William D. Black

The plaintiffs brought an urgent ex parte motion for an Anton Piller Order and related injunctive relief against a former independent contractor.

The contractor allegedly manipulated invoices, and upon being suspended, launched a cyber attack that shut down the plaintiffs' systems, deleted sensitive data, and caused significant financial damage.

The contractor also allegedly engaged in a campaign of defamation, doxing, and death threats against the plaintiffs' personnel.

The court found the evidence justified the rare remedy of an Anton Piller Order without notice to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant hospital network and subsequently seconded to a provincial health agency.

The secondment was terminated early, and the plaintiff's employment was terminated without cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the secondment agreement was a fixed-term employment contract entitling him to compensation for the balance of the term, plus 12 months' severance under his original employment agreement.

The court dismissed this claim, finding the secondment agreement was not an employment contract and the plaintiff remained an employee of the hospital network subject to the 12-month termination provision.

The court awarded the plaintiff a $5,000 health care spending account but dismissed his claim for a performance bonus.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for preservation and Norwich Orders after $2.55 million was fraudulently transferred from its bank account to accounts held by the defendants.

The plaintiff sought to trace and preserve the funds, and required identity information from the banks to proceed with a Mareva injunction.

The court found clear evidence of a scheme to defraud the plaintiff and granted the requested orders.

This endorsement clarifies previous orders regarding costs and an injunction.

A dispute arose concerning the liability of the Estate of Maria De Fatima Sardinha for costs of a prior motion.

The court found that the Estate had consistently advised it was not opposing the motion, and therefore, it should not be liable for costs.

The court also clarified that the injunction against all defendants, including the Estate, remains in effect until trial or further order, and that the costs order (excluding the Estate and Michael Freeborn) is joint and several, with Angie Sardinha-Farias's liability capped at $40,000 and the total award at $100,000.

The plaintiff, Jinzhong Miao, sued his lawyer, Dheeraj Bhatia, and his firm, Madamser Law, for negligence and breach of contract concerning a real estate transaction.

The plaintiff sought to extricate himself from an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property, alleging the lawyer provided negligent advice by assuring him he could exit the deal.

The court found that the lawyer did not provide such a guarantee and that the plaintiff's credibility was compromised by his admitted misrepresentations about his financial circumstances.

The court concluded that the lawyer's conduct did not fall below the required standard of care and was not causative of any loss to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Indell Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, Axiom Real-Time Metrics Inc., concerning responsibility for flood damage repairs and unauthorized tenant improvements under a commercial lease.

The third party, MMC Marketing and Promotion Inc., also raised issues regarding damages and betterment.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding contractual interpretation, estoppel, and the calculation of damages, including betterment and an administrative fee.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action claiming the defendant, his sister-in-law, agreed to pay him proceeds from a life insurance policy on his late wife.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish any consideration flowing to the defendant to support a binding contract, noting the payments made were equally consistent with a gift.

Despite the defendant being noted in default, the court held that deemed admissions apply only to facts, not conclusions of law.

The claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed an Associate Justice's decision removing its counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant, a former lawyer for the plaintiff being sued for professional negligence, intended to call lawyers from the plaintiff's current firm as witnesses regarding advice they provided to the plaintiff before, during, and after the defendant's retainer.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's conclusion that the lawyers were likely to be material witnesses and that their continued representation would impair the administration of justice.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The defendant had been granted two extensions but failed to close, and the plaintiff subsequently resold the property to another buyer at a lower price.

The court granted summary judgment, awarding the plaintiff damages for the difference in purchase price, specific incurred costs, and six months of foregone interest on a vendor-take-back mortgage, offset by the defendant's forfeited deposit.

On the eve of trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion for further documentary production and discovery after the defendants provided late answers to questions previously refused during examinations for discovery.

The defendants argued that issue estoppel applied due to previous unsuccessful refusals motions.

The court rejected the issue estoppel argument, finding that the defendants altered the litigation landscape by voluntarily providing the late answers.

The court ordered limited, file-specific documentary production relevant to the new answers, but denied broader discovery requests to avoid delaying the trial.

The plaintiff brought an undefended trial claiming his sister-in-law agreed to transfer life insurance proceeds to him following his wife's death.

The court raised concerns about the lack of consideration for the alleged agreement, as the plaintiff admitted the defendant received nothing in exchange.

The court deferred its decision to allow the plaintiff's counsel to provide written submissions on the issue of consideration.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision in a loss transfer dispute regarding priority for statutory accident benefits.

The claimant was injured while driving a rental vehicle provided by the respondent insurer as a temporary substitute vehicle for more than 30 days.

The court held that the 30-day limit for rental vehicles under section 2.2.4 of the Ontario Automobile Policy (O.A.P.1) does not apply to temporary substitute vehicles under section 2.2.2.

The court also upheld the arbitrator's finding that the claimant's submission of an OCF-1 form to the respondent constituted a valid choice of insurer under section 268(4) of the Insurance Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant second mortgagee sought assignment of a first ranked mortgage and challenged the priority effect of undisclosed and unregistered mortgage amending agreements entered into after the first mortgage was assigned to the respondent.

The court held that the mortgagor was in default when the applicant demanded an assignment under s. 2 of the Mortgages Act, and that the respondent was obliged to assign the first ranked mortgage upon payment of $788,152.20.

Following prior authority on notice and subsequent encumbrancers, the court held that the undisclosed amending agreements did not obtain priority over the second mortgage.

The court also applied equitable estoppel because the respondent repeatedly represented that the first mortgage was in good standing while capitalizing unpaid interest and increasing the secured amount.

Distribution of proceeds and payment of costs were held in abeyance pending a related trial involving the intervenor.

The applicant landlord brought an application regarding a commercial tenancy after the respondent tenants unilaterally withheld rent for 10 months.

The tenants claimed they were entitled to an abatement of rent because a failed Fire Code inspection delayed their ability to open a daycare facility on the premises.

The court found that while the landlord was responsible for some delay in rectifying the Fire Code violations, the tenants' withholding of 10 months' rent was an unduly aggressive self-help remedy.

The court granted a 4-month rent abatement, ordered the tenants to pay the remaining arrears within 45 days, and declined to order forfeiture of the lease.

The court also ordered the parties to cooperate on revising the design of a fence the tenants had installed without approval.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in her wrongful dismissal claim against the defendant hospital.

The central issue was whether the termination clause in her employment agreement was enforceable.

The court found that several 'for cause' provisions in the agreement violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) by falling short of the narrow 'wilful misconduct' exemption.

Applying Waksdale, the court held that these illegal provisions rendered the entire termination clause unenforceable, despite 'saving' language in the contract.

The plaintiff was awarded 4.5 months of reasonable notice under common law.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, Sikhs for Justice, sued the defendants over an article alleging the plaintiff's referendum campaign for an independent Sikh state was driven and controlled by Pakistan.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendants' defences of responsible communication and fair comment might not succeed.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff developer purchased limited partnership units back from the defendant investor.

The plaintiff mistakenly calculated the purchase price based on an assumed original investment of $300,000 instead of the actual $150,000, resulting in a windfall to the defendant.

Upon discovering the error, the plaintiff sought rectification or rescission.

The court found that the transaction proceeded on a common mistake and that the defendant could not rely on the entire agreement clause to take advantage of an obvious error she could have verified.

The court granted the plaintiff equitable relief, allowing the defendant to elect between rescission or rectification (returning the $132,300 overpayment).

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal after being terminated from a three-year fixed-term employment contract.

The employment agreement was negotiated alongside a share purchase agreement.

The court found that the 'just cause' termination provision violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000, rendering the entire termination clause void, despite the commercial context and the parties' sophistication.

The plaintiff was awarded the balance of the fixed-term contract (approximately 20 months) without a duty to mitigate, plus 10% for benefits, less CERB payments received.

The applicant brought an application for a permanent injunction against the respondents, a plumber and his corporation, for holding themselves out as legal practitioners.

The individual respondent used a fake law firm name to send demand letters to plumbing customers and maintained a website offering legal services.

The court granted the injunction, finding the respondents' actions violated the Law Society Act, and ordered the corporation to change its name to remove any reference to legal services.

The plaintiff commenced an action against his real estate agent and brokerage, alleging the agent forged his signature on a waiver of a home inspection condition.

This same allegation of forgery had been previously raised by the plaintiff and rejected by a judge in an earlier application brought by the vendor to keep the plaintiff's deposit.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim as an abuse of process and barred by issue estoppel.

The court granted the motion, finding that the core issue was identical to the one already decided, the plaintiff had the opportunity to appeal the prior decision but did not, and allowing the claim to proceed would be an abuse of process.