Ryan Mullins

This is an appeal from a conviction for impaired driving, where the appellant argued an infringement of their Section 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 18 months and 16 days.

The trial judge, and subsequently the appeal court, deducted 54 days for defence delay related to counsel's attempts to bypass necessary pre-trial procedures, resulting in a net delay of 17 months, which is within the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court affirmed the necessity of pre-trials for efficient court scheduling and found the defence's conduct contributed to the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a Seaboyer application seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's consensual sexual activity with the accused immediately prior to the alleged assault and sexual assault with a weapon.

The accused did not oppose the application.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence admissible for the limited purpose of providing narrative context as to why the complainant was unclothed at the time of the alleged offences, and that its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

The defendant, Edward Bobbitt, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in his trial for operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial conclusion was 989 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, deducting 322 days attributable to the defence (including periods of counsel unavailability and inaction in rescheduling) and 146 days attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The resulting net institutional delay was 521 days (approximately 17 months and one week), which fell below the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found that the defendant had not made a concerted effort to advance the case and protect his s. 11(b) right.

The application was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

The applicant, Sharabil Mohamed, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) right to a speedy trial.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated trial conclusion was 944 days (31 months and 1 day), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court matters.

The court deducted 14 days for defence-caused delay and 349 days for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on court scheduling in the Region of Peel.

After deductions, the remaining delay was 581 days (19 months and 2 days), still above the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness with further exceptional circumstances.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle accident.

The insurer terminated benefits and brought a motion to dismiss the arbitration and seek repayment, alleging the applicant wilfully misrepresented material facts about the accident and his claim for housekeeping benefits.

The arbitrator found that the applicant failed to provide evidence to rebut the insurer's prima facie case of misrepresentation, noting significant inconsistencies in his account of the accident and claims for housekeeping services that were never provided.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant intentionally misled the insurer.

The applicant's claim was barred, and he was ordered to repay $41,036.44 in benefits received as a result of the misrepresentation.

The insurer brought a motion for an order declaring the applicant is not entitled to statutory accident benefits until she submits to an Examination Under Oath (EUO).

The applicant brought a cross-motion to preclude the insurer from examining her regarding income replacement and housekeeping benefits, arguing that because the insurer initially paid these benefits, it could not later require an EUO under section 35(3) of the Schedule.

The arbitrator held that section 35(3) does not restrict an insurer's ongoing right to request an EUO under section 33.

The applicant was found to have failed to attend the EUO by refusing to answer relevant questions.

The arbitration was adjourned sine die, benefits were suspended until attendance, and the applicant was ordered to pay $1,000 in expenses.