William A. Stevenson

The appellant lawyer was subject to disciplinary proceedings by the provincial law society.

He challenged the constitutionality of a provision in the Law Society Act that allowed the society to award costs of an investigation against a lawyer found guilty of professional misconduct, arguing it created a pecuniary interest and a reasonable apprehension of bias violating section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the costs provision did not contravene the principles of fundamental justice, as the recouped costs were reimbursements for expenses, not profits, and any pecuniary interest of the committee members was too remote to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant wrote anonymous letters to three cheerleaders threatening to rape them.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that a threat to rape did not necessarily constitute a threat to cause serious bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that 'serious bodily harm' includes psychological harm and that a threat to rape, viewed objectively in its context, constitutes a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The appeals concerned the constitutionality of the former rape-shield provisions in Criminal Code ss. 276 and 277, which restricted defence use of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence prosecutions.

The Court held that s. 276 violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because its blanket exclusion could bar relevant defence evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that the provision was not saved by s. 1.

Section 277, which barred sexual reputation evidence to support or attack credibility, was upheld as targeting an illegitimate use of evidence.

The Court also held that preliminary inquiry judges lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, so the appeals from the committals nevertheless failed and the matters were to proceed to trial.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought an action against the Bear Island Foundation after cautions were registered against unceded land on behalf of the Temagami Band of Indians.

The Foundation counterclaimed for a declaration of quiet title based on aboriginal rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that while the Indians exercised sufficient occupation to establish an aboriginal right, this right was surrendered by subsequent arrangements adhering to the Robinson-Huron Treaty in exchange for annuities and a reserve.

Although the Crown breached its fiduciary obligations under this agreement, the aboriginal right was nonetheless extinguished.

The appeal was dismissed.

The federal government introduced legislation to limit its cost-sharing obligations to certain provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan.

British Columbia referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the federal government had the authority to unilaterally limit its obligations and whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations prevented the introduction of such legislation without provincial consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had the authority to amend the Plan, as parliamentary sovereignty allows Parliament to amend its statutes.

The Court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the legislative process and cannot create substantive rights to veto proposed legislation.

The Director of Soldier Settlement appealed a decision regarding the ownership of mines and minerals in a parcel of land in Alberta.

The land was originally sold by the Soldier Settlement Board in 1928, with the Soldier Settlement Act reserving mines and minerals to the federal Crown.

However, the transfer was registered under the provincial Land Titles Act without the reservation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mines and minerals were transferred to the Province of Alberta under the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement.

As a result, the respondent executors, as bona fide purchasers for value, held valid title to the mines and minerals under the provincial Land Titles Act, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving simpliciter, having been acquitted of the more serious charges of dangerous driving causing death and bodily injury.

During sentencing, the trial judge considered the deaths and injuries resulting from the collision, and the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge is bound by the express and implied factual implications of a jury's verdict.

Because the jury unambiguously negated the factor of causation by acquitting on the more serious charges, the sentencing judge erred in considering the consequences of death and bodily injury.

The sentence was reduced to six months' imprisonment.

The respondent was seriously injured when he slipped and fell on the icy parking area of a rural farmhouse rented by the appellants.

The parking area had not been salted or sanded, which the appellants argued was consistent with local custom.

The respondent sued for damages under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The trial judge found the appellants liable, and the Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants breached their statutory duty of care under s. 3(1) of the Act by doing nothing to make the premises reasonably safe.

The Court further held that the respondent's mere knowledge of the icy conditions did not mean he willingly assumed the legal risks under s. 4(1) of the Act, which preserves the strict volenti non fit injuria doctrine.

The appellant was acquitted at trial after the trial judge disallowed evidence on a voir dire that a credit card in another person's name was found in the appellant's residence.

The Crown appealed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err on a question of law alone, and restored the acquittal.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter at trial on the basis of provocation.

The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the subjective test for provocation was not met.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right, adopting the dissenting reasons of Foisy J.A. in the Court of Appeal, and restored the trial judge's verdict.

The Attorney General for Saskatchewan appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which found that proposed changes to provincial electoral boundaries infringed the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter.

The impugned legislation imposed a strict quota of urban and rural ridings and required urban ridings to coincide with municipal boundaries, resulting in variances in voter populations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the purpose of s. 3 is not absolute equality of voting power, but effective representation.

The Court found that the deviations from voter parity were justified by factors such as geography, community interests, and population growth patterns, and therefore did not violate s. 3.

The union filed an application for certification before the Ontario Labour Relations Board relating to employees at the appellant's chicken hatchery.

The appellant argued the employees were agricultural workers excluded from the Labour Relations Act under s. 2(b).

The union gave notice it would challenge s. 2(b) under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an administrative tribunal with the power to decide questions of law has the concomitant power to determine whether that law is constitutionally valid under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Board therefore had jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of s. 2(b) of its enabling statute.

The respondent lost her job shortly after turning 65 and was denied regular unemployment insurance benefits due to the age restriction in s. 31 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.

She appealed to a Board of Referees, arguing the provision violated s. 15 of the Charter, but the Board upheld the denial without deciding the constitutional issue.

The Federal Court of Appeal directly reviewed the decision and found the provision unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board of Referees lacked the statutory mandate to decide Charter questions, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make a final determination on the issue.

However, addressing the substantive issue, the Court found that s. 31 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of age and could not be justified under s. 1, as it did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

These consolidated appeals concerned the constitutionality of a federal statutory prohibition on partisan political work by public servants.

The Court held that legislation implementing a constitutional convention of public service neutrality remains ordinary legislation and is subject to Charter review.

The impugned provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), was sufficiently precise to be a limit prescribed by law, but failed the s. 1 proportionality analysis because it applied overbroadly to all public servants regardless of role or level.

The Court declined to preserve the provision through case-by-case reading down and left standing the declaration that the impugned provision was of no force or effect except as it applied to deputy heads.

The appellant sought to hold a municipality liable in extra-contract for its loss.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in a brief oral judgment, holding that its recent decision in Laurentide Motels governed the matter.

Adopting the dissenting reasons in the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Court ordered judgment for the appellant in the amount of $29,000, with interest, additional indemnity, and costs throughout.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of sexual assault against a fifteen-year-old complainant based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered a conviction, finding no evidentiary basis for the defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the evidence relied upon by the trial judge was incapable of lending an 'air of reality' to the defence, and affirmed that substituting a conviction was appropriate as a new trial would serve no purpose.

The appellant was charged with historical sexual offences against his stepdaughter and daughters, with the charges laid up to 30 years after the alleged events.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under the Charter, finding the pre-charge delay violated the appellant's rights to fundamental justice and a fair trial, and rejecting the complainants' explanation for the delay without hearing viva voce evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-charge delay alone does not automatically undermine trial fairness and that the trial judge erred in making credibility findings without a proper evidentiary basis.

A bank appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that had curtailed its recovery after enforcing Bank Act security against a manufacturer's inventory.

The Supreme Court held the debtor was in default on demand loans, the bank was justified in calling the loans, and the debtor had consented to delivery of the secured inventory for realization.

The Court further held that contractual clauses authorizing possession and sale were valid and not contrary to public policy or the Bank Act where the debtor did not object.

The Court restored the trial judgment, rejected the higher inventory valuation advanced on appeal, and dismissed the cross-appeal and new damages claims.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no ground had been established that would warrant the disclosure of the identity of the police informer.

The appellant appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial judge was not impartial because he asked questions of the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have entered a conviction based on the evidence.