Health Law - SCJ

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his attending physician's finding that he lacked capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and that the finding of incapacity was unreasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice found no procedural unfairness but concluded the Board's decision on capacity was unreasonable.

The court noted a lack of evidence that the physician had actually explained the proposed treatment, its consequences, or alternatives to the appellant, which is a prerequisite to finding an inability to appreciate reasonably foreseeable consequences.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim in a medical malpractice action to replace 'Dr. John/Jane Doe' with two specific physicians, after the expiry of the limitation period.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add new parties out of time.

The court found that the litigation finger was clearly pointed at the proposed defendants, establishing a misnomer.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to refuse the amendment, noting the proposed defendants had early notice of the claim and suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted.

The appellant, who has a long history of schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider her preference for homeopathic treatments and her views on the traditional medical model.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding ample evidence that the appellant's mental illness prevented her from recognizing her condition and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decisions on a standard of reasonableness.

The court found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant met the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act due to the risk of serious bodily harm to her mother.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the capacity to consent to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, as her delusions prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant ophthalmologist brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice action.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to obtain informed consent for a gold shunt surgery that resulted in a hemorrhage and loss of vision.

The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue for trial because the plaintiff failed to provide any expert medical evidence to support her claim, relying instead on an inadmissible hearsay affidavit from an articling student.

The defendant's expert evidence established that the standard of care for disclosure was met and that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's circumstances would have consented to the surgery to prevent inevitable blindness.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on his appeal from decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board regarding his capacity and the appointment of a substitute decision-maker.

The proposed evidence related to his prior capable wishes regarding treatment with Clozapine.

The court applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been adduced at the original hearings with due diligence and that its reliability was questionable given the appellant's periods of incapacity.

The applicant brought an application for a constitutional exemption to permit a physician-assisted death, along with a motion for confidentiality measures including a publication ban and an in camera hearing.

The court granted the publication ban and use of pseudonyms but denied the request for an in camera hearing, citing the open court principle.

On the main application, the court found that the applicant suffered from a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that the request was made freely by a competent adult.

The application for physician-assisted death was granted.

The appellant, a forensic inpatient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its application of the capacity test and relied on uncorroborated evidence from his attending physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant's persecutory delusions prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that the physician's evidence was adequately corroborated by the appellant's own testimony.

The applicant brought an urgent application for physician-assisted death and sought confidentiality orders, including a publication ban and sealing order, without giving notice to the media.

The court balanced the open court principle with the applicant's dire medical circumstances and privacy interests.

The court granted an interim publication ban and sealing order, authorized the use of pseudonyms, and directed the applicant to provide notice to the media, giving the media 60 days to bring a motion to challenge the orders.

The applicant sought a publication ban, sealing order, and anonymity for a physician-assisted dying application under the Carter exemption.

The applicant also requested to dispense with notice of the motion to the media.

The court declined to hear the motion without notice to the media, emphasizing the open court principle and the presumption that the media must be notified of requests for sealing orders.

The motion and application were adjourned to allow for notice to the media.

The self-represented plaintiff filed a 400-page Statement of Claim alleging medical malpractice resulting in his wife's death.

The court found the pleading unintelligible and potentially frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court stayed the action under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.

The plaintiff commenced a $1,000,000 professional negligence action against the defendant dentist, alleging an allergic reaction to latex during treatment.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

Despite multiple adjournments and court orders over 15 months, the self-represented plaintiff failed to advance the litigation or produce any expert evidence to support her claim.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the plaintiff failed to provide the requisite expert evidence to establish the standard of care, breach, or causation.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to anti-psychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan, and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's finding on incapacity, noting the appellant's lack of insight into her condition.

However, the court granted the appeal regarding the Community Treatment Order, finding it invalid because the Community Treatment Plan was not 'entered into' by all required parties within 72 hours of the physician's examination, as required by the Mental Health Act.

The self-represented plaintiff sued a women's shelter, the city's public health department, and an infectious disease specialist, alleging she contracted active tuberculosis from another shelter resident and was subsequently misdiagnosed and mistreated.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding the plaintiff failed to adduce any expert medical evidence to support her claims of medical malpractice or to prove she was exposed to an infectious person.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

In a supplemental endorsement following a trial decision where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 for delayed diagnosis but failed on claims of informed consent and surgical negligence, the plaintiff's counsel requested an assessment of damages had all claims succeeded.

The court assessed the hypothetical damages at $100,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 for past loss of income, and $125,000 for future loss of income, plus the Ministry of Health subrogated claim and prejudgment interest.

Following a medical malpractice trial where the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in damages for delayed diagnosis, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The parties agreed the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for both the first and second trials.

The court noted the high cost of expert opinion evidence but declined to penalize the plaintiff for these expenses, particularly given the defendant's poor recordkeeping which complicated the case.

Costs were fixed at $210,000.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his status as an involuntary psychiatric patient under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider his mobility issues when assessing his risk of harm to others and erred by refusing to make comments regarding his long-term detention.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, supported by evidence of recent assaults, and that the Board was not required to make comments on the conditions of detention.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against several healthcare providers and police officers regarding a psychiatric assessment hold under the Mental Health Act.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff failed to produce an expert report addressing professional negligence.

The court found that without a supportive expert report, the plaintiff had no prospect of success.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found NCR for First Degree Murder and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, stopped taking his medication and his mental health deteriorated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant lacked insight into his illness and could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her attending physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the statutory test for capacity, lacked evidentiary support, and relied on uncorroborated evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze, and its conclusion that the appellant lacked insight into her condition and could not appreciate the consequences of treatment was reasonable and supported by the record.