William Stephen Challis

The applicant sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the Ministry of the Attorney General to disclose records provided under the Casino Rama Revenue Agreement.

The applicant argued the records contained commercial information and their disclosure would cause harm.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's finding that the records related to the administration of funds, not commercial operations, and that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of expected harm.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant ministry appealed a lower court order dismissing its applications for judicial review of two orders by the commissioner.

The commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records relating to funding applications, finding they did not fall under the 'advice or recommendations' exemption in s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The appellate court held that the standard of review for the commissioner's interpretation of s. 13(1) is reasonableness, and found the commissioner's interpretation and application to the records to be reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records containing the Ministry's evaluations and scores of consultants who submitted tenders for highway construction projects.

The appellants argued the records were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's findings that the scores did not constitute 'advice or recommendations' under section 13, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm under sections 17 and 18.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Ministry of the Attorney General appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two orders by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The orders required the disclosure of the total amounts of legal fees paid by the Ministry to lawyers acting for intervenors and for Paul Bernardo on his criminal appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the disclosure of the total fee amounts would not reveal any privileged solicitor-client communications.

The Court also held that the disclosure did not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed an order of the Divisional Court that upheld a decision by Blair J. regarding the control of court process and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal found that Blair J.'s order was discretionary and made within his jurisdiction.

Finding no basis to interfere with the order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the Requester.

The Ministry of the Attorney General brought an application for judicial review regarding a freedom of information request.

During the hearing, the Divisional Court panel asked counsel whether the requester should be permitted to bring an application under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act that would breach a confidentiality undertaking previously given by his lawyer during negotiations.

The court adjourned the application to allow counsel time to prepare an answer to this pivotal question.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an order by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring it to disclose an electronic database containing the personal information of over 10 million Ontario residents to a collection agency.

The Commissioner had found that disclosure was expressly authorized by the Assessment Act, relying on previous case law regarding municipal election records.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decision, finding that the Assessment Act did not expressly authorize disclosure of the electronic records and that the Commissioner failed to properly consider the differing statutory contexts and privacy interests.

The Court also held that MPAC was entitled to refuse disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because the information was already available to the public in paper form.

The Ministry of the Attorney General applied for judicial review of two orders by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of the total amounts paid by the Ministry for court-ordered legal representation of certain individuals in criminal proceedings.

The Ministry argued the records were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act due to solicitor-client privilege and the protection of personal privacy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commissioner was correct in determining that the aggregate fee amounts were neutral information not protected by solicitor-client privilege, and that the Commissioner's decision that the disclosure would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy was reasonable.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of documents related to default hearings under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The Ministry claimed exemptions under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, including solicitor-client privilege.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's decision regarding sections 13, 14, and 18, but found the Commissioner erred in law by concluding that the documents, which were prepared by in-house counsel, lost their solicitor-client privilege once used as guidelines for general application.

The court held the documents were exempt from disclosure under section 19.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding fee estimates and time extensions for producing records.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was procedural in nature and fell squarely within the Commissioner's expertise.

Applying a standard of reasonableness, the court found the decision was not irrational and dismissed the application.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of evaluation scores awarded to consulting engineering firms bidding on highway construction projects.

The applicants argued the scores were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation and application of the exemptions were reasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm from disclosure.

The Ministry of Northern Development and Mines sought judicial review of two orders by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of project evaluation reports.

The Ministry argued that the Commissioner misinterpreted the 'advice or recommendations' exemption under section 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation—that 'advice' and 'recommendations' have similar meanings and require a suggested course of action—was reasonable.

The applications for judicial review were dismissed.

The applicant applied for judicial review to quash an adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of records relating to the costs of bringing witnesses from India to Canada for a murder trial.

The adjudicator had ordered the records disclosed with the witnesses' names and signatures expunged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator reasonably interpreted and applied the exemptions under the applicable legislation and correctly found that the exemption under s. 19 did not apply.

The moving parties brought a motion to have four applications heard together.

The applications all involved the interpretation of section 13 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act regarding 'advice or recommendations' in different factual contexts.

The court found that hearing the applications together would be in the interests of justice and would not cause substantial prejudice or inconvenience.

The motion was granted and the applications were ordered to be heard together.

The requester sought access to photos and a video from a closed Crown prosecutor's file under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The inquiry officer ordered disclosure, finding that the litigation privilege exemption under s. 19 ended when the prosecution concluded.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the legislative intent of s. 19 was to provide a permanent exemption for Crown counsel's work product, akin to solicitor-client privilege.

The Assistant Commissioner applied for leave to appeal, raising issues regarding the standard of review by the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash the application, arguing the Assistant Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and adjourned the motion to quash to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

A journalist requested an electronic database of municipal election campaign contributors from the City of Toronto to investigate potential breaches of contribution limits.

The City and the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner refused disclosure, citing privacy exemptions under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Commissioner erred in interpreting the Municipal Elections Act, finding the database was a public record prepared under the Act.

The Court further held that the Commissioner's decisions on the privacy exemption and public interest override were unreasonable, as the public interest in scrutinizing the democratic process outweighed the minimal privacy intrusion of disclosing contributors' telephone numbers.

The application was allowed and the database ordered disclosed.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of the top ten medical procedures billed to OHIP by the highest-billing general practitioner in Toronto.

The Ministry argued the records constituted personal information and were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's finding that the physician was not identifiable from the requested records.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The requester, an insurance company, sought access to Crown files prepared for a criminal prosecution under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Attorney General refused disclosure, and an Inquiry Officer ordered partial disclosure, finding that litigation privilege under s. 19 of FIPPA terminated when the criminal proceedings ended.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Inquiry Officer's interpretation of s. 19 was unreasonable and wrong in law, as the statutory exemption for records prepared by Crown counsel for litigation does not incorporate common law limitations on litigation privilege.

The Attorney General's application was allowed, and the requester's application regarding privacy exemptions under s. 21 was dismissed.

Three requesters sought access to information in the possession of Ontario government ministries.

The ministries denied access, claiming the records were excluded from the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under ss. 65(6)1 and 65(6)3.

The Assistant Privacy Commissioner ruled the Act applied, interpreting 'interest' as a 'legal interest' and finding no current or anticipated proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the ministries' application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held the standard of review is correctness.

The Court found the Commissioner erred by restricting 'interest' to 'legal interest' and by introducing a time element into the exclusions.

The appeal was allowed and the Commissioner's decisions were quashed.