Paul F. Monahan

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown abandoned the over 80 charge due to inability to establish the two-hour presumption of identity.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging section 8 and 9 violations based on lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge found the arresting officer had ample reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious collision, witness identification, vehicle registration, and observable signs of impairment.

The court convicted on the impaired charge based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, admissions on the breath room video, breath readings, and observations of impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with failing to stop and provide his name and address at the scene of an accident contrary to section 252 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called evidence from a civilian witness, three police officers, and an expert toxicologist.

The accused testified and raised Charter violations.

The court found no Charter breaches, rejected the accused's evidence regarding post-accident drinking as fabricated, and found the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court acquitted on the section 252 charge, finding the accused provided his cell phone number and did not intend to escape liability.

The defendant brought an application to stay proceedings for violation of his s.11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The defendant was arrested on September 8, 2014, charged with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm.

The trial was originally scheduled for July 13-15, 2016, but was adjourned due to defence counsel illness, with an express s.11(b) waiver.

A new trial date was set for September 26-27, 2017.

The court found that the net delay under the Jordan framework was 585 days (approximately 19.2 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court determined that the Crown failed to justify the delay under the transitional exceptional circumstance, particularly due to significant Crown delay caused by a missing Crown file for over four months.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendant, Matcor Automotive Inc., appealed a sentence of $270,000 (three counts at $90,000 each) imposed after conviction on three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The conviction arose from a workplace incident in which a maintenance worker suffered catastrophic injury (paraplegia) due to inadequate training, supervision, and safety procedures regarding robotic equipment.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and within the acceptable range, rejecting arguments that the sentencing judge erred in principle regarding proportionality, totality, inferences from evidence, consideration of prior convictions, and the acceptability of the sentencing range.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with consuming alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration thereof in her blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offences were alleged to have occurred on September 18, 2014.

The Crown relied on breath samples taken outside the two-hour window for the presumption of identity, requiring expert toxicological evidence.

The defendant testified that she consumed alcohol in response to phone calls from her abusive ex-husband and that she poured alcohol on her car floor when she saw police pulling her over.

The court found the defendant's credibility seriously undermined by her false statements regarding requesting a Punjabi interpreter and her implausible account of pouring alcohol on the car floor.

The court acquitted on the over 80 charge because the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's opinion, given evidence that the defendant was consuming large quantities of alcohol while driving.

However, the court convicted on the impaired driving charge based on poor driving, slurred speech, swaying, and stumbling observed by police officers.

The defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a female tenant who rented a basement apartment from him and his wife.

The Crown proceeded summarily on both charges.

The first alleged incident occurred between June 20-30, 2016, when the defendant allegedly touched the complainant's breast and vagina outside her clothing while hugging her as she left his home.

The second alleged incident occurred on or about August 4, 2016, when the defendant allegedly touched the complainant's breast outside her clothing and attempted to place her hand on his crotch while she was in the basement apartment.

The defendant denied all allegations and testified that his son was present during the first incident and his wife and younger son were present during the second incident, making the alleged assaults impossible.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the defendant's evidence evasive and argumentative.

The defendant was acquitted on the first count due to an apparent inconsistency in the complainant's evidence regarding whether the defendant's older son was present during the alleged assault, which created a reasonable doubt.

However, the defendant was convicted on the second count, as the complainant's evidence was coherent, logical, and not significantly contradicted, and the defendant's defence evidence contained multiple contradictions and implausibilities.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault, two counts of recruiting and holding a person offering sexual services, one count of obtaining financial benefit from sexual services, and two counts of human trafficking.

The Crown narrowed its case to seek conviction on one assault charge (October 31, 2014) and two human trafficking charges.

The trial involved significant credibility issues between the complainant's videotaped police statements (November 2014) and her trial testimony.

The court admitted the police statements under the KGB exception to the hearsay rule and found them ultimately reliable.

The court concluded that the complainant was assaulted on October 31, 2014, and that the accused committed human trafficking by exercising control over the complainant's movements and exploiting her through threats and violence to provide strip club services and surrender her earnings.

The court found the accused received material benefits from the trafficking offence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called three witnesses: a civilian tow truck driver who observed the erratic driving and followed the vehicle; the arresting officer; and the breath technician.

The defence called the accused.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle observed by the tow truck driver and that his ability to operate the motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court also found that the Crown proved the mens rea and actus reus of the refusal charge.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The applicants sought disclosure of handler's notes, investigative plans, and payment records relating to a confidential informant used in obtaining a search warrant.

The Crown opposed the disclosure, arguing the request was a fishing expedition.

The court held that while the handler's notes do not normally form part of the investigative file when the handler is not the affiant, the applicants met the "reasonable possibility" or "reasonable likelihood" test for disclosure.

The court found that on the face of the Information to Obtain, reasonable questions arose as to whether the claimed confidential informant was actually a police agent, which is a material issue on a Garofoli application.

The court ordered disclosure of the handler's notes subject to claims of blanket confidential informant privilege or editing, but declined to order disclosure of investigative plans.

A youth was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breach of probation following a stabbing incident at a party.

The Crown alleged the defendant stabbed the victim unprovoked in a bedroom.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting she was engaged in a physical altercation with the victim both inside and outside an apartment, during which she grabbed a knife from the kitchen and used it defensively after being thrown to the ground and punched.

The trial judge found the victim's evidence largely unreliable due to his serious injuries and drug and alcohol consumption.

The defendant's account was substantially corroborated by the only eyewitness.

The court found no evidence of intent to kill for the attempted murder charge and determined the Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt for the aggravated assault charge.

All charges were dismissed.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in trial.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months from charge to anticipated end of trial in provincial court.

The overall delay was calculated at 18 months and 21 days, but after deducting approximately 3 months and 8 days of defence delay, the net delay was 15 months and 13 days, falling below the ceiling.

The court found the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case had not taken markedly longer than reasonably required.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown called five witnesses including two paramedics who observed erratic driving, the arresting officer, a second officer, and a breath technician.

The defendant conceded the over 80 charge but contested the impaired driving charge.

The court found both charges proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on cumulative evidence including observations of erratic driving, near-accident involvement, physical signs of impairment, and breath test results.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right under s. 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the new framework established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

After deducting time for a discrete exceptional circumstance (judicial conflict of interest) and defence delay, the net delay was 15.5 months, falling below the ceiling.

However, the court found that the case had taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering local institutional delay standards and the defence's meaningful efforts to expedite.

The court granted the stay, finding that under the previous Morin framework the case would have been stayed, and the Jordan framework should not transform previously unreasonable delays into reasonable ones in transitional cases.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge heard Charter and voluntariness voir dires on a blended basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, ultimately proceeding only with the section 10(b) right to counsel argument.

The defence also challenged the voluntariness of statements made to police.

The trial judge found that all statements were voluntary but that the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated because police failed to wait a reasonable time for the defendant's second counsel of choice to call back before proceeding with breath testing.

The accused was charged with theft of a cellphone, assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering a threat to kill.

The Crown proceeded on the assault, unlawful confinement, and threat charges after withdrawing the theft charge.

The trial involved evidence of a domestic dispute between the accused and the complainant, including video recordings of the initial interaction.

The accused raised a self-defence claim.

The court found the accused guilty of assault but acquitted on the unlawful confinement and threat charges, finding insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt on those counts and determining that the self-defence claim failed on the assault charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded a violation of section 10(b) rights, acknowledging that special circumstances existed requiring the police to ensure the accused understood his legal rights in a meaningful way.

The central issue was whether the breath sample evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused's limited English proficiency and sincere request for a Punjabi language interpreter were not adequately addressed, resulting in a failure to provide meaningful consultation with counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the approved screening device demand was made "forthwith" as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found a nine-minute delay between the formation of suspicion and the ASD demand, during which the accused was detained without being informed of his rights to counsel or the reason for detention.

The court determined that multiple Charter violations occurred and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and touching for a sexual purpose a person under the age of 16 contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offences occurred on or about May 25, 2014, involving a three-year-old complainant.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant, her brother, and their mother.

The accused provided a statement to police denying the allegations and offering an alternative account of events.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's guilt based on inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, the plausibility of the accused's alternative account, and concerns about the reliability of evidence from a very young child at a late hour.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown's case relied on civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of impairment, and breath sample results of 185 mg and 176 mg.

The defence advanced a "last drink" argument under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, claiming the accused consumed minimal alcohol before driving and substantial alcohol after arriving home.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence as incredible and fabricated, finding the accused had consumed substantial alcohol prior to driving.

The court found the statutory presumptions of identity were not rebutted and convicted on both charges.