S. Zachary Green

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario opticians could lawfully dispense corrective eyewear using a business model in which an onsite refractive test would be faxed to a remote optometrist or ophthalmologist who had not examined the customer, and who would then issue a prescription.

The court held the applicants failed to establish the legality of the model, accepting that the combined statutory scheme and professional standards governing opticians, physicians, and optometrists precluded dispensing based on a prescription issued without examination of the customer.

The court further held that, even if the model were legally permissible, declaratory relief should be refused because the application was based on hypothetical facts, no actual lis existed, and the court should not intervene in an unresolved policy debate concerning refractive testing regulation.

The application was dismissed with costs to the respondent fixed at $23,000 inclusive, and the intervenors bore their own costs.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging systemic gender-based compensation discrimination against midwives spanning two decades.

The respondent brought a preliminary request to dismiss all allegations relating to events prior to November 27, 2012, arguing they fell outside the one-year limitation period in section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the detailed allegations of historical practices, policies, and attitudes formed an interconnected web that constituted a 'series of incidents' under section 34(1)(b), making the entire application timely.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.

The applicant, who has disabilities and receives social assistance, alleged that the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care discriminated against her by refusing to fund medical marihuana under the Ontario Drug Benefit Program.

The Tribunal found that the purpose of the Program is to provide cost-effective drug coverage based on clinical and economic evidence, not to fund every therapeutic treatment.

The Tribunal concluded that the exclusion of medical marihuana was due to its lack of Health Canada approval and disputed efficacy, not any Code-related reason.

The application was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of their judicial review application, the applicants argued they should not pay costs because the application was public interest litigation.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the application was motivated by the practitioner applicants' commercial interests.

The court awarded costs of $30,000 to the Transitional Council and $15,000 to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care, finding the Transitional Council's initial claim of up to $125,297.56 excessive.

The court ordered all applicants, including patient applicants, to be jointly and severally liable for the costs.

The applicant requested a change of venue for the upcoming hearing from Toronto to Lucknow, Ontario, citing a serious medical condition including a recent breast cancer diagnosis.

The applicant also requested leave to amend her Application and to restrict access to the hearing and its record.

The Tribunal granted the change of venue to accommodate the applicant's medical needs, despite the late request.

The request to amend the Application was not addressed due to a lack of particulars, and the request to restrict access was deferred to the hearing.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario Regulation 27/13 under the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 was ultra vires and breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

They argued the regulation failed to create a 'doctor' class of practitioners and imposed discriminatory English or French language fluency requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was intra vires, there is no section 7 Charter right to practice a profession unfettered by regulation, and language alone is not a protected ground under section 15.

The accused was stopped for driving a vehicle with heavily tinted windows, leading the officer to smell fresh marijuana and conduct a vehicle and pat-down search that revealed a concealed knife and loaded handgun.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court found that the officer lacked the subjective belief required for an arrest, rendering the searches unlawful under ss. 8 and 9, and also found a s. 10(b) breach due to a delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police conduct was not egregious, the evidence was highly reliable, and society's interest favoured admission.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, who holds an Authorization to Possess medical marijuana, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.

He challenged a regulation under the Liquor Licence Act that prohibited him from possessing or consuming marijuana on licensed premises, seeking to smoke on uncovered patios where tobacco is permitted.

The Tribunal found that the regulation was prima facie discriminatory as it created a substantive disadvantage for the applicant.

However, the Tribunal accepted expert evidence that second-hand marijuana smoke poses a serious risk to passive inhalers, establishing a bona fide health and safety justification for prohibiting smoking on the premises.

The Tribunal found no such justification for prohibiting the mere possession of medical marijuana, and declared that the regulation should not be enforced to prevent authorized persons from holding medical marijuana on licensed premises.

The applicant, who had no legal immigration status in Canada, alleged that her ineligibility for Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) benefits constituted discrimination on the basis of citizenship under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that even if the denial of coverage raised the ground of citizenship, the defence under s. 16(1) of the Code applied.

Section 16(1) provides that there is no discrimination where Canadian citizenship is a requirement imposed or authorized by law, which includes distinctions based on legal immigration status.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they breached securities laws and acted contrary to the public interest.

The Commission found that the appellant Rowan failed to file insider reports, traded during blackout periods, and failed to disclose his control over certain trust accounts.

The Commission also found that the other appellants failed to adequately supervise Rowan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Commission's interpretation of 'control or direction' under the Securities Act, its public interest findings, or its imposition of administrative monetary penalties.

The applicant, an undocumented immigrant, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of citizenship after being denied OHIP coverage.

She requested an interim remedy ordering the Ontario government to provide her with OHIP coverage pending the determination of her application.

The respondent argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive interim remedies.

The Tribunal held that s. 16.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act grants it the power to make substantive interim orders.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the request for an interim remedy, finding there was considerable doubt about whether the application fell within its jurisdiction under the ground of citizenship, and noting a lack of immediate urgency that would require a remedy before addressing the jurisdictional issue.

The appellants, two young children born in Sri Lanka to a Canadian citizen father, came to Ontario to live with him.

They were subjected to a three-month waiting period for OHIP coverage, during which one child incurred $66,000 in medical bills.

They appealed the imposition of the waiting period, arguing it discriminated against them on the basis of place of origin and family status, as exemptions existed for newborns born in Ontario and adopted children.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no discrimination based on place of origin because the children were not newborns when they arrived.

While the court found a distinction based on family status, it held that biological children are not a disadvantaged group compared to adopted children, and therefore the exclusion did not violate section 15(1) of the Charter or the Human Rights Code.

The respondent was charged with stunt driving by speeding 50 kph or more over the limit under s. 172 of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, she was convicted, but on appeal, the judge found the offence to be one of absolute liability and unconstitutional under s. 7 of the Charter due to the potential for imprisonment.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the offence is one of strict liability, not absolute liability, and therefore does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

A new trial was ordered to allow the respondent to raise a due diligence defence.

The respondents requested an order to consolidate or hear together two human rights applications challenging the prohibition on smoking medical marihuana in licensed premises.

The respondents proposed hearing both matters in Ottawa and offered to pay travel expenses for the Toronto-based applicant.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting the Ottawa complainant's inability to travel and the Toronto applicant's childcare responsibilities, which made a joint hearing in either location impractical.

The Tribunal indicated a willingness to consider other ways to manage the evidence efficiently.

The Tribunal considered whether an application filed under the new Part IV of the Human Rights Code and a complaint referred by the Ontario Human Rights Commission under the old Code should be heard together.

Both matters involved allegations of discrimination in services based on disability, specifically related to the smoking of medical marihuana.

After receiving written submissions where the applicant and the Commission opposed hearing the matters together, the Tribunal declined to order that the proceedings be joined.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's ban on pit bulls under the Dog Owners' Liability Act, arguing the law was overbroad and vague under s. 7 of the Charter, and that a provision allowing a veterinarian's certificate as proof of breed violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d).

The application judge upheld the ban but struck down parts of the definition and the certificate provision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the Attorney General's cross-appeal, restoring the struck provisions.

The Court held the ban was not grossly disproportionate to the risk posed by pit bulls, the definition was not unconstitutionally vague, and the certificate provision did not create a mandatory presumption of guilt.

The appellant, who was adopted as an infant, sought to discover the identity of her birth father.

She challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Child and Family Services Act and the Vital Statistics Act, arguing they violated her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the provisions did not violate equality rights as they did not make stereotypical assumptions, nor did they infringe section 7, as unconditional disclosure of third-party identifying information is not a principle of fundamental justice.