Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant appealed her conviction on three counts, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

The trial judge conducted no plea inquiry and did not read in the facts.

The police synopsis was filed as an exhibit with defence counsel indicating the appellant had reviewed it.

At sentencing, a pre-sentence report revealed the appellant disputed her guilt and suffered from a mental disorder.

Although the sentencing judge obtained verbal acknowledgments from the appellant regarding the facts and acceptance of responsibility, the judge expressed reservations about the genuineness of the appellant's acceptance of responsibility.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was not unequivocal due to the absence of a proper plea inquiry, the mental health issues at play, and the ambiguity regarding what the appellant was accepting responsibility for.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to dangerous driving and failure to comply with conditions of a recognizance, arising from a serious motor vehicle collision involving a police vehicle and a stolen vehicle.

The trial counsel failed to adequately advise the appellant of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea and joint submission on sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appellant demonstrated he was unaware of these consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant established a reasonable possibility that he would not have pled guilty had he known of the immigration consequences, thereby meeting the threshold for setting aside the guilty pleas.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 6.5 years imposed on the respondent for 102 counts of sexual offences against 18 young boys committed over more than 20 years while employed in positions of trust.

The respondent pleaded guilty to 43 counts of indecent assault on a male, 47 counts of gross indecency, and 10 counts of sexual assault, and was found guilty of 2 additional counts of gross indecency.

The sentencing judge found the respondent posed a very low to low risk for future sexual offending and imposed a concurrent sentence of 6.5 years, less six months' credit for pre-trial bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and varied it to 10 years' imprisonment, less six months' credit for a net sentence of 9.5 years.

On appeal from a summary judgment decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether a motion judge properly granted judgment to the plaintiff in the absence of a cross-motion, whether hearsay evidence was improperly admitted on the summary judgment motion, and whether the defendant occupier breached its statutory duty under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The plaintiff was injured when he tripped over a skateboard in a shopping mall food court.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff on liability, directing a trial only on damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge acted unfairly by granting judgment not requested by the plaintiff, improperly admitted hearsay evidence on contested issues, and erred in finding liability.

The Court granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The appellant, president of the Amalgamated Transit Union (International), appealed the dismissal of a motion to strike an action brought by four rank-and-file members of the International's Toronto-based affiliate, Local 113.

The members sought a declaration that certain provisions of the International's Constitution were void for unconscionability, arguing these provisions prevented disaffiliation.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to strike but granted a temporary stay pending exhaustion of the International's constitutional amendment process.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the dismissal of the motion to strike and the temporary stay, finding the action presented arguable issues of unconscionability and that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his wife following a trial by jury.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant attempted a planned murder-suicide.

The defence argued an unknown assailant was responsible.

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mental state required for murder, the treatment of the appellant's post-offence conduct and suicide attempt, and alleged imbalance in the instructions.

The appellant also made unsupported claims that evidence and exhibits were tampered with.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on charges of murder.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a critical statement made during a phone conversation with a Nashville police detective, arguing that because he was located in Toronto when the call was made, the evidence was gathered in Canada and must satisfy Canadian rules of evidence, which would render it inadmissible due to alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's decision, finding that evidence obtained by telephone where the call is made by a police officer located in the United States to a person located in Canada for an American investigation is gathered where the officer is located, and therefore need not meet Canadian evidentiary requirements.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of contempt on three access provisions in a custody and access order.

The motion judge had found the appellant in contempt for: (1) failing to provide the children's summer activity schedule by May 1 from 2012 to 2015; (2) denying access during Easter weekend in 2015; and (3) denying access to the son on his birthday in October 2015.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside all three findings of contempt, finding that the record did not support the motion judge's findings and that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant failed to appear at the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on January 16, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned after the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre communicated that it would receive the appellant immediately as he continued to serve his sentence.

The appellant appealed an order sealing court files relating to the estates of Bernard and Honey Sherman, who were murdered in December 2017.

The motion judge had granted sealing orders ex parte, citing the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims and their loved ones, as well as concerns about the personal safety of estate beneficiaries and administrators.

The Court of Appeal set aside the sealing orders, finding that the respondents failed to meet the necessity threshold required for sealing orders.

The court held that personal privacy concerns alone cannot justify sealing, and that the evidence of risk to beneficiaries and administrators was speculative rather than based on concrete facts.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the duration of a driving prohibition.

On consent and limited to the issue of the driving prohibition duration, the Court of Appeal reduced the prohibition from a lifetime ban to one expiring on May 20, 2022, pursuant to section 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on February 5, 2019.

The Court of Appeal identified a mathematical error in the trial judge's calculation of credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was granted an additional 22 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, for a total credit of 33 days.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to stay an Ontario action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The action concerned a dispute over payment obligations under a Term Sheet governing an upstream oil and gas rights transaction in Iran.

The Term Sheet contained a clause providing that it would be governed by English law and that the parties agreed to attorn to the courts of England.

The motion judge had applied the strong cause test and stayed the action in favour of England.

The Court of Appeal found that the forum selection clause was not an exclusive jurisdiction clause and therefore the strong cause test did not apply.

Conducting a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, the court found that the respondents had not demonstrated that England was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The appeal was allowed and the stay was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault using a weapon and one count of assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a pizza store.

The trial judge found the appellant used a screwdriver to assault the store owner and employee, and rejected his self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's excessive interventions during the appellant's testimony undermined the appearance of fairness and resulted in actual unfairness.

The trial judge's pointed cross-examination of the appellant, belittling comments to defence counsel, and persistent challenging of the appellant's account prevented him from presenting his version of events.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her request for broad relief and the granting of child support by the application judge.

The appellant argued that the application judge lacked jurisdiction and erred in assessing the parties' requests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the jurisdiction argument and declining to find error in the application judge's assessment of the merits.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The respondent Fund and the appellant Manager agreed that the Fund should be liquidated and dissolved but disagreed on the liquidation process.

The motion judge ordered liquidation without appointing a court-supervised liquidator, instead allowing the Fund to proceed with its proposed process using an expert.

The Manager appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in not appointing a liquidator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 217 of the Canada Business Corporations Act grants courts broad discretion to make orders in connection with liquidation and dissolution, and does not mandate the appointment of a liquidator.

The motion judge's reasons were cogent and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claim for unconscionability and upholding the respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment.

The appeal concerned a forfeiture clause in an agreement between a purchaser and vendor.

The Court of Appeal deferred to the motion judge's finding that there was no unconscionability based on the circumstances and relationship between the parties.

The court also found that while the damages document may have overstated the vendor's losses, the damages were significant and the forfeited amount was not out of all proportion to those damages, failing to meet the criteria established in Redstone Enterprises Ltd. v. Simple Technology Inc.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for support from the estate of her deceased spouse.

The appellant argued that a waiver of support clause in the marriage contract was contingent upon the matrimonial home being held in joint tenancy, and that when the home ceased to be so held, the waiver no longer applied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding that two amendments to the marriage contract made clear that the home would be held in tenancy in common with certain rights to the appellant upon the respondent's death, and that neither amendment detracted from the waiver provision.

The court deferred to the trial judge's contractual interpretation and found no clearly identifiable error in law or palpable and overriding factual error.