Ronald D. Davis

The appellant made a complaint to Serbian Orthodox Church authorities about the respondent, a priest, regarding his involvement in her family law proceedings.

The respondent sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the expression did not relate to a matter of public interest because it was a private grievance not widely disseminated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing on the size of the audience rather than the content of the expression, which raised broader concerns about the propriety of priests participating in private litigation.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a full s. 137.1 analysis.

The appellants brought an application seeking wide-ranging relief regarding the operation of the respondent gun club and the finances of all three respondents.

The application judge dismissed the application on the basis of lack of standing, a full and final release previously signed by the appellants, and the expiry of the limitation period.

On appeal, the appellants attempted to argue the merits afresh without addressing the application judge's dispositive findings.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, holding the release barred the claims and the limitation period had expired, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $22,000 to the respondents.

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from an arbitrator's decision in a long-running dispute between law firms regarding a Professional Services Agreement.

The appellants challenged the arbitrator's handling of a solicitor-client privilege objection to spreadsheets and her refusal to remove respondents' counsel who received the allegedly privileged documents.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision to dismiss the privilege motion while reserving the right to reconsider the issue after further evidence, and upheld the decision not to remove counsel.

The court found the arbitrator acted within her discretion and applied the law reasonably to the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of the Attorney General of Canada, setting aside the conditional certification of a class action brought by Andrew Knisley, a veteran, regarding the administration of disability benefits by Veterans Affairs Canada.

The court found that conditional certification is not permitted under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether an identifiable class exists.

The court also upheld the motion judge’s finding that the claim in negligence disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

The defendants, Michael Slattery and Skylark Holdings Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them.

They argued that the plaintiffs had not sustained any damages and had breached the immediate disclosure rule by failing to disclose a partial settlement agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding damages due to conflicting evidence on reliance, and determining that the partial settlement did not significantly alter the litigation dynamics to constitute a breach of the immediate disclosure rule.

The respondent, Harrison Pensa LLP, brought a motion to transfer an application from Toronto to London.

The application concerned a dispute over a contingency fee agreement between Aylmer Meat Packers Inc. and Richard Walter Clare (applicants) and Harrison Pensa LLP.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding a significant connection to London, where the contingency fee agreement was drafted and the related trial took place.

The court determined that London was a "significantly better" venue and granted the motion to transfer the proceeding to London.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal which rescinded a previous order requiring the respondents to contribute over $2 million toward mining development expenses.

The Tribunal had found that an oral agreement between the parties' predecessors established the respondents' interest as a 'free carried, perpetual, non-contributing' interest.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence and conclusion that a binding oral agreement existed.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs for the entire action after successfully moving to dismiss the proposed class action for delay.

The plaintiffs argued the costs claimed were excessive and that previous steps had already been addressed by prior costs rulings.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs' response to the motion did not warrant an elevated scale.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the delay motion and reimbursement for mediation disbursements, fixing costs at $125,000 all-inclusive.

The defendant, Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP, brought a motion to dismiss a class proceeding for delay, arguing that the plaintiffs, William Tataryn and Daya Nand Rajan, failed to comply with section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not taken the required steps towards certification within the statutory deadline of October 1, 2021.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that their efforts to amend faulty pleadings constituted progress under s. 29.1 or that the defendant had waived its rights.

The court also dismissed the request for a "Phoenix" order, which would allow a new action to be started, deeming it contrary to the policy of s. 29.1.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant sought specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase the respondents' shares in a corporation involved in the Thai medical cannabis industry.

The court found that the email correspondence between the parties constituted an agreement in principle, but not a binding contract, as essential terms regarding due diligence and disclosure remained unresolved.

However, the court found that a subsequent rights offering proposed by the respondents, which would have significantly diluted the applicant's minority shareholding at a below-market price, was oppressive.

The application for specific performance was dismissed, but the rights offering was permanently enjoined.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Morgan J. dated April 13, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,874.14.

The defendants brought a second motion under Rule 21.01 to strike portions of the plaintiff's seventh amended statement of claim, alleging non-compliance with a previous ruling.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to add a new plaintiff and new statutory causes of action.

The court granted the motion to strike references to previously discontinued defendants and a claim of fraudulent concealment, finding them improper or insufficiently pleaded.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike new consumer protection claims and the challenge based on limitation periods, deeming these issues premature for a pleadings motion.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to add a new plaintiff was granted.

The appellant, Capital Sports Management Inc., appealed a motion judge's order requiring the production of certain solicitor-client documents to the respondent, Trinity Development Group Inc. The motion judge had found an implied joint retainer of the law firm Gowlings by both parties in relation to a joint venture, and ordered production of documents up to the commencement of the litigation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the implied joint retainer terminated in May 2016 when the parties became materially adverse and threatened litigation against each other.

Furthermore, the respondent had acquiesced to Gowlings continuing to act solely for the appellant after that date.

The appeal was allowed, and the production order was narrowed to exclude documents created after May 2016.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the production of financial records relating to mortgages held by the defendants in trust for the plaintiffs, alleging a fraudulent scheme to misappropriate funds.

The defendants argued that the documents should be produced in the ordinary course of litigation.

The court held that beneficiaries of a trust have a proprietary right to records relevant to an accounting for the trust property, separate from the ordinary rules of discovery, and ordered the defendants to produce the requested documents or confirm their non-existence.

Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP sought leave to intervene as a party in an appeal brought by Capital Sports Management Inc. The underlying appeal challenged an order requiring the production of certain solicitor-client documents based on a finding of an implied joint retainer among Capital Sports, Trinity Development Group Inc., and Gowlings.

Gowlings argued it had a direct interest in the appeal because its conduct and advice were directly impugned.

The court granted Gowlings leave to intervene as a party with limited participation rights, finding that its focused submissions would likely be useful to the court in addressing significant issues about solicitor-client privilege after the breakdown of a relationship involving an implied joint retainer.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order regarding the production of documents.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on a single issue: whether the motion judge erred in ordering the production of documents after May 2016, having found an implied joint retainer among the parties and their counsel.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The proposed intervener law firm sought leave to intervene in a motion for leave to appeal an order requiring the production of its privileged documents based on an implied joint retainer.

The moving party argued it had a direct interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by new grounds of appeal challenging its conduct.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that intervention on a leave to appeal motion should be rare and extraordinary, and that the proposed intervener's submissions largely duplicated those of the appellant.

The request to intervene in the appeal itself was adjourned pending the outcome of the leave motion.