ODC 2017

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a written caution issued by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The caution was issued because the applicant's clinic used patient and staff testimonials in its advertising, contrary to the regulations under the Medicine Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the investigation was adequate and the interpretation of the regulation prohibiting testimonials was reasonable.

The applicant company sought judicial review of an interlocutory procedural order made by an arbitrator in an ongoing grievance arbitration.

The order required the company to produce documents found to be arguably relevant and declined to bifurcate the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, reiterating its disinclination to intervene in ongoing labour relations processes absent exceptional circumstances.

The appellant purchased a used car from the respondent that proved defective.

At trial in Small Claims Court, the appellant was awarded repair costs but denied damages for a 34-month car rental and a full refund.

The appellant cross-appealed the damages and costs awards.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the lengthy rental costs were unforeseeable, rescission was not pleaded, and costs were appropriately capped at 15 percent under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant client appealed a motion judge's order refusing to confirm an Assessment Officer's Report and Certificate regarding the respondent solicitor's accounts.

The solicitor had abandoned the assessment hearing after his adjournment request was denied.

The Assessment Officer reduced the accounts from over $1 million to $325,789.01.

The motion judge refused to confirm the report, finding the Assessment Officer's reasons inadequate and imposing an evidentiary burden on the client.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in law by reversing the onus of proof, which rests entirely on the solicitor to prove the reasonableness of his fees.

Given the solicitor's failure to adduce any evidence, the Assessment Officer's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondents $10,000 plus interest and costs based on a promissory note.

The appellant argued the note was unenforceable, the claim was statute-barred, and the corporate defendant should not be liable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the promissory note was valid, the limitation period had not expired, and both appellants were liable as makers of the note.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her claim under Rule 2.1.01(1) to the Divisional Court.

The defendants requested the appeal be dismissed under the same rule.

The court quashed the appeal on its own motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the damages claimed exceeded the $50,000 limit for Divisional Court appeals under section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The proper route of appeal was to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal which found that his injuries from a motor vehicle accident fell within the Minor Injury Guideline under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The adjudicator preferred the objective medical evidence of the respondent's experts over the self-reported evidence of the appellant's treating physicians, noting credibility issues with the appellant.

The Divisional Court held that the adjudicator properly applied the law and that the decision was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a 40-day liquor licence suspension imposed by the Licence Appeal Tribunal for selling alcohol to intoxicated patrons and permitting drunkenness, following two separate incidents where patrons left the establishment and were later found suffering from hypothermia (one fatally).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law in the Tribunal's assessment of evidence, no procedural unfairness from an incomplete recording of the hearing, and no error in principle regarding the sanction imposed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the New Democratic Party's internal decision to reject his candidacy for the party's leadership.

The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the decision, finding that the selection of a major political party's leader has a sufficiently broad public impact to bring it within the realm of public law.

However, applying a reasonableness standard, the court upheld the National Director's decision to reject the applicant, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and concluding that the party was entitled to broad discretion in vetting its leadership candidates.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application under the Hague Convention for the return of his child to Colorado.

The application judge had found that while the respondent mother wrongfully retained the child in Ontario, the appellant subsequently acquiesced to the retention through his prolonged silence and lack of contact.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's conduct demonstrated acquiescence and that his actions did not constitute bona fide attempts at reconciliation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Acting Drainage Referee denying him standing under the Drainage Act to appeal a drainage works report.

The appellant argued he had standing as the spouse of the registered owner of the affected property and as a resident who paid bills.

The Divisional Court upheld the Referee's decision, finding it reasonable that the Family Law Act did not confer an ownership interest for the purposes of the Drainage Act, and that residing in the home did not make the appellant an 'owner'.

The court also dismissed arguments related to the Protection of Public Participation Act and a request for a stay, ultimately dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondents.

The plaintiff appealed a Small Claims Court order that dismissed its claim for an unpaid credit card debt.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim on her own initiative, without notice or submissions, on the basis that it was barred by the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the judge failed to follow the mandatory notice and submission requirements under Rule 12.02 of the Rules of the Small Claims Court.

The matter was remitted back to the Small Claims Court for trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted his request to amend his application but vacated the scheduled trial date and awarded $10,000 in costs thrown away to the respondent.

The Divisional Court applied the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4).

Finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, the court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance concerning the employer's amendment to its photo identification policy.

The amendment discontinued the practice of allowing non-management employees to bring an occasional visitor on transit vehicles without paying a fare.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable, as the plain wording did not require consideration of past practice.

The Court also found that the arbitrator reasonably concluded the employer's past practice did not give rise to an estoppel, as there was no representation by the employer that the practice would continue.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation claim against a hotel and its night manager.

The claim arose from a log entry made by the manager describing the appellant and her husband as 'very intoxicated' and belligerent during a late-night dispute over a hotel room.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was not intoxicated, the description of her belligerent behaviour was justified and the log entry was protected by qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions on justification, qualified privilege, and the absence of malice.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from a Master's decision, the successful police respondents sought costs.

The Crown did not seek costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the appellants had claimed $40 million in damages and made serious allegations against the police in a factually complex action.

The court awarded the police respondents $4,000 in costs, representing a reasonable reduction from their partial indemnity costs.

The applicants, Saugeen First Nation and Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to issue a limestone quarry license to the respondent proponent.

The applicants argued the Crown failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate their Aboriginal and treaty rights.

The Divisional Court found that while the duty to consult was triggered and assessed at the middle of the spectrum, the Crown failed to discharge this duty by repeatedly changing its consultation process, failing to provide agreed-upon capacity funding for expert reviews, and prematurely issuing the license.

The application was allowed, the license was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision striking out his statement of claim with leave to amend and staying the proceeding pending related litigation.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, noting that pleadings motions rarely warrant appellate review.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a substantial indemnity basis due to the moving party making unfounded and serious allegations of improper conduct against opposing counsel.

The appellant physician appealed an eight-month suspension imposed by the Discipline Committee for professional misconduct.

The appellant had borrowed substantial sums of money from two patients to fund a failed investment and subsequently made a consumer proposal, resulting in significant financial losses for the patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee reasonably considered specific and general deterrence, the appellant's lack of remorse, and the vulnerability of the patients due to shared ethnicity and language.

The applicant sought a stay of conduct and reinstatement proceedings before the Law Society Tribunal pending her application for judicial review of several interlocutory rulings.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify intervening in ongoing administrative proceedings.

The court noted the availability of an adequate alternative remedy through the internal appeal structure and found that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the disciplinary process to proceed in the public interest.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.