Patricia D. S. Jackson

The CCAA monitor of Algoma brought an oppression action under the CBCA against Algoma's parent company, Essar Global, regarding a transaction that transferred Algoma's critical port facilities to a related entity.

The court found that the monitor had standing to bring the action on behalf of creditors.

The court held that the port transaction and a change of control clause giving Essar Global a veto over any buyer of Algoma violated the reasonable expectations of creditors and were oppressive.

The court rejected the business judgment rule defence and ordered the deletion of the change of control clause and amended the agreements to allow Algoma to terminate them after a third-party loan is repaid.

Portco sought orders for immediate and future payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement, and a US$5 million charge on Algoma's assets, arguing the payments were required post-filing in a CCAA proceeding.

The CCAA Applicants (Algoma) and DIP lenders opposed, citing the DIP Agreement's budget approval requirement and an arguable right to equitable set-off against a promissory note owed by Portco's parent company (EGFL) to Algoma.

The court found that the DIP Agreement and Initial Order did not mandate payments without DIP lender approval and that an arguable case for equitable set-off existed.

The motion was dismissed as premature, pending determination of the set-off issue and other concerns raised by the Monitor regarding the Portco transaction and recapitalization.

The applicants brought a motion to strike portions of the respondents' affidavits filed in a pending application regarding a right of way dispute and defamation claims.

The applicants argued the impugned paragraphs contained irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was either withdrawn from objection by the applicants or was admissible as it went to the respondents' state of mind, responded directly to issues raised by the applicants, or provided relevant narrative history rather than being offered for the truth of its contents.

The applicants, anchor tenants in three shopping malls, sought to assign and sublease their leases to a joint venture limited partnership.

The respondent landlords refused consent.

The court held that consent was not required because the leases were being assigned to the general partner, which was an affiliate of the existing tenant, thus falling under the leases' Affiliate Exception.

Alternatively, the court found that the landlords unreasonably withheld consent for two of the leases, as the tenant would remain liable and continue operating the stores, but the landlord was entitled to arbitrarily withhold consent for the third lease based on its specific terms.

The appellant utility appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming an Ontario Energy Board order that reclassified $22 million in FT-RAM revenues from utility earnings to gas supply cost reductions.

The appellant argued this was an unauthorized departure from their Incentive Regulation Mechanism Agreement and constituted impermissible retroactive ratemaking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the revenues were generated on a planned basis contrary to the regulatory principle inherent in the agreement, and that because the revenues were brought forward for disposition and the utility failed to disclose its planned activities, the funds were encumbered and subject to further disposition by the Board without offending the rule against retroactive ratemaking.

The plaintiffs moved to certify a proposed class proceeding arising from alleged respiratory injuries following administration of Taxotere during breast cancer treatment at a hospital.

Certification was refused because the amended statement of claim did not adequately plead material facts supporting negligence, fiduciary duty, contract, misrepresentation, or failure to warn, and because the proposed class definition was vague and overbroad.

The court held that causation, duty, standard of care, warning, and damages issues were inherently individual and lacked a workable class-wide methodology.

Given the limited number of potential claimants and the predominance of individualized malpractice issues, a class action was not the preferable procedure and the litigation plan was unworkable.

The Court dismissed an appeal from a civil contempt finding against a lawyer who returned trust funds to his client despite a Mareva injunction.

The Court held that civil contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act that breaches a clear order with notice, and does not require contumacious intent.

The Court also held the motions judge erred by reopening and setting aside the initial contempt finding on evidence that should have been filed at the liability stage.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed securities class action for secondary market misrepresentation under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act, obtained leave under s. 138.1, and had the action certified.

They later moved for leave to amend their statement of claim to add new allegations of misrepresentation.

The defendants consented to amendments that merely expanded already-pleaded allegations but opposed the balance as fresh misrepresentation claims requiring a separate, and now time-barred, leave application.

The court held that leave under s. 138.8 is assessed against each discrete allegation of misrepresentation, so that the impugned amendments — alleging new bribery and code-of-ethics violations in multiple jurisdictions — were not mere elaborations but discrete claims requiring a fresh leave application.

The motion was granted in part: the consented amendments were allowed and the impugned amendments were refused.

The appellants sought to certify a class action claiming unpaid overtime on behalf of Investment Advisors and Associate Investment Advisors employed by the respondents.

The motion judge and Divisional Court dismissed the certification motion, finding that eligibility for overtime pay could not be determined as a common issue because it required an individual assessment of each employee's duties, autonomy, and managerial responsibilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the lower courts correctly applied the legal principles governing the common issue requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision granting the plaintiffs leave to pursue claims under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act and certifying the action as a class proceeding.

The plaintiffs alleged the corporate defendant misrepresented its equity market risk by failing to disclose its decision to abandon hedging and reinsurance of guaranteed products.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusions that the plaintiffs had a reasonable possibility of success at trial and that the common law misrepresentation claims were suitable for certification alongside the statutory claims.

The appellant utility company appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board that reclassified $22 million in earnings from a transportation risk alleviation mechanism as 'gas transportation costs' rather than 'utilities revenue'.

The appellant argued this constituted impermissible retroactive ratemaking.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Board had the authority under section 36 of the Ontario Energy Board Act to ensure rates were just and reasonable, particularly given the appellant's lack of disclosure regarding the nature of the revenues.

Following certification of a securities class action, the court determined the appropriate costs award arising from the leave and certification motions.

The moving parties sought more than $1.18 million in fees and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The court emphasized the need for transparency, proportionality, and historical benchmarking when assessing certification-motion costs under Rule 57.01(1).

After adjusting excessive hourly rates and disbursements, and considering historical averages for comparable certification motions, the court fixed costs at $467,234 payable forthwith, with an additional $100,000 in disbursements payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act to bring an action against Manulife Financial Corporation and its former executives.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the adequacy of Manulife's risk management practices and failed to disclose its massive unhedged exposure to equity market risk prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable possibility of success at trial, and certified the action as a class proceeding, certifying seven common issues.

The appellants appealed a decision denying certification of a proposed class proceeding against CIBC and CIBC World Markets for alleged misclassification of employees making them ineligible for overtime.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that despite an amended class definition, the issue of eligibility for overtime for Investment Advisors and Associate Investment Advisors required individual, case-by-case determinations regarding their managerial or supervisory functions.

The appellants failed to establish a basis in fact that the job functions were sufficiently similar to be resolved as a common issue.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action against a pharmaceutical manufacturer regarding the oral contraceptives Yasmin and YAZ.

The proposed class included Ontario residents prescribed and using the drugs prior to November 30, 2011, and derivative claimants under the Family Law Act.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the design, testing, marketing, and warning associated with the drospirenone component, claiming it posed greater risks than other oral contraceptives.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action, that the proposed class and common issues were sufficiently defined, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Certification was granted with certain modifications to the class definition and litigation plan.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action for secondary market misrepresentation sought leave to appeal a decision quashing their summonses to two Manulife employees and refusing to compel the defendants to file affidavits on the upcoming leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which followed established jurisprudence that defendants are not required to deliver affidavits or be subjected to cross-examination if they do not intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

The plaintiffs sought leave under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act and certification of a proposed class proceeding alleging secondary market misrepresentation by a public issuer and its directors and officers in continuous disclosure documents.

They also requested approval to discontinue common law negligent misrepresentation and oppression remedy claims in favour of the statutory cause of action.

The court held that the plaintiffs met the statutory leave test by demonstrating good faith and a reasonable possibility of success at trial.

It further concluded that discontinuance of the common law and oppression claims would not prejudice class members because the statutory claim avoided reliance issues and certification difficulties.

The action was certified as a class proceeding, with identifiable class members, common issues, and a preferable procedure established.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action on behalf of CIBC customer service employees for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge and Divisional Court had found it plain and obvious that CIBC's policy requiring pre-approval for overtime complied with the Canada Labour Code, and that individual issues predominated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable the pre-approval requirement violated the Code's mandate to pay for overtime 'required or permitted' by the employer.

The Court also found some basis in fact that CIBC's systemic practices breached employment contracts, satisfying the common issues requirement for certification.

Employees sought certification of a class action alleging that a bank misclassified analysts, investment advisors, and associate investment advisors as ineligible for overtime pay contrary to the Canada Labour Code and the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The proposed class relied on job titles and levels to establish commonality, arguing that eligibility for overtime could be determined collectively or through statistical sampling.

The court held that determining whether an employee exercised managerial or supervisory functions required a fact‑specific assessment of the actual duties performed by each employee.

Evidence showed wide variation in responsibilities even among employees sharing identical job titles, defeating the proposed common issues and rendering statistical sampling inappropriate for determining liability.

As the central issues of overtime eligibility and breach required individualized inquiries, a class proceeding was not a preferable procedure and the certification motion was dismissed.

The appellant, a bank employee, sought to certify a class action against the respondent bank for systemic unpaid overtime.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding no common issues that would advance the litigation and that the bank's overtime policy requiring pre-approval was lawful under the Canada Labour Code.

The motion judge also awarded $525,000 in costs to the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims required individual assessments and that the costs award was reasonable.