E. Ria Tzimas

This appeal concerned parental responsibility and decision-making for twin children, where one child was alienated from the mother and the other from the father.

The appellant mother sought to overturn a lower court order that maintained the de facto living arrangements (daughter with mother, son with father) and to reinstate previous shared parenting orders or gain sole parental responsibility for the son.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the existing arrangements were in the children's best interests, given the history of failed therapeutic interventions and the lack of a concrete plan for reunification therapy.

The court also confirmed that a material change in circumstances was not required for the motion judge's order, as per a prior consent order.

The appellant, David Wong, representing a class of shareholders, appealed the summary dismissal of a secondary market misrepresentation class action against Pretium Resources Inc. and its former CEO.

The claim alleged that Pretium failed to publicly disclose concerns about its Brucejack mining project's resource estimate and feasibility study, which had been conveyed by Strathcona Mineral Services Ltd. The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Strathcona's concerns were not material facts requiring disclosure because they were unsolicited, inexpert, premature, and unreliable opinions, not undisputed facts.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's alternative finding that the respondents had conducted a reasonable investigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of arson to property for setting fire to a Jeep Cherokee.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the conviction, arguing misapplication of circumstantial evidence and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence, which included GPS data placing the appellant's tow truck at the scene and the appellant's suspicious post-offence conduct.

The Court also found the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient given the straightforward nature of the case and the lack of contradictory evidence or complex legal issues.

This appeal concerned whether taxes collected by Enterprise Rent-A-Car on insurance products were Retail Sales Tax (RST) or Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) for assessment purposes.

Enterprise had collected and remitted these taxes as HST to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).

The Minister of Finance assessed Enterprise for RST, arguing Enterprise had erroneously remitted RST as HST.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by focusing on Enterprise's belief about the tax collected, rather than the factual question of what tax was actually collected.

The Court concluded that Enterprise had, in fact, collected HST, based on its invoicing practices and remittances.

As the Minister's assessments were based on "tax collected" under the Retail Sales Tax Act, and Enterprise had collected HST, the assessments had no legal basis.

The appeal was allowed, and the Minister's assessments were set aside.

The appellant appealed convictions for non-consensual distribution of intimate images, criminal harassment, extortion by libel, and mischief to computer data.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance and erred by allowing the trial to proceed without counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial was fair, the judge provided adequate assistance, and the appellant's actions suggested an attempt to delay proceedings rather than a genuine inability to secure counsel.

This appeal concerned a dispute between former spouses over an Ontario condominium property.

The appellant argued the respondent's claim was a statute-barred equalization claim under the Family Law Act, and that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or the matter was res judicata due to prior Saudi Arabian annulment proceedings.

The respondent asserted a resulting or constructive trust claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction as Saudi Arabian courts declined jurisdiction over foreign property and their annulment proceedings did not resolve property issues.

The court further held that the claim was a distinct equitable trust claim, not an equalization claim, and therefore the ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied, not the two-year period under the Family Law Act.

The appeal and a motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant, AOD Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration that a patent agreement was invalid.

The appellant argued that the agreement required shareholder approval under s. 189(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act and that the indoor management rule did not apply because the respondent, Miramare Investment Incorporated, had knowledge of internal irregularities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 189(3) argument was a new issue raised for the first time on appeal without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court also upheld the application judge's finding that Miramare had no knowledge of any irregularities, thereby affirming the application of the indoor management rule under common law and s. 18(1) of the CBCA.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Justice that struck the appellant's statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissed the action.

The appellant had sued the respondent, a lawyer for an opposing party in separate litigation, alleging failure to respond to emails regarding mediation and constitutional rights violations due to a comment about his attire.

The motion judge found no duty of care, that the statement of claim was irremediably defective, and that the doctrine of absolute immunity applied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no errors of fact or law, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the application of established legal principles regarding striking pleadings and the standard of review for such decisions.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action.

The action alleged mistreatment by professors and York University, and sought damages, an investigation by the Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development, and the establishment of an independent tribunal.

The motion judge found no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the Ministry owed no duty of care to post-secondary students regarding administrative complaints and could not intervene in the internal management of an autonomous university.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought to review a decision by Justice Thorburn, who had denied his motion to extend time to review Justice Benotto's decision.

Justice Benotto had previously denied the applicant's motion to extend time to perfect his appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned the dismissal of the applicant's lawsuit against the respondent, an employee of the City of Toronto, regarding French language services.

Both Justice Benotto and Justice Thorburn found the applicant's lawsuit to have no chance of success, citing that individuals cannot be held liable for Charter damages and and that lawsuits against the City of Toronto are prohibited by specific legislation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's motion for review, finding no error of law or principle in the lower court's discretionary decisions regarding extensions of time.

The moving parties sought to review an order dismissing their motion to extend time to perfect an appeal of an Independent Review Order concerning St. Anne's Indian Residential School claims.

The Independent Review Order had appointed an independent special advisor to review certain concluded claims.

After the motion was heard, the independent review was completed, and its report approved.

The court found the appeal moot because the factual substratum had disappeared, and there were no grounds to exercise discretion to hear a moot appeal.

Consequently, the review motion was dismissed, and no extension of time to appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion to quash an appeal brought by the respondent, Ms. LaFontaine.

The appellant, Mr. Froom, had appealed an interlocutory order from the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion judge had adjourned Ms. LaFontaine's motion to trial, imposing terms including a requirement for Mr. Froom to deposit US$475,000 into court.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore an appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave, not directly to the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed, and Mr. Froom's request to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court was denied.

Costs were awarded to Ms. LaFontaine.

The appellant, Anita Csizmazia, appealed an order refusing to set aside a final order made after an uncontested trial.

She alleged misrepresentation and concealment of facts by the respondent, Zoltan Csizmazia, and a significant miscarriage of justice.

The review judge had dismissed her motion, noting that her financial issues were moot due to her bankruptcy and rejecting her claim of lack of notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the review judge's reasons sufficient and affirming that the appellant's bankruptcy rendered her equalization claims moot, thus making it unnecessary to address the fraud allegations.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application against the Law Society of Ontario and various individuals.

The motion judge had found the appellant's pleadings to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to their rambling, racist, and misogynistic content.

The Court of Appeal, exercising its authority under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the appellant's notice of appeal and factum continued the abusive conduct and raised no arguable grounds.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting the respondent father sole custody/decision-making responsibility for their child and temporarily suspending the mother's contact, following a finding of parental alienation.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the best interests test, failed to consider less drastic options, did not adequately weigh the child's views, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these submissions, affirming the trial judge's findings of parental alienation and the drastic change in custody as being in the child's best interests, supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay appeal costs.

The applicant brought an urgent motion for a vesting order to transfer the matrimonial home to her name and permit its sale to secure outstanding child support, s.7 expenses, and cost awards from the respondent.

The respondent failed to file responding materials and his representatives engaged in inappropriate and disrespectful conduct during the virtual hearing.

The court granted the vesting order, finding it necessary to enforce the respondent's obligations given his persistent non-compliance with court orders, abandonment of the property, and imminent power of sale proceedings by the mortgagee.

This endorsement concerns costs arising from two applications related to an estate: an application for directions by the testamentary trustee (Mr. Cardinal) and an application for passing of accounts by the estate trustee (Mrs. Perreault).

The court found that Mr. Cardinal was entitled to costs for his initial application due to Mrs. Perreault's resistance to providing an accounting.

However, Mr. Cardinal's subsequent allegations of bad faith and misappropriation against Mrs. Perreault were unfounded and reprehensible.

Mrs. Perreault was largely successful in defending her accounting, despite some reductions in claimed expenses.

The court awarded Mr. Cardinal $18,000 in costs and Mrs. Perreault $48,000 in costs, resulting in a net award of $30,000 to Mrs. Perreault, payable personally by Mr. Cardinal due to his unfounded allegations.

The defendants, having successfully defended a substantial damages claim at trial, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis totaling $244,893.47.

The plaintiff disputed the quantum, arguing the fees were inflated, disbursements non-recoverable, and the amount exceeded reasonable expectations, proposing $100,000.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, found the defendants' claim overinflated due to excessive hours, duplication of effort, time dedicated to training, and inadequate billing particulars.

The plaintiff's expectation of paying only $100,000 was deemed unreasonable given the trial's length and complexity.

The court fixed costs at $145,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, finding this amount fair and just in all circumstances.

The applicant, charged with robbery using an imitation firearm, brought an application seeking a declaration that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were infringed and a stay of proceedings.

The application alleged that police improperly obtained identification information and lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest without relying on privileged information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 8 Charter rights due to insufficient evidentiary foundation and concluding that the police had objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, considering all accumulated evidence, including privileged information.

The plaintiff's action against the defendants was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs payable by the plaintiff, Ms. Liddy, to the defendant, Ms. Mauro.

Ms. Mauro sought substantial indemnity costs of over $650,000, or partial indemnity then substantial indemnity costs of over $613,000, based on Ms. Liddy's unreasonable conduct, rejection of settlement offers, and pursuit of unsubstantiated allegations, including punitive damages.

Ms. Liddy argued for partial indemnity costs at no more than 50% of Ms. Mauro's fees, blaming the City of Vaughan defendants for delays and a mistrial.

The court found Ms. Mauro's offers reasonable and Ms. Liddy's conduct, particularly the persistent punitive damages claim without evidentiary support, reprehensible.

The court awarded Ms. Mauro $585,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, assessed on a partial indemnity scale until the start of trial and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.