S. Zachary Green

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding against the Crown for failure to hold timely bail hearings, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter rights violations.

The motion judge dismissed certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cause of action in negligence (claims attacked core policy decisions), the fiduciary duty claim abandoned, and the Charter claims lacking common issues and not being a preferable procedure due to the need for individualized assessments.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

An individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in respect of sexual offences, and subsequently granted an absolute discharge by the provincial review board, challenged the provincial sex offender registry regime on equality grounds.

The majority held that the regime drew discriminatory distinctions on the basis of mental disability by denying those found not criminally responsible any opportunity for exemption or removal from the registry, in contrast to mechanisms available to those found guilty, and that the infringement was not justified under section 1.

The Court affirmed a tailored declaration of invalidity limited to those found not criminally responsible who had received an absolute discharge, suspended for twelve months, with the respondent granted an individual exemption from the suspension.

The concurring reasons of Rowe J. would have reaffirmed the Schachter framework for suspended declarations as grounded in rule-of-law considerations rather than adopting the majority's principled-discretion approach.

The partial dissent of Côté and Brown JJ. agreed on the section 15(1) breach and the suspension but would have grounded the suspension solely in the rule of law and declined to grant an individual exemption, which in their view exceeded the institutional competence of the Court and raised horizontal unfairness concerns.

The applicants, seven youths residing in Ontario, brought an application challenging Ontario's cancellation of the Climate Change Act and its newly-enacted greenhouse gas reduction target under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They alleged that the target violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application under Rule 21, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was not justiciable, was based on unprovable speculations, depended on positive obligations, and that the applicants lacked standing for future generations.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the target and plan are reviewable by the courts, the claims are capable of scientific proof, the matter is justiciable as it challenges specific government conduct, the issue of positive obligations should be decided on a full evidentiary record, and the applicants meet the test for public interest standing at this preliminary stage.

The applicant brought a motion to stay an individual exemption granted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had exempted the respondent from a 12-month suspension of a declaration of invalidity striking down sex offender registry provisions as unconstitutional in their application to persons found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and granted an absolute discharge.

The applicant sought the stay pending disposition of a leave to appeal application.

The single judge found no special circumstances warranting re-examination of the Court of Appeal's prior refusal to grant the same stay.

The applicant also failed to establish a tenable case for irreparable harm, as the respondent's exemplary 17-year track record provided cogent evidence of minimal risk of reoffending, and there was no apparent reason to deprive the respondent of his s. 15(1) Charter right in the interim.

Motion dismissed without costs.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.