Vincenzo Rondinelli

The appellants were committed for trial on fraud-related charges and appealed the dismissal of their motion to quash the committals.

The appellant Suissa argued that the preliminary inquiry judge's reasons were inadequate and constituted jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal held that inadequate reasons for committal are not per se a jurisdictional error and that the application judge properly reviewed the record to find a basis for committal.

The appellant Tehrani argued there was insufficient evidence for committal, but the Court found a sufficient evidentiary basis existed.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on liability under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge failed to relate evidence to critical issues.

The Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of planning and deliberation or forcible confinement.

The court also held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that the appellant be an active participant in the killing to be convicted under s. 231(5)(e).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a young first offender, pleaded guilty to armed robbery after he and a co-perpetrator beat a store proprietor with a bat and iron bar.

He appealed his 15-month custodial sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and raising a parity argument regarding his co-perpetrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's thorough reasons and deferring to the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding both the custodial term and the distinction drawn between the perpetrators.

The applicant was committed for extradition on a charge of second degree murder after the extradition judge found no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Minister subsequently ordered the applicant surrendered on the foreign charge of first degree murder, which requires premeditation under Arizona law.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Court of Appeal held that the Minister's decision was unreasonable because there was a total absence of evidence at the committal stage on an essential element of the foreign offence.

The surrender order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Minister.

The appellant was committed for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud, and laundering the proceeds of crime.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered his surrender on those charges, as well as conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering.

The appellant appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the surrender order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order, finding sufficient evidence of the offences.

However, the Court allowed the judicial review in part, setting aside the surrender order regarding conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering, as the extradition judge had made no findings to support committal on those specific charges.

The young person appealed a decision upholding a committal order for trial on a charge of first degree murder.

The appellant argued there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant carrying a large knife, making statements about wanting to do something stupid, and his actions before and after the stabbing.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain, and careless storage of firearms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the warrantless entry into the appellant's home was not justified by hot pursuit or consent, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter and requiring the exclusion of the firearms evidence.

The driving convictions were upheld, but the total sentence was reduced to three years and the DNA order was set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the aggravated assault of his domestic partner.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable, based on circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence, including blood evidence and witness testimony, was sufficient to support the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the domestic context and the appellant's lengthy criminal record for violent offences.

The appellant appealed from an order upholding a committal order made by a preliminary hearing judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the reviewing judge, while endorsing the reviewing judge's remark that the extent of the preliminary hearing judge's questioning of witnesses was difficult to understand or condone.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by removing the possibility of an acquittal from the jury's consideration and directing them that they must, at a minimum, convict him of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence establishing that a trial judge cannot direct a jury to convict absent a formal admission of all essential elements of an offence.

Since the appellant's formal admissions did not cover all essential elements of manslaughter, he was deprived of his right to a jury trial.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained during two police entries into his apartment and alleging errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the first entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

While questioning the second entry, the Court concluded the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to police good faith, inevitable discovery, and the appellant's consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a committal order made by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge provided a careful analysis of the evidence which warranted the committal for trial.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life relating to severe injuries sustained by her premature infant.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction for failing to provide necessaries, finding insufficient evidence that a short delay in seeking medical attention permanently endangered the child's health.

The Court also ordered a new trial on the aggravated assault charge, holding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for party liability by suggesting that mere knowledge of the abuse, rather than an intention to aid or encourage the principal offender, was sufficient for a conviction.

The Court also provided guidance on the application of the 'deemed consent' defence in the context of normal child care.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing for a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence of his medical condition.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the trial judge and held that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction in sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in denying the enhanced credit, noting the appellant served his pre-trial custody in segregation at his own request and had not engaged in rehabilitative programs.

The court upheld the sentence length given the offender's extensive record and high risk of re-offending.

However, based on a concession by the Crown, the court varied the parole eligibility period to half of the balance of the sentence imposed.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of production of marijuana, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and wilful damage to property related to two commercial grow operations.

He appealed his 18-month sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly sentenced him as part of a criminal organization and improperly considered his immigration status as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and that a conditional sentence would not satisfy the principle of general deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death, driving over 80, and dangerous driving causing death, and sentenced to four years and ten months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of bolus drinking and improperly drew an adverse inference from his failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge properly rejected the bolus drinking evidence and correctly applied the burden of proof, though it conditionally stayed the over 80 conviction based on a Crown concession.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act, arguing the Minister failed to give sufficient weight to his rehabilitation and the impact of extradition on his 15-year-old daughter, for whom he is the sole parent in Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister considered these factors appropriately and made no error of law, concluding the decision was reasonable given the goals of the international extradition regime.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and arson after driving to the home of his estranged wife's lover, shooting the lover, assaulting his wife, and setting the house on fire.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code by suggesting he could be liable if he actively participated in a struggle that accidentally caused the gun to discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the causation instruction was potentially confusing, it caused no prejudice because the jury's verdict demonstrated they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally shot the deceased.