Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed his convictions for five counts of robbery, possession of prohibited ammunition, and possession of stolen property, as well as his seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict was supported by ample circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, video evidence, and similar fact evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; despite the appellant being a youthful first-time offender, the court held that the seven-year sentence was fit given the gravity of the armed robberies, and the trial judge did not err in prioritizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering an equalization payment, dismissing a constructive trust claim, and imposing restraining and vexatious litigant orders.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of a hearing impairment, which the Court of Appeal rejected.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that certain shares had no value, but adjusted the equalization payment to account for uncollectable receivables.

The Court also struck the restraining and vexatious litigant orders as they were not raised as issues for trial.

The appellant municipality appealed a declaration that it was responsible for maintaining two roads leading to a First Nation reserve and an education centre following a municipal restructuring order.

The application judge had found the roads became municipal highways through statutory dedication under the Municipal Act and common law dedication by conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Municipal Act provisions relied upon explicitly excluded provincial roads under Crown control.

Furthermore, the common law doctrine of dedication and acceptance could not apply because the public already enjoyed a statutory right of passage under the Public Lands Act, and the province had failed to use the available statutory mechanisms to transfer the roads.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against his ex-wife.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on credibility findings, rejecting the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inappropriate considerations to assess the appellant's credibility, including the conduct of defense counsel, evidence from a voir dire that was not part of the trial record, and the appellant's proficiency in French.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's orders regarding child support arrears, equalization, property division, and costs following a divorce.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding errors in the calculation of child support arrears and the equalization payment, which were adjusted accordingly.

The Court also set aside the trial judge's order to sell a commercial property registered to the appellant's father, as the father was not a party to the proceedings and no finding of fraudulent conveyance had been made.

Finally, the trial costs award was reduced to exclude costs incurred prior to a previous consent order and costs from unrelated proceedings.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and appealed on two grounds: the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about conversations with a business associate regarding NSF cheques, and the Crown's undisclosed jury vetting process using police databases.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence as hearsay, the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the jury had sufficient other evidence to assess the appellant's state of mind.

Regarding the jury vetting, the Court held that while the Crown breached its disclosure obligations and the police misused databases, the non-disclosure did not impact the reliability of the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to order the respondent to register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on impermissible speculation about the impact of registration on the respondent.

The respondent failed to meet the high statutory threshold of demonstrating that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

A 20-year SOIRA registration order was imposed.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a destruction order for a pit bull under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appeal judge had interpreted section 4(8) of the Act as requiring the court to find that destruction was necessary for the protection of the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary and natural meaning of section 4(8) is clear and unambiguous: once a pit bull is found to have bitten or attacked, the court is mandated to order its destruction.

The original destruction order was reinstated.

The respondents issued a notice of action against the appellant within the two-year limitation period under the Warsaw Convention but failed to serve it within the six-month period under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The master granted an extension of time for service, which was affirmed by the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed, arguing the claim was extinguished under Article 29 of the Convention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that once a claim is issued within the two-year period, the Convention is satisfied and subsequent procedural requirements, including time for service, are governed by the Ontario Rules.

In six family law cases, a Superior Court judge exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to order the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent children or conduct investigations, bypassing the statutory request process.

The OCL appealed these mandatory orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the judge erred by circumventing the existing statutory structure under the Courts of Justice Act, which grants the OCL discretion to accept or decline requests for involvement based on its resources and intake criteria.

The appellant was convicted of two unrelated counts of first degree murder following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements obtained during a 'Mr. Big' operation and testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts and in denying a mistrial application after a witness blurted out highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by concluding the absence of similar fact evidence militated against severance.

The Court held that the risk of impermissible propensity reasoning was overwhelming and ordered a new trial with the counts severed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the trial judge had compelling reasons to reject the appellant's evidence, the appeal judge's reasons were sufficient under the Sheppard test, and the proposed fresh evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for malicious prosecution and wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, finding they clearly showed the pathway to the result.

However, the Court agreed with the appellants that the trial judge erred by duplicating the award of 'Wallace' or 'Honda' damages and aggravated damages for malicious prosecution, as the same factors were used to justify both.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the $15,000 'Wallace' damages award, but otherwise dismissed.

The appellant settled its claim with the hospital and sought to amend its statement of claim to proceed against the remaining defendants for their several liabilities, as contemplated by the settlement.

The motion judge refused to allow the amendment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed amendments fully disclosed the terms of the settlement and restricted the claim against the remaining defendants to what was permitted by the settlement.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate review of the evidence and failed to provide a balanced charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have provided a fuller explanation of the evidence, the charge was adequate in the circumstances and the jury would have understood the defence advanced.

The appellant school board appealed a trial judgment finding it breached its obligation to treat bidders equally and fairly during a tendering process.

The respondent, an unsuccessful bidder, alleged the successful bid was non-compliant because the bidder provided a letter of credit instead of the required performance bonds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the tender documents only required performance bonds upon acceptance of the bid.

The successful bid was compliant when submitted, forming Contract A. The appellant's acceptance formed Contract B, discharging obligations to the respondent.

The subsequent modification to accept a letter of credit did not breach the respondent's contractual rights.