Human Rights - ODC

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing his discrimination claim for being filed one day beyond the one-year limitation period.

The HRTO had refused to extend the time limit, finding the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court found this decision unreasonable, noting the applicant had filed a timely complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission and moved with reasonable dispatch to file with the HRTO after the federal commission declined jurisdiction.

The HRTO's decision was set aside and the matter remitted for a determination on the merits.

The appellants appealed a trial decision awarding the respondent $15,270 in Charter damages for breaches of his s. 10(b) rights during a police detention.

The respondent had previously been granted a stay of criminal proceedings for the same breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the Ward test for Charter damages.

The Court held that the stay of proceedings adequately served the functions of vindication and deterrence, and that an award of damages was not an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances.

The applicants sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to revoke a special event permit for a cultural festival after violent protests erupted on the first day.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it moot since the 2023 festival dates had passed and the 2024 festival proceeded without incident.

The court also noted that the City's decision was substantively reasonable given the immediate risk to public safety, and declined to rule on the jurisdictional and Charter issues.

The University of Waterloo sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision ordering it to implement a Prior Learning Assessment and Recognition (PLAR) pilot project as a systemic remedy for discriminating against an applicant with learning disabilities.

The University argued the Tribunal improperly relied on inadmissible expert evidence and that the remedy violated its institutional autonomy over admissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal did not improperly rely on inadmissible expert opinion and that the PLAR pilot project was a tailored, proportional remedy that respected the University's academic standards while addressing the specific discrimination suffered by the respondent.

The applicants, a reporter and a newspaper, sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision that upheld the refusal to disclose the names and badge numbers of police officers subject to misconduct complaints.

The applicants argued the IPC Adjudicator failed to consider their freedom of expression rights under section 2(b) of the Charter when applying the public interest override in section 23 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the Adjudicator erred by dismissing the Charter argument solely because a formal notice of constitutional question was not filed.

The application for judicial review was granted, the IPC decision was quashed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) decision dismissing its application to remove a second dog from the respondent's unit.

The CAT found that the respondent's partner required the service dog as an accommodation for a disability under the Human Rights Code, and awarded $15,000 in damages for discriminatory treatment.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the CAT did not err in law in its accommodation framework and did not breach procedural fairness in awarding damages or a common expense credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his application.

The applicant had alleged that his termination during his probationary period was based on sex discrimination and reprisal.

The HRTO found no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant provided no evidence connecting his termination to a protected ground.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the HRTO's decision was logical and justified.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination application as an abuse of process due to his persistently discourteous and disruptive behaviour.

The applicant alleged reasonable apprehension of bias, procedural unfairness, and unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court declined to dismiss the judicial review for delay, accepting the applicant's medical explanation.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no breach of procedural fairness, and concluding that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the underlying application for abuse of process was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division upholding findings of professional misconduct, a five-month suspension, and costs.

The misconduct related to his representation of a vulnerable family law client, filing an affidavit containing personal attacks on a judge, and maintaining a website about a dismissed Canadian Judicial Council complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the disciplinary actions reflected a proportionate balancing of the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and rejecting his s. 15(1) Charter and procedural arguments.

The applicant sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario after successfully bringing an application for judicial review.

The Tribunal had erroneously dismissed her human rights application for failing to comply with case assessment directions, despite her having filed the required documents.

The Tribunal consented to the judicial review but opposed the request for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request for costs, finding that the Tribunal's error was made in the course of its administrative functions and that it did not assume an adversarial role in the proceedings.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant mother sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Special Education (English) Tribunal, which upheld the school board's placement of her son, an exceptional student with Down's Syndrome, in a special education class for half the day.

The mother preferred full-time placement in a regular class with one-to-one support.

The Divisional Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and in the child's best interests.

The Court held that total integration would work to the student's disadvantage and dismissed the application.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award which held that the collective agreement violated the Human Rights Code by providing different drug and hospital benefit coverage durations for employees receiving Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (WSIA) benefits compared to those receiving long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the award, finding that the arbitrator erred by failing to compare the two benefit schemes holistically.

When viewed in their entirety, the WSIA scheme provided significant advantages over the LTD plan, and the differential treatment did not constitute discrimination.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a grievance regarding supplemental unemployment benefits.

The collective agreement provided top-up benefits during parental leave to adoptive parents but not to biological parents.

The union argued this violated the Human Rights Code and s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court upheld the arbitration board's decision, finding that the provision responded to the special needs of adoptive parents and did not undermine the human dignity of biological parents, who are not a historically disadvantaged group.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent Commission brought a motion to quash a judicial review application filed by the applicants.

The applicants sought to review the Commission's refusal to enter into a settlement agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the Commission's discretion to enter into a settlement is not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, as it does not affect legal rights or eligibility for benefits.

No costs were awarded due to miscommunications between the parties.

The Attorney General applied for judicial review of a Consent and Capacity Board decision which held that the Board had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the community treatment order (CTO) provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The Divisional Court applied the Martin test and concluded that the Board's mandate involves applying facts to prescribed statutory criteria, not deciding questions of law.

Furthermore, the strict statutory timelines for Board hearings rebut any presumption of jurisdiction to hear complex Charter challenges.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the Board's decision on jurisdiction was quashed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to deal with her discrimination complaint against her former employer.

The Commission had exercised its discretion under section 34 of the Human Rights Code to dismiss the complaint because it was filed more than six months after the events giving rise to it, and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding that the Commission's exercise of discretion was not patently unreasonable.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed a decision of the Human Rights Board of Inquiry finding that the Ministry failed to comply with a 1998 remedial order regarding a racially poisoned work environment.

The Board had ordered a human rights training program, which was not implemented within the required timeframe or in the approved manner.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board had the supervisory jurisdiction to remain seized of the matter, hear evidence of continuing discrimination, and recast its original orders to ensure an effective remedy.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision to decline to deal with her complaint of discrimination based on marital status and age.

The Commission had found the complaint to be vexatious and out of time under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court held that the Commission was entitled to rely on the definition of 'vexatious' from Black's Law Dictionary and that its decision was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a non-custodial parent, sought access to his son's medical records through the Ontario Human Rights Commission, alleging discrimination on the basis of family or marital status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to usurp the Family Court's role in determining parental access rights.

The court found no discrimination and upheld the tribunal's procedural fairness, awarding $1,000 in costs to the Commission.