challenged via judicial review.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs, finding insufficient assets to cover potential adverse cost awards.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy intervened in the taxation of a Licensed Insolvency Trustee's fees, seeking a reduction due to the Trustee's failure to fulfill statutory duties in a timely manner, specifically a four-year delay in submitting the final Statement of Receipts and Disbursements.

The Trustee argued that the delay was due to focusing on older estates as per Superintendent's advice and a prior agreement.

The court found the delay unjustified and, citing precedents, reduced the Trustee's fees by $750 to incentivize timely administration and maintain the integrity of the insolvency system.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy intervened in the taxation of a Licensed Insolvency Trustee's fees, seeking a reduction due to a six-year delay in submitting the final Statement of Receipts and Disbursements for a bankrupt estate.

The Trustee argued the administration was proper and creditors did not object, attributing delays to focusing on older estates and an agreement with the Superintendent.

The court found the delay inexcusable, emphasizing the Trustee's duty to act timely.

It reduced the Trustee's fees by $750 to incentivize efficient administration and uphold the integrity of the insolvency system, noting the reduction was not a penalty but a reflection of the dilatory conduct.

Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP ("Gowlings") brought a motion for a charging order on settlement funds recovered by their former client, Michael Dervin, in his personal injury action.

Dervin had terminated Gowlings' retainer and subsequently settled the action directly with the defendants for $1 million.

The court dismissed Gowlings' motion, finding that their efforts were not "substantial and integral" enough to be considered instrumental in the recovery of the funds, especially considering the extensive prior work by Dervin's previous counsel and the proximity of the final settlement to an earlier offer made before Gowlings' involvement.

The court also dismissed Dervin's request for costs as a self-represented litigant, as he failed to demonstrate any foregone remunerative activity.

The respondent moved by a Rule 14B motion to continue previously heard substantive motions, either by virtual conference or in-person.

The applicant opposed a virtual hearing, citing potential prejudice.

The court noted that recent procedural changes eliminated the requirement for urgency or pressing matters for motions.

The substantive issues involved the enforceability of an alleged agreement and the effect of escrow provisions related to the sale of a commercial property.

Recognizing the complexities and the court's rescheduling challenges due to COVID-19, the court declined to immediately set a hearing mode or date.

Instead, it ordered a further case conference before another Justice to review the parties' positions on the substantive issues and the preferred mode of hearing (in-person vs. virtual), before rescheduling the motions.

The plaintiff, Jennifer Horrocks, brought an ex parte motion for leave to register certificates of pending litigation against properties sold by the defendant, Bruce McConville, and related corporate entities.

The plaintiff alleged these sales were fraudulent conveyances designed to defeat her family law claims for equalization and support.

The court granted the motion, finding a high probability of the plaintiff recovering judgment in the main family law action, sufficient evidence of intent to defeat creditors based on several 'badges of fraud,' and that the balance of convenience favored issuing the certificates to prevent further disposition of assets to bona fide purchasers without notice.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim alleged the defendant "perverted the course of justice" by failing to attend a Small Claims Court settlement conference to provide medical documents.

The court, noting the plaintiff's history of numerous similar claims referencing an involuntary committal, driver's licence suspension, and vague conspiracy allegations, found the current claim to be abusive litigation.

The action was dismissed.

The Respondent sought costs after the Applicant's urgent motion to prevent her relocation was denied.

The Applicant opposed the costs order, citing the Respondent's alleged breach of their separation agreement regarding notice for relocation and claims of misleading the court.

While acknowledging the Applicant's motion might have been granted pre-COVID and his insistence on the agreement's terms was reasonable, the court found the Respondent's requested costs quantum reasonable.

Ultimately, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The Applicant's request for an urgent motion regarding access to his 11-month-old daughter was denied due to the Respondent's offer of twice-weekly access visits.

The Respondent sought costs for the urgent motion, to which she was presumptively entitled.

The Applicant resisted, arguing he did not request an urgent motion and that the Respondent's access offers were conditional.

The court found the Applicant clearly requested an urgent motion and that the Respondent's offer was unconditional.

The court assessed costs at $900 for the Respondent, inclusive of HST and disbursements, rejecting the principle of full recovery in family law and emphasizing proportionality.

The applicant sought an urgent motion for sole and exclusive custody of the three children, citing concerns that the respondent, an emergency physician, posed a COVID-19 exposure risk and had allegedly violated inter-regional travel restrictions.

The respondent countered that she adhered to all preventive measures, was an essential worker capable of assessing risks, and her travel was justified.

The court dismissed the urgent motion, finding no sufficient justification for exclusive custody and emphasizing the need for separated parents to foster normalcy and communicate respectfully during the pandemic, as per *Johnson c.

Johnson, 2020 ONSC 2896*.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court, applying a generous interpretation to the self-represented plaintiff's Statement of Claim, found that despite drafting deficiencies, it contained a discernable cause of action.

The motion was denied, with the court emphasizing that Rule 2.1 should be reserved for the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading.

The respondent brought a motion seeking urgent relief for retroactive child support and an order prohibiting the applicant from drawing on a joint line of credit, citing dire financial circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court determined the matter was not urgent, noting the applicant's consent to interim child support payments and a restriction on the line of credit, and finding insufficient evidence of dire financial need given the applicant's concessions and the respondent's financial statement.

Despite the finding of non-urgency, the court issued interim orders reflecting the applicant's consent.

The self-represented plaintiff, Brian Charbonneau, sought an urgent determination for the defendants' motion for summary judgment to proceed, requesting its dismissal and the scheduling of mediation.

The underlying dispute involved an erroneous land conveyance from 2011.

The plaintiff argued urgency due to potential farming business losses of $4,500 for the season.

The court, applying the Provincial Direction's definition of "urgent" (immediate and significant financial repercussions), found that the matter was not urgent, as the issue had been ongoing since 2015 and the potential loss was not deemed "significant." The request for urgency was denied.

The plaintiffs sought a six-month extension to serve their statement of claim on the defendant surgeon, Dr. Sasha Carsen, to obtain an expert opinion before proceeding.

The motion was brought before the original service deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that extensions should not generally be granted solely to investigate the merits of a claim when the defendant has no knowledge of the action, as this constitutes prejudice.

The court noted that the COVID-19 emergency order had already suspended time limits, providing the plaintiffs with an automatic extension.

The plaintiff, Roger Callow, commenced an action against Justice U.C. MacLeod after Justice MacLeod had previously dismissed one of Callow's actions under Rule 2.1.

The new claim largely replicated the previous one, adding an allegation against Justice MacLeod for dismissing the prior action.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1, dismissed the current action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

It was emphasized that challenges to judicial decisions must be made by appeal, not by commencing a new action against the judge, who enjoys absolute immunity for actions taken in their judicial role.

Two of the four defendants, Riad Rihane and France Rancourt, filed a written request under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to annul or stay the action, arguing it appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The action concerned arrears of rent and property taxes.

The court reiterated that a Rule 2.1 request should not contain evidence or arguments and that the determination must be made solely by examining the pleading itself.

Finding the action, on its face, to be a legitimate claim for debt, the court dismissed the defendants' ill-founded request.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to provide further affidavit of documents and permit additional examinations for discovery, eight years after the action commenced and after it was set down for trial.

The defendant opposed, arguing the plaintiff required leave and that the request was untimely and disproportional.

The court found that a pre-trial endorsement by Justice Doyle constituted leave.

It determined the requested documents, concerning other clients using the same IP address and related performance issues, were relevant to the plaintiff's negligence claim.

Despite the significant delay and potential for trial adjournment, the court ordered disclosure, with the plaintiff bearing the initial costs of retrieval, to mitigate proportionality concerns.

Costs for the motion were not awarded to the successful plaintiff due to the delay and non-compliance with case management orders.

The plaintiffs, former employees and shareholders, brought a motion for refusals and undertakings and leave to amend their Statement of Claim in an oppression action.

The defendants opposed the disclosure of documents related to company valuation post-commencement of the action, arguing the valuation date should be the action's start.

The court granted leave to amend and ruled that post-commencement valuation documents were relevant, citing judicial discretion in selecting the fairest valuation date in oppression cases.

The court also addressed procedural issues regarding questions arising from undertakings, prioritizing efficiency under Rule 1.04.