Stanley Frederick Floras

The applicant appealed the Township's failure to make a decision on applications for a zoning by-law amendment and plan of subdivision to permit a 59-unit residential subdivision.

At a Case Management Conference, the parties disputed a paragraph in the draft Procedural Order regarding the timeline for submitting a revised proposal and the Township's right to seek an adjournment.

The parties subsequently agreed on revised wording, which the Tribunal approved.

The Tribunal scheduled a 13-day video hearing and deferred consideration of the draft Issues List to a second Case Management Conference.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting its practice of not providing reasons for such decisions.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the responding developer, payable in monthly installments.

The self-represented moving party requested a short adjournment of his motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal due to technical challenges, illness, and the need to cross-examine a responding witness.

The Ontario Land Tribunal and the City of Toronto took no position, while the respondent developer opposed the request.

The court granted the adjournment on peremptory terms, setting a schedule for cross-examination and the filing of materials.

The appellant appealed a Review Decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, arguing that the Tribunal erred in law by applying the 'Clergy principle' to allow the respondent's planning applications to be assessed under the policy regime in place when they were originally filed in 1990.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Clergy principle is a procedural policy choice within the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction, not a legal principle subject to appeal on a question of law.

The Court also found that the Tribunal provided sufficient reasons for its decision.

Six proposed intervenors brought motions for leave to intervene in a stated case before the Divisional Court regarding the interpretation of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017.

The stated case concerns the Tribunal's power to call evidence and permit cross-examination in planning appeals.

The applicants and respondents generally did not oppose the interventions, provided they did not delay the proceedings.

One proposed intervenor, the Toronto Port Authority, also sought to be added as a party to obtain independent appeal rights.

The court granted intervenor status to all six proposed intervenors, finding they had a real interest and could make useful and distinct contributions.

However, the court denied the Toronto Port Authority's request for party status, concluding that granting it would unduly delay the determination of the main parties' rights.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (now LPAT) which adjourned the hearing of appeals regarding Official Plan Amendment 258 (OPA 258) until the City enacted a Development Permit System (DPS) by-law.

The City argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to effectively order the passage of a by-law and denied the City its statutory right to a hearing under the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board did not order the passage of a by-law but reasonably exercised its procedural discretion to adjourn the hearing to ensure it had the necessary evidence to properly assess the planning merits of OPA 258.

The moving party brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an order of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that adjourned the hearing of an appeal from an Official Plan Amendment.

The OMB had adjourned the hearing until the municipality enacted a development permit by-law, despite acknowledging it could not order the municipality to pass such a by-law.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's order raised a question of law of sufficient general or public importance regarding whether the municipality is entitled under s. 17(44) of the Planning Act to have its appeal adjudicated before enacting a development permit by-law.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board dismissing a request for an Official Plan amendment to sever a two-acre portion of its golf course property containing a house.

The house was originally built as an accessory use to the golf course.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB's decision was reasonable, agreeing that it would be contrary to planning policy to allow a party to build a home as an accessory use and later sever it for residential use when it is no longer needed for the golf course.

The Town of Richmond Hill appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved the Town's official plan policies regarding parkland dedication but imposed a 25% cap on the alternative requirement under s. 42 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Planning Act was unreasonable.

The Court held that the legislation expressly grants municipalities the authority to set the alternative parkland dedication rate by by-law, and the OMB does not have the jurisdiction to impose a cap or fix a specific rate through its power to approve official plan policies.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding costs against him personally, despite him not being a party to the underlying zoning appeal.

The Board had found him to be the 'real litigant' or 'straw man' behind a non-profit corporation's appeal.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the questions of whether the Board has statutory jurisdiction to award costs against a non-party and whether it erred in principle in doing so on the facts of this case.

Leave was denied on issues of fair notice and SLAPP legislation.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) which allowed the respondent developer to amend conditions of a 1996 zoning approval for a trailer park.

The applicant argued the OMB failed to properly apply Rule 106 of its Rules of Practice and Procedure by not reopening the entire hearing after 20 years had passed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of its own procedural rules was reasonable, the decision was based on evidence, and the matter did not raise a question of law of sufficient general or public importance.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board finding that it had jurisdiction to determine whether site plan control applied to the respondent's proposed interior alterations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's jurisdiction under s. 114(7) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 is limited to resolving disputes about what types of features or design elements should be included in a site plan application, not the threshold question of whether site plan control applies at all.

The standard of review was determined to be reasonableness, and the Board's interpretation was found to be unreasonable as it undermined the overall legislative scheme.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board approving a subdivision plan, arguing it was denied natural justice because it did not receive notice of the hearing.

The moving party held an easement over land near the proposed subdivision but was not on the municipal tax roll.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the Board followed its standard notice procedures and was not required to notify an easement holder it could not have known about.

The court also found no error in the Board Chair's refusal to review and re-open the decision.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that dismissed parts of her appeal regarding a municipal Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy.

Specifically, the applicant failed to request a review or rehearing under section 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, which provides a statutory mechanism to address her claims of procedural unfairness.

The court noted that allowing the judicial review would undermine the legislative scheme, which requires leave to appeal Board decisions.

The appellant sought to adjourn its motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board.

The appellant discovered that a witness who testified at the Board hearing had previously made a presentation to Board members, prompting the appellant to commence an application for judicial review regarding procedural fairness.

The court granted the adjournment, noting that it would be an inefficient use of court resources to hear the leave to appeal motion when the underlying decision could potentially be declared a nullity through the judicial review application.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board Chair, which dismissed their request for review of an earlier OMB decision regarding draft plan conditions for a subdivision.

The applicants argued the Chair erred in applying the public interest test to deny an extension of time, applied the wrong legal test to strike Charter arguments, failed to recognize Charter rights related to home ownership, and ignored new evidence about inconsistent slope setbacks.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness or reasonableness of the Chair's decision on any of the grounds raised.

The moving party sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from decisions of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) refusing to change the designation of the appellants from two individuals to a ratepayers' association.

The moving party argued the OMB erred in its interpretation of its rules regarding minor errors and reviews.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of law or jurisdiction in the OMB's conclusion that the individuals who signed the appeal forms were the proper parties.

The Court also addressed a potential conflict of interest involving the moving party's counsel and adjourned the issue of costs.

The applicant sought to prohibit the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) from conducting a hearing into whether the applicant should pay costs to the respondents following an unsuccessful appeal.

The applicant argued that the lack of a transcript and the OMB member's refusal to consider a lawyer's notes demonstrated bias and precluded a fair hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, holding that courts generally will not entertain piecemeal attacks on administrative proceedings before a final decision is made.

The City of Toronto appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision finding that Home Depot's application to develop a major retail store in an Employment Area did not constitute a 'conversion' under the Growth Plan.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for the Board's interpretation of planning documents is reasonableness.

The Court found the Board's conclusion—that major retail use was already contemplated in the Official Plan and thus not a conversion—was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.