Philip B. Norton

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and aggravated assault, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel ignored his instructions that he wished to testify in his own defence.

Trial counsel failed to respond to the allegations and had been disbarred for similar conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant established on a balance of probabilities that his instructions were ignored, which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assault-related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons, finding the trial judge gave a detailed explanation for his credibility findings.

However, based on fresh evidence and a Crown concession, the Court substituted a conviction for assault simpliciter on count six instead of assault causing bodily harm.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence of two years less a day—significantly higher than the Crown's 90-day proposal—without allowing counsel to make submissions.

The global sentence was reduced to 18 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his rights under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter were violated during a police encounter in a parking lot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that no detention occurred until the formal arrest, as the initial interaction was preliminary and exploratory.

The court also upheld the finding that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest, making the subsequent search lawful as an incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to quash the information due to non-compliance with s. 508 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged defect concerned a justice of the peace failing to correctly confirm the form of release on the information, despite the accused having been released on a promise to appear.

The court held that such non-compliance did not invalidate an otherwise properly sworn information and did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Relying on appellate authority and persuasive Superior Court decisions, the court concluded that defects relating to confirmation of a promise to appear are collateral to the validity of the charge.

The appeal was dismissed.