ODC 2017

The appellant telecommunications carriers appealed a final order of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) that increased the annual pole attachment charge payable to Hydro One Networks Inc. The appellants argued that the OEB breached procedural fairness by expanding the scope of their review and vary motion to include new evidence and issues, and erred in law by refusing to order production of a pole sharing agreement between Hydro One and Bell Canada.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OEB conducted the hearing fairly by granting the appellants' request for a hearing de novo and allowing all parties to present updated evidence.

The Court also held that the OEB's refusal to order production of the actual agreement, while requiring disclosure of its relevant financial impacts, was within its procedural jurisdiction and did not breach natural justice.

The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the National Dental Examining Board of Canada, which dismissed his appeal after he failed the Assessment of Clinical Skills Examination for the third time.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to inadequate reasons and the lack of an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee provided adequate reasons addressing the applicant's specific concerns and that the appeal process did not require an oral hearing under the circumstances.

The appellant sued a public transit commission after falling on a bus when another passenger flipped up an accessible seat.

At trial, the judge granted the transit commission's motion for non-suit, finding no evidence of the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellant argued the driver had special knowledge and should have warned her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in finding the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence by omission.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against the City of Toronto as an abuse of process, and against her union and its counsel for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant had previously settled her grievance and human rights complaint with the City but later filed a new complaint, alleging she signed the settlement under duress from her union.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision was reasonable and correct, as the settlement was binding and the allegations of duress did not invalidate it.

The applicant police officer faced misconduct allegations under the Police Services Act.

He brought a motion for the hearing officer to recuse himself due to alleged bias and lack of jurisdiction, which the hearing officer dismissed.

The applicant then commenced an application for judicial review.

The Chief of Police moved to quash the application on the basis of prematurity.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and quashed the application, holding that judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions is only available in exceptional cases, which this was not.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing her complaint that the respondent union breached its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had been terminated by her employer, and an arbitrator upheld the termination after a five-day hearing.

The Board found the union did not act arbitrarily in refusing to seek judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision was reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's 18-month suspension and substituted a penalty of licence revocation for professional misconduct.

The Appeal Panel had also overturned the dismissal of two particulars of misconduct, finding the appellant had misled investigators and filed false reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Appeal Panel's decisions on both the penalty and the findings of misconduct were reasonable and entitled to a high degree of deference.

The applicants, owners of a designated heritage property, sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change to issue a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) for a wind farm project.

The applicants argued the Director failed to properly interpret the REA Regulation regarding cultural heritage and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness, the Director's decision to issue the REA was reasonable and balanced the statutory priorities, and the comprehensive procedural code in the REA Regulation fulfilled the duty of procedural fairness.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his legal malpractice action for failure to pay costs awards, as well as the Master's award of substantial indemnity costs and refusal to permit cross-examination of an affiant.

The Divisional Court found no factual or legal errors in the Master's decisions, noting the appellant's failure to pay tens of thousands of dollars in costs and his vitriolic submissions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought to stay academic disciplinary proceedings before the University Tribunal pending his application for judicial review of the Tribunal Chair's interim decisions refusing to recuse himself and refusing to disqualify the university's counsel.

The university brought a cross-motion to quash the judicial review application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay and granted the cross-motion to quash, finding that the application for judicial review was manifestly premature as the hearing on the merits had not yet proceeded and the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy through an internal appeal.

The appellant mother sought leave to appeal an order requiring her to post $25,000 in security for costs for her appeal of a custody and access decision.

The court reviewed the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) and found no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The motion judge had properly considered the exceptional circumstances of the high-conflict litigation and the Family Law Rules.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his former employer violated s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act by dismissing him in reprisal for raising harassment allegations.

The Board found the applicant was dismissed for insubordination and failure to follow employer rules, not for asserting rights under the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on clear and logical reasons, and supported by the evidence.

The appellant, a lawyer who acted for a mortgagee in enforcement proceedings, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that found him jointly and severally liable for $9,000 in punitive damages and $5,750 in costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Deputy Judge erred in law by awarding punitive damages against the lawyer without finding any primary liability, independent actionable wrong, or duty of care owed to the mortgagor.

The judgment against the lawyer was set aside.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal a costs order made three years prior.

The applicant argued that his periods of incarceration prevented him from filing the materials on time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to adequately explain the lengthy delay and that he could have prepared the materials while incarcerated.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there were no strong grounds to suggest the motion judge erred in exercising his discretion regarding costs.

The moving party, a lawyer whose license was revoked for professional misconduct involving mortgage fraud, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to explain the delay in seeking leave to appeal and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The moving party sought to set aside or vary an order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal.

The court found that the motion was effectively an appeal of the refusal to grant leave, for which there is no right of appeal unless jurisdiction was mistakenly declined.

Finding no such error, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order made following three motions.

The court determined that the costs order regarding the dismissed action was final, requiring leave under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, while the costs order for the remaining motions was interlocutory, requiring leave under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no matter of general importance for the interlocutory order and no strong grounds to find an error in discretion for the final order.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ottawa Community Housing Corporation and the City of Ottawa that required him to pay parking charges in addition to his rent-geared-to-income.

The applicant argued that parking charges must be included in the geared-to-income rent calculation under the Housing Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the Housing Services Act does not authorize adding parking charges to geared-to-income rent, it does not preclude a separate contractual agreement for parking under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court held that any dispute regarding the validity of the parking charges or the tenancy agreement must be determined by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The appellants, a landlord and his corporation, appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board requiring the corporation to pay the tenant $5,829.91.

The individual appellant argued the corporation was not properly served with the notice of hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on a threshold issue, noting that under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a corporation must be represented by a lawyer unless leave is granted.

As the individual appellant was self-represented, had not sought leave, and had no standing to speak for the corporation, the appeal was not properly before the court and was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed their motion for additional documentary production from the Crown, upheld claims of solicitor-client privilege between a Crown prosecutor and Environment Canada investigators, and allowed the Crown to claw back inadvertently disclosed privileged documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions, which properly applied principles of proportionality and solicitor-client privilege.

The court also found that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance, as the issues were specific to the parties.