Stephen A. Victor

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $11,853.89, while the defendants argued the amount should not exceed $5,000 based on average awards for similar written motions.

The court found the motion for leave involved complex constitutional issues, justifying a higher award than typical leave applications.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $8,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a motion judge’s decision partially refusing to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rule 21.

The defendants argued that certain claims relating to the plaintiff’s removal from political office were non‑justiciable due to Crown prerogative and that references to testimony before a Parliamentary Committee were barred by parliamentary privilege.

The court held that the low threshold for surviving a pleadings motion meant the motion judge’s rulings were not open to serious debate.

The court further held that potential conflicts between parliamentary privilege and solicitor‑client privilege could appropriately be addressed at trial on a full evidentiary record.

The plaintiff corporation sued its former solicitor in negligence, alleging he was in a conflict of interest and breached his fiduciary duty while acting for both sides in a joint venture and subsequent purchase and sale agreement for an apartment building conversion.

The plaintiff claimed the solicitor failed to advise them of their options when purchasers resiled from agreements and failed to disclose a vendor take back mortgage provided to another party.

The court dismissed the action, finding that while the solicitor breached the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain written consent for the joint retainer, his conduct did not fall below the standard of care of a reasonably competent solicitor.

The court also found no breach of fiduciary duty, as the undisclosed information was not material, and concluded the plaintiff failed to establish causation or damages.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of an amended statement of claim alleging breach of solicitor-client duties and defamation.

The court considered challenges including alleged non‑justiciable claims tied to parliamentary and executive privilege, insufficient particulars in the libel pleadings, prior determinations that certain statements were not defamatory, and whether fiduciary duty allegations were merely disguised defamation claims.

The court held that most allegations were properly pleaded and could proceed, including claims relating to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and defamatory statements.

However, portions alleging that previously adjudicated statements were defamatory had to be re‑cast due to issue estoppel.

References to parliamentary committee testimony were permitted to remain pending determination of privilege issues at trial.

The appellant received long-term disability benefits from the respondent insurer.

Unaware that the appellant had retired and was receiving superannuation benefits, the respondent failed to deduct those benefits and overpaid the appellant by approximately $114,000 over five years.

To recoup the overpayment, the respondent reduced the appellant's monthly disability payments by 50 per cent.

The appellant sued, arguing the policy did not permit the reduction and that the insurer breached its fiduciary duty and duty of good faith.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the policy permitted the insurer to reduce current benefits to recover past overpayments and that no ad hoc fiduciary duty existed.

The appellants, selling shareholders in a family business, appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of fiduciary duty and oppression against the non-selling shareholders and the corporation's professional advisors.

The trial judge had utilized a 'hybrid' trial model following a failed summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were precluded from challenging the hybrid trial model as they had not appealed the initial trial management order.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no fiduciary duty was owed during the share redemption negotiations, as the relationship between the parties was highly adversarial and marked by distrust.

The substantial indemnity costs award of nearly $2.5 million was also upheld.

Following a successful opposition to a motion seeking to stay or dismiss an action for non-payment of prior costs, the plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The court applied the presumption of partial indemnity costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While accepting the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, the court reduced the preparation time claimed and fixed the costs at $8,000 plus disbursements and HST.

The court further ordered that the awarded costs could be set off against outstanding costs owed by the plaintiff to the moving party.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to consolidate two related actions, add a new plaintiff, and amend its pleadings to include claims for defamation and breach of a duty of good faith.

The court held that the two actions should not be formally consolidated but ordered that they be listed for trial consecutively.

The proposed defamation claim and addition of a new plaintiff were refused because the pleadings lacked the particularity required for defamation and would not survive a motion to strike.

The proposed claim for breach of a duty of good faith was also rejected because such a duty cannot stand as an independent cause of action separate from breach of contract.

Certain amendments pleading material facts were allowed, while others were dismissed for improperly pleading evidence rather than material facts.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff, a former government employee, had received an overpayment of long-term disability benefits totaling $114,644.76 after she took medical retirement and began receiving pension benefits without the insurer's knowledge.

When the insurer discovered the overpayment, it reduced her ongoing disability benefits by 50 percent to recover the debt.

The plaintiff sued for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of good faith, and punitive damages.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no fiduciary duty existed, the unintentional overpayment was not a breach of good faith, and the insurer was entitled to the self-help remedy of set-off under the policy.

The action was dismissed.

Following a trial and partial appeal, the only remaining issue in the action was damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The parties exchanged settlement communications in which the defendant offered to pay $80,000 inclusive of interest and costs in exchange for dismissal of the remaining issues and a full and final release.

The plaintiff accepted the offer but the parties later disagreed about the scope of the release wording.

The court held that settlements normally imply the provision of a release, but the terms must reflect the agreement actually reached.

The court found the plaintiff’s proposed release properly reflected the settlement terms and rejected the defendant’s attempt to broaden the release to include additional discoverable claims.

Following a professional negligence trial, the court considered submissions on costs and the applicable rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court corrected an error in the original reasons, confirming that pre‑judgment interest applied only to the $22,000 award rather than the total $50,000 damages figure referenced in the earlier decision.

It held that the appropriate pre‑judgment interest rate was 5% for the entire pre‑judgment period.

Although the plaintiffs sought more than $278,000 in partial indemnity costs, the court reduced the award after considering that the plaintiffs succeeded only in part and were unsuccessful on several factual allegations.

Applying principles from appellate authority regarding the purpose and reasonableness of costs, the court awarded $150,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a master's costs order that directed no costs be awarded to either party following a motion in which the plaintiff had been substantially successful.

The court considered the standard for granting leave to appeal a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, which requires strong grounds demonstrating that the lower court erred in principle or exercised discretion improperly.

The court emphasized that appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with discretionary costs decisions absent clear error.

The master had considered the conduct of the parties and explained why costs were not awarded despite the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court found no basis to conclude the master was plainly wrong or erred in principle and refused leave to appeal.

The appellant, a former federal cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his staff, and other officials for defamation, conspiracy, and other torts after she was removed from Cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus amid allegations of misconduct.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding the claims non-justiciable due to Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, and that the alleged defamatory statements were either not capable of being defamatory or were protected by absolute privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims against all defendants except one Member of Parliament, finding her public statements had a possible defamatory meaning that should be determined at trial.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, the court assessed the costs payable to the successful defendants on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had settled costs with the Accountant Defendants for $550,000.

The court reviewed the bills of costs submitted by the Lawyer Defendants, the Katz Defendants, and the Leikin Group Inc. The court made several reductions to the amounts claimed, noting issues with top-heavy staffing, excessive time spent on documentary discovery, and duplication of effort.

The court ultimately awarded substantial indemnity costs totaling $2,340,485.75 across the three remaining sets of defendants.

The plaintiffs sought clarification of a prior costs endorsement issued following an adjournment request on a motion.

The court reviewed the earlier endorsement and clarified that the costs award of $1,250 plus HST was intended to cover both the costs thrown away and the disposition of relief sought in specific paragraphs of the notice of motion.

The judge confirmed that the order was not intended to award $1,250 plus an additional amount for costs thrown away.

No further appointment was required to resolve the issue.

The plaintiffs, selling shareholders in a family-owned group of companies, brought an action against the non-selling shareholders, the companies' lawyers, and accountants.

They alleged breach of fiduciary duty, oppression, and knowing assistance arising from a share redemption transaction.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to disclose material information regarding the potential sale of a core asset to a third party at a higher value.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the share redemption was a product of self-interested negotiations where both sides had independent advice.

No ad hoc fiduciary duty was owed by the non-selling shareholders, lawyers, or accountants to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' expectations were not reasonable under the oppression remedy.

Following the striking of a statement of claim alleging conspiracy, defamation, misfeasance in public office, and related torts against numerous defendants, the court determined the quantum of costs payable on the successful pleadings motion.

Multiple defendant groups sought more than $205,000 in partial indemnity fees and over $20,000 in disbursements.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles articulated in Boucher, the court considered duplication of effort among separately represented defendants with similar interests.

The court concluded that substantial overlap existed between certain defendants’ legal work and therefore limited recovery to a single set of costs for those parties.

Reduced costs totalling $108,000 in fees plus $10,560 in disbursements were awarded, subject to HST.

Following a successful appeal that ordered a new trial limited to damages, the appellant sought its costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to defer the costs assessment until damages were quantified, citing the respondent's reprehensible conduct in rigging bids prior to the litigation.

The court awarded the appellant its trial costs on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $370,000, after applying a 40% reduction to account for the appellant's lack of success on certain issues.

The court declined to make a distributive costs order in favour of the respondent.

The appellant, a retail tenant, appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim against its landlord for failing to provide additional parking spaces.

The trial judge found a breach but concluded the appellant failed to prove the breach caused a loss, as expert evidence showed vacant spaces were available during peak periods.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the trial costs order, finding the trial judge erred in using non-Rule 49 offers to offset time spent on an unsuccessful defence.

The Court awarded the respondents $200,000 in trial costs and $30,000 in appeal costs.

The plaintiff, a former Member of Parliament and cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his senior advisors, and others for conspiracy, defamation, and other torts following her removal from cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the decisions to remove the plaintiff from cabinet and caucus were protected by Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, respectively, and were therefore not justiciable.

The court also held that communications between the prime minister and his advisors were protected by absolute privilege, and that the Conservative Party of Canada, as an unincorporated association, lacked the capacity to be sued.