Paul-Erik Veel

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendants were partially successful in striking out "campaign of defamation" allegations from the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, while the plaintiffs successfully opposed striking out pleas of malice.

The defendants sought $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 and considering the "fair and reasonable" principle, found that despite divided success, the "campaign of defamation" allegations were a principal issue where the defendants' position was validated.

The court awarded the defendants $11,500 in all-inclusive costs, payable by the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, which alleged defamation, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The court struck the paragraphs alleging a 'campaign of defamation' because the plaintiffs failed to plead a coherent body of fact regarding the defamatory statements.

The court declined to strike the pleadings of malice and injurious falsehood, finding they did not necessarily encroach upon solicitor-client privilege.

The court struck the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, as no duty of care was owed to the third parties, but granted leave to amend.

The plaintiff in a defamation action sought leave to amend his statement of claim to add allegations of further defamatory statements by the existing defendant and to add a psychiatrist as a new defendant for negligence and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court denied leave to add the new defamation allegations against the existing defendant, finding them barred by the two-year limitation period and lacking sufficient particulars.

However, the court granted leave to add the claims against the psychiatrist, finding that although the negligence claim based on a third-party duty of care was novel, it was not plain and obvious that it would fail.

The court also allowed the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim to proceed.

The plaintiff brought an action against 39 defendants, including lawyers, police officers, and private investigators, seeking $20 million in damages for various torts including abuse of process, negligent investigation, and conspiracy.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on previous court orders finding the plaintiff in contempt of court.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively struck the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Substantial costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant employee deleted and took confidential information upon the breakdown of her employment.

The respondent employer sued and moved for an injunction.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but a dispute arose over whether the agreement included a full forensic sweep of the appellant's devices.

The respondent insisted on the sweep and adjourned its injunction motion, while the appellant claimed the respondent had repudiated the settlement.

The motion judge found a binding settlement without the forensic sweep term and held the respondent had not repudiated it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's insistence on the term and its steps to preserve the status quo via the injunction did not objectively evince an intention not to be bound by the settlement agreement.

The plaintiff moved to strike a statement of defence and abuse of process counterclaim arising from a solicitor's negligence action against former criminal counsel concerning advice to enter a U.S. plea agreement.

The court held that the defence pleading was replete with evidence, argument, quotations, and scandalous character attacks contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and struck it in its entirety with leave to amend.

The court declined to strike the abuse of process counterclaim under rule 21.01(1)(b), holding it was not plain and obvious the claim could not succeed where the plaintiff had arguably made his innocence and reputational vindication an unnecessary material issue in the negligence action.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking judgment enforcing a settlement allegedly reached through email exchanges with a former employee.

The dispute concerned whether the parties had agreed to a settlement and, if so, the scope of an IT consultant’s work to delete and certify the destruction of confidential electronic information taken by the employee prior to departure.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement through their email correspondence, despite subsequent disagreement when counsel attempted to draft formal minutes of settlement.

Interpreting the emails objectively, the court concluded the parties had agreed to the employee’s proposed process for wiping devices, but using the employer’s chosen IT consultant at the employee’s cost.

The employer’s later insistence on a broader “full sweep” did not amount to repudiation of the settlement.

Judgment was granted enforcing the settlement on the terms determined by the court.

The court addressed scheduling for submissions regarding the appropriate penalty in a proceeding brought by the Commissioner of Competition against telecommunications companies.

The parties appeared to establish timelines for written submissions and oral argument on penalty.

The court set deadlines for the applicant’s submissions, the respondents’ responding submissions, and the applicant’s reply.

Dates were also scheduled for oral argument concerning the penalty to be imposed.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.

In a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two bar owners for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The deceased driver, who had consumed alcohol at the defendants' licensed establishment, was found to have a blood alcohol level exceeding 200 milligrams percent at the time of the collision.

The Crown alleged violations of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act constituted unlawful acts supporting manslaughter charges, or alternatively, that the defendants' conduct amounted to criminal negligence.

The court discharged both accused, finding that violations of liquor licensing regulations, while potentially constituting unlawful acts, were not objectively dangerous as required by law, and that the evidence did not establish the marked departure from the standard of care necessary for criminal negligence.

The court considered whether a single-purpose corporate purchaser seeking specific performance after a failed land transaction was exempt from the mitigation principle in contract damages.

The majority held that incorporation benefits carry corresponding burdens, including reasonable mitigation efforts where substitute opportunities are available.

It concluded the purchaser lacked a substantial and legitimate basis to avoid mitigation and that the evidentiary record supported available comparable development opportunities.

The dissent would have restored trial damages, finding no palpable and overriding error on mitigation opportunity and reasonableness.

The appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed, leaving the appellate reduction to nominal damages in place.

A municipal candidate appealed preliminary rulings concerning the scope of an appeal from a Compliance Audit Committee decision ordering a compliance audit under the Municipal Elections Act, 1996.

The appellant argued the appeal should proceed as a de novo hearing rather than a review based on the existing record and challenged the committee’s procedures and lack of reasons.

The court held that appeals are presumptively based on the record unless legislation clearly authorizes a new hearing, and the statute provided only for an appeal.

Issues relating to fresh evidence and the standard of review were properly deferred to the hearing of the main appeal.

The preliminary appeal was dismissed.

The moving defendants sought a stay of an Ontario action on the basis that the dispute should proceed in Alberta where related litigation concerning unpaid commissions had already been commenced.

The plaintiffs relied on forum selection and governing law clauses in a merger agreement and unanimous shareholders agreement providing for Ontario law and attornment to Ontario courts.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and that the contractual forum clauses were entitled to significant weight.

The moving parties failed to demonstrate strong cause to override the forum selection clauses or establish that Alberta was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The motion for a stay based on forum non conveniens was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, the president of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, brought an application for judicial review of a decision by the Association's Council to accept the resignation of a councillor.

The councillor had submitted an unequivocal resignation via email but later attempted to retract it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that at common law, the resignation of a director of a corporation without share capital is effective upon delivery and does not require acceptance by the corporation.

Furthermore, once delivered, the resignation cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the remaining directors.

This is a preliminary motion ruling on appeals of Compliance Audit Committee decisions to order compliance audits of election campaign finances.

The appellants sought to have the appeals conducted as hearings de novo, while the respondents and the Committee argued the appeals should be limited to a review of the record.

The court determined that absent a clear statutory mandate to the contrary, appeals must take the form of a review of the record rather than de novo hearings.

The court rejected arguments that deficiencies in the record, the Committee's failure to provide reasons, or the prematurity of the audit application warranted a de novo hearing format.

The appellant appealed an order recognizing a foreign default judgment, arguing that the English process denied him natural justice through the registration of the default judgment, refusal to set it aside, denial of an adjournment, and absence of reasons for a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to be heard had he complied with the English rules of court, and that the denial of an adjournment was an exercise of judicial discretion.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed the sentence imposed for civil contempt.

They argued the motion judge erred by imposing a significantly longer sentence than suggested by counsel without advising them beforehand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge did not owe deference to the trustee's submissions on sentence and that the sentence was fit to vindicate the due administration of justice in the context of the contempts.