S.F. Dunphy J.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) over several properties allegedly purchased with profits from a landscaping business he co-founded with the individual defendant.

The defendants sought an adjournment, which the court denied due to their failure to advance the proceeding or file evidence.

The court found the plaintiff raised a triable issue regarding an interest in land based on claims of partnership breach, oppression, and constructive trust.

Applying the Dhunna criteria, the court concluded the equities favoured granting the CPL to protect the plaintiff's interests.

The plaintiffs, two long-term employees, were laid off by the defendant employer in early 2020 due to supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in China.

The plaintiffs treated the lay-offs as constructive dismissals and brought summary judgment motions for wrongful dismissal.

The court found that the employer did not have an implied right to lay off the employees, and even if it did, the lay-offs exceeded 35 weeks, resulting in deemed terminations under the Employment Standards Act.

The court awarded both plaintiffs 22 months of reasonable notice.

The defendants filed a request under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's 120-page statement of claim, arguing the issues had already been litigated before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court declined to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 2.1, finding that the res judicata argument required referencing extrinsic evidence, which is inappropriate for a Rule 2.1 request unless the conclusion is plain and obvious.

The court directed the defendants to bring a formal motion on notice.

The plaintiff, a teacher, sued his employer school board and several co-workers for damages arising from alleged workplace discrimination and defamatory tweets.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under the collective agreement.

Applying the Weber test, the court found that the essential character of the dispute concerned the employer's obligation to provide a harassment-free workplace and the application of workplace policies, which were inferentially incorporated into the collective agreement.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against him arising from a three-way motor vehicle accident.

The defendant brought the motion before submitting to discovery and relied solely on a lawyer's double-hearsay affidavit rather than providing his own direct evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the record was insufficiently developed to permit a fair and just determination of the issues on the merits, and drew an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to provide his own evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment based on a consent to judgment signed by the defendants as part of a settlement agreement regarding a defaulted loan secured by Florida real estate.

The defendants argued that one corporate defendant should not be a party, that they lacked independent Canadian legal advice, and that the debt was satisfied by a foreclosure.

The court found that the non-signing corporate defendant should not be subject to the judgment, but rejected the other defenses, noting the defendants had US legal advice and the settlement agreement explicitly valued the foreclosed property at a set credit amount.

Judgment was granted against the signing defendants for the remaining balance, converted to Canadian dollars.

The applicant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a commercial property needed for a land assembly development.

The respondents repudiated the agreement, arguing that the wife was coerced into signing and did not sign all portions of the document.

The court found that a binding agreement was formed, rejecting the coercion claims as unsupported and finding the signatures sufficient.

The court granted specific performance, holding that the property was unique to the applicant's development plans and damages would be inadequate.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion to determine the effect of a Pierringer Agreement and a prior court order on the remaining claims against the non-settling defendant and subsequent third and fourth parties.

The court clarified that the prior order restricted the plaintiffs' claim against the remaining defendant to several liability, but did not affect the remaining defendant's ability to pursue contribution from third parties.

The motion was resolved with all parties ultimately agreeing on this interpretation, and costs were deferred to the pre-trial or trial judge.

The moving party, a corporate defendant, brought a motion for a complex protective order before producing an affidavit of documents or reviewing its own relevant documents.

The plaintiff consented, but the self-represented co-defendant did not respond.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it premature and the proposed order over-broad.

The court noted that the moving party failed to identify specific harm associated with the disclosure of particular documents and relied on sweeping generalizations instead of the existing protections under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after deliberately driving his car at two pedestrians, striking one and causing a compound fracture.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence, the offender's prior record, and the severe injuries against mitigating factors including strong community support and stringent house arrest conditions.

The offender was sentenced to three years in custody for aggravated assault and a concurrent twelve-month sentence for dangerous driving, along with a three-year driving prohibition and a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual interference and sexual assault arising from allegations by a child complainant that he touched her vagina on multiple occasions and licked her vagina once while living in the same household as her mother’s common law spouse.

The court admitted the complainant’s videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and assessed the evidence under the W(D.) framework, while also applying the common-sense approach to child testimony described by the Supreme Court.

Although the trial judge found the complainant careful, credible, and unaffected by malice, he also found the accused sincere, internally consistent, and capable of raising a reasonable doubt.

Because the Crown failed to disprove the accused’s denial beyond a reasonable doubt, verdicts of not guilty were entered on both counts.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose following an unprovoked stabbing attack on his sleeping fiancée.

The Crown sought a sentence of 10 to 12 years, while the defence proposed 7 years less a day.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factor of domestic violence and the profound impact on the victim against the offender's lack of a prior record, genuine remorse, and mental health struggles.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 9 years, less 5 years of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh detention conditions, leaving 4 years to serve, along with ancillary orders.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, applied for an order committing the respondent into custody pending a decision on his extradition.

The United States sought the respondent for allegedly preparing fraudulent asylum applications and providing false identification documents.

The court found that the double-criminality requirement was met, as the alleged conduct would constitute counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act if committed in Canada.

The court also dismissed the respondent's arguments regarding identity, finding sufficient evidence that the respondent was the person sought.

The committal order was granted.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of a subsequent sexual relationship with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to provide context for his narrative that the relationship was consensual from the outset, while the Crown opposed it as violating the twin-myth prohibitions.

The court granted the application in part, allowing evidence of the fact and nature of the subsequent sexual relationship to be admitted to assess credibility and context, but excluding details of specific sexual encounters.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon (a motor vehicle), and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle after striking a pedestrian with his car during a parking lot altercation.

The incident was captured on video surveillance, showing the accused repeatedly driving his vehicle aggressively towards the unarmed victim, resulting in a compound fracture to the victim's leg.

The court rejected the accused's claims of accident and self-defence, finding the driving was deliberate and a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving, possession of a weapon, and aggravated assault, but acquitted of attempted murder as the Crown failed to prove a specific intent to kill.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose after stabbing his sleeping fiancé multiple times.

The accused admitted to the stabbing but raised a defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing he suffered a transient psychotic episode.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the expert's opinion relied on facts inconsistent with the evidence, and concluded the attack was driven by jealousy rather than psychosis.

The court found the accused had the specific intent to kill and convicted him of attempted murder and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The accused was charged with armed robbery, possession of a loaded firearm, and reckless discharge of a firearm following a bank robbery.

The Crown's case relied heavily on video surveillance and the testimony of a co-accused who had already pleaded guilty.

The court carefully assessed the co-accused's evidence as an unsavoury witness, finding it credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding he was the individual who brandished and fired a handgun during the robbery.

The applicants, two of three co-accused in a large project prosecution involving a criminal organization, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial was delayed by six weeks to accommodate the schedule of counsel for the third co-accused.

The court found that the net delay for one applicant fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

For the other applicant, the court found that the delay exceeded the ceiling but was justified by exceptional circumstances, specifically case complexity and the strong public interest in holding a joint trial.

Both applications were dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a Stage 1 application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of a post-incident sexual relationship with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to contradict the complainant's narrative of their subsequent relationship and to support his defence that the initial encounter was the start of a consensual, months-long relationship.

The court found the proposed evidence was capable of being admissible as it did not rely on prohibited twin-myth reasoning and was relevant to the complainant's credibility and the narrative of the relationship.

The application was granted, moving the matter to a Stage 2 hearing.

The Crown sought to call a key witness residing in Barbados to testify via videoconference at a firearms trial due to COVID-19 travel risks.

The accused opposed, arguing it would be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the accused failed to discharge the onus of showing that videoconference testimony would impair his ability to make full answer and defence or adequately test credibility.

The motion was granted, and the evidence was ordered to be received by videoconference.