Divisional Court

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to compel the respondent's deponent to re-attend to complete his cross-examination on an affidavit.

The applicant had terminated the virtual cross-examination after 5.5 hours due to alleged technological issues and objections.

The court found the applicant's conduct during the examination unreasonable and unfocused, noting that the seven-hour limit for discoveries under Rule 31.05.1(1) does not apply to cross-examinations.

The court denied the request for oral re-attendance but permitted the applicant to complete the cross-examination by way of written questions.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to convert his application for judicial review against the Law Society of Ontario into an action.

The application challenged the Law Society's licensing examinations as ultra vires and alleged Charter violations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting that it is an intermediate appeal and review court that does not hear actions or oral testimony.

The court transferred the matter to the Superior Court of Justice, struck the Notice of Application, and directed the applicant to file a Statement of Claim.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against Employment and Social Service.

The HRTO had dismissed the complaint because the applicant failed to allege a nexus between her long-term unemployment and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous or vexatious.

After reviewing the applicant's written submissions, the court concluded that the application lacked any arguable legal basis and dismissed it.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $3,050.08.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order requiring her to pay the respondent tenant $1,130.00.

The appellant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by proceeding with the hearing in her absence after she sent a letter advising of a doctor's appointment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to follow the Board's procedures for requesting an adjournment and the Board properly exercised its discretion to proceed under the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the November 30, 2020 order of Davies J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as neither party filed a bill of costs.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding retroactive child support and section 7 expenses.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the parties' daughter remained a 'child of the marriage' while attending college and that the respondent was entitled to retroactive child support.

However, the court found the motion judge failed to adequately analyze the section 7 expenses under the Child Support Guidelines.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the issue of section 7 arrears was remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration.

The appellant mother abducted her children and brought them to Canada in violation of a valid divorce order from Nigeria.

The motion judge ordered the children's return to Nigeria.

The mother appealed the decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and that the evidence fell short of establishing the children would suffer serious harm if returned.

The court ordered the children to be returned within 14 days and awarded costs to the respondent father.

The moving party brought motions for an extension of time and leave to appeal two previous orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside two decisions of a single judge of the Divisional Court that quashed his appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order and refused to stay the quashing order.

The tenant argued his appeal was based on a denial of procedural rights, not an attempt to game the system.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the tenant's appeal was an abuse of process because he had no defence to the non-payment of rent and was using the proceedings to live rent-free.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 28, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of $5,000 to the defendants.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

The entitlement to costs of the motion was reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, with the quantum fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an urgent motion order requiring him to return his three children to their primary residence with the respondent and to pay $3,000 in costs.

The Divisional Court found the appeal on the merits to be moot, as the appellant had already complied with the order to return the children.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied, as the motion judge's award of full indemnity costs was reasonable and within her discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother sought to appeal a temporary order adding the child's kin as parties to a child protection proceeding for the limited purpose of seeking access.

The Divisional Court determined the order was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal.

Applying the test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court denied leave, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no issue of general importance.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order confirming that the jurisdiction of an Estate Trustee During Litigation continues during an appeal of the underlying will challenge claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the phrase 'pending the final disposition' in the appointment order clearly encompasses the appellate process.

The court affirmed the long-standing principle that an estate trustee's duties continue until the litigation is finally completed, including any appeals.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university academic appeal committee decision.

In support of his application, he filed an affidavit containing evidence of events that occurred after the original board decision.

The university brought a motion to strike those portions of the affidavit.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, applying the Keeprite principle that judicial review is based on the record before the decision-maker, and finding that the applicant had previously consented to excluding this evidence during the internal appeal processes.