Stephen A. Victor

The appellant and respondent worked together to develop an automated attenuator for Lockheed Martin.

The respondent represented to the appellant that it would be the sole supplier.

However, the respondent secretly approached a competitor, rigged the bids to favour the competitor, and the competitor won the contract.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of good faith.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the elements of negligent misrepresentation were met because the respondent negligently continued to represent the appellant as the sole supplier, causing the appellant to rely on this to its detriment.

A new trial was ordered to assess damages.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action.

The appellant argued that the parties had agreed to renew an existing commercial lease, subject only to agreeing on rent and the term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an agreement missing essential terms such as rent and duration is merely an unenforceable agreement to agree.

The court also noted the appellant failed to comply with the in-writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

The appellant and respondent entered into an agreement to sublease commercial office space.

Due to construction delays, the anticipated occupancy date was pushed back by approximately six weeks.

The respondent treated this anticipated delay as a fundamental breach and repudiated the agreement, subsequently leasing cheaper space elsewhere.

The appellant accepted the repudiation, mitigated its damages by subleasing to third parties at a lower rate, and sued for the difference.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant in fundamental breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a six-week delay in a three-year lease did not deprive the respondent of substantially the whole benefit of the contract and therefore did not constitute a fundamental breach.

Judgment was granted to the appellant for its losses.

The appellant appealed an order dissolving a constructive trust imposed on the shares of a joint venture vehicle.

The constructive trust had been imposed to secure the repayment of a loan and the payment of the appellant's share of the joint venture profits.

After the respondents paid the amounts owing, they moved to discharge the trust to utilize accumulated tax losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the constructive trust had served its purpose and the trial judge properly exercised his equitable discretion to dissolve it once the appellant had elected to pursue an accounting and received payment.

The defendant appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff for the purchase price of a fiber optic measurement machine.

The defendant argued the machine was defective and that the Master erred in finding no genuine issue for trial.

The Divisional Court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the standard of review for a Master's final discretionary order, concluding the standard is correctness.

Applying this standard, the court upheld the Master's decision, finding the defendant had retained the machine for over a year without rejecting it, thereby accepting it under the Sale of Goods Act.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondents leave to amend their statement of claim to include a declaration that the deceased's estate was entitled to ownership of a condominium based on a resulting or constructive trust.

The appellants argued the proposed claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act and that the amendments would cause non-compensable prejudice due to the deaths of key parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proposed trust claims fell within the exception in s. 43(2) of the Act for claims to recover trust property retained by a trustee, and thus were not statute-barred.

The Court also found no non-compensable prejudice, as intention could be inferred from documentary and third-party evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his counterclaims for a declaration that he owned certain technology.

The motions judge found that the appellant had assigned any rights in the technology to his employer and that his employment contract precluded him from claiming ownership upon termination.

The Court of Appeal agreed that there was no genuine issue for trial and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his counterclaims for a declaration that he owned certain technology.

The motions judge found that the appellant had assigned any rights in the technology to the respondent employer and that his employment contract precluded him from claiming ownership upon termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no genuine issue for trial and concluding that the appellant received consideration for the employment contracts.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the issue of unlawful possession of a booth had already been raised, considered, and determined in the respondent's favour during proceedings in New Jersey.

The issue of possession was fundamental and integral to the determination of the appellant's set-off and recoupment claim.

The respondents brought a motion to quash several paragraphs of the appellant's notice of appeal.

The appellant argued that the time for appealing the judgment in the second proceedings did not begin to run until the constructive trust issue was disposed of.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the order terminating the constructive trust was a post-judgment order and the time for appealing the earlier orders had expired.

The court also declined to extend the time for appealing, noting the appellant's consistent prior position that he had no intention to appeal.

The motion to quash was allowed and the specified paragraphs of the notice of appeal were struck.

The appellants appealed an order of a motions judge awarding costs of an interlocutory injunction motion to the respondents, payable within 30 days.

The appellants argued that, following established principles, costs of an interlocutory injunction should typically be reserved to the trial judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure preserves the motions judge's residual discretion to fix costs payable forthwith.

The court found the motions judge reasonably exercised her discretion based on the appellants' conduct, including unauthorized cashing of cheques and retention of property.