Sidney N. Lederman

A corporation sought an order under the Solicitors Act referring a law firm’s legal accounts to assessment.

The corporation had indemnified a former executive for defence costs in regulatory proceedings and had paid most of the law firm’s accounts over a two‑and‑a‑half‑year period.

The court held that accounts paid more than twelve months before the application were final accounts and therefore statute‑barred from assessment absent fraud or misconduct.

Accounts paid within twelve months were not subject to assessment because the applicant failed to establish “special circumstances.” However, three recent unpaid accounts were referred to assessment as it was just and equitable given the breakdown in the parties’ relationship.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a case management master requiring them to post additional security for costs in complex civil litigation.

The plaintiffs were non-residents of Ontario and did not claim impecuniosity, but argued that the strength of their claims justified denying security for costs.

The court held that the master applied the wrong legal standard by requiring the plaintiffs to show an "overwhelming likelihood of success" rather than the correct standard of a "good chance of success" when assessing the merits under Rule 56.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because this constituted an error of law, the appeal was allowed in part and the matter was remitted to the case management master for reconsideration using the proper standard.

Costs decision following a summary judgment motion where both sides achieved partial success.

The defendant obtained orders striking the personal plaintiff’s claim and a claim for damages for improvident sale.

However, the corporate plaintiff succeeded on the primary issue concerning the mortgagee in possession’s responsibility to insure the corporate plaintiff’s interest.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the corporate plaintiff should receive reduced costs to reflect the divided success.

Following summary judgment in an employment dispute, the parties disagreed on the proper calculation of mitigation income to deduct from the damages award.

The moving party sought clarification that mitigation should be calculated using net income rather than gross revenue from subsequent earnings.

The responding party argued that the issue had not been raised during the summary judgment motion and could not be altered through a clarification request.

The court held that the question involved new factual and legal determinations and could not be resolved as a simple clarification of the judgment.

The issue was reopened and directed to proceed by motion with supporting evidence and cross-examination.

The Commissioner of Competition sought declaratory and remedial relief under s. 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act for a deceptive marketing scheme involving unsolicited faxes and websites designed to mimic a well‑known business directory provider.

The respondents’ materials suggested recipients were updating existing listings while the fine print created binding two‑year contracts for directory services.

The court found the representations materially false or misleading and concluded the scheme deceived thousands of Canadian businesses and organizations.

The court declared the conduct reviewable under the Competition Act, voided the contracts, ordered restitution to affected customers, imposed corrective notice requirements, and issued a ten‑year prohibition order.

Administrative monetary penalties totaling $8 million against corporate respondents and additional penalties against individual respondents were imposed.

On a defendant mortgagee's summary judgment motion, the court considered whether a mortgagee in possession owed and breached a duty to act prudently regarding insurance of the mortgagor's property interest after cancellation of coverage.

The record contained material conflicts on notice of cancellation, communications between agents, and whether reliance on the mortgagee's blanket insurance could reasonably be inferred, requiring credibility assessments not suitable for summary judgment.

Applying summary judgment principles, the court held that genuine issues requiring a trial remained on duty, breach, causation, and damages, including potential accounting issues tied to any insurance recovery.

The court granted limited summary judgment only to strike the personal plaintiff's claim and the improvident sale allegation, and otherwise dismissed the motion.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action following the closure of the defendant’s manufacturing operations.

The court considered the appropriate reasonable notice period, whether overtime should be included in calculating damages, the compensability of lost employment benefits, and whether mitigation income earned during the statutory notice period under the Employment Standards Act should reduce common law damages.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court determined that a 20‑month notice period was appropriate.

The court held that overtime formed an integral component of the employee’s compensation and must be included in damages, and that the employee was entitled to compensation for lost benefits.

Mitigation income earned during the statutory ESA notice period was not deductible from damages beyond ESA minimum entitlements.

The plaintiff sought interim and interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendant from continuing an alleged trespass and requiring removal of construction equipment, fencing, refuse bins, and a large stockpile of topsoil from its property.

The dispute arose from a development arrangement where the defendant was permitted under a letter agreement to operate a sales or construction trailer on a commercial block pending reconveyance.

The defendant argued the provision created a lease granting broader rights of occupation, or alternatively that any misuse constituted only a breach of contract.

The court held the agreement granted only a limited licence to place and operate a trailer and did not confer exclusive possession or a leasehold interest.

The defendant’s additional uses constituted deliberate and continuing trespass warranting injunctive relief, and the RJR‑MacDonald test was satisfied in any event.