SCJ 2022

The moving party brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) from rendering a final audit decision that could recommend the revocation of its charitable status.

The moving party alleged the audit was tainted by Islamophobia and violated its Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the moving party failed to establish irreparable harm because the CRA had not yet made a final decision, making the anticipated harm premature and speculative.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the CRA due to the public interest in its regulatory role, and the moving party failed to meet the high threshold for a quia timet injunction.

The 17-year-old offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault following a series of gang-related shootings.

The Crown applied to have the young person sentenced as an adult.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, noting the youth's cognitive limitations, mental health issues, substance abuse, and vulnerability to older criminal peers.

The court also found that a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the offender accountable.

The young person was sentenced to the maximum youth sentence of seven years for second degree murder, comprising four years in secure custody and three years of community supervision.

The plaintiffs, a group of nurses and their organization who organized protests against COVID-19 mandates outside hospitals, sued the defendants for defamation over statements and articles criticizing their actions.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the plaintiffs' claim had substantial merit, they failed to show that the harm they suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions on matters of public health.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff landlord sought to continue an ex parte injunction preventing the defendant tenant from removing equipment, including an external HVAC unit and generator, from the leased premises.

The tenant argued it had paid for the equipment and had the right to remove it.

The court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the ownership of the equipment and whether it constituted fixtures or trade fixtures.

The court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured leaving the external HVAC unit and generator in place pending the litigation, effectively granting a preservation order, while noting that damages would be an adequate remedy for equipment already removed.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $51,185.65 after successfully defending against the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion.

The court considered section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs for a responding party unless the motion was frivolous or unmeritorious.

Given the divided success on the underlying motion, the court found the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous and declined to depart from the statutory presumption.

The plaintiff's request for costs was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to have the parties' child returned to Oman.

The court previously directed a trial of the jurisdictional issue and requested submissions on whether the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) should be appointed.

The applicant mother requested the OCL's appointment, which the father opposed due to urgency and the impending trial date.

The court found that the father had not proceeded with urgency and that the complexity of the materials warranted a trial rather than a motion.

The court ordered the appointment of the OCL to ensure the child's best interests were advanced and adjourned the scheduled trial pending the OCL's decision.

The applicants brought several pre-trial Charter motions alleging unlawful arrest, excessive force, lost evidence, and delays in implementing their right to counsel.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 10(b) due to a delay in providing access to counsel, but the court declined to exclude the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was not causally connected to the discovery of the evidence and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All other Charter applications were dismissed, as the court found the officers had reasonable grounds for the warrantless arrests, did not use excessive force, and were not unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve video evidence.

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The plaintiff lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment in a mortgage action against the defendant corporation.

The mortgage was given as security for unpaid legal fees owed by the mother of the defendant's sole officer.

The defendant requested an adjournment of the summary judgment motion pending the resolution of applications to assess the plaintiff's legal accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The court granted the adjournment, finding that proceeding with the mortgage action before the assessments were completed would contravene the public policy underlying section 6(4) of the Solicitors Act.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's summary conviction appeal for abandonment.

The appellant had appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample in August 2019, but took no steps to perfect the appeal for over three years.

The court applied the criteria from *R. v. Villanti* and found the delay was excessive, the explanation was weak, and the delay had a profound effect on the administration of justice as the appellant benefited from a stay of his driving prohibition.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed for abandonment.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of breaching a probation order and criminal harassment against a family he had previously been convicted of harassing.

The Crown alleged the accused was seen near the complainants' residence and following one of the complainants in a vehicle.

The court found the eyewitness identification evidence provided by the complainants to be unreliable due to lack of familiarity, poor lighting, brief observation times, and the complainants' heightened anxiety and assumption that the perpetrator was the accused.

The Crown failed to prove the identity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts, and a one-year peace bond was entered on consent.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant for an unprovoked assault at a stag-and-doe party that resulted in a T11 compression fracture.

The defendant failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The court found the defendant liable for battery and assessed damages, awarding $85,000 in non-pecuniary general damages, $17,585 for past income loss, $50,000 for loss of competitive advantage, and $21,640 for future care costs, totaling $177,248.60.

The parties sought to settle the judgment following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

They disagreed on the wording of a consent reduction for a past loss of housekeeping award and the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the wording of the order to reflect that the reduction was made pursuant to Rule 52.08 on consent.

Applying MacLeod v. Marshall, the court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to reduce the prejudgment interest rate on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% under Rule 53.10 to 1.3%, finding that 5% would overcompensate the plaintiffs given historical market rates.

The applicant, who was convicted of six offences following a judge-alone trial, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was breached.

The total delay from the laying of the Information to the end of the trial was approximately 48.8 months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to raise the issue in a timely manner.

Furthermore, after deducting defence delay and significant periods of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which constituted exceptional circumstances, the net delay was 23.7 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence of the parties' two children, as well as child support.

The father requested an adjournment, claiming he had been in Africa for health reasons and questioning his paternity of one child.

The court partially denied the adjournment, proceeding with the parenting issues but adjourning the child support claims.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, noting she had been the primary caregiver and the father had not seen the children in over three years.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a finding of primary residence and confirmation of the status quo since March 2020, when the children were placed in his care following child welfare involvement.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion seeking the return of primary residence or expanded parenting time.

The court found that a new status quo had been established and that there was no compelling evidence to disturb it pending trial, especially given the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendation.

The court ordered that the children remain in the primary care of the applicant, but granted the respondent expanded parenting time of three weekends per month.

The plaintiff sought damages for wrongful dismissal, arguing that his employment with the defendant municipality was permanent and indefinite despite being hired under a contract with an expected duration of two years.

The defendant maintained that the plaintiff was employed under a fixed-term contract that was extended four times before expiring.

The court found no ambiguity in the employment agreement or the extension notices, concluding that the plaintiff was employed under a fixed-term contract.

As the contract simply expired, there was no wrongful dismissal, and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion to reduce the respondent father's parenting time based on an OCL report recommending weekend-only time.

The OCL report revealed that the father had failed to disclose numerous police attendances at his home for domestic disputes involving his new partner.

The court found that the father's failure to disclose this chaotic living situation to the judge who previously expanded his parenting time justified a change in the interim status quo.

The court reduced the father's parenting time to limit the children's exposure to the chaotic environment.

The court also ordered the father to provide an accounting of home expenses paid in lieu of support, but dismissed the mother's requests for mandatory counselling and home repairs.

The plaintiff brought an action against his brother's former wife, claiming she held his interest in a property in trust.

The property had been sold and the proceeds disbursed pursuant to family law proceedings between the brother and his former wife.

The plaintiff argued for an express, constructive, or resulting trust.

The court dismissed the action, finding insufficient evidence of an express trust, no equitable obligation or unjust enrichment to support a constructive trust, and that the presumption of resulting trust did not apply.

The offender, a 25-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon after stabbing a victim outside a nightclub.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served based on pre-trial custody and strict house arrest conditions.

The court applied the restraint principle for young first offenders and sentenced the offender to 9 months' imprisonment concurrent with 6 months for the weapons offence, followed by two years' probation.