Court of Justice

The respondent father sought to reduce his child support obligation from $324.00 per month to $298.51 per month and to have accumulated arrears of approximately $17,500.00 set to zero.

The original order from Justice Baldock in 2012 had imputed the father's income at $21,300.00 based on minimum wage.

The father argued his actual income averaged $19,514.00 over three years and that he had obligations to three other children not considered in the original order.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing there was no material change in circumstances and that the father's arrears resulted from his decision to stop paying.

The court found no significant and lasting change in circumstances, noting the father's actual income remained close to the imputed amount and that he had simply chosen not to pay.

The Crown appealed a decision by a Justice of the Peace who granted a stay of a careless driving charge under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The appeal was conducted as a review under section 136 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found that the delay of approximately 12-13 months from the notice of intention to appear to trial completion significantly exceeded the guidelines established in R. v. Morin.

The Crown's argument that the defence was not ready for trial because it did not request disclosure until June 24, 2014 was rejected.

The court found that the inferred prejudice from such delay outweighed any societal interest in prosecution of the highway traffic offence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The offender was arrested carrying a loaded 32-calibre revolver in a public park after being threatened by an assailant at a shelter.

He pled guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The court imposed a sentence of 22 months, reduced to 6 months after applying 1.5:1 credit for 325 days of pre-sentence custody, followed by 18 months of probation.

The decision addresses the application of sentencing principles following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Nur striking down the three-year mandatory minimum for firearm possession offences, and provides extensive analysis of the mitigative effect of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, excess alcohol, and possession of cocaine following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to establish that the accused was the driver.

The court found that while the accused exhibited clear signs of impairment, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was driving the vehicle or in care and control of it.

The accused was found 30 feet from the disabled vehicle when police arrived, with no direct evidence of driving or occupancy of the driver's seat.

The court applied the three-pathway test for care and control and found that the Crown had not established a realistic risk of danger as required.

The accused was acquitted of the driving charges but convicted of cocaine possession, as the arrest was found to be lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The respondent sought to relocate with the parties' child from Ontario to Calgary, Alberta to be with her fiancé who had employment there.

The applicant opposed the relocation.

The court found that while a material change in circumstances existed (the fiancé's inability to find employment in Ontario), the relocation would not be in the child's best interests.

The child had strong, meaningful relationships with both parents, extended family, and friends in Ontario.

The proposed move would significantly curtail contact with the access parent and disrupt the child's established life.

The court dismissed the motion to change.

The defendant brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenging a traffic stop and the issuance of a ticket for driving without a valid license.

The defendant alleged that the stop constituted an arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The court found that the officer had articulable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle based on specific information that the defendant was an unlicensed driver, information that was only two weeks old at the time of the stop.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation, finding that the circumstances did not support an inference of racial profiling and that the stop was lawful under provincial legislation.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision arising from Project Bermuda, a Durham Regional Police investigation into cocaine trafficking.

Four accused were charged with various drug trafficking, firearm, and proceeds of crime offences.

The Crown proceeded on numerous counts with some concessions by defence counsel.

The judge applied the Shephard test to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to commit each accused to trial.

The decision addresses key legal principles regarding possession, conspiracy, voice identification, and the scope of preliminary inquiries.

Multiple counts were dismissed for insufficient evidence, while others proceeded to trial.

The respondent brought a motion to change the child support order of February 15, 2006, seeking retroactive variation to 2007 and rescission of arrears based on changed financial circumstances due to medical conditions.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to terminate the respondent's access and sought a restraining order.

The court found that the respondent established a material change in circumstances due to documented medical conditions limiting his earning capacity.

The court granted a retroactive variation of child support from 2010 onwards, fixed arrears at $10,728 payable at $100 per month, and set ongoing support at $288 per month based on anticipated 2015 income of $33,600.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to terminate access, finding insufficient evidence of material change in circumstances warranting termination.

The court declined to grant a restraining order but imposed restrictions on the respondent's contact with the applicant and child through an order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The father brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' teenage son and to obtain specified access pending trial.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to modify the father's access and require family counselling before access resumed.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the long-standing status quo of the child residing primarily with the mother should be maintained pending trial.

The court held that there were no compelling reasons to disturb the status quo, particularly given the untested nature of competing expert reports on parental alienation and the proximity of trial.

The court determined costs following a motion brought by the father to enforce compliance with three provisions of a consent order, particularly a provision requiring the mother to afford the father the first opportunity to care for the child when she was unable to do so.

The father was successful on the motion, and the court awarded costs to the father while considering the mother's financial circumstances as a custodial parent and the best interests of the child.

The court fixed costs at $2,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable in monthly instalments.

The accused was charged with Dangerous Driving and Driving while Over 80mgs following a high-speed flight from police and a failed Approved Screening Device test.

The Crown proved dangerous driving based on the accused's objectively dangerous conduct during the pursuit, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable driver would observe.

The defence raised Charter breaches regarding delayed right to counsel advice and the breath demand due to language difficulties.

The court found no Charter breaches, as the officer acted appropriately in obtaining translation assistance when language barriers were identified, and the right to counsel advice was provided without delay in the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The accused was charged with assaulting his pregnant partner and threatening to kill her and their unborn child on November 25, 2013.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the credibility of the complainant, who alleged the accused pushed her onto a bed, straddled her, grabbed her arms, and applied pressure to her neck.

The accused denied all allegations and claimed the bruising on the complainant's arms resulted from consensual rough sexual activity.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility due to multiple inconsistencies, including contradictions regarding whether the accused had been drinking, whether he had previously choked her, and discrepancies between her police statement and trial testimony.

The judge found the accused's evidence consistent and credible, and acquitted him of all charges.

The applicant mother sought costs of $17,450.51 following successful motions in a family law proceeding involving custody of two children.

The respondent father opposed the costs award.

The court found the mother was the successful party on the contested motions and entitled to costs.

The father's unreasonable conduct, including avoiding service, failing to meet filing deadlines, and refusing to make settlement offers, was considered.

The court awarded costs of $10,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, finding this amount fair and reasonable in the circumstances rather than a mechanical calculation of actual costs incurred.

The respondent father brought a motion to change child and spousal support provisions in a separation agreement dated December 22, 1999.

The father sought to reduce his child support obligations based on declining commission income and to fix arrears at zero.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and sought to maintain the father's imputed income at $80,000 per annum, arguing the father was intentionally underemployed.

The court found that while the father's gross commission income had declined, he had been significantly underpaying child support by structuring his financial affairs to declare substantially less income than available.

The court imputed income at $80,000 per annum, ordered ongoing child support of $1,823 per month, and fixed arrears at $10,000.

The appellant municipality appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace who reduced a statutory minimum fine of $200 for failing to stop at a red light to $100.

The Justice of the Peace had announced in advance that she would never impose the statutory minimum fine and made comments suggesting bias against the prosecution.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by disregarding the statutory minimum penalty without evidence of exceptional circumstances or undue hardship justifying relief under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to the statutory minimum of $200 plus costs.

The appellant was convicted of parking in a designated handicapped parking space without a permit in violation of City of Markham Bylaw 2005-188, Section 11(1).

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that the sign at the location did not display the bylaw number, and second, that there was no evidence of a painted handicapped sign on the pavement.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that neither the bylaw nor the applicable regulation required the bylaw number to be displayed on the sign or a painted sign on the pavement.

The appeal as to conviction was dismissed, but the appeal as to sentence was allowed on consent and the sentence was varied to the minimum fine of $300 plus costs.