Patricia D. S. Jackson

The appellant corporation sued three of its former directors and its secured lender for breach of duty leading to its bankruptcy.

The defendants successfully moved for an order requiring the corporation to advance their legal expenses incurred in defending the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the corporation's by-laws, read in conjunction with s. 136 of the Business Corporations Act, made the advancement of legal costs mandatory for the former directors.

The court also upheld the finding that the loan agreement required advancement for the secured lender, and that the motion judge did not err in ordering payment prior to assessment under the Solicitors' Act.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $26,457.59.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, responsible for the appellants' costs, argued for a reduction to $12,000 due to novelty, public interest, and access to justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondent's costs at $18,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, reflecting the nature of the appeal and the dismissal of the cross-appeal.

The appellants, who received long-term disability benefits, brought a proposed class action challenging the insurer's deduction of CPP Child Benefits from their payments.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the deductions were permitted by the policies and not contrary to the Canada Pension Plan, and awarded the insurer $215,000 in costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and the costs award, confirming that while the factors in s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act must be given significance, they do not automatically insulate an unsuccessful class plaintiff from an adverse costs award.

The defendants, eight major financial institutions, successfully defended an appeal of a decision denying certification of a class action regarding mortgage contracts.

The defendants sought their costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded, asserting the proceeding was a test case and involved a matter of public interest under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Divisional Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding the case was not a test case, did not raise a novel point of law, and was not a matter of public interest, but rather involved individual commercial mortgage contracts.

The court awarded the defendants modified partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 per defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions to certify eight separate class proceedings against various financial institutions.

The claims alleged that the respondents incorrectly interpreted mortgage provisions regarding partial prepayment rights and early discharge penalties.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action as they relied on implied terms not supported by the express language of the mortgages.

The court also agreed that the proposed classes were overly broad, individual issues overwhelmed any common issues, and a class proceeding would be unmanageable and not the preferable procedure.

The third parties, who were directors and officers of the plaintiff company, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order refusing to strike out third party claims brought against them personally by the defendant auditors.

The defendants had been sued for negligence in performing audits and sought contribution and indemnity from the third parties for their alleged tortious personal conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as the pleadings properly founded a reasonable cause of action against the third parties.

The appellants, two major gas distributors in Ontario, appealed a decision of the Divisional Court upholding the Gas Distribution Access Rule (GDAR) issued by the Ontario Energy Board.

The GDAR permitted gas vendors to determine how customers are billed for gas commodity sales and distribution services.

The appellants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction under the Ontario Energy Board Act to make such billing rules and failed to follow the required rule-making process.

The Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for subordinate legislation is correctness.

Applying this standard, the Court found that the Board had ample jurisdiction to make the billing provisions, as they regulated an important part of the gas distribution business.

The Court also found the Board complied with the statutory notice and comment process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion before a single judge of the Divisional Court to quash the applicant's appeal on the grounds of mootness and estoppel.

The underlying appeal concerned the applicant's standing to challenge the respondent's election to satisfy debenture obligations by issuing shares.

The single judge concluded that the issues raised on the motion to quash were intertwined with the merits of the appeal and potential prejudice to the parties.

Pursuant to section 21(4) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 61.16(2.1), the judge adjourned the motion to be heard by the full panel of the Divisional Court hearing the appeal.

The applicant held debentures issued by the respondent and applied for an oppression remedy under the Business Corporations Act to prevent the respondent from converting the debentures to common shares.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked standing under the trust indenture.

The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the dismissal of the oppression application was an order made under the Act, and therefore the appeal must be heard by the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and cross-appeal regarding a summary judgment motion.

The respondents successfully had all their claims proceed to trial, as the appellants failed to obtain the dismissal of any claims.

The court awarded the respondents 100 percent of their costs for the motions, fixed at $43,799.70 per appellant, and fixed the costs of the appeal at $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants, former auditors and actuaries of the respondent law society, appealed the dismissal of their motions for summary judgment and to strike the statement of claim.

The respondents had sued for professional negligence, alleging the appellants understated deficits in the professional liability insurance plan.

The appellants argued that even if they were negligent, the respondents suffered no damages because the losses were 'passed on' to members through increased levies.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' motions and struck the 'passing on' defence, proceeding on the basis of assumed facts.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in deciding hypothetical questions of law based on assumed facts when material facts were in dispute.

The Court concluded that it was not plain and obvious that the 'passing on' defence is unavailable in Canadian law, and ordered the entire action to proceed to trial.

The appellants appealed a defamation judgment arising from a series of newspaper articles alleging that a municipal engineering commissioner arranged an improper land payment to a developer friend while withholding planning information from council.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege, finding ample support for malice based on a sensationalized, one-sided reporting purpose undertaken without regard for the facts, although one branch of the trial judge’s malice reasoning was set aside because the journalist had been unfairly restricted from explaining his intended meaning.

The court also upheld special damages for loss of employment and substantial general damages, finding a sufficient causal link between the defamatory publication and the respondent’s dismissal.

Punitive damages were set aside because the compensatory award was already sufficient to punish and deter.

The cross-appeal seeking increased damages was dismissed.

The patient underwent a cerebral angiogram to locate a suspected aneurism.

During the procedure, she experienced discomfort, hyperventilated, and asked the doctors to stop.

After calming down, she was asked if she wished the test completed and she consented.

Following the final injection, she suffered a rare reaction rendering her a quadriplegic.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a patient may withdraw consent during a procedure, the patient here had validly consented to its continuation.

The doctors were not required to repeat the full disclosure of risks because there had been no material change in circumstances.