W. I. C. Binnie

The federal government introduced legislation to limit its cost-sharing obligations to certain provinces under the Canada Assistance Plan.

British Columbia referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the federal government had the authority to unilaterally limit its obligations and whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations prevented the introduction of such legislation without provincial consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had the authority to amend the Plan, as parliamentary sovereignty allows Parliament to amend its statutes.

The Court further held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the legislative process and cannot create substantive rights to veto proposed legislation.

The Auditor General of Canada sought access to Cabinet documents and Crown corporation records relating to Petro-Canada's acquisition of Petrofina, relying on section 13(1) of the Auditor General Act.

The government denied access, citing Cabinet confidentiality and the limits of the Auditor General's mandate.

The Auditor General applied to the courts for a declaration of his right to access the information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dispute was not justiciable.

The Court found that the Auditor General's exclusive remedy for a denial of access to information is the political remedy provided in section 7(1)(b) of the Act, which requires him to report the denial to the House of Commons.

The Woodstock Indian Band barricaded a railway right-of-way that crossed their reserve, claiming the railway company had no right to use the land.

The railway company sought a permanent injunction to restrain the Band from interfering with its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the railway company's predecessor had acquired a statutory easement in the nature of a right-of-way over the land prior to Confederation, with the permission of the Crown.

This valid right-of-way was sufficient to support the award of a permanent injunction against the Band, without needing to determine whether the Band's underlying interest in the fee held by the Crown had been extinguished.

The respondent, a Quebec Superior Court judge, challenged the constitutional validity of s. 29.1 of the Judges Act, which required judges appointed after February 16, 1975, to contribute a higher percentage of their salary toward their pensions than those appointed before that date.

The respondent argued this violated the principle of judicial independence under s. 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the right to equality before the law under s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contributory pension scheme did not interfere with judicial independence, as it merely treated judges in accordance with standard pension schemes and did not diminish their overall financial position.

The Court also found no violation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, concluding that the legislation pursued a valid federal objective and the cut-off date chosen by Parliament was not discriminatory.

The appellants challenged the federal cabinet's decision to permit the United States to test cruise missiles in Canada, alleging it violated their right to life, liberty, and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter by increasing the risk of nuclear war.

The respondents moved to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while cabinet decisions are reviewable under the Charter, the statement of claim must be struck out.

The Court found that the causal link between the testing of the cruise missile and an increased risk of nuclear war was entirely speculative and incapable of proof, meaning the facts alleged could not establish a violation of s. 7.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered valuable reserve lands to the Crown for lease to a golf club on specific terms approved by the Band.

The Crown subsequently entered into a lease on significantly less favourable terms without consulting the Band.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown's historical responsibility and the statutory scheme of the Indian Act impose a fiduciary duty on the Crown when dealing with surrendered Indian lands.

The Crown breached this fiduciary duty by ignoring the terms approved by the Band, and the Band was awarded $10 million in damages for the lost opportunity to develop the land.

The Law Society of British Columbia disciplined a lawyer, Donald Jabour, for advertising his legal services.

Jabour and the federal Director of Investigation and Research challenged the Law Society's actions, arguing they violated the Combines Investigation Act and freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act does not apply to regulatory schemes validly established by provincial legislation.

The Court also affirmed that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, despite the Federal Court Act.

Finally, the Court held that the Law Society's advertising restrictions, authorized by valid provincial law, did not unlawfully infringe freedom of speech.

The respondent, a concerned citizen and taxpayer, sought a declaration that the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code were invalid under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the provincial superior court and the respondent's standing to bring the action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent had public interest standing to challenge the legislation, as there was a serious issue as to its validity, he had a genuine interest as a citizen, and there was no other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue could be brought before the court.