Philip B. Norton

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after spending 32 months in pre-trial custody on charges including drug trafficking and participating in a criminal organization.

The court found that the lengthy pre-trial custody constituted a material change in circumstances justifying a review of the initial detention order.

The court concluded that the proposed strict release plan, supervised by a reliable surety, adequately addressed the secondary ground for detention.

The accused was ordered released on a $50,000 recognizance with strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a dating website.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, including his reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, his use of a friend's evidence to corroborate the complainant's allegations, and his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for committing an indecent act and dangerous driving.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of the indecent act based on a perceived legal presumption that intent to act wilfully arises when the act is seen by another person.

The appeal court found this to be a legal error, as no such presumption exists, and ordered a new trial on the indecent act charge.

The appeal against the dangerous driving conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving in heavy fog was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired care and control and having a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter motion and misapplied the law on care and control following the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Boudreault.

The Superior Court held that although the trial judge mischaracterized part of the delay as entirely neutral, the total Crown and institutional delay remained within the permissible range and did not violate the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

On the merits, the court found no error in the trial judge’s conclusion that the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care and control and that the circumstances established a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was extremely intoxicated, seated in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle parked at a busy downtown intersection, and his evidence regarding an alternate plan not to drive was rejected as not credible.

The findings were consistent with the principles in Boudreault concerning realistic risk of danger.

The accused was charged with care or control over 80 and released on a promise to appear.

A justice of the peace failed to properly confirm the promise to appear under s. 508 of the Criminal Code, issuing a summons for a new date without endorsing the cancellation of the original promise.

The trial judge quashed the information for want of jurisdiction, and the summary conviction appeal judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that non-compliance with s. 508 results in a loss of jurisdiction over the person, not the offence, and does not affect the validity of a properly laid information.

The accused was sentenced for indignity to human remains and obstructing police in connection with the death and disposal of a six-week-old child.

The child died under mysterious circumstances, and the accused and the child's father disposed of the remains in a dumpster behind a convenience store, then misled police during the investigation.

The accused received 27 months in custody with credit for 23 months of pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months, followed by 3 years of probation with various conditions including substance abuse counselling, life management skills training, and ongoing contact with Children's Aid Society.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and aggravated assault, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel ignored his instructions that he wished to testify in his own defence.

Trial counsel failed to respond to the allegations and had been disbarred for similar conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant established on a balance of probabilities that his instructions were ignored, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assault-related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons, finding the trial judge gave a detailed explanation for his credibility findings.

However, based on fresh evidence and a Crown concession, the Court substituted a conviction for assault simpliciter on count six instead of assault causing bodily harm.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence of two years less a day—significantly higher than the Crown's 90-day proposal—without allowing counsel to make submissions.

The global sentence was reduced to 18 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his rights under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter were violated during a police encounter in a parking lot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that no detention occurred until the formal arrest, as the initial interaction was preliminary and exploratory.

The court also upheld the finding that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest, making the subsequent search lawful as an incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to quash the information due to non-compliance with s. 508 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged defect concerned a justice of the peace failing to correctly confirm the form of release on the information, despite the accused having been released on a promise to appear.

The court held that such non-compliance did not invalidate an otherwise properly sworn information and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Relying on appellate authority and persuasive Superior Court decisions, the court concluded that defects relating to confirmation of a promise to appear are collateral to the validity of the charge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conviction did not depend on accepting the police evidence, as the appellant's own evidence established both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Superior Court of Justice decision that allowed the Crown's appeal and remitted the matter for a new trial.

The applicant had originally been acquitted of assaulting a peace officer and breach of recognizance.

The summary conviction appeal judge found a misapprehension of evidence central to the trial decision.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no exceptional circumstances or matters of general importance to justify a second-level appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and breach of recognizance, as well as his life sentence for attempted murder.

The victim was shot six times at point-blank range and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence, which included recognition by the victim and an independent witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exemplary assessment of the identification evidence.

The court also upheld the life sentence, finding it proportionate to the grave, unprovoked nature of the crime and the need to deter gun violence in public places.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after the victim identified him as the attacker.

At trial, the lead investigating police officer testified for the Crown, providing a narrative of the investigation that included hearsay and his personal opinion that the accused was guilty.

The trial judge failed to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of this investigative hearsay and opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions due to this error.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, it was harmless in the context of the trial and caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued that police conducted an unauthorized search and breached his s. 10(b) Charter rights following an investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the Charter arguments as they were not raised before the trial judge.

Furthermore, the court found that the police's actions did not amount to a search, as the appellant's clothing was in plain view and no pat-down occurred until after his arrest.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant sought a reduction of his 4.5-year sentence to a reformatory term to contest a deportation order.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within an acceptable range and a major adjustment was not warranted.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing the victim following a dispute.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the common sense inference of intent, and the 'rolled-up' charge on mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, properly cautioned the jury, and correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and driving offences.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching his vehicle after he was arrested for failing to identify himself under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police did not know the appellant's identity with certainty and that the search of the vehicle for identification was progressive and reasonable.

The conviction and the five-year sentence were upheld, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of prohibitions.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after a third trial, the first two having resulted in hung juries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the lead police investigator's testimony, which included hearsay and personal opinions on the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a fatal error that could have led the jury to believe the police possessed undisclosed inculpatory evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso given the prior hung juries, and entered a stay of proceedings rather than ordering a fourth trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to the assistance of an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was violated because his assigned interpreter was not accredited.

He also raised several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on identification evidence, the mental element for murder, post-offence conduct, and intoxication, as well as evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a violation of his s. 14 Charter rights, as he had agreed to the interpreter arrangement and never complained of any lack of understanding during the trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder and breach of probation.

The jury acquitted him of attempted murder but convicted him of aggravated assault.

The trial judge inadvertently instructed the jury on self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code instead of s. 34(2), despite agreement among counsel that only s. 34(2) applied.

The Crown conceded this was a serious legal error.

Additionally, the trial judge withdrew the breach of probation count from the jury and recorded the conviction himself, which he lacked jurisdiction to do.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside both convictions, and ordered a new trial.