Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The accused was tried on multiple counts arising from an alleged sex-trade operation conducted from a motel room, including human trafficking, material benefit, procuring, advertising sexual services, assault, threats, and breach of undertaking.

The complainants did not testify, and the Crown relied primarily on admitted hearsay, CCTV, police evidence, digital extraction evidence, business records, and other objective evidence.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence under the W.(D.) framework, found the hearsay substantially confirmed by independent evidence, and applied the Sinclair framework to conclude that the accused exercised purposive control, exploitation, and centralized management of money, logistics, communications, and advertising.

The court found that the Crown proved all essential elements of all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

This sentencing judgment concerns A.C., who pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual interference against his niece, K.J., under section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The offences occurred over several years, involving repeated sexual abuse of a minor family member.

The court considered the extensive harm to the victim and family, the offender's background, and relevant sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The judge imposed a six-year concurrent sentence on each count, along with ancillary orders including DNA, long-term probation, and a lifetime SOIRA order.

This decision addresses the sexual assault allegations against Trung Pham, who was accused of non-consensual sexual touching during a body hair removal service at his hair salon.

The court carefully analyzed the credibility and reliability of the complainant J.N. and the accused, focusing on the issue of consent.

While the complainant testified to unwanted touching, the court found reasonable doubt regarding consent due to inconsistencies and the complainant’s conduct, including leaving a tip.

The accused’s denial was not believed, but the Crown failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

This decision addresses the application of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the right to counsel upon detention.

Dylan Smith was charged with two Highway Traffic Act offences related to a fatal accident.

The key issue was whether Smith was detained when he gave a statement in the back of a police cruiser without being informed of his right to counsel, thus triggering Charter protections.

The court applied the purposive approach to detention from R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu, considering physical and psychological restraint.

It found that although Smith was not physically restrained or formally arrested, the circumstances—being isolated in the cruiser, cautioned about charges, and the power imbalance—amounted to detention.

Consequently, his right to counsel was engaged and denied, leading to exclusion of the statement under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Luis Trindade Pereira of multiple charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and breach of undertaking.

The case centered on the credibility and reliability of the complainant M.G. and the accused.

The judge found the accused to be an honest and credible witness, corroborated by independent evidence from a roommate, while rejecting the complainant’s testimony due to inconsistencies, contradictions with independent evidence, and implausible explanations regarding text messages.

The Crown’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not met.

This decision involves the sexual assault trial of Sharmake Sheikh, who was charged with one count of sexual assault against C.N. The case hinged on conflicting accounts of the events that occurred after the parties met at an after-hours club in Toronto.

The complainant testified to non-consensual sexual contact in a cab and outside an apartment building, supported by video evidence and witness testimony.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming consensual interaction and an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The judge found the complainant credible and the accused evasive, rejecting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

This sentencing decision addresses the serious offences committed by Abdisatar Aden, who pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm endangering life, aggravated assault, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The case involved a shooting of an 18-year-old victim, Amadou Suwareh, who suffered life-threatening injuries but survived.

The decision carefully balances aggravating factors such as the use of a modified fully automatic firearm, prior weapons prohibition orders, and possession of crack cocaine for trafficking, against mitigating factors including an early guilty plea, social context evidence of systemic racism and disadvantage, and the offender’s remorse and family support.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, with credit for pre-sentence custody, reflecting the gravity of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence in the context of ongoing gun violence in Toronto.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to his infant daughter, causing her bodily harm through severe malnutrition.

The accused, who was not the primary caregiver, failed to seek medical attention for months despite noticing the child's physical deterioration.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the child's vulnerability and the prolonged neglect against mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, eventual call for medical help, and collateral employment consequences.

The court rejected a conditional discharge and imposed an 8-month conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation.

The defendant, Ryan Patterson, charged with two counts of possession of child pornography, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence (an iPod Touch, Samsung tablet, and Dell laptop) seized during the execution of a search warrant.

The court had previously ruled the warrant overbroad and invalidly obtained due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO) to support the seizure of all listed devices.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the police conduct was careless but not flagrant, the impact on the accused's privacy was mitigated by discoverability (as grounds *could* have been established for a valid warrant), and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

Following the conviction, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The core issue was whether the time the trial judge took to deliberate and render a decision should be included in the total delay calculation under the Jordan framework.

The court held that judicial deliberation time should be excluded from the Jordan calculation, and found that the net delay did not exceed the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was tried on a single count of operating a motor vehicle with blood/alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown called two witnesses: a security guard and the arresting officer who was also a qualified breath technician.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 9 and 10(b), seeking remedies under section 24(2).

The court found that the accused was psychologically detained at her residential door without being advised of her rights to counsel, and that she was arbitrarily detained in a locked cell for 89 minutes after being determined releasable.

The court excluded the breath evidence due to the serious Charter breaches and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a roadside stop at an LCBO plaza.

The defence sought exclusion of breathalyzer results on grounds that the accused, whose first language was Punjabi, was not provided with rights to counsel and breath demand in his language until arrival at the police station, and that he was not given the opportunity to contact counsel of choice.

The court found no breach of Charter rights.

Although there were language difficulties at the roadside, the officer appropriately sought assistance from a Punjabi-speaking officer.

The breath demand was provided as soon as practicable given the language barrier.

The accused was informed of his right to counsel of choice but did not indicate he wished to contact private counsel.

The breathalyzer results were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown abandoned the over 80 charge due to inability to establish the two-hour presumption of identity.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging section 8 and 9 violations based on lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge found the arresting officer had ample reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious collision, witness identification, vehicle registration, and observable signs of impairment.

The court convicted on the impaired charge based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, admissions on the breath room video, breath readings, and observations of impairment.

A defendant was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in prescription drugs following a traffic stop and roadside search.

The court conducted a Charter application to determine whether evidence obtained during the stop should be excluded.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the investigative detention, the warrantless search of her purse and vehicle, and the denial of timely access to counsel.

The court found that the detention was arbitrary, lacking reasonable suspicion; the search was unlawful, as there was no valid consent and no genuine officer safety concern; and access to counsel was improperly delayed.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these Charter breaches under section 24(2), finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement arising from events at the complainant's residence over a ten-hour period.

The central issues were credibility and consent.

The complainant testified that the accused made unwanted sexual advances, blocked her exit, and engaged in non-consensual sexual activity.

The accused testified that all sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but was left in reasonable doubt as to which version of events was true, resulting in acquittals on all counts.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol contrary to the Criminal Code.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of breath test evidence on grounds of breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: (1) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to a 10-minute delay in providing rights to counsel following arrest; (2) a breach of sections 8 and 9 rights due to an 11-minute delay in making the breath demand without reasonable justification; (3) a breach of section 8 rights due to video recording of the accused using the toilet without his knowledge or consent, with his genitals clearly visible on multiple occasions; and (4) a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police questioning the accused about the offence after he indicated he wished to speak to counsel but before he had an opportunity to do so.

The court excluded the breath test evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches, combined with the serious invasion of privacy and the lack of justification for the police conduct, outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused applied for production of the complainant's medical records pursuant to section 278.3 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault case.

The court conducted an in camera hearing to determine whether the records should be produced for judicial review.

The court found that the complainant's waiver of her privacy rights was invalid because she did not have knowledge of the statutory protections or the consequences of waiving them.

The court also rejected the defence argument that the Crown had a duty to review the records and take a position on likely relevance.

On the substantive issue, the court found that the accused failed to establish that the records were likely relevant to any issue at trial or to the competence of the witness.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: assaulting a bus driver contrary to section 266, committing that assault while bound by a probation order contrary to section 733.1, and theft of tip money from a restaurant contrary to section 334(b).

The Crown sought 18 months incarceration followed by one year probation.

Defence counsel sought one year custody.

The court rejected the Crown's submission as disproportionate, finding the assault itself was minor in nature despite aggravating circumstances including the reckless endangerment of bus passengers and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 months and 9 days incarceration (after crediting 44 days pretrial custody at 1.5:1 ratio), plus 12 months probation.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: mischief under $5,000 by interference with an ATM, possession of a forgery device (skimmer device), and possession of a credit card obtained by crime.

The accused was observed manipulating an ATM where a skimmer device and pinhole camera had been installed to steal debit card data and record PINs.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected both positions, finding that incarceration was necessary but that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the accused's youth, first-offender status, and the need to balance general deterrence with rehabilitation principles.