Superior Court of Justice

The applicants sought to enforce an arbitral award against the respondent.

The respondent agreed to pay the full amount owing under the award, though the parties differed slightly on the precise calculation.

The court ordered the continuation of a Mareva injunction until the final amount is resolved and paid into court, and scheduled a further case conference to address the final calculations and costs.

The applicant brought an application to recover money allegedly removed from her bank account by her brother.

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the applicant brought a motion for a final order confirming the consent to settle.

After the applicant filed the required additional materials and the consent executed by counsel of record, the court granted the order in accordance with the draft order.

On a Crown appeal from an acquittal for sexual assault, the court held that the trial judge committed reviewable errors of law.

The trial judge relied on stereotypical and myth-based reasoning in assessing the complainant’s evidence, including the notion that a sexual assault would not occur in a semi-public setting where others might enter.

The court further held that accompanying the accused into a washroom stall did not amount to consent to sexual activity, because consent must be directed to each sexual act and exist at the time it occurs.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The self-represented applicant lawyer brought an application against the Law Society of Ontario and several individuals following online disputes and subsequent professional complaints.

The matter came before the court on a regular motions list but was plagued by procedural irregularities, including improper service, failure to file application records, and disputes over representation.

The court adjourned the matter to a special appointment hearing, provided strict timetables for the filing of materials, and dismissed the applicant's request to remove opposing counsel from the record for alleged sharp practice.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' child.

The respondent father had unilaterally relocated with the child and repeatedly denied the mother access, failing to comply with a previous court order for access.

The father raised uncorroborated allegations of substance abuse and physical abuse against the mother.

The court found the father was actively attempting to sever the child's relationship with the mother.

To preserve the relationship and in the child's best interests, the court granted temporary sole custody to the mother, with scheduled access for the father.

The parties disagreed over the form of the formal Judgment arising from previous decisions.

The applicants sought to include specific recitals of all materials filed, while the respondent argued that Form 59B does not require particulars of evidence for applications.

The court approved the applicants' draft Judgment, finding no harm and potential benefit in providing specificity, especially given the context of an ongoing arbitration.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after killing his father and setting the body on fire in a vehicle.

The accused had a lengthy history of mental illness and was experiencing severe delusions at the time, believing his father was an alien trying to kill him.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and the matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board.

The parties separated after a 33-year relationship during which they had three children.

The applicant sought spousal support, child support, damages for unjust enrichment, and a restraining order.

The court found the respondent lacked credibility and imputed his income at $100,000 per year due to non-disclosure and voluntary underemployment.

The court awarded the applicant a $330,000 lump sum for indefinite spousal support, finding it adequately compensated her for her contributions to the joint family venture, thereby dismissing the separate unjust enrichment claim.

A restraining order was also granted against the respondent.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period should be deferred under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, because it was not legally appropriate to commence a civil claim while criminal charges arising from the defendant's statements to the police were ongoing.

The court applied the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Sosnowski v. MacEwan Petroleum, finding that the civil claim and criminal charges were not 'two sides of the same coin' and that subjective, evaluative concerns do not delay discoverability.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought to challenge his deceased father's 2019 Will, which left the entire estate to the applicant's mother.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for lack of standing, relying on a 1996 Will that also left the entire estate to the mother.

The court found that the applicant failed to present sufficient evidence to challenge the validity of the 1996 Will.

Consequently, even if the 2019 Will were invalid, the applicant would have no financial interest in the estate under the 1996 Will.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that his separate civil claim for proprietary estoppel gave him independent standing under s. 23 of the Estates Act.

The motion was granted and the application dismissed.

The father brought an interim mobility motion seeking custody and permission to relocate with the two children from Windsor, Ontario to Virginia, USA, due to an employment transfer.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing the children should remain in Windsor due to the COVID-19 pandemic and her recent progress in addressing mental health and parenting issues.

The court applied the tests from Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley v. Plumley, finding that the proposed relocation during a pandemic raised significant unanswered safety and logistical concerns.

The court concluded that the father failed to demonstrate a strong probability of success at trial or compelling circumstances to justify disrupting the children's status quo on an interim basis.

The motion was dismissed, and the existing shared parenting arrangement was maintained.

The applicant brought a motion to transfer the respondent's motion to change spousal support from Hamilton to Milton, where a related proceeding between the parties was already ongoing.

The respondent had previously commenced and withdrawn a similar motion in Milton, incurring significant unpaid costs, before starting fresh in Hamilton.

The court granted the transfer, finding it substantially more convenient and necessary to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, inconsistent findings, and the waste of judicial resources, particularly given the respondent's history of litigation misconduct.

The defendant bank requested an administrative dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court noted deficiencies in the statement of claim but recognized a legitimate cause of action might be buried within.

The court stayed the action and directed the registrar to issue a notice allowing the plaintiff to provide written submissions before determining whether the claim should be struck.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking the immediate return of his three children from Newfoundland to Ontario.

The respondent mother and children had travelled to Newfoundland for Christmas but did not return as agreed, citing the children's fear of the worsening COVID-19 situation in Ontario.

The court found that the 13-year-old child's expressed 'terror' about returning required therapeutic intervention rather than an immediate legal order.

The motion was adjourned, and the parents were ordered to arrange immediate counselling for the child and to communicate daily.

The applicant brought a motion to change a 1978 divorce order to claim retroactive child support and post-secondary expenses from the estate of her deceased ex-husband, 41 years after the original order.

The respondent estate trustee brought a motion to dismiss the claim on a question of law.

The court held that under the Divorce Act, a support obligation ends upon the payor's death unless the order explicitly provides that it binds the estate.

Because the original order contained no such provision, it died with the payor and could not be retroactively varied post-death.

The applicant's motion to change was dismissed.

Following a summary trial where the plaintiffs were completely successful and awarded damages of $191,429.88, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that the $50,000 costs cap under Rule 76.12.1 applied, finding the action was commenced before the rule's effective date of January 1, 2020, despite later amendments.

The court declined the plaintiffs' request for full indemnity costs, maintaining its trial finding that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to the defendants' egregious and fraudulent conduct.

Costs were fixed at $95,000 for the main action and $25,000 for the construction lien action.

In a bifurcated family law and estate proceeding, both the applicant and the respondent estate brought motions to compel answers to questions refused or taken under advisement during questioning.

The central issue for the first phase of the trial was the validity and enforceability of a 1986 marriage contract.

The court ordered the applicant to produce documents relating to her prior divorce and records from her physician and counsellor, finding them relevant to her understanding of domestic contracts.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to compel the estate trustee to answer questions regarding the deceased's subsequent estate planning and relationships with lawyers, finding them irrelevant to the 1986 contract or overly broad.

The defendant, Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's claim for additional compensation related to alleged delays and extra work on a construction project.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to comply with the strict notice provisions of the contract, which barred its claims.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant waived strict compliance with the contract or that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant mother sought the return of her child to the Czech Republic pursuant to the Hague Convention after the respondent father removed the child to Canada without her consent.

The father initially opposed the return, claiming the child's habitual residence was Canada and that the child objected to returning.

An independent assessment revealed the child wished to return to the Czech Republic.

The court found the child was habitually resident in the Czech Republic, the mother had custody rights, and the removal was wrongful.

The court ordered the immediate return of the child to the Czech Republic.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application arguing that police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him without a warrant and unlawfully searched his vehicle incident to arrest.

He also alleged his right to counsel was violated.

The court found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to order the arrest based on a combination of witness descriptions, vehicle identification, and a partial licence plate match.

The subsequent search of the vehicle, which yielded a loaded handgun, was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest.

The court also found no violation of the applicant's right to counsel.

The Charter application was dismissed.