WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: R. v. Laguerre, 2026 ONCJ 255
DATE: 2026 05 04
Peel Region
COURT FILE No.: 3111-998-24-31111966-00
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
WOOLDY LAGUERRE
Before Justice S. Robichaud
Heard on October 27, 2025, to April 10, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on May 4, 2026
Deanna Ida........................................................................................... counsel for the Crown
Stefan Peters............................................... counsel for the accused Wooldy Laguerre
I. Overview.. 5
II. Procedural History. 6
III. The Charges Mr. Laguerre Faces. 7
IV. The Evidentiary Record. 9
A. Admissible Hearsay. 9
B. Police Testimony, CCTV, Cellebrite Extraction, Business Records, and Other Admissible Evidence. 11
C. The Evidence of Mr. Laguerre. 12
i. Examination-in-chief 12
ii. Cross-examination.. 14
D. Assessment and Rejection of the Evidence of Mr. Laguerre. 15
i. Lack of Confirmatory Evidence Supporting the Accused’s Account 15
ii. Mr. Laguerre’s Stated Memory Loss. 19
iii. Internal Incoherence and Shifting Positions. 20
iv. The CCTV Evidence Compared to the Accused’s Account 22
v. The Accused’s Reliance on Prior Experience as a Source of Caution.. 28
E. Overall Findings on the Accused’s Evidence. 29
V. Legal Framework Governing the Human Trafficking and Related Sexual Services Offences 30
VI. Analysis of the Evidence on Material Issues. 32
A. Essential Carry-Over Evidence from the Blended Proceedings. 33
i. Permitted Use of Hearsay of K.L. and N.B. 33
ii. CCTV Time Adjustments. 34
iii. The Timeline of CCTV Evidence. 35
iv. Control of Money and Resulting Dependency. 38
v. Violence as Context for Exploitation and Fear 44
vi. Phone Evidence and Attribution.. 48
The trap phone and the Issue of attribution.. 48
The accused’s sale, distancing, and denied usage of the “trap phone” 49
Adopted findings of the “trap phone” from the blended proceedings. 49
Access vs. control 51
K.L.’s attribution of the “trap phone” to Mr. Laguerre. 52
Cellebrite extraction report: nature, admissibility, and use. 54
The Face-Value Data on The Trap Phone. 55
Cash Images on the trap phone as corroborative evidence of control of proceeds 56
i. Frequency, Management, and Operational Pattern.. 60
Shift to in-call services and alignment with room 408. 60
Digital corroboration and client communications. 60
Corroborative inference from advertising photographs. 61
Corroborative evidence of lack of control of LeoList advertising. 61
B. Use of multiple statements and the limits on prior consistent statements. 63
C. An Assessment of the Complainant’s Hearsay Evidence. 64
VII. Legal Analysis and Application. 67
A. Material Benefit from the Provision of Sexual Services - s. 286.2. 68
B. Receipt of material benefits whether the presumption applies or not 68
C. The exclusions under s.286.2(5) apply. 68
D. Exploitation under s. 279.04: application of the Sinclair Framework. 69
E. Purpose and Exploitation.. 69
i. Legal meaning of “purpose” and “exploitation” 69
ii. Evidence supporting purposive control: 71
iii. The Sinclair factors applied. 73
F. Count‑based synthesis and disposition.. 74
ROBICHAUD J.:
I. Overview
1On October 12, 2024, at approximately 4:15 p.m., a 911 call was made by K.L. from a gas station connected to a motel in Mississauga. During the call, she requested immediate police attendance and declined an ambulance. She reported that she had just left a motel room after being assaulted by her boyfriend, whom she identified as Wooldy Laguerre.
2K.L. told the dispatcher, “My boyfriend keeps hitting me,” and explained that she had gone to the gas station after leaving the room. She stated that she was wearing only a T‑shirt, had no pants, and had left her belongings behind. She described the assault, stating, “He fucking hit me with like a cable… a phone charger,” and added that he “just punched me… like everywhere.” When asked when this had occurred, she responded, “Just right now.” During the call, K.L. was able to identify the room number as 408 but did not know the name of the motel and learned that it was the Super 8.
3K.L. advised that another woman, N.B., was also present in the room. She told the dispatcher that she worked for the accused as an escort and stated that the other woman did as well. She acknowledged cocaine use earlier in the day. She indicated that the accused had not been using drugs or alcohol.
4Throughout the call, K.L. expressed concern about her belongings, repeatedly stating that her phone, keys, money, and other possessions were still inside the room. She told the dispatcher that she was afraid the accused would leave with them if he knew she had contacted police, stating that if he became aware of the call, “he’s gonna leave.” She also said that she could not return to Montreal without her belongings and money.
5Police attended and located K.L. The initial stages of the investigation were captured on body‑worn camera from multiple perspectives. This footage includes the arrest of the accused, statements made by both K.L. and N.B., police attendance at the motel room where the women had been staying, and their transportation to 12 Division.
6As the investigation progressed, allegations emerged that the accused was trafficking and exercising control over both women in connection with sex‑trade activity during a multi‑day stay in Ontario. Neither K.L. nor N.B. testified at trial. The Crown therefore relied primarily on hearsay evidence, together with video surveillance, digital extraction evidence, business records, and police observations. During the trial, I released written reasons addressing the admissibility of the proposed hearsay evidence, reported as R. v. Laguerre, 2025 ONCJ 694.
7The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations.
8The trial therefore turns first on whether the evidence of the accused is accepted or leaves me with a reasonable doubt in relation to the allegations. If it does not, I must then assess whether the admissible hearsay evidence, considered together with the other admissible evidence, is sufficient to satisfy the Crown’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The analysis that follows addresses those questions in detail.
II. Procedural History
9Despite the initial estimate of five days, this trial spanned a period of over twenty court days between October 27, 2025, and April 10, 2026, and was marked by several unexpected developments and mid‑trial applications that shaped both the evidentiary record and the way the case proceeded.
10Prior to trial, on October 23, 2025, the Crown filed notice of its intention to seek admission of hearsay statements from both complainants, including the 911 call, body‑worn camera footage, and a video‑recorded police interview. The Crown advised that, despite the complainants having been properly subpoenaed, their attendance could not be assured.
11As anticipated, neither complainant attended at the outset of trial. Evidence was heard concerning extensive police efforts to secure their attendance. Officer Kenaul Douglas testified and was cross‑examined by the defence on those efforts. Being satisfied that the statutory requirements were met under ss. 705(2) and 698(2)(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada, material witness warrants were issued for both complainants on October 27, 2025. The trial thereafter proceeded as a blended voir dire.
12On October 28, 2025, the defence brought an application to exclude a statement attributed to the accused on the basis that it was involuntary and obtained in violation of ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
13On November 17, 2025, the Crown applied pursuant to s. 601 of the Criminal Code to amend the Information with respect to the allegation of assault with a weapon involving N.B. The proposed amendment expanded the description of the alleged weapon from “a knife” to “a knife, phone, or phone cord.” The application was granted.
14Evidence on the hearsay and Charter applications was heard over the dates of October 27 to 31, 2025, with continuation dates in November and December 2025. On December 29, 2025, I delivered the written reasons referenced above, admitting some of the hearsay evidence under the principled exception, with necessity conceded by the defence and threshold reliability remaining in issue, and excluding the accused’s statement as involuntary and obtained in breach of the Charter.
15Following delivery of that decision, the Court held the matter down, at its own suggestion, to permit defence counsel to review the ruling with Mr. Laguerre and obtain instructions regarding defence evidence. In light of Mr. Laguerre’s custodial status, the balance of December 29 and December 30, 2025, was set aside to ensure counsel had adequate time to prepare. A priority continuation date of January 9, 2026, was obtained.
16The Crown also advised of its intention to proceed with an application to adduce similar‑fact evidence, notice of which had been provided earlier in the proceedings. At the request of the defence, that application was deferred to allow time for responding materials to be filed. Additional continuation dates were set to permit proper adjudication of the application.
17Defence responding materials were ultimately filed by February 4, 2026, following an unavoidable delay to a personal matter relating to the loss of a family member.
18The Court rendered its decision dismissing the similar fact application on February 9, 2026. On that same date, defence counsel advised the Court that K.L. had contacted him directly the previous day, notwithstanding the outstanding material witness warrant and without having contacted the Crown or police. The defence took the position that, considering that communication, the hearsay ruling should be revisited on the basis that necessity was no longer operative. Due to an administrative issue, the accused was not produced until late in the court day, and no reopening of the hearsay ruling occurred.
19The Crown closed its case. The defence elected to call evidence, and Mr. Laguerre testified on February 10 and 11, 2026.
20On February 11, 2026, while Mr. Laguerre remained under cross‑examination, the Court was advised that N.B. had been located in Quebec pursuant to the material witness warrant and was produced by video appearance. She was released on a recognizance designed to secure her attendance, should it be required. At that point, the defence advised that it did not intend to call her as a witness.
21K.L. remained at large throughout the remainder of the proceedings and continued to have no contact with the Crown or police, notwithstanding her communications with defence counsel and her apparent awareness of the trial dates.
22In light of these developments, I permitted defence counsel to obtain further instructions from Mr. Laguerre pursuant to rule 5.4‑2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The defence subsequently brought a mistrial application, which I dismissed with oral reasons on February 11, 2026.[1]
23Additional continuation dates were required due to scheduling constraints and Crown counsel’s engagement in another trial. Mr. Laguerre’s cross‑examination concluded on March 19, 2026.
24Neither complainant ultimately testified. The matter proceeded to closing submissions on March 25, 2026.
III. The Charges Mr. Laguerre Faces
25The accused faces fifteen charges arising from events alleged to have occurred in Mississauga between October 6 and October 12, 2024. Mr. Laguerre is charged with a total of fifteen offences under the Criminal Code, namely:
(1) Assault against K.L. contrary to s. 266;
(2) Breach of an undertaking in relation to K.L. contrary to s. 145(4)(a);
(3) Assault with a weapon against N.B. contrary to s. 267(a);
(4) Uttering threats to cause bodily harm or death to N.B. contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a);
(5) Trafficking in persons in relation to K.L. contrary to s. 279.01(1);
(6) Trafficking in persons in relation to N.B. contrary to s. 279.01(1);
(7) Receipt of a financial or other material benefit derived from trafficking in relation to K.L. contrary to s. 279.02(2);
(8) Receipt of a financial or other material benefit derived from trafficking in relation to N.B. contrary to s. 279.02(2);
(9) Obtaining or communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration in relation to K.L. contrary to s. 286.1(1);
(10) Obtaining or communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration in relation to N.B. contrary to s. 286.1(1);
(11) Receipt of financial or other material benefits derived from the provision of sexual services in relation to K.L. contrary to s. 286.2(1);
(12) Receipt of financial or other material benefits derived from the provision of sexual services in relation to N.B. contrary to s. 286.2(1);
(13) Exercising control or influence over K.L. for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services contrary to s. 286.3(1);
(14) Exercising control or influence over N.B. for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services contrary to s. 286.3(1); and
(15) Knowingly advertising an offer to provide sexual services contrary to s. 286.4.
26The defence concedes that the breach of undertaking contrary to s. 145(4)(a) of the Criminal Code is made out. That concession is supported by the evidentiary record and requires no further analysis beyond disposition.
27The Crown pointed out a drafting error in relation to Counts 5 and 6. Those counts charge the accused under s. 279.02(2) of the Criminal Code, which applies only where the financial or other material benefit is derived from trafficking of a person under the age of eighteen, contrary to s. 279.011(1).
28It is common ground that neither K.L. nor N.B. was under the age of eighteen at the material times.
29As framed, the youth‑specific offence under s. 279.02(2) cannot be made out. However, where the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused received a financial or other material benefit knowing that it was derived directly or indirectly from human trafficking of an adult, the offence under s. 279.02(1) is available as a lesser included offence. That is the framework applicable to the disposition of Counts 5 and 6.[1]
30Except for the conceded breach of undertaking, all remaining counts are contested. Their determination turns on whether the Crown has proven the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt, having regard to the admissible evidence.
IV. The Evidentiary Record
31The evidence at trial and on pre‑trial motions proceeded in a blended manner. In addition to hearing trial evidence, the Court was required to receive and determine evidence and submissions relating to a number of admissibility issues, including hearsay, the voluntariness of statements, similar‑fact evidence, and related evidentiary questions. Following my rulings on those issues, including rulings on the admissibility of certain hearsay and other contested evidence, the evidentiary record was refined accordingly.
A. Admissible Hearsay
32The admissibility of hearsay evidence in this case was determined through a combination of rulings under the traditional res gestae exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule.
33The admissibility of portions of the 911 call placed by K.L. on October 12, 2024, was addressed in a separate ruling released on November 25, 2025, concerning the traditional res gestae exception.
34The portions of the 911 call admitted under the res gestae exception consist of spontaneous and contemporaneous utterances made under the stress of the alleged assault. These include, but are not limited to, K.L.’s statements relating to:
the timing and nature of the assault,
her identification and description of the accused,
her location and immediate flight from Room 408,
her lack of clothing and personal belongings,
the presence of another woman in the room,
her expressions of fear, panic, and urgency, and
her stated concern that the accused would leave with her property.
35In R. v. Laguerre, 2025 ONCJ 694,[2] I identified the admissible out‑of‑court statements attributed to K.L. and N.B. admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule. Subject to the exclusions and qualifications identified in that ruling, the following evidence was admitted:
- The remaining portions of the 911 call placed by K.L. on October 12, 2024, including statements relating to her employment as an escort, the working relationship between herself, N.B., and the accused, the presence and role of the other woman in the room, admissions concerning prior drug use, and other narrative or contextual information not strictly spontaneous in nature.
- Utterances made by K.L. captured on body‑worn camera footage on October 12, 2024, including statements relating to the alleged assault and its timing, her physical condition, deprivation of her phone, money, and property, her work as an escort and her relationship with the accused, and her expressed concerns.
- Utterances made by N.B. captured on body‑worn camera footage on October 12, 2024, including statements describing what she witnessed in Room 408, alleged violence against K.L. and herself, expressed fear, alleged threats, and aspects of control and working arrangements.
- Utterances made by N.B. captured on in‑car camera footage during police transport on October 12, 2024.
- Utterances and conduct of K.L. captured on in‑car camera footage during police transport on October 12, 2024, to the extent admitted in the hearsay ruling.
- The video‑recorded police statement of N.B. at 12 Division, conducted in French with interpretation, admitted under the principled hearsay exception, subject to the express exclusions identified below.
- In‑person utterances made by K.L. to Detective Constables Brunino and Douglas on October 12 and 13, 2024, admitted under the principled hearsay exception to the extent identified in the ruling.
- Text messages sent by K.L. to Detective Constable Douglas on October 16, 20, and 23, 2024, including text messages, images, and screenshots.
- Statements by K.L. and N.B. describing their present physical condition, admitted for the limited purpose of establishing contemporaneous pain, but not the cause of that pain.
- References to “Julian” made by K.L. and N.B., admitted solely for context and evidence of fear, and not for the truth of any alleged criminal conduct, weapon possession, or organized crime association.
36As explained further below, the admission of hearsay evidence at the threshold stage does not determine the weight it ultimately carries. Admissibility and ultimate reliability remain distinct inquiries.
37As part of the W.(D.)[2] analysis, I must assess hearsay evidence on the same reasonable‑doubt standard that applies to all evidence at trial. I may accept some, all, or none of it, having regard to the content of the statements, the circumstances in which they were made, and their consistency or inconsistency with other admissible evidence.
38Even outside the threshold analysis stage, I nonetheless assess the hearsay with caution given its inherent limitations and the inability to completely test such evidence through cross‑examination.
B. Police Testimony, CCTV, Cellebrite Extraction, Business Records, and Other Admissible Evidence
39In addition to the hearsay evidence admitted pursuant to my prior ruling, the evidentiary record includes the following:
The viva voce evidence of multiple police witnesses, together with corresponding body‑worn camera footage (audio and video), including evidence from Detective Constable Douglas, Detective Constable Brunino, Constable Hunt, Constable Thurston, Constable Bolarinho, and Sergeant Bennewitz.
Hotel surveillance video from the Super 8 hotel, including footage depicting movements in and around Room 408 between October 6 and October 12, 2024.
Hotel records and related documentation confirming the booking of Room 408, associated registration details, and the duration of occupancy.
Physical and photographic evidence documenting observed injuries to K.L. and N.B. at the time police attended, as well as photographs subsequently provided to police.
Digital evidence extracted from the cellular device referred to throughout the trial as the “trap phone,” including the Cellebrite extraction report and associated exhibits.
Business and third‑party records, including Leolist legal production materials and Traffic Jam archival data relating to online advertisements for sexual services.
Physical evidence seized from Mr. Laguerre upon arrest, including currency and other property, together with continuity documentation.
Other relevant documentary exhibits, including identification materials, undertakings, and seizure records, admitted without objection.
40This evidence was led as part of the blended proceedings. As a result, there is overlap in the evidentiary record that will not be repeated here, except where necessary for the analysis that follows. It is the totality of the admissible evidence, considered as a whole, that must be assessed to determine whether the Crown has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. The Evidence of Mr. Laguerre
i. Examination-in-chief
41In his examination‑in‑chief, the accused categorically denied trafficking, exploiting, or exercising control over either K.L. or N.B. as alleged. He denied recruiting them into the sex trade, directing their activities, controlling their movements or finances, or profiting from their sexual services.
42He maintained that both women were already engaged in sex work prior to travelling to Ontario and that any decision to continue that work was theirs alone. He portrayed his role in relation to K.L. as supportive rather than exploitative, testifying that he encouraged her to improve her circumstances and reduce or leave sex‑work activities, and denied any intent to exploit her.
43In elaborating on his description of a “supportive” role, the accused testified that he encouraged K.L. to improve her circumstances by pursuing education. He stated that this included encouraging her to register for school, which he portrayed as an effort to assist her in reducing or leaving sex‑work activity and improving her life situation.
44In his examination-in-chief, the accused acknowledged that he had previously been involved in trafficking‑related conduct. He testified that he did not engage in such conduct during the period in issue and denied repeating that behaviour in his dealings with K.L. or N.B. [3]
45The accused testified that he transported K.L. and N.B. from Quebec to Ontario, which he described as merely giving them a ride. He denied that this transportation involved recruiting them into sex work, directing their activities, or coordinating their movements once in Ontario.
46According to his evidence, he travelled to Ontario to engage in vehicle theft and phone‑ and credit card related fraud, which he described as his primary source of income. He stated that these activities were undertaken independently and not in coordination with K.L. or N.B.
47With respect to these vehicle theft(s), the accused testified in broad terms. He stated that vehicles were targeted and stolen with the assistance of others using electronic programming devices, and that stolen vehicles were sold for cash. In his examination‑in‑chief, he did not identify specific dates, locations, vehicle makes or models, or the number of thefts carried out in Ontario. He testified that the proceeds of this activity explained why he possessed cash during the relevant period.
48He maintained that this lack of precision was related to his intoxication at the relevant times, the passage of time since his arrest, his time in custody, and the impact of those factors on his memory.
49Mr. Laguerre testified that he also engaged in phone, and credit card fraud related by obtaining mobile phones using false identification and reselling them. He acknowledged that K.L. had previously assisted him in this activity but did not, in his examination-in-chief, identify when that assistance occurred during the charged period, whether it took place in Ontario, or whether it overlapped with her sex‑trade activity. He did not testify that N.B. participated in any fraud.
50While in Ontario, he stated he obtained his own accommodation at an Airbnb that was separate from where K.L. and N.B. were staying. Notwithstanding, he acknowledged fraudulently securing a room at the Super 8 hotel in Mississauga for K.L. and N.B. According to his evidence, the arrangement was that they would pay him approximately 50 percent of the hotel’s stated rate, an amount he characterized as substantially less than what they would otherwise have been required to pay.
51He was adamant that he did not reside at the hotel and attended there only intermittently to socialize. In his examination‑in‑chief, he did not describe how frequently he attended the hotel, how long he remained on any visit, or how transportation between the various locations was arranged.
52With respect to finances, the accused denied taking money earned through sex work. He testified that any funds he received from K.L. or N.B. related only to drug sales or reimbursement for accommodation.
53The accused acknowledged that he was a drug dealer and admitted selling speed, cocaine, and crack to K.L. during the relevant period. He denied selling fentanyl. He denied selling drugs directly to N.B. but acknowledged that, through K.L., N.B. would have presumably received them. He further denied using drugs as a means of coercion, leverage, or control over either complainant. He testified that drug use sometimes contributed to instability and conflict, but denied exploiting that vulnerability.
54With respect to the events of October 12, 2024, the accused testified in his examination-in-chief that he did not assault or threaten either K.L. or N.B. He stated that upon returning to room 408 after having gone out to obtain food, he was told by N.B. that K.L. had overdosed. According to his account, K.L. became immediately upset upon learning this and accused N.B. of having “snitched,” which he testified meant disclosing her drug use to him, something he said K.L. believed could result in him informing the father of her children.
55He testified that the verbal argument escalated when K.L. threw a phone at N.B. According to his evidence, N.B. then responded by picking up a cord and striking K.L. several times in a swinging or whipping motion. He described the physical altercation as brief, lasting only a short period.
56The accused maintained that he did not strike either woman, did not use a weapon, and did not make threats. He testified that his own involvement was limited to attempting to intervene, separate the two women, and de‑escalate the situation, and he denied participating in the physical confrontation in any way.
57He further testified that K.L. ran out of the room shortly thereafter, leaving without her belongings. He denied causing any injuries later observed on either woman, attributing those injuries to the physical altercation between K.L. and N.B. He stated that he left the hotel soon after because the room had been fraudulently obtained in his name and he feared police involvement.
58In his examination-in-chief, the accused did not provide a clear explanation for why K.L. fled the room without clothing or possessions beyond attributing her departure to the altercation with N.B. He denied that either complainant acted out of fear of him, maintaining that any actions, movements, or decisions made by K.L. or N.B. were voluntary and not the product of intimidation, threats, or coercion by him
ii. Cross-examination
59Under cross‑examination, the accused’s evidence became more detailed in certain areas, primarily in response to focused questioning on matters he had addressed only in general terms in chief. These additional details were not offered spontaneously but emerged through such focused cross‑examination.
60When pressed on the source of the cash found in his possession, the accused tied that money to the theft and sale of a specific vehicle. He testified that he stole a black Lexus RX 350 that was sold for approximately $5,000 to $5,500 in cash in the days leading up to October 12, 2024, and that a large portion of that money remained in his possession thereafter.
61None of those particulars had been provided in his examination‑in‑chief.
62Similarly, when questioned about other participants in vehicle theft, the accused identified a specific associate, Leslie Francois, also referred to as “Pac Man,” whom he said he met while previously in custody. He further identified Mr. Francois’s girlfriend as being involved in auto‑theft activity.
63Neither individual was named, nor were their roles described, in chief.
64Cross‑examination also elicited more detailed admissions concerning drug sales. The accused acknowledged selling cocaine, speed, and crack to K.L. frequently during the relevant period and accepted that individual purchases sometimes involved several hundred dollars. When pressed to account for those figures in the aggregate, he did not identify the number of transactions, the overall sums involved or explain how those amounts reconciled with the cash later found in his possession. Instead, his answers remained general and did not yield a calculable explanation.
65Although Mr. Laguerre maintained that the money in his possession resulted from drug sales to K.L., he provided no meaningful detail to support that explanation. He did not identify specific transactions, quantities, prices, timing, or overall amounts. Nor did he explain how, on his account, the funds later found in his possession would have been exhausted in this way. His explanation remained at a level of generality. He did not identify specific transactions, quantities, prices, timing, or overall amounts, nor did he explain how the funds later found in his possession would have been exhausted in this way.
66With respect to accommodation, the accused confirmed under cross‑examination that the Super 8 hotel room was fraudulently obtained in his name and acknowledged attending at the hotel repeatedly during the Ontario trip. He also tied his departures from the hotel to fear of police detection arising from the fraudulent booking. The frequency and circumstances of his attendance were not addressed in his direct testimony.
67Cross‑examination further revealed repeated disagreements when the accused was confronted with CCTV footage and extracted phone data. He questioned the accuracy of timestamps, denied that he was using the “trap phone” on October 12, and asserted that images could be subject to multiple interpretations.
68Throughout cross‑examination, the accused frequently attributed his earlier lack of detail to intoxication, the passage of time, or difficulty remembering dates. However, it was only under sustained challenge that his evidence became anchored to specific vehicles, named individuals, cash amounts, and operational details.
69The significance of this evolution is addressed in the assessment that follows.
D. Assessment and Rejection of the Evidence of Mr. Laguerre
70Having set out the content of Mr. Laguerre’s evidence-in-chief and the way that evidence unfolded under cross‑examination, I now turn to its assessment. In doing so, I consider his testimony, measured against the objective record and the surrounding evidence. The focus of what follows is not on whether the accused was required to corroborate his account, but on whether the explanations he offered can reasonably be accepted considering the evidence before the Court and the way his evidence evolved.
71Although I address the accused’s testimony first for the purposes of structure and clarity, I have considered it in the context of the full evidentiary record. The assessment that follows is informed not only by the accused’s own evidence, but by the objective and contextual evidence adduced at trial, including the CCTV footage, the extracted digital data, and other exhibits addressed in greater detail elsewhere in these reasons.
72The sequencing of that analysis should not be taken to suggest that any part of the evidence was considered in isolation or out of its proper context.
i. Lack of Confirmatory Evidence Supporting the Accused’s Account
73In assessing the evidence of the accused, I look to the extent to which his narrative is supported, or undermined, by independent or confirmatory evidence.
74There is no requirement in law that an accused’s evidence be confirmed by independent evidence. The presence or absence of confirmatory evidence is but one of many considerations in assessing the evidence as a whole when determining whether the Crown has discharged its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
75However, where an accused elects to testify and explains his conduct, it is open to the Court to assess that explanation in light of the presence, or absence, of objective support and the appropriate weight it may deserve, while remaining mindful at all times of the Crown’s burden.
76A central feature of the accused’s account was his assertion that he travelled to Ontario to engage in criminal activity, including organized vehicle theft and fraud, and that this activity explained both his conduct and the money he had in his possession during the relevant period. That explanation depended on the Court accepting the existence of an organized criminal enterprise operating independently of K.L. and N.B.’s sex‑trade activity. The objective evidence before the Court did not meaningfully support that narrative.
77In particular, the accused testified that he was involved in stealing vehicles using electronic programming equipment, including devices designed to bypass vehicle security systems, and that this activity formed the purpose of his travel to Ontario.
78However, no items consistent with vehicle‑theft activity were seized or observed by police.
79There was no evidence of any OBD device, electronic transmitter, programmer, laptop, tablet, wiring equipment, or other tools commonly associated with modern vehicle theft. Nothing of that nature was located in the Super 8 hotel room, the Honda vehicle, or among the belongings found at the scene. Although the accused repeatedly referred to such equipment when describing how these thefts were carried out, he offered no evidence as to where that equipment was at the time of his arrest, nor any explanation suggesting that it was stored elsewhere or beyond police reach.
80Given the accused evidence that electronic devices were central to his alleged criminal activity and, on his account, actively in use during this period, the complete absence of any such equipment in the evidence or his testimony provides no objective support for that stated purpose of attending Ontario.
81I am mindful that the absence of such items must be approached with caution, particularly where the accused was not directly questioned about their location nor was there an extensive inventory of searches provided by police testimony. The weight of this absence therefore rests not on any failure to explain, but on reasonable inference drawn from the evidentiary record as a whole.
82I have also considered the possibility that any tools used for vehicle theft were in the possession of others associated with the accused. However, even on that interpretation, the evidence does not disclose how the accused could have engaged in, directed, or prepared for the activity he described without possession of, or access to, the very devices said to be essential to it.
83There are also similar concerns relating to his evidence relating to the rental vehicle he claimed to have rented while in Ontario to commit these thefts. Mr. Laguerre testified that the rental vehicle was connected to his vehicle‑theft activity and that it formed part of how he operated while in Ontario. However, when pressed on how the rental vehicle fit into that asserted criminal enterprise, his answers were internally inconsistent. He was unable to clearly explain why a rented vehicle, traceable to him, would be used in furtherance of covert theft activity, or how its use advanced the thefts he claimed to have committed.
84Cross‑examination also exposed gaps in his explanation about timing, duration, and purpose of the rental. He did not provide a coherent account of when the vehicle was used, for what specific tasks, or how that use aligned with his description of organized vehicle theft carried out with others. Nor did his explanation account for why the rental vehicle would be retained in circumstances where no associated theft equipment, tools, or proceeds were ever located.
85As with his broader account of vehicle theft, the accused’s explanation of the rental vehicle rested largely on assertion. When examined in detail, it did not meaningfully align with the objective evidence, nor did it provide a persuasive or internally consistent explanation for his conduct during the relevant period.
86In cross‑examination, the accused attempted to explain the use of a rental vehicle bearing Ontario licence plates by suggesting that Quebec plates would have attracted suspicion while operating in Ontario. That explanation, however, was difficult to reconcile with the broader narrative he advanced.
87The accused’s evidence was that he was engaged in organized vehicle theft and took steps to avoid police attention. Yet the use of a rental vehicle, obtained from a commercial business in his own name and tied directly to his identity, payment information, and contractual records, increased rather than reduced traceability.
88The accused did not explain why, if his objective was to avoid detection and scrutiny, he would rely on a vehicle so readily linked to him personally, nor how that approach aligned with his account of covert criminal activity. He also did not address why other alternatives, such as the use of non‑traceable plates, would not have been available to him given the level of criminal sophistication he otherwise described.
89When examined closely, the explanation for the rental vehicle and its licence plates did not coherently align with the accused’s asserted purpose for being in Ontario or with his broader description of avoiding police attention.
90In cross‑examination, the accused suggested that the rental vehicle had been obtained through a business that he characterized as informal and not operating in the manner of a standard commercial rental agency. However, he did not describe that business as one that rented vehicles without safeguards, nor did he testify that vehicles were provided without identification, records, or any means of linking the vehicle to the renter.
91The vehicle in question was described as a Dodge 300, a valuable and readily identifiable asset. The accused did not explain how such a vehicle would be rented without any mechanism to ensure its return or to identify the person in possession of it. His evidence did not address how the purported rental operation would recover the vehicle if it was not returned, or how the renter would avoid being identified in that process.
92Although the accused suggested that the rental arrangement was informal, he did not testify that the vehicle was obtained fraudulently, nor did he explain how any such fraud would have operated. In particular, he did not describe using false identification, providing fictitious information, or otherwise concealing his identity from the entity that supplied the vehicle.
93As with his broader account of vehicle theft and avoidance of police detection, the explanation concerning the rental vehicle rested largely on assertion. When examined in detail, it did not coherently explain how the use of a rented vehicle, obtained through an identifiable transaction, advanced his stated objective of avoiding scrutiny or detection.
94In short, there was no evidence outside the testimony of the accused allowing a reasonable inference that another vehicle was being used by the accused during this time (no receipts, changes to hotel parking records, witnesses, references from N.B. or K.L. to another vehicle) that would confirm his account to allow such an inference to be made.
95Again, the accused need not prove anything but the lack of any confirmatory evidence where one might reasonably expect some remnant to remain is a relevant consideration in assessing his credibility.
96Similar difficulties arise with respect to the accused’s evidence about phone‑based fraud.
97The accused testified that he typically used multiple phones for fraudulent activity and that such phones would become unusable once associated with fraud, which he attributed to IMEI‑based blocking. He further testified that the phone seized by police, referred to as the “trap phone,” was not his primary fraud device, that it had been sold or transferred to K.L. months earlier, and that he used it only on a limited basis when his other device was unavailable.
98Even if I were to accept the accused’s evidence that he used the trap phone in a limited way for fraudulent purposes on October 8, the phone extraction revealed no digital artefacts consistent with that type of activity.
99The phone contained no communications, applications, transaction attempts, or other digital artefacts indicative of the fraud described by the accused outside of that relating to the fraudulent hotel acquisition. There is nothing relating to Amazon purchases, dark web activity, or Snapchat conversations offering to obtain discounted items through these means. The activity reflected on the device related directly to the events giving rise to the charges, including the booking of the hotel room. There was no digital evidence consistent with even limited use of the phone for the fraudulent conduct the accused described.
100I remain mindful that the scope and focus of a phone extraction may be influenced by investigative priorities. However, the accused’s own evidence was that the phone had been used for fraudulent purposes during the relevant period. The absence of any digital footprint consistent with that claim does not align with the narrative he advanced, particularly in light of the detailed extraction covering that time frame.
101This absence is also relevant when considered alongside the accused’s broader portrayal of his relationship with K.L. and the alternative narrative he advanced. Specifically, he testified that he encouraged improvement in her circumstances and described fraud activity as a principal source of income unrelated to sex work.
102To the extent that this explanation was offered as context for his proximity to her activities, there is no objective evidence supporting any effort to redirect or replace sex‑work activity during the relevant period. The material extracted from the phone he said K.L. was using contains no communications or indications consistent with that portrayal. While such evidence is not required, its absence provides no objective support for the narrative advanced.
103The absence of confirmatory evidence relating to vehicle thefts, vehicle rentals, phone frauds, or any other criminal activity he testified to is an important, albeit not determinative factor in assessing the truthfulness of his testimony.
ii. Mr. Laguerre’s Stated Memory Loss
104The accused repeatedly asserted, primarily under cross-examination, that he could not recall basic, concrete details, including addresses, dates, timelines, quantities of drugs sold, and amounts of money exchanged.
105He was unable to provide even approximate locations for the Airbnb, such as the street name, intersection, or nearby landmarks, notwithstanding his evidence that this location played a central role in his movements during the period from October 6 to October 12, 2024.
106He attributed these gaps in memory to a combination of factors, including sustained alcohol consumption during the relevant period, the passage of time since the events, his time spent in custody, and his unfamiliarity with Peel Region. I accept that each of these factors can affect recollection of these specific details.
107Nonetheless, the accused’s memory difficulties did not present uniformly across his testimony. While his recollection was limited on matters central to the chronology of events, his movements, and his interactions with the complainants, he was at times able to recall other details with a greater degree of specificity.
108By way of example, he was able to provide more particular evidence regarding:
the sale of a black Lexus RX 350 and his estimate that approximately $4,000 to $5,500 in proceeds remained thereafter;
the identity of an associate known to him as Leslie, also referred to as “Pac Man,” and that individual’s involvement in vehicle theft;
the involvement of that associate’s girlfriend in auto theft activity;
the sale of a phone to K.L. for $250, which he described as having occurred several months prior to October 2024;
his assertion that he used that phone on a single occasion, later identified as October 8, because another device had been left at the Airbnb;
his claim that he did not sell drugs to K.L. on October 12, while asserting sales on other days; and
his explanation that IMEI based “burning” rendered certain phones unusable for fraud.
109Importantly, many of these more detailed points were not volunteered during the accused’s examination-in-chief and were instead developed through cross-examination, often in response to focused questioning or reference to objective exhibits.
110This unevenness in recollection does not, on its own, determine credibility. However, when viewed in the context of the evidence, it bears on the weight and reliability to be given to the accused’s account, particularly where limited memory affected his ability to provide coherent and testable explanations for matters central to the charged events.
111While a significant time has elapsed, that fact does not readily account for the pattern of memory difficulty reflected in the accused’s testimony. The matters said to be beyond recall were not peripheral or background details, but events central to the allegations and to the day of arrest itself, including the accused’s movements, interactions with the complainants, and explanations for his conduct. The passage of time may explain the fading of contextual detail, but it does not persuasively explain an inability to recall such core and consequential events.
112The accused’s evidence in chief was not framed around impaired memory or an inability to recall events. Concerns about intoxication and lapses in recall arose more prominently during cross‑examination, often in response to questioning directed at inconsistencies, unexplained details, or aspects of his account that were difficult to reconcile with the evidence. This does not, of itself, establish unreliability. However, when considered alongside the uneven nature of the accused’s recollection and the specificity he was able to provide on other matters, it diminishes the persuasive force of his reliance on time in custody as an explanation for his inability to recall key details.
iii. Internal Incoherence and Shifting Positions
113In addition to the issues surrounding memory, there were internal inconsistencies in the accused’s evidence that further undermined the coherence of his account.
114Mr. Laguerre insisted that he was not staying at the Super 8 hotel, characterizing his presence there as merely “chilling.” At the same time, he acknowledged possessing a key card to the room, storing personal clothing and belongings inside, and coming and going freely. He offered no clear explanation for how these indicia of ongoing access and personal use were consistent with his assertion that he was not, in fact, residing there.
115This evidence is difficult to reconcile with the accused’s repeated assertion that K.L. and N.B. were engaged in sex‑trade activity entirely independently of him and without his involvement, awareness, or coordination. On his account, he had unrestricted access to the very space where that activity was occurring, yet denied knowledge of client timing or arrangements. The combination of unrestricted access, personal belongings in the room, and frequent attendance sits uneasily with his denial of oversight, participation, or specific awareness of client activity.
116The accused offered no explanation as to how, in the absence of any coordination or awareness of client arrangements, he would know when it was appropriate to attend at the room so as to avoid entering during client encounters. On his own evidence, his access was unfettered and uncoordinated. It defies common sense that, in those circumstances, a person could repeatedly attend a room used for sex‑trade activity without knowledge of, or communication about, client timing. Such unrestricted access is far more consistent with participation in, or at least awareness of, the planning and coordination of those activities than with the role of a wholly uninvolved third party.
117This internal incoherence is compounded by the absence of any evidence on the “trap phone” suggesting coordination between the accused and the complainants concerning his access to the room. There were no communications indicating that his attendance was timed to avoid client encounters or that permission was sought before entering. While such evidence is not required, its absence further undermines the coherence of his assertion that he was merely present as an uninvolved third party with unrestricted access to the room.
118A similar internal inconsistency arises in the accused’s description of his level of intoxication during the relevant period.
119Mr. Laguerre repeatedly testified that he was heavily intoxicated, and at times “always drunk,” relying on that assertion to explain gaps in memory and an inability to recall key details. At the same time, he maintained that he was capable of driving, coordinating travel between locations, engaging in complex fraud and vehicle‑theft activity, managing multiple phones, and making calculated decisions to avoid police detection. These positions are difficult to reconcile.
120The accused’s evidence regarding his departure from the hotel following the events in room 408 also shifted. He testified that he left because he feared being detected for defrauding the hotel. However, he also maintained that no adverse consequences had yet arisen from that fraudulent booking. No one had been confronted, payment had not been demanded, and no intervention had occurred. His explanation for leaving therefore sat in tension with the factual circumstances as he himself described them. It also makes little sense considering the room was not connected to him in any way in the records or billing information.
121The accused’s evidence regarding the timing of events on October 12, 2024, was likewise inconsistent. When confronted with surveillance footage that did not align with his narrative, he variously denied the implication of the footage, suggested that timestamps were inaccurate, or asserted that an image could “mean many things,” without offering a coherent alternative sequence of events.
122These inconsistencies did not concern peripheral or background matters. They related to issues central to the case, including where the accused was staying, his level of intoxication and capacity, his degree of involvement with the complainants, the events surrounding the alleged assault, and his stated reasons for leaving the hotel. Considered cumulatively, they further undermined the internal coherence of his account.
iv. The CCTV Evidence Compared to the Accused’s Account
123The most significant incompatibility in the accused’s evidence arises when his account of events is measured against the CCTV evidence from the Super 8 hotel. The sequence he advanced in his examination-in-chief, and later attempted to maintain under cross‑examination, cannot be reconciled with what is objectively depicted on video.
124In his examination-in-chief, the accused testified that the relevant sequence of events unfolded as follows:
(1) he left the hotel room to obtain food;
(2) he later returned to Room 408 with the food;
(3) upon returning, he was told by N.B. that K.L. had overdosed;
(4) K.L. became upset and accused N.B. of being a “snitch”;
(5) a physical altercation ensued between the two women;
(6) K.L. fled the room; and
(7) he and N.B. left the hotel shortly thereafter, which he attributed to fear of police involvement arising from the fraudulent acquisition of the hotel room
125He testified that the altercation he observed was as follows:
Upon entering the room, he was told by N.B. that K.L. had overdosed. According to his evidence, this precipitated an argument between the two women.
He testified that K.L. became upset and accused N.B. of having “snitched,” which led to a heated verbal exchange between them.
The argument escalated into a physical altercation, during which, on his account, N.B. struck K.L.
He testified that the strike or strikes involved a cord or phone charger, and at different points described N.B. as having hit K.L. multiple times, though he later indicated that he did not count the number of blows and could not be precise.
He maintained that he did not strike either woman and did not use any force against K.L. or N.B. or threaten either of them.
He did not use any form of weapon, namely a phone cable or telephone receiver.
He testified that his involvement was limited to attempting to intervene by separating the two women and de‑escalating the situation.
According to his evidence, following this altercation, K.L. ran out of the room without her belongings. He testified that he did not prevent her from leaving and did not understand why she fled without clothing or personal property, attributing her departure solely to the conflict between K.L. and N.B.
The accused further testified that after K.L. fled, he left the hotel with N.B. shortly thereafter.
He stated that his reason for leaving was fear of police involvement arising from the fact that the hotel room had been fraudulently obtained in his name, not fear that K.L. would contact police. He denied that either woman acted out of fear of him and maintained that their actions that night were voluntary and unrelated to any coercion or control on his part.
126That narrative collapses when tested against the CCTV evidence.
127The video shows that K.L. ran from Room 408 at approximately 15:28 on the E‑4 camera feed, corresponding to approximately 16:06–16:07 actual time. She is seen exiting Room 408 abruptly, running down the hallway in a state of clear distress. At that point, the accused is not depicted returning to the room with food.
Figure 1 - Exhibit 28 - Screenshot of CCTV Video - K.L. Running from 408 at 16:07 (adjusted time)
Figure 2 - Super 8 CCTV - K.L. running from room at 16:07 (adjusted time)
128The 911 call was made by K.L. at approximately 4:15 p.m. from a gas station connected to the hotel.
129When confronted with this discrepancy under cross‑examination, the accused did not offer an alternative sequence. Instead, he asserted that “the hotel has to fix that,” a position he repeated despite prior findings confirming the accuracy of the CCTV timestamps.
130The accused’s version of events is irreconcilable and improbable with the objective CCTV evidence for several inter-related reasons.
First, the complainants did not flee together. K.L. ran from Room 408 first and alone. N.B. did not follow her. Instead, N.B. remained inside the room for several additional minutes before later fleeing separately at approximately 16:16. That staggered flight is inconsistent with the accused’s claim that the violence was a mutual altercation between the two women. If K.L. was fleeing violence from N.B., one might reasonably expect immediate pursuit or near‑simultaneous exit – or at least the altercation or escalation spilling out into the hallway. Neither occurred.
Second, the accused’s own conduct following K.L.’s flight contradicts his portrayal of a peripheral or disengaged role. CCTV shows him exiting the room shortly after K.L. fled, looking in the direction she ran, speaking on a phone, and re-entering the room. That behaviour reflects continued involvement rather than withdrawal.
Third, the accused’s account cannot logically explain N.B.’s conduct following K.L.’s flight. On his evidence, K.L.’s departure should have brought any altercation to an end. Instead, N.B. remained inside Room 408 for several minutes after K.L. fled and only later ran out separately, after the 911 call had been placed. That sequence suggests a continuing source of fear within the room after K.L. left, which is inconsistent with the accused’s assertion that the violence consisted solely of a mutual dispute between the two women.
Fourth, the accused’s explanation involving a food run is fundamentally inconsistent with the established timeline. CCTV shows that he returned with food only after K.L. had fled and after the 911 call had been placed. Returning to the room with food, waiting outside it, and continuing to move about the floor is incompatible with his claims of confusion, panic, or disengagement. If his narrative were accurate, returning with food at that point makes no sense.
Fifth, he does nothing to distance himself with N.B., whom he states was the assailant, N.B. despite his concern of criminal exposure on the fraudulent hotel booking.
Sixth, despite his stated affection and ongoing concern for K.L., he does nothing to pursue her and instead associates and flees with her stated assailant, N.B. and is found casually alongside her when police find them.
Finally, the accused’s reliance on intoxication and confusion cannot account for the ordered and sequential conduct captured on multiple cameras over several minutes. The events recorded are structured, not chaotic.
131Taken together, the timeline does not merely fail to support the accused’s evidence; it affirmatively contradicts it. The temporal separation between K.L.’s flight and N.B.’s later escape, combined with the accused’s documented conduct in the intervening period, is inconsistent with his claim that the violence was confined to a mutual altercation between the complainants and that he played a limited or protective role.
132When confronted with this timing under cross‑examination, the accused did not reconcile his evidence with the video. Instead, he asserted that the CCTV timestamps must be incorrect and maintained that the food was obtained before K.L. fled. As already explained in the hearsay ruling, the CCTV timestamps are corroborated by independent evidence and are reliable. No evidentiary basis was offered to undermine their accuracy.
133The CCTV also shows the accused leaving with N.B., returning to the floor, and later exiting via the stairwell. This behaviour is inconsistent with his testimony that he left promptly out of his stated fear of police detection for his involvement in the fraudulent booking of the room.
134The accused’s explanation fails to account for why he did not leave the hotel alone.
135As the CCTV footage demonstrates, he exited the hotel with N.B. in a coordinated and cautious manner through a rear stairwell. This was the same individual whom he claimed had just committed a violent assault on K.L. and who, on his account, would therefore have been the person of immediate interest to police. If his concern was solely to distance himself from criminal exposure, there is no cogent explanation for departing with N.B., rather than separating from, the person he said was responsible for the violence. As body-worn camera footage later shows, he is then seen speaking calmly with the N.B. as police attend the scene and approach them with no indication, he is trying to distance himself from her, his alleged assailant of N.B.
136This conduct must also be assessed considering the accused’s own evidence regarding his relationships with the two women. He testified emphatically that he loved K.L., and that he was concerned for her well‑being. By contrast, he minimized any relationship with N.B., describing it as recent and lacking any meaningful personal connection. Against that backdrop, his decision not to follow, locate, or check on K.L. after she fled in evident distress, while instead remaining with and later departing alongside N.B., is difficult to reconcile with the version of events he advanced. That divergence between what he said about his priorities and how he acted in the immediate aftermath further undermines the plausibility of his account.
137This stated reason for leaving to avoid detection is further undermined by the lack of any means to connect him to the hotel (other than CCTV footage and key-card issuance), let alone the specifics of the fraudulent booking.
138I do not accept that explanation.
139Even taken at face value, there was no objective basis upon which such a fear could reasonably arise. The room was not registered in his name, and the accused did not point to any payment method, identification, or booking information that would have linked him to Room 408 in a manner apparent to hotel staff or police at the time.[4]
Figure 3 - Exhibit 1 - Registration details of alias J.S. aka K.L.
140While a “Honda Civic” was registered to the room, this was not done so under his name or any identifying vehicle marker (plate or temporary permit).
Figure 4 - Exhibit 1 - Vehicle Registration to Room 408
141Nothing in the unfolding police response suggested an investigation into hotel fraud, and even on the accused’s own evidence, the status of payment was not the focus of police attention. In these circumstances, the explanation that he fled out of fear of detection for hotel fraud lacks a rational foundation and does not withstand scrutiny.
142Returning to his conduct outside the room, when pressed on why he was repeatedly present outside the room after K.L. fled, the accused offered shifting explanations, including selective denials, professed lack of memory, and suggestions that the footage could be interpreted differently, without proposing any coherent alternative sequence.
143These contradictions, implausibilities, and improbabilities are not immaterial. They go to the core of the accused’s account of what occurred before, during, and after the incident.
144His explanation would require acceptance that the food was obtained before K.L. fled, despite video showing the opposite, that reliable CCTV timestamps were wrong without evidentiary foundation, and that his repeated presence outside the room was coincidental rather than reflective of ongoing involvement.
145I am unable to reconcile the accused’s evidence with the CCTV record. Where an accused’s testimony conflicts with clear and contemporaneous video evidence and no plausible alternative explanation is offered, the objective evidence must be preferred.
v. The Accused’s Reliance on Prior Experience as a Source of Caution
146In his testimony, the accused relied on his prior experience with human trafficking charges as a reason his account should be accepted.
147He testified that, having been convicted in the past, he understood how trafficking investigations unfold and would therefore avoid conduct that might place him at risk again. He stated, in substance, that he was “not an idiot,” and that if he had “any connection with that,” he would not put himself in the same circumstances again.
148He further testified that when he had previously “made that mistake,” it was because he had placed himself too close to the activity, and that he had learned from that experience.
149I do not rely on the accused’s criminal record as evidence of propensity or bad character. However, where an accused affirmatively invokes prior convictions to explain why his conduct should be viewed as cautious or innocent, it is open to the trier of fact to assess whether that explanation coheres with the conduct he himself describes.
150The accused’s stated caution is difficult to reconcile with his own evidence.
151Despite claiming an understanding of the types of conduct that attract police attention in human trafficking investigations, he acknowledged behaviour that placed him in sustained proximity to sex‑trade activity and conduct alleged to be in breach of an undertaking relating to K.L.
152This included selling drugs to a sex worker with whom he had a close relationship and a known substance use issue, in violation of a court order prohibiting contact with her, transporting her and another sex worker to and within Ontario, arranging discounted hotel accommodation used for sex‑trade activity, retaining unrestricted access to the hotel room by key card, keeping personal belongings inside that room, and remaining physically present during the period when that activity was occurring.
153This admitted conduct does not align with his claim that he deliberately structured his behaviour to avoid any connection to human trafficking.
154Mr. Laguerre testified that, through experience, he understood the indicators relied upon by police and courts. That assertion sits uneasily with the close logistical and practical proximity to sex‑trade activity reflected in his own account.
155The accused repeatedly relied on this claimed caution when responding to allegations of control and exploitation during cross‑examination.
156In these circumstances, the accused’s reliance on his prior experience does not enhance the reliability or plausibility of his explanation.
157When considered carefully, it highlights the inconsistency between what he said he knew to avoid and what he acknowledged having done.
E. Overall Findings on the Accused’s Evidence
158The concerns outlined above regarding the accused’s evidence are not isolated or peripheral. They arise repeatedly and centrally across his explanations for why he was in Ontario, the source of the money found in his possession, his relationship with the complainants, the events of October 12, 2024, and his conduct before and after K.L. fled Room 408.
159When assessed cumulatively, Mr. Laguerre’s evidence is marked by internal inconsistency, selective recall, shifting positions under cross‑examination, and a lack of alignment with objective and contemporaneous evidence, including the CCTV footage, digital extraction evidence, and hotel records. His explanations require acceptance of strained reconciliations between what he asserted and what the evidence shows, records, or omits.
160For these reasons, I am unable to accept the accused’s account. I reject his evidence where it conflicts with the objective and reliable evidence before the Court.
161Having rejected the accused’s explanation, I turn to the question that remains dispositive: whether the admissible evidence relied upon by the Crown, assessed on its own and cumulatively, proves the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the analysis that follows depends on disbelief of the accused alone.
V. Legal Framework Governing the Human Trafficking and Related Sexual Services Offences
162The charges alleging violence and threats turn on whether the prohibited conduct and the requisite intent are established on the evidence accepted by the Court. If the evidence of K.L. or N.B. is accepted and does not leave the Court in reasonable doubt, the elements of assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats may be satisfied.
163The breach of undertaking count is conceded by the defence and is addressed on the basis of the admitted record.
164In contrast, the human trafficking and sexual services offences require a more detailed statutory analysis. Liability for those offences depends on the application of specific definitions and legal tests, including control, exploitation, and purpose, which must be applied to the evidence with precision.
165The sexual services offences alleged in this case include obtaining or communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services and advertising sexual services. Those offences do not require proof of exploitation. Liability turns on whether the accused knowingly engaged in, or exercised control over, communications or advertisements made for the purpose of obtaining sexual services or promoting their availability. In assessing those offences, the Court must determine whether the evidence establishes authorship, control, or direction over the relevant communications or advertisements, as well as the requisite knowledge and intent. Evidence that overlaps with the trafficking allegations may be relevant to that inquiry, but the statutory elements remain distinct.
166Certain sexual services offences include statutory immunity or exceptions that may, depending on the facts, preclude liability. Those provisions are considered only where engaged by the evidence and are addressed in the analysis of the specific counts to which they apply.
167Section 279.01 of the Criminal Code criminalizes a broad range of conduct, including recruiting, transporting, transferring, receiving, holding, concealing, or harbouring another person, as well as exercising control, direction, or influence over that person’s movements. Proof of any one of these forms of conduct is sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of the offence. Control, direction, or influence over movements is not limited to physical restraint and may include non‑physical or psychological means of affecting where, when, or how a person moves or acts.[3]
168The trafficking offences further require proof that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct for the purpose of exploiting or facilitating the exploitation of the complainant. The focus of this inquiry is on the purpose motivating the accused’s conduct, not on whether exploitation was successful or completed. Actual exploitation is therefore not an essential element. Where exploitation is established on the facts, inferring that exploitation was the accused’s purpose will often be straightforward, but the analysis remains directed to the accused’s state of mind and the objective circumstances surrounding the conduct.[4]
169The meaning of “exploitation” is derived by s. 279.04 of the Criminal Code. A person is exploited where they are caused to provide, or offer to provide, labour or services by conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause a reasonable person in the complainant’s circumstances to believe that their safety, or the safety of a person known to them, would be threatened if they failed to provide the labour or service. The assessment is an objective one. It is not necessary that the complainant was in fact threatened, nor that the accused intended to threaten; nor must the complainant subjectively articulate fear.[5]
170The concept of “safety” under s. 279.04 is broad and encompasses both physical and psychological safety. Psychological harm, emotional dependency, and fear arising from financial deprivation, isolation, manipulation, or abuse of power may be sufficient to meet the statutory threshold. In determining whether the accused’s conduct could reasonably be expected to produce the requisite fear for safety, courts may consider a non‑exhaustive range of factors, including the complainant’s vulnerability, the nature of the relationship, the accused’s control of finances or communications, the use of coercion or manipulation, and any abuse of trust, power, or authority. None of these factors is required in every case, and no single factor is determinative.[6]
171Finally, the analysis of trafficking offences is contextual and must be undertaken with close attention to the cumulative effect of the accused’s conduct on the complainant’s autonomy and safety. Prior participation in sex work, apparent cooperation, or the absence of overt violence does not preclude a finding of exploitation. The question remains whether, viewed realistically and considering the totality of the relationship and circumstances, the accused’s conduct crossed the statutory threshold by creating or sustaining a situation in which a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would believe their safety was threatened if they did not continue to provide services.[7]
172Some of the charged offences allege specific acts of violence. Those allegations cannot be considered in isolation from the human trafficking offences. Acts of violence and threats may be relevant not only as independent offences, but also as evidence of control, dependence, and exploitation under the trafficking provisions.
173In particular, the human trafficking offences require a contextual assessment of whether the accused’s conduct, taken as a whole, could reasonably be expected to cause the complainant to believe that their safety, including their psychological safety, would be threatened if they failed to provide labour or services. Evidence of physical violence, threats, or intimidation may therefore serve a dual role: it may ground liability for specific violent offences, while also informing whether the statutory definition of exploitation is met. The analysis cannot artificially compartmentalize those allegations without distorting the legal inquiry.
174For that reason, although the elements of the non‑trafficking offences are distinct as a matter of law, the evidence relevant to those counts overlaps materially with the evidence relied upon to establish exploitation, control, and purpose under the trafficking provisions. The legal framework set out here therefore focuses first on the trafficking offences, while recognizing that alleged acts of violence will later be assessed both on their own elements and as part of the contextual analysis required by ss. 279.01 and 279.04 of the Criminal Code.
175The Crown bears the burden of proving each essential element of every offence beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden never shifts. Proof may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, assessed as a whole. Where the evidence is circumstantial, guilt must be the only reasonable inference available on the totality of the evidence, and alternative rational inferences consistent with innocence must be excluded.[8]
176Credibility and reliability findings inform what evidence is accepted and the weight it carries, but they do not themselves determine guilt. Each count must ultimately be considered separately, and guilt must be established on each count independently, even where evidence overlaps across offences.
177It is against this legal framework, and based on the admissible evidence summarized above, that I now turn to the assessment of whether the Crown has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each count.
VI. Analysis of the Evidence on Material Issues
178Having rejected the evidence of the accused on all material issues, I turn to the evidence that remains, and in particular to the admissible hearsay and objective evidence relied upon by the Crown.
179The question is whether the Crown has proven the essential elements of the contested offences beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the admissible evidence considered cumulatively and in light of the findings already made. Nothing in the analysis that follows depends on disbelief of the accused alone.
180A central component of the Crown’s case consists of hearsay evidence. Through that evidence, the Crown submits that N.B. and K.L. attribute to the accused conduct which, if accepted, would meet the essential elements of the charged offences. The reliability and weight of that hearsay, assessed within the limits imposed by the hearsay ruling, is therefore central to the determination of whether the Crown has met its burden.
181Even where hearsay has been admitted under the principled exception, that determination resolves only threshold admissibility. It does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation to assess whether the hearsay can ultimately be relied upon to make findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
182Recent Ontario appellate authority has reiterated this distinction and the need for trial judges to maintain evidentiary discipline at the ultimate reliability stage. In R. v. Oloko, the Ontario Court of Appeal stressed that satisfying threshold reliability “does not license a trial judge to short‑circuit the ultimate reliability analysis” and that hearsay evidence must still be evaluated in light of the whole of the evidence, including any objective evidence that may contradict or undermine it.[9] The Court cautioned that reliability cannot be assumed simply because the statement was admitted, particularly where the hearsay relates to contested and consequential issues.
183Guided by these principles, I assess the hearsay evidence in this case with particular care. Where the hearsay is supported by independent, objective evidence that meaningfully reduces the risks associated with motive, perception, memory, narration, or sincerity, it may strengthen the Crown’s case. Where it is not, or where external evidence undermines aspects of the hearsay account, I take that into account in determining whether the Crown has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the material elements of the offences.
A. Essential Carry-Over Evidence from the Blended Proceedings
184As previously explained, the parties agreed that issues relating to hearsay, voluntariness, similar fact evidence, and related evidentiary matters would proceed by way of a blended voir dire forming part of the trial record.
185The resulting evidentiary rulings are therefore to be read together with these reasons in order to understand the scope of the admissible record upon which my findings are based. This judgment is therefore inextricable from the previous ruling.
186The conclusions that follow draw only upon that blended record. I briefly identify here those aspects of the carry‑over evidence that are of particular relevance to the analysis that follows.
i. Permitted Use of Hearsay of K.L. and N.B.
187A central component of the carry‑over record concerns the admissibility and permitted use of out‑of‑court statements made by K.L. and N.B. In the blended ruling, I determined which portions of those statements were admissible for the truth of their contents under the principled approach to hearsay, and which were admitted for more limited purposes. Those determinations define the parameters within which the statements may be considered in the analysis of the offences.
188The statements admitted for the truth of their contents included factual assertions bearing on the complainants’ movements, the accused’s role in communications and logistics, the handling of proceeds, and the complainants’ ability to leave or act independently during the relevant period. Other portions of the statements were admitted for contextual or narrative purposes only. The findings that follow rely exclusively on those portions of the statements that were expressly admitted for the truth of their contents, and only within the limits set out in the hearsay ruling.
189Consistent with that ruling, the admissible hearsay evidence forms part of the record against which reliability and weight are assessed at this stage, together with the other admissible evidence led at trial, including objective and documentary evidence. No aspect of the analysis that follows relies on portions of the statements that were excluded or admitted for a limited purpose only.
ii. CCTV Time Adjustments
190A further aspect of the prior ruling forming part of the carry‑over record concerns the synchronization of CCTV footage. Although the admissibility of the surveillance evidence was not in dispute, it was necessary to reconcile individual camera timestamps with objectively verifiable temporal reference points in order to accurately situate observed events within the broader timeline.
191It was not contentious that the 911 call and the responding officers’ body‑worn camera footage provided reliable external temporal anchors. Those anchors were used to calculate fixed offsets for specific camera feeds. The resulting adjustments, together with a conservative tolerance to account for minor synchronization variability and movement intervals, were set out in a chart appended to the blended ruling. I adopt those calculations here and rely on them solely for the purpose of situating observed events within a coherent and reliable timeline, not as evidence of absolute temporal precision.
Source
Adjustment
Notes
“West stair-G” camera (WSG)
Add 00:38:47
Fixed offset derived from body-worn camera anchor at 16:48:00.
“E-4” camera
(E-4)
Add 00:38:15
Fixed offset derived from paired event with West Stair G plus known descent interval.
“4th” west camera (4W)
Add 00:38:15
Shares camera clock with E-4 (same event at 15:28:50 on both feeds); use E-4 offset.
Stair descent interval
Add 00:00:40
Apply when linking upper-floor cameras to first appearance on West Stair G.
Tolerance notation 'XX'
Approximately one minute
Conservative tolerance for synchronization and movement variability and accounting for deductive calculations from estimated time of W.L. and N.B.’s descent, compared to that of the 40 seconds it took officers to descend the stairwell.
iii. The Timeline of CCTV Evidence
192While the adjusted CCTV timeline was included in the blended ruling, I reproduce it here for ease of reference, as it forms an objective record against which other evidence is properly evaluated.
Date / Actual time (+/- 1 minute estimate)[5]
CCTV time stamp / camera source
Event
EX#
October 6, 2024
21:25:XX
20:47:10 4W cam
K.L. and N.B. arriving and entering Room 408.
27
21:29:XX
20:50:50 4W cam
W.L. arriving at Room 408 at the Super 8 Hotel. W.L. wearing red shoes. W.L. carrying large duffle bag. Enters room.
24
22:45:XX
22:06:45 E-4 cam
W.L., K.L, and N.B. returning to room 408.
25
October 7, 2024
13:46:XX
13:08:00 E-4 cam
W.L., K.L, and N.B. exiting room 408.
26
16:18:XX
15:39:51 E-4 cam
Male exits elevator. Knocks. On phone. Waiting. Enters room 408.
40
16:47:XX
16:09:05 E-4 cam
Male exiting room of 408. (Same male as Exhibit 40).
41
16:56:XX
16:18:00 E-4 cam
W.L., K.L. and N.B. leaving 408 together. K.L. arguing with W.L. – W.L. wearing red Nike shoes. N.B. trails behind to catch elevator.
33
October 8, 2024
17:47:XX
17:09:40 E-4 cam
W.L. exiting 408. Carrying two phones. One is identified as the “trap phone” by distinctive broken component to it and colour.
34
October 9, 2024
03:38:XX
03:00:20 E-4 cam
W.L., K.L. and N.B. leaving room 408 together. Into elevator.
37
04:53:XX
04:15:00 E-4 cam
W.L., K.L., and N.B. return together to room 408 and enter.
36
05:23:XX
04:45:00 E-4 cam
W.L. exits 408 alone. Counting considerable sum of money. Wearing red shoes, white shirt, and black pants. Beige satchel.
35
October 10, 2024
03:00:XX
02:22:24 E-4 cam
Two males going to room 408. One male holding phone as he exits elevator. Enter room 408.
38
03:09:XX
02:31:34 E-4 cam
N.B. exits room 408 with two males. Walks them to elevator. Same males as exhibit 38. Enter and goes into elevator with them.
39
03:46:XX
03:08:22 E-4 cam
Male exits elevator. Knocks on 408. Pulls out phone. Entering room 408
42
04:16:XX
03:38:00 E-4 cam
Same male (exhibit 42) exits room 408 and goes to elevator with N.B. N.B. holding black phone (not trap phone)
43
October 12, 2024
01:04:XX
00:26:00 E-4 cam
Male leaves elevator. Phone in hand. Outside Room 408. Waiting.
44
01:05:XX
00:27:00 E-4 cam
Same male (Exhibit 44) still waiting outsidE-408. On phone texting.
46
01:24:XX
00:46:18 E-4 cam
Different male from Exhibit 44 now waiting outsidE-408. K.L. shows up. Appears to have trap phone in hand (two phones).
47
01:44:XX
01:06:46 E-4 cam
Same male as Exhibit 47 – outside Room 408. Appears to knock. Leaves.
48
16:08:XX
15:30:13 E-4 cam
W.L. outside room 408. Enter elevator. Holding iPhone. Unlocks it. Goes into elevator.
50
16:07:XX
15:28:50 E-4 cam
K.L. seen running from room 408 alone with no pants on – runs past elevator to east stairwell (Same event as exhibit 49). W.L., seen exiting the room and looking towards where K.L. ran 20 seconds later. (N.B. present with him but not on this clip) On telephone. Agitated. Goes back in room.
28
16:07:XX
15:28:50 4W cam
K.L. seen running from room 408 alone no pants on – runs past elevator to east stairwell. W.L. and N.B. exit room. W.L. on telephone. Seen arguing / agitated with N.B. (same event from a different angle as exhibit 28)
49
16:08:XX
15:30:20 E-4 cam
W.L. is seen exiting Room 408, speaking into the doorway, then leaving alone wearing black Adidas flip‑flops, a red shirt, and carrying a beige satchel; checks an iPhone; enters the elevator.
50
16:13:XX
15:35:42 E-4 cam
N.B. runs out of room 408 – runs towards west stairwell – alone does not return to room in this footage (Same event to Exhibit 57)
55
16:13:XX
16:16:04 4W cam
N.B. seen peering out of 408 – looking down hall ,before running quickly down hall towards stairwell – Exhibit57 – 4th west camera – Exhibit 54 (same event to Exhibit 55)
57
16:15
n/a
K.L. calls 911
23
16:28:XX
15:49:57 E-4 cam
W.L. exits elevator - seen holding brown paper bag – holding paper bag etc. - seen returning to room 408 – holding paper bag – wearing flip flops
51
16:29:XX
15:50:35 E-4 cam
W.L. waiting outsidE-408 – holding paper bag etc. – puts bag down in front of 408 – appears to be no response from 408 -– wearing flip flops
52
16:30:XX
15:52:39 E-4 cam
W.L. still waiting outsidE-408 – walking back towards elevators – no longer holding paper bag – holding white iPhone (trap phone) – enters elevator –
53
16:34:XX
15:56:25 E-4 cam
W.L. and N.B. exit elevator with W.L. leading – enter room 408 – W.L. reaches into pocket for key to room – W.L. enters first
99
16:37:XX
15:58:25 E-4 cam
N.B. runs from 408 – W.L. follows walking – W.L. wearing flip flops - walking towards west stairwell
54
16:38:XX
15:59:28 E-4 cam
N.B. and W.L. in stairwell leaving into emergency exit. Both appear uncertain to leave this way. Look for another exit but it is not available. W.L, points out sign that shows an “alarm will sound” if opened. Decide to leave anyway with N.B. looking out carefully first and W.L. cautiously following. (Exhibit 98)
98
16:48:00
16:09:13West Stair G
Officer Bolarinho exits the motel. Body-worn camera used to cross -reference accuracy at this point to the west stair well CCTV time stamp. Bolarinho exits the emergency door at exactly 16:48:00 (real time). The same footage captured from the CCTV stairwell camera (Exhibit 56) (inaccurate) shows a time difference of +00:38:47
iv. Control of Money and Resulting Dependency
193The admissible hearsay record includes statements attributed to both K.L. and N.B. addressing how money earned through sex work was handled during the Ontario trip, including assertions that the accused held or controlled those funds.
194In the 911 call, K.L. stated that she worked for the accused as an escort and that he had possession of all her money. She expressed concern that he would leave with her money and belongings after she fled Room 408 without her belongings. In that call and in subsequent utterances captured on police body‑worn camera, she stated that she did not have access to her phone or money at the time police were contacted.
195In body‑worn camera utterances made shortly after police arrival, N.B. similarly described financial arrangements in which money earned through sex work was turned over to the accused. She made statements indicating that neither she nor K.L. retained control of the money they earned, and that the accused collected or held those funds. N.B. also described an expectation that money earned would be given to the accused rather than kept by the women themselves.
196The following statements attributed to K.L. illustrate the nature of her assertions regarding control of earnings and resulting dependency:
In the 911 call placed on October 12, 2024, K.L. stated that she worked for the accused as an escort and that “he had all my money.” During the same call, she expressed concern that the accused would “leave with my money and my stuff” after she fled Room 408 without her belongings.
In that call, when asked to clarify the nature of the money, K.L. stated that it was “the money that he took from me … the money that I worked for … for him,” expressly linking the funds in his possession to earnings she generated through sex work.
In body worn camera footage recorded by police shortly after arrival at the Super 8 Motel on October 12, 2024, K.L. again stated that the accused had possession of the money, saying that “he had all the money.”
In the same body worn camera footage, when police asked whether she would be able to retrieve her property, K.L. asked, “Am I going to be able to take my money?”, indicating that the money was in the accused’s possession rather than hers.
Later in that interaction, K.L. stated, “all the money he has on him, it’s all ours,” asserting that the cash held by the accused consisted of earnings belonging to her and N.B.
Still during the same sequence, K.L. explained her inability to make decisions or leave independently by stating, “since I have no money, I have to get prepared,” explicitly linking her lack of access to funds to immediate dependency and inability to act independently.
197Assertions of control asserted by N.B.:
In body worn camera footage recorded shortly after police arrival on October 12, 2024, N.B. described financial arrangements in which money earned through sex work was not retained by the women but was turned over to the accused, indicating that earnings were expected to be given to him rather than kept by them.
During the same police interaction, when asked whether anyone could assist her financially, N.B. responded, “No, I have nobody,” indicating the absence of any alternative source of support or access to funds.
In that footage, N.B. also stated that money generated during the trip was in the accused’s possession and suggested that funds existed but were not accessible to her, indicating an awareness that money was present but beyond her control.
Later in the same recording, N.B. described how purported gifts were financed, stating: “He said, ‘I bought you this,’ but in the end what he bought us was with our money,” describing a dynamic in which earnings generated by the women were controlled by the accused and later presented as his generosity.
198In her video recorded police statement later that evening, N.B. provided a more detailed account of these expressed aspects of the control the accused exercised over her and K.L.:
N.B. stated that she worked continuously during the Ontario trip, explaining, “Yes, that’s right, I had to,” and that even when she was not prepared or ready, “the call was there,” indicating that the work proceeded regardless of her wishes or condition.
She stated that the accused determined how work was arranged and controlled communication with clients, explaining that clients would arrive because “he texted” or “he called,” and confirming that it was the accused who advised her when clients were at the door.
When asked who handled the money generated by sex work, N.B. stated, “They kept everything,” and agreed that she herself did not retain the proceeds, adding that she “didn’t get anything.”
N.B. stated that while she would initially collect money from clients, she did not retain control of it. When officers paraphrased that the money was subsequently taken by others, she confirmed that “they kept everything,” indicating that earnings were not accessible to her after collection.[6]
She described an expectation that a specific amount of money had to be earned, stating that they “had to make a lot of money,” and later confirming that there was a maximum expectation of “2000” per night.
When asked what would happen if that amount was not made, N.B. stated that she did not want to find out and that she knew she would be assaulted if she did not work, explaining, “He would have beaten me, I know it.”
She further described that the accused controlled pricing and amounts to be collected, stating that she knew how much money to collect because “he texted me,” and confirming that he set the amounts to be obtained from clients.
In describing the handling of money more broadly, N.B. stated that purported gifts were funded by the women’s own earnings, explaining, “I’m going to buy you presents, presents, right, we’re giving ourselves presents, basically,” reflecting that money generated through her work was controlled and re‑characterized by the accused.
199Additional assertions of control attributed to K.L.
In in‑person utterances admitted through police testimony on the evening of October 12, 2024, K.L. stated that the accused had her money and that it had not been returned to her. Those utterances were made shortly after her arrival at the police station and were described by the officers as brief but consistent with her earlier statements regarding possession and control of earnings.
During those same interactions, K.L. reiterated concern about how she would access money or return to Quebec without assistance, indicating that she did not have independent access to funds and remained reliant on the accused for financial means.
In text messages sent to police in the days following the incident, including communications on October 16, 20, and 23, 2024, K.L. referred to the financial arrangements during the Ontario trip and to her lack of access to money while staying at the Super 8 Motel.
In those communications, K.L. also referred to money earned during the trip being held by the accused and expressed ongoing concern about her inability to retrieve or control those earnings.
These in‑person utterances and subsequent text communications were admitted under the principled approach to hearsay and form part of the admissible record bearing on who held and controlled money generated through sex work during the relevant period.
200In addition to the hearsay evidence, there is objective corroboration bearing on the handling and retention of earnings.
201During the stay at the Super 8 Motel, K.L. is shown in a photograph holding a Canadian $100 banknote bearing serial number GKU9730776. Evidence established that a $100 bill bearing the same serial number was seized from the accused upon his arrest. This serial‑number match was addressed in my prior ruling and relied on as corroborative evidence tied to the retention of proceeds. In context, this constitutes objective evidence relevant to the control and pooling of money during the relevant period.
Figure 5 - Exhibit 76, p.75 – K.L. holding funds
Figure 6 - Exhibit 7 - IMG_1053 – Seized funds from Laguerre
202In addition to the $100 Canadian bill bearing a matching serial number, there is also evidence that K.L. was holding, in Exhibit 67, a $100 United States bill in a photograph she sent to Detective Constable Douglas prior to Mr. Laguerre’s arrest.
Figure 7 - Exhibit 67
Figure 8 - Exhibit 7 - Img_1049
203While the serial number of the $100 United States bill depicted in Exhibit 67 was not compared to the currency seized from Mr. Laguerre and is not visible in the photograph itself, the evidence establishes that Mr. Laguerre was apprehended shortly thereafter in possession of a single $100 U.S. bill among the other cash he carried. This evidence does not permit a definitive identification of that bill. However, when considered alongside the seized Canadian currency bearing a matched serial number, the absence of funds on either complainant, and the broader financial record, it is consistent with the conclusion that Mr. Laguerre possessed money that had previously been in K.L.’s possession as part of the earnings generated during the Ontario trip.
204The evidentiary record, including the accused’s own testimony, establishes that a substantial amount of money was generated from sex work during the Ontario trip. The contemporaneous descriptions given by K.L. and N.B. as to how much money the accused possessed are broadly consistent with the cash seized from him by police. Although the evidence does not permit a precise accounting, this consistency provides objective support for the assertion that earnings generated during the trip were retained by Mr. Laguerre.
205Neither K.L. nor N.B. was found to be in possession of any cash following police attendance. This is in the context where both N.B. and K.L. were both actively working as sex-trade workers during that time and earning a significant amount of funds on even a conservative calculation.
206The evidence further establishes that both complainants lacked any practical means of meeting their immediate needs, including securing food, accommodation, or transportation, and required police assistance to do so. In the circumstances, the earnings generated during the trip were not available to them in any meaningful or usable form.
207Mr. Laguerre testified that the money in his possession resulted from selling drugs to K.L. I have rejected that evidence. The material fact remains that Mr. Laguerre ultimately possessed the funds at the end of the events, while K.L. and N.B. did not.
208Whether through direct retention of sex work earnings or through other mechanisms advanced by the accused, the evidence leads to the same result: control of the money rested with Mr. Laguerre.
209In addition, the evidence of Vice Unit officers corroborates the practical consequences of that financial deprivation following police intervention. Police were required to make arrangements to meet the complainants’ immediate needs and to facilitate their return to Quebec. This assistance would not have been necessary had the complainants retained control over their earnings.
210Further objective corroboration is found in hotel surveillance footage from Exhibit 35, dated October 9, 2024, bearing a time stamp of 04:45:00. The footage shows Mr. Laguerre exiting Room 408 and physically counting a quantity of cash in the hallway. This conduct is consistent with the accumulation and retention of earnings during the Ontario trip and provides real‑time, objective evidence of his possession of cash while the complainants had no meaningful access to funds.
Figure 9 - Exhibit 35 - October 9, 2024 - 04:45:06
211Mr. Laguerre explained this conduct by testifying that he transferred the money from a bag to his person while using the bathroom, out of concern that K.L. might take it. Even accepting this explanation at its highest, it does not coherently account for the observed conduct. His evidence did not establish that he knew what amount of money should have been present, nor how he would have been able to determine whether any was missing. This difficulty is compounded by his broader testimony minimizing his recollection of quantities and attributing poor recall to intoxication. In those circumstances, the act of openly counting cash in the hallway is not plausibly explained as a protective or precautionary measure. For these reasons, I do not accept his explanation for the conduct depicted in the surveillance footage.
212Beyond direct control of earnings, the evidence establishes that K.L. and N.B. were dependent on Mr. Laguerre for accommodation and transportation during the Ontario trip. On his own evidence, Mr. Laguerre acknowledged that he booked the Super 8 Motel room and drove both complainants from Quebec to Ontario. He also acknowledged that there was only one vehicle available during the trip, which he controlled.
213The hearsay evidence attributed to K.L. and N.B. is consistent with, and corroborative of, that account. It establishes that the motel room booked by the accused was where they stayed and worked, that neither complainant had independent access to transportation, and that they relied on the accused to arrange accommodation and movement during the trip. In addition, Mr. Laguerre acknowledged that, on at least one occasion, he went to obtain food for the group. While this evidence does not negate the possibility that food was occasionally obtained in other ways, it is consistent with the hearsay evidence indicating reliance on him for basic necessities during the trip.
214There is no evidence that either complainant independently obtained food, nor would that have been feasible given their lack of access to money.
215Considered cumulatively, the evidence establishes that Mr. Laguerre exercised effective control over money generated during the Ontario trip and, as a result, over the complainants’ ability to meet basic needs and to move independently. This control did not operate in isolation but formed part of the broader context in which the alleged exploitation occurred.
216The dependency described above is also reflected in contemporaneous utterances captured during the 911 call. K.L. stated that the accused had taken her phone and keys, that all her belongings were inside the hotel room, and that she was afraid he would leave with them. She further stated that she could not leave him and that she had no way to return to Montreal. These statements are consistent with, and corroborative of, the broader evidentiary record establishing control over money, movement, and necessities.
217Following police intervention, both complainants lacked the practical ability to secure food, accommodation, or transportation independently, and police were required to make those arrangements. This dependence flowed directly from the accused’s retention of their earnings and his control over the logistical arrangements of the trip. Considered together, the evidence establishes a pattern of dependency tied to the accused’s control of money, accommodation, transportation, and access to necessities, affecting the complainants’ ability to meet their needs and to move independently during the relevant period.
218I turn next to the evidence bearing on violence, threats, and coercion as context for exploitation.
v. Violence as Context for Exploitation and Fear
219The admissible hearsay record contains multiple statements attributed to both K.L. and N.B. describing alleged acts of physical violence, threats, and intimidation by the accused. Those statements are captured through the 911 call, police body‑worn camera footage, and a video‑recorded police interview conducted later the same evening. The complainants made these statements in close temporal proximity to the events of October 12, 2024, and they describe allegations of violence and threats said to have occurred immediately before or in connection with their attempts to flee, resist instructions, or seek police assistance.
220In the 911 call placed shortly after fleeing Room 408, K.L. reported that the accused assaulted her in the hotel room. She stated that he struck her repeatedly and used a phone charging cable in doing so. She told the dispatcher that she fled the room without her belongings after the accused took her phone. During that call, K.L. conveyed fear of the accused, urgency for police assistance, and concern that he might leave or evade police involvement.
221Shortly after police arrival, body‑worn camera footage captured contemporaneous utterances from both complainants describing violence and threats, recorded before police separated them and while visible injuries remained apparent. Those statements provide insight into the circumstances existing immediately before police intervention and into the complainants’ state at that time.
222Despite the repetition from the prior ruling, I include those images here for ease of reference:
Figure 10 - Photograph of injuries of N.B.
Figure 11 - Photograph injury of K.L.
Figure 12 - Photograph injury 2 of K.L.
223Assertions of violence and threats attributed to the accused from K.L.:
During the call, K.L. expressed fear and the need for police assistance, rejecting an ambulance despite her injuries, stating, “I’m scared,” and “I just need the police.”
In the 911 call placed on October 12, 2024, K.L. stated, “My boyfriend keeps hitting me,” and later added, “He fucking hit me with like a cable… a phone charger.”
In the same call, K.L. stated, “He punched me… like everywhere. I’m all bruised up,” in describing the extent of the assault.
In that call, K.L. stated that she fled without her belongings after the accused took her phone, leaving her unable to leave safely or contact help until she reached the gas station.
K.L. explained her flight from the hotel room by stating, “I had to run,” and confirmed, “I left the room.”
In body‑worn camera footage recorded shortly after police arrival, K.L. reiterated that the accused assaulted her and stated that her body hurt “everywhere,” consistent with a recent physical altercation.
In those utterances, K.L. connected the violence to her fear of the accused and to her inability to leave earlier without assistance. K.L. also described deprivation of means to leave safely, stating, “He took my phone,” and “All my stuff is still in the room.”
224Assertions of violence and threats attributed to the accused from N.B.:
In body‑worn camera footage at the scene, N.B. stated that she witnessed violence directed at K.L., including being struck with an object described as a cable.
During those same interactions, N.B. stated that the accused struck her on at least one occasion during the Ontario trip.
In her video‑recorded police statement later the same evening, N.B. described repeated acts of physical violence directed primarily at K.L., stating, “He hit her with a cable,” and adding, “He kept hitting her,” and “He was beating her.” In that same statement, N.B. described violence directed at her personally, stating, “He hit me too.”
In audio recorded during police transport, N.B. described an explicit threat made by the accused in response to the prospect of police involvement. She stated “he clearly told us that if we talked to the police, that he was going to kill us.”[7] In the same transport statement, N.B. expressed concern for the safety of K.L. and stated “I’m also afraid to leave her alone in all this; I’m afraid something’s going to happen to her.”
N.B. made those statements while police transported her shortly after the incident and before any formal, structured interview process, describing ongoing fear and intimidation at that time.
225Later that evening, during her video‑recorded police statement, N.B. expanded on these allegations. She described repeated assaults directed primarily at K.L., threats of serious harm, and an atmosphere of intimidation associated with attempts to resist instructions, leave the situation, or involve authorities:
In her video‑recorded police statement, N.B. stated, “I didn’t want to get hit,” and later stated, “I was so scared that something would happen to me.”
In describing threats associated with leaving, N.B. stated that the accused told her, “you’re not leaving me,” and added, “If you manage to leave, you’ll be destroyed.”
226Police officers documented physical injuries on both complainants at the time of attendance. Officers observed and recorded visible injuries consistent with recent physical altercations. Although the cause and responsibility for those injuries remain issues for evaluation on the totality of the evidence, the injuries provide objective context for the complainants’ contemporaneous statements describing violence and threats.
227As with the evidence concerning control of money, the Court considers the evidence of alleged violence and threats cumulatively and contextually. The issue is not whether those allegations, standing alone, establish criminal responsibility for assault, but whether the conduct alleged is capable of explaining fear, intimidation, and the inability or unwillingness of the complainants to resist, leave, or seek assistance. The assessment of the weight of this evidence, and its consideration alongside the accused’s denials, follows later in these reasons.
vi. Phone Evidence and Attribution
1) The trap phone and the Issue of attribution
228The trial evidence includes a cellular device referred to throughout the trial as the “trap phone,” a white Apple iPhone 12 seized by police from the hotel room following the accused’s arrest. The device was not found on the accused at the time of arrest and attribution therefore remained a live issue at trial. Investigators subjected the phone to a Cellebrite extraction, the results of which were tendered through police testimony and admitted into evidence without challenge to the extraction process itself.
Figure 13 - Exhibit 7 - Front of Trap Phone
Figure 14 - Exhibit 7 - Rear of Trap Phone
229The extracted data reflects communications, images, and application use contemporaneous with October 2024, including material purporting to relate to accommodation bookings, escort‑related communications, and logistical arrangements during the Ontario trip. Whether that activity is properly attributable to the accused is addressed below.
230When police arrived at the Super 8 Motel, K.L. immediately requested access to a personal phone belonging to her and repeatedly stated that the accused had possession of it. In Constable Hunt’s body‑worn camera footage, K.L. stated, “He has my phone,” and sought its return in the course of police attendance. She described that phone as a black device with a pink case and treated it as her own personal property, linking her lack of access to it to her inability to leave safely or manage her situation independently.
231Upon police attendance at Room 408 following the accused’s arrest, officers located another phone in the vicinity that K.L. did not identify as hers. She did not know its password, did not suggest that it contained her communications, and displayed no interest in retrieving it. Her focus remained on recovering the phone with the pink case that she identified as her own, together with her money and other personal belongings.
232It was that other phone, which K.L. did not claim as hers and to which she had no access, that was later subjected to Cellebrite forensic extraction and is referred to elsewhere in these reasons as the “trap phone.” The evidence therefore supports a clear distinction between K.L.’s personal phone, which she said had been taken from her and which she sought to recover, and a separate device not shown to be hers, the attribution of which required careful assessment.
233The evidence further establishes that N.B. also possessed her own personal phone, separate from both K.L.’s phone and the device later subjected to Cellebrite extraction.
234In the body‑worn camera footage and subsequent police interactions, N.B. was treated as having a personal device distinct from K.L.’s phone with the pink case. Neither complainant identified the extracted device as belonging to N.B., and there was no suggestion that N.B.’s personal phone was the one later examined through forensic analysis. The evidentiary record therefore supports the conclusion that, at the material time, there were three distinct mobile phones in issue: K.L.’s personal phone, which she sought to recover; N.B.’s personal phone; and a separate device not claimed by either complainant, later analyzed and referred to as the “trap phone.”
2) The accused’s sale, distancing, and denied usage of the “trap phone”
235In his testimony at trial, the accused denied ownership and control of the trap phone. He testified that the device belonged to K.L., that he sold it to her several months before the Ontario trip, and that he said used it only intermittently when his primary phone was unavailable. He denied using the phone on October 12, 2024, and denied authorship of communications or activity attributed to the device during the relevant period.
3) Adopted findings of the “trap phone” from the blended proceedings
236As previously explained, the admissible evidence from the blended proceedings carries over into the trial proper. As I concluded in my hearsay ruling, the suggestion that the trap phone was not in Mr. Laguerre’s possession or control at material times does not remain reasonably plausible.
237In summary, the cumulative evidence established that Mr. Laguerre was repeatedly observed on hotel surveillance footage holding and using the same damaged device later seized and extracted as the trap phone. The physical damage visible on CCTV corresponds to the device recovered from Room 408 and to photographs taken during the investigation.
238The extracted digital artefacts, including screenshots of client communications, accommodation arrangements, and advertising material, align temporally with those periods in which Mr. Laguerre is observed in possession of the device. That alignment, together with the operational nature of the artefacts, supports the inference that the phone was being used as a tool of coordination rather than as a personal device independently operated by the complainants.
239Although K.L., and possibly N.B., had episodic access to the device, that access does not displace the broader evidentiary pattern. K.L. identified the damaged phone on body‑worn camera as belonging to Mr. Laguerre, offered it to police, and was unable to unlock it. Neither complainant demonstrated concern with retaining the device as personal property, and neither attempted to conceal or destroy it when police became involved.
240The extraction also revealed personal identifiers linking the device to Mr. Laguerre, including images of him, identification documents in his name, and other account artefacts consistent with his ownership and use. The existence of additional images relating to the complainants, including false‑name identification and advertising material, is consistent with use of the device to manage and coordinate sex work activity rather than with independent complainant operation.
241While certain messages appear as screenshots saved in the photo library and not all message metadata is available, the decisive factors are device continuity, identifier alignment, temporal correspondence with client traffic observed on CCTV, and repeated surveillance of Mr. Laguerre handling the device at operationally significant times. On those material points, alternative explanations grounded in multiple user authorship or curated screenshot activity do not remain reasonably plausible.
242Taken together, the digital evidence, surveillance footage, and contemporaneous police observations support the finding that Mr. Laguerre exercised functional possession and control of the trap phone during the relevant period, including for the purposes of client communication, advertisement coordination, and the management of proceeds. I rely on that finding in the analysis that follows.
243It is important to note that the findings set out above concerning possession and control of the trap phone are independent of the hearsay statements attributed to K.L. that have been admitted but not yet weighed for ultimate reliability. Those findings rest on objective and circumstantial evidence, including hotel surveillance footage, device continuity, the alignment of identifiers on the phone, and the temporal correspondence between trap phone activity and observed client movements.
4) Access vs. control
244These findings do not suggest that K.L., or possibly N.B., never had access to the trap phone. The evidence establishes that K.L., and perhaps N.B., had episodic access to the device at various times. That access does not undermine the broader evidentiary picture.
245The extraction report reflects, for example, that with a creation date of October 8, 2024, at 2:32:06 p.m. there is an image of K.L. holding the trap phone in a selfie, identifiable by its distinctive physical damage.[8]
246Similarly, the trap phone’s logged‑in Snapchat account shows activity between 1:28 and 1:59 a.m. on October 12, 2024, which coincides roughly with a corridor sequence at 00:46:40 in which K.L. is observed carrying what appears to be two phones, one of which appears to be the trap phone.
Figure 15 - Exhibit 47 - KL entering room 408 with two phones.
247I find these examples illustrate episodic access and do not displace the cumulative evidence establishing that Mr. Laguerre exercised possession and functional control over the trap phone at material times and for material purposes, including client coordination, advertising, and logistical arrangements.
248Reasonable conclusions cannot be drawn by isolating individual digital artefacts in a vacuum. Rather, attribution emerges from a holistic assessment of the digital material in alignment with hotel surveillance, extraction timing, and the operational purpose served by the artefacts. On that analysis, episodic access by K.L. or N.B. does not undermine the finding of primary control by Mr. Laguerre.
5) K.L.’s attribution of the “trap phone” to Mr. Laguerre
a) Source and context of the evidence
249As noted, the body‑worn camera recording of Constable Hunt captures K.L. speaking in the immediate aftermath of her flight from Room 408. As noted elsewhere, the admissibility of this evidence has already been determined. At this stage, the issue is the weight to be given to K.L.’s statements on the recording, assessed considering the objective record, including CCTV footage and the extracted digital evidence.
b) K.L.’s identification of the phone and control
250On the body‑worn camera, K.L. describes a phone used in connection with client communications and advertisements. She clearly attributes ownership and control of that phone to Mr. Laguerre stating words to the effect that it was “his phone.” She does not describe herself as the owner of the device, nor does she present herself as having independent authority over its use.
251K.L. also explains why she did not take that phone with her when she fled the room. On the recording, she says that she did not know the password and could not access the phone on her own. Her account is that, while she may have handled or interacted with the device at times (as already noted above and corroborated by the extraction report), she did not control it and could not use it independently.
252This aspect of K.L.’s evidence bears directly on weight. Her explanation for leaving the phone behind is internally coherent and consistent with confirmatory evidence. The CCTV footage shows her fleeing abruptly, without belongings, in a manner that conveys urgency rather than deliberation. Her contemporaneous explanation on the body‑worn camera for why the phone remained in the room plausibly accounts for what is observed on video.
253K.L.’s statements do not purport to draw technical distinctions about digital usage. Rather, they describe control, access, and dependency in practical terms. Read fairly, her evidence distinguishes between occasional or constrained interaction with the phone, and primary control over the device. That distinction is consistent with her other statements and with the cumulative evidence concerning the role the phone played in communications and arrangements.
254When K.L.’s body‑worn camera statements are assessed together with N.B.’s police statement, a consistent narrative emerges. N.B. likewise describes the phone as being used by W.L. for coordinating clients and advertisements and does not describe shared or equal control. Neither complainant suggests that they exercised independent authority over the device.
255At the level of ultimate reliability, I find that K.L.’s statements on the body‑worn camera regarding the phone are not undermined by the objective record. They are temporally proximate to the events, internally consistent, and consistent with the observed sequence captured on CCTV. While they do not, on their own, resolve every question of digital attribution, they form part of a coherent evidentiary picture that supports the conclusion that the complainants did not exercise primary control over the phone at material times.
256Against this broader evidentiary backdrop, I reject Mr. Laguerre’s evidence that he sold the trap phone to K.L. months prior to the events in question and that he effectively ceased using the device from that point onward. I reject that account for several independent and reinforcing reasons:
When police interacted with the complainants following the incident, K.L. did not know the passcode to the trap phone. That fact sits uneasily with the assertion that she owned, controlled, and used the device as her own phone over an extended period.
When K.L. fled Room 408 and later gathered her belongings, she expressed no interest in securing or removing the phone as personal property. Her focus was on retrieving clothing and other possessions. That conduct does not support the claim that the phone belonged to her.
The accused’s evidence concerning the alleged sale of the phone was vague and internally thin. He provided no documentary support, no clear timeline, and no persuasive explanation for the circumstances of the transaction he described.
The amount of money he claimed to have received for the phone was minimal. On his own account, it would have made little sense to sell the device for such a small sum rather than simply give it to K.L. if, as he claimed, the phone held no ongoing utility or risk.
c) K.L.’s direct identification of the phone and control to Mr. Laguerre on October 13, 2024
257In statements admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and made in the immediate aftermath of the events of October 12, 2024, K.L. explained that she contacted police because she had fled from the accused following an assault and feared further harm, and not for the alternative reason suggested by the accused.
258In those interactions with police, K.L. produced a damaged white iPhone and identified it as belonging to Mr. Laguerre. She stated that the device was used by him to communicate with clients and to arrange advertisements for sexual services. She distinguished that phone from her own personal phone, stated that she did not know the passcode, and treated the device as the accused’s property rather than her own. K.L. showed no interest in retaining the phone as personal property and was prepared to provide it to police.
6) Cellebrite extraction report: nature, admissibility, and use
259The Cellebrite extraction relating to the trap phone spans forty‑one pages (Exhibit 76) and is accompanied by enlarged thumbnail images drawn from that report (Exhibit 75), as well as a preliminary device report summarizing device metadata (Exhibit 74).
260Detective Constable Douglas testified regarding the extraction process. He explained that, apart from applying brief descriptive labels and organizational tags for investigative navigation and reference only, officers do not manipulate the underlying data. They do not curate or generate content. Rather, the Cellebrite software extracts and organizes data as it exists on the device at the time of seizure, subject to the technical limits inherent in the extraction process.
261A Cellebrite report is not a police‑authored narrative and does not purport to explain or interpret digital evidence. It is a formatted presentation of data extracted from a digital device. When properly authenticated, it is admissible only for what it objectively shows on its face, namely the existence, timing, categorization, and storage location of data on the device. It is not admitted as opinion evidence. Conclusions regarding authorship, use, or significance must be grounded in other admissible evidence and rational inference, not inferred from the extraction alone.
262Ontario appellate authority has consistently affirmed that the threshold for authentication of electronic evidence under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act is modest, and that authenticity may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is what it purports to be.[10]
263Recent authority further confirms that concerns relating to the accuracy of digital timing, the possibility of manipulation, or the ultimate significance of electronic artefacts generally go to weight rather than admissibility, and that timing and context may properly be inferred by situating digital evidence within the surrounding objective and testimonial record.[11]
264Consistent with this jurisprudence, once authenticated by a witness with relevant familiarity and experience, technical extraction evidence may be admitted without formal expert qualification, provided the testimony remains confined to a description of the extraction process and the data displayed, and does not stray into evaluative or interpretive opinion.
265Ontario courts have likewise recognized that evidence describing the operation of digital systems and the recovery of electronic data may properly be received as factual technical evidence through witnesses with relevant operational knowledge, without expert qualification, so long as the evidence remains descriptive rather than evaluative.[12] It is for this limited purpose that the Cellebrite evidence was admitted in this case.
266It would be neither practical nor helpful to catalogue the extraction in its entirety. Nor is that necessary. Instead, I focus on a limited number of representative artefacts that bear directly on the issues of attribution and control during the Ontario stay.
7) The Face-Value Data on The Trap Phone
267The Cellebrite materials tendered in evidence include a preliminary device report and a full file system extraction. The preliminary report identifies foundational device information, including the make and model of the phone, operating system, serial number, and unique identifiers such as IMEI and related network information. It also records the presence of multiple user accounts and services associated with the device. This material is not relied upon to establish authorship or use of any specific application or communication. Its purpose is to situate the device within the broader evidentiary record and to provide context for the extracted content that follows.
268The full extraction report catalogues the data recovered from the device and organizes it by category, including images, videos, chats, instant messages, and tagged items. The report displays associated timestamps and file information as extracted from the phone and permits review of the content of individual artefacts as they existed at the time of seizure. Enlarged thumbnails drawn from this report were also tendered. It is from these materials that the illustrative examples discussed later are drawn.
269One notable feature of the extraction is the absence of populated native text‑based message databases. The report reflects only a very limited number of chats‑type artefacts, consisting primarily of Snapchat activity, alongside isolated entries categorized as a chat or instant message. There are no iMessage or SMS databases of the kind ordinarily associated with sustained text‑based messaging, notwithstanding the presence of numerous images depicting the appearance of text exchanges.
Figure 16 - Exhibit 75, p.1
270This feature of the extraction explains why much of the communication evidence appears in the form of screenshots saved to the photo library rather than as native message records resident on the device. Whatever the technical reasons for the absence of native message data, the extraction does not, on its face, establish who used the device at particular times or authored particular communications. The report is descriptive, not interpretive.
271That limitation does not preclude findings of use or control. Attribution is not determined from any single artefact or data point. It may be established through circumstantial and cumulative evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn from the content of the artefacts, their timing, and their alignment with objectively verifiable events, when considered alongside the surrounding surveillance evidence and other admissible material.
272Against that framework, the extraction identifies a number of discrete artefacts that, when viewed cumulatively and in context, assist in understanding how the phone was used during the Ontario stay. The examples that follow are illustrative rather than exhaustive. They are considered not in isolation, but as part of the broader evidentiary record bearing on coordination, control, and benefit.
8) Cash Images on the trap phone as corroborative evidence of control of proceeds
273The Cellebrite extraction also includes images of substantial quantities of cash stored on the trap phone. One such image bears an origin timestamp of October 11, 2024, at approximately 10:55 a.m. It depicts a hand holding a significant number of what appear to be $100 bills.
274Of particular significance, one of the $100 bills depicted in the October 11 image corresponds, by serial number GKU9730776, to a bill subsequently found in the accused’s possession at the time of arrest. The appearance of that same bill on the trap phone shortly before police intervention, and on the accused shortly thereafter, provides an objective linkage between the digital artefact and the cash seized from him.
Figure 17 - Exhibits 75 & 76 - October 11, 2024, at 10:55 AM
275The extraction also includes a second image bearing an origin timestamp of October 9, 2024, at approximately 11:38 a.m. The metadata reflects when the image was saved to the device, not necessarily when or by whom it was originally captured. The image depicts a quantity of cash laid out on a bed, estimated at approximately $800.
Figure 18 - Exhibits 75 & 76 - October 9, 2024, 11:38 AM
276The configuration and appearance of the currency in the October 9 image differ from those shown in the October 11 photograph, both in arrangement and apparent quantity. This suggests that the two images do not depict the same stack of cash. While this cannot be determined conclusively, it is a factor properly considered as part of the cumulative assessment.
277The presence of these images is difficult to reconcile with the accused’s position that he did not possess or use the phone at material times and that the complainants were operating independently. Images depicting bulk cash serve no obvious personal purpose in this context. Their presence is more consistent with an operational function, such as confirming, tracking, or reporting proceeds, than with casual or incidental photography.
278The evidentiary record offers no coherent alternative explanation grounded in the evidence for why a person engaged in independent sex‑work activity would retain multiple photographs of substantial cash amounts for later reference. While the Cellebrite data alone cannot establish whether the images were captured directly on the device or received through another application, that limitation does not preclude a reasonable inference as to purpose when the images are considered in context.
279Viewed together with the serial number correspondence, the timing of the images, and the surrounding evidence concerning control of proceeds, the more probable inference is that these images reflect proceeds being documented in furtherance of centralized control rather than as personal records of independent earnings. This conclusion rests not on the digital artefacts in isolation, but on the application of common‑sense reasoning to the totality of the evidence.
280While it is possible that K.L. or N.B. temporarily possessed funds at the time one or more of these images were captured, that possibility does not explain why the images would then reside on the trap phone. As already noted, the extraction data establishes only that the photographs existed on the device, not whether they were taken using that device or received through another application. This limits what can be inferred from the extraction alone and requires the analysis to turn to circumstantial evidence concerning purpose.
281When these images are assessed considering the surrounding evidence, the most probable explanation is that they were captured as proof of earnings to be forwarded to the person controlling the proceeds and the phone. This inference is supported by the serial‑number correspondence, the timing of the images, and the absence of any alternative explanation grounded in the record.
282The differing nature of the two cash images further informs their purpose. One depicts currency laid out in a manner that would permit counting or tallying. The other, by contrast, shows the cash held in hand with no visible means of accounting for the value of the funds.
283The latter image therefore does not serve an obvious counting or record‑keeping function of the kind associated with tracking personal earnings. This distinction undermines the inference that the photographs were taken so that K.L. could determine or record how much she had earned. That inference is further weakened by the evidence establishing that K.L. did not know precisely how much of the proceeds Mr. Laguerre had at material times. Considered together, the form of the images and the surrounding evidence support the conclusion that the photographs were created for an accounting or reporting purpose directed toward the person controlling the funds, rather than as personal records of independent earnings.
284This conclusion is reinforced by the circumstances at the time of police attendance. Neither K.L. nor N.B. was found to be in possession of any meaningful amount of cash, a fact documented contemporaneously through body‑worn camera footage and the testimony of the attending officers. By contrast, Mr. Laguerre was found in possession of a significant quantity of cash. Both complainants independently stated that he retained the proceeds as a matter of routine. If, as the accused asserts, K.L. was operating independently, possessed the phone, and generated the funds reflected in these images, the record offers no coherent explanation for why neither complainant retained any portion of those earnings.
285Viewed cumulatively, the cash images operate less as personal records and more as operational artefacts reflecting proceeds generated and accounted for. Considered alongside the absence of cash on the complainants, the presence of cash on the accused, and the objective serial‑number match, they undermine the proposition of independent operation and are consistent with centralized control of proceeds exercised by the accused.
i. Frequency, Management, and Operational Pattern
286The Mississauga advertisements were posted, edited, and re‑posted repeatedly between October 6 and October 11, 2024. Several postings were modified within short intervals, and some accumulated substantial view counts, exceeding 2,000 views. This volume, frequency, and responsiveness are consistent with active, ongoing management of advertising content rather than sporadic or incidental use.
287The content of the advertisements is largely uniform across postings. Each contains the same or near‑identical descriptions, pricing structure, taglines, and bilingual presentation. The absence of meaningful variation undermines any suggestion that different individuals were independently advertising contemporaneously from the same location using the same platform.
1) Shift to in-call services and alignment with room 408
288The LeoList records show that the initial Mississauga posting on October 6, 2024, listed services as “outcall only,” while all subsequent Mississauga postings beginning early October 7, 2024, listed “incall & outcall & online.”[9]
289This shift is operationally significant. It reflects coordination between advertising content, physical location, and client management rather than a mere change in descriptive language. The evidentiary record contains no evidence that either complainant independently directed or controlled this change in service model.
2) Digital corroboration and client communications
290The advertising activity documented in Exhibit 94 aligns closely with the digital extraction evidence from the trap phone. The Cellebrite extraction contains numerous screenshots of client communications created contemporaneously with the Mississauga postings. As previously addressed, these screenshots reflect a relay or coordination model in which client information was preserved and conveyed, rather than direct, independent client engagement by the complainants.
291This alignment is reinforced by device‑level metadata. The Cellebrite extraction confirms that the MSISDN assigned to the trap phone included +1 438 833 0530, the same number appearing on all LeoList advertisements active during the Ontario stay. This linkage arises from system‑level data rather than user assertion and independently corroborates the connection between the advertising infrastructure and the device.
292In addition, the trap phone’s photo library contains multiple QR‑code images associated with Litecoin purchases for LeoList advertising. These artefacts span several months and include entries created on or immediately before October 6, 2024. Their presence is consistent with repeated posting, editing, and reactivation of advertisements during the Ontario stay and supports the conclusion that advertising activity was being actively maintained.
293Client communications preserved on the trap phone further align temporally and functionally with this advertising activity. Screenshots created between October 6 and October 12, 2024, depict inbound client inquiries, arrival confirmations, and logistical discussions, including directions to specific rooms at the Super 8 Motel. These communications correspond to the period during which LeoList advertisements were active in Mississauga and reflect client traffic generated by those advertisements.
3) Corroborative inference from advertising photographs
294The content and apparent perspective of the photographs used in the LeoList advertisements provide additional, though not determinative, corroboration of who exercised control over the advertising process during the Ontario stay. The images depict the complainants from a third‑person viewpoint consistent with being taken by someone else rather than self‑captured. While it is possible that the complainants may have taken photographs of one another at times, that possibility must be assessed within the broader evidentiary context.
295When considered alongside the centralized advertising infrastructure already described, the more coherent inference is that responsibility for preparing advertising content, including photographic material, rested with the person controlling the trap phone. That device contained the advertising images, verification artefacts, payment‑related material, and functioned as the access point through which advertisements were created, edited, and maintained.
296I emphasize that this conclusion does not depend on establishing that Mr. Laguerre personally took every photograph. Its significance lies in how the photographs fit within an operational structure already shown to be centrally managed through the trap phone, rather than in identifying the individual operating the camera on each occasion.
4) Corroborative evidence of lack of control of LeoList advertising
297The conclusion that K.L. and N.B. did not exercise primary control over the LeoList advertising and intake system during the Ontario stay is further corroborated by their conduct and circumstances following Mr. Laguerre’s arrest.
298If the complainants had controlled the advertising account and related intake infrastructure, they would have retained the practical ability to generate income immediately. The evidence establishes that the advertising system was producing regular client traffic and that the complainants were staying in a hotel room configured for in‑call services. Possession of the advertising platform would have enabled rapid resumption of income generation independent of Mr. Laguerre’s presence.
299The record reflects the opposite. Following Mr. Laguerre’s arrest, the complainants did not resume advertising, client communications, or income generation. They remained without access to money, food, accommodation, or transportation, and police were required to make arrangements for basic necessities.
300This post‑arrest dependency also bears directly on access to the trap phone itself. As the evidence establishes, that device functioned as the central access point for advertising, client communications, and payment‑related activity. Without access to the phone, there was no practical access to the LeoList advertisements, no means of responding to client inquiries, and no ability to generate or retrieve proceeds.
301Additional evidentiary features already addressed reinforce this conclusion, including the complainants’ lack of knowledge of the phone’s passcode, their apparent indifference toward retaining it as personal property, and their limited understanding of how advertising payments, including cryptocurrency, were accessed or controlled. These facts align with a model in which the complainants interacted with, but did not control, the advertising and payment infrastructure.
302Considered cumulatively, this evidence supports the conclusion that K.L. and N.B. did not exercise primary control over the unified LeoList advertising and intake system or over the trap phone through which that system operated. Their ongoing financial dependency during the Ontario stay and after Mr. Laguerre’s arrest is inconsistent with independent control and is instead consistent with centralized management exercised by the accused.
5) Evidence of Advertising sexual services
303As set out above, the LeoList advertisements active during the Ontario stay were repeatedly posted, edited, and re‑posted over several days. They shared uniform content, formatting, imagery, pricing, and contact information. All Ontario advertisements were linked to a single contact number, which the Cellebrite extraction identifies as the MSISDN associated with the trap phone. That linkage arises from system‑level data, not user assertion.
304The Cellebrite extraction from the trap phone contains multiple artefacts directly connected to the advertising process. These include screenshots of live LeoList advertisements, verification and payment‑related QR codes associated with advertising purchases, and contemporaneous screenshots of client communications generated by those advertisements. These artefacts align temporally with the period during which the advertisements were active and were saved on the same device that I have already found was under the operational control of the accused at material times.
305I have also found, on the evidence, that neither K.L. nor N.B. exercised primary control over the trap phone or the advertising infrastructure. Neither had the phone’s passcode. Neither described themselves as owning or controlling the device. Neither demonstrated knowledge of, or access to, the account credentials, payment mechanisms, or posting process required to independently manage LeoList advertisements. Their statements to police on this point were consistent with one another and are corroborated by their conduct following the accused’s arrest.
306That post‑arrest conduct is particularly revealing. If either complainant had controlled the advertising account, they would have retained the practical ability to continue advertising, communicate with clients, and generate income. Instead, the evidence establishes that advertising ceased, no client communications occurred, and both complainants were left without access to money, accommodation, or transportation. Police were required to assist with basic necessities. That outcome is inconsistent with independent control of the advertising process and strongly consistent with exclusive control resting with the accused.
307As further analysed below, the admissible hearsay evidence further supports this conclusion. Both complainants attributed the phone used for advertising and client coordination to the accused and described him as the person who handled postings and communications. Those statements are not relied upon in isolation. They are confirmed by the objective digital record, the surveillance evidence showing the accused repeatedly in possession of the trap phone at critical times, and the structural features of the advertising itself.
308Finally, the nature and perspective of the advertising photographs reinforce the inference of centralized control. The images depict the complainants from a third‑person viewpoint and located on the trap phone alongside other operational advertising artefacts. While it is not necessary to determine who physically operated the camera, or whether the photos were taken from the trap phone, the evidence supports the conclusion that the accused controlled the preparation and deployment of advertising content as part of a unified advertising system.
309Viewed as a whole, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly caused or controlled the publication of LeoList advertisements offering sexual services for consideration during the Ontario stay. That finding rests not on any single artefact or statement, but on the cumulative force of the digital extraction evidence, the LeoList records, the surveillance footage, the complainants’ admissible statements, and the practical impossibility of independent advertising control by either complainant. The essential elements of the offence under s. 286.4 are therefore proven.
B. Use of multiple statements and the limits on prior consistent statements
310Before assessing the out‑of‑court statements attributed to K.L. and N.B., I am mindful of the well‑established rule that prior consistent statements, standing alone, have no probative value on the issue of truth or credibility. Repetition does not enhance reliability, and the mere fact that a witness has said the same thing more than once does not make the statement more likely to be true. Consistency over time cannot be used as a form of self‑corroboration or oath‑helping, and misuse of prior consistent statements in that manner constitutes legal error.[13]
311In this case, the analysis begins with the complainants’ earliest statements. K.L.’s 911 call and her contemporaneous utterances captured on Constable Hunt’s body‑worn camera form a continuous narrative made in close temporal proximity to the events in question. Properly characterized, they do not engage the rule against prior consistent statements, as they are not “prior” in the sense contemplated by that rule, but rather constitute the initial complaint extended over time, location, and recipients.
312Subsequent statements provided by K.L. and N.B., including formal police interviews given later on the same day, are not relied upon to bolster the truth or credibility of their initial accounts through repetition. To the extent that those later statements restate what was already alleged, that consistency adds nothing.
313This distinction is particularly important in relation to N.B.’s video‑recorded statement given later that evening. That statement is not relied upon as a prior consistent statement to reinforce the truth of her earlier utterances, nor is it used as a narrative echo to supply corroboration by repetition. Rather, it constitutes a discrete item of evidence admitted on its own evidentiary footing, subject to separate analysis of threshold reliability and scope.
314To the extent that N.B.’s formal statement amplifies, elaborates upon, or contextualizes earlier accounts, those aspects are assessed independently for coherence, plausibility, and consistency with the surrounding evidence. Their admissibility and weight do not depend on alignment with prior statements, but on whether the statement, viewed on its own and against independent evidence, withstands scrutiny.
315Accordingly, any assessment of credibility or reliability proceeds not from repetition, but from whether the substance of a given account is coherent, plausible, and logically consistent when considered in the context of all the evidence. Where later statements contain additional detail or elaboration, their relevance lies solely in whether those particulars withstand scrutiny when assessed against the surrounding circumstances and, where available, independent evidence such as contemporaneous police observations, CCTV footage, digital records, and physical evidence.
C. An Assessment of the Complainant’s Hearsay Evidence
316I have carefully considered the hearsay statements attributed to K.L. and N.B. and the weight that may properly be assigned to that evidence at this stage of the analysis. As explained in my earlier ruling, hearsay evidence is inherently vulnerable to reliability concerns and must be approached with care. That caution does not end once admissibility is established. Threshold reliability serves as a gatekeeping function. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reliance on hearsay to prove a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
317The standard applied at the admissibility stage is distinct from the standard governing ultimate findings of fact. Evidence that meets threshold reliability is not automatically entitled to be accepted as truthful or accurate for all purposes. At the merits stage, the Court must remain alert to the residual dangers of hearsay and must assess whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to support the specific factual findings sought, having regard to the full evidentiary record.
318In conducting that assessment, confirmatory evidence assumes central importance. Hearsay is strengthened in a legally meaningful way only where, considered cumulatively and in context, the surrounding evidence supports the conclusion that the material aspects of the hearsay are truthful or accurate. Evidence that is merely compatible with the hearsay, or that is equally consistent with competing explanations, does little to resolve the absence of cross‑examination.
319In undertaking this assessment, I have not treated the hearsay statements of either complainant in isolation. Rather, I have examined those statements considering the objective and circumstantial evidence admitted at trial, including CCTV footage, contemporaneous police observations, admissible digital extraction evidence, business records, and the accused’s own testimony.
320Each of these evidentiary sources provides an independent reference point against which the hearsay may be tested. In particular, the third‑party LeoList production and the associated device and surveillance evidence analysed above provide an objective framework against which the complainants’ assertions regarding advertising, client coordination, and control may be assessed.
321Applying that framework, I have examined whether any material aspect of the complainants’ accounts is inconsistent with, exaggerated by, or contradicted by reliable evidence on the record. I have also assessed whether the surrounding evidence meaningfully corroborates the substance of their statements in a manner that reduces the risk of misperception, fabrication, or exaggeration.
322Having conducted that review, the only inconsistency I have identified relates to a matter already addressed in my admissibility ruling, namely an allegation in the hearsay that a knife was used as part of a threat. No knife was located by police despite prompt attendance, and no other physical evidence corroborated the presence or use of a knife. It is that absence, viewed against the immediacy of the police response, that gives rise to the inconsistency. I have ruled that this aspect of the hearsay inadmissible for the truth of its contents. Nonetheless, for completeness and fairness, I am prepared to treat it as an inconsistency when assessing overall reliability. Even considered in that light, it is inconsequential in my ultimate findings concerning the central issues in dispute.
323Importantly, that isolated inconsistency does not detract from the overwhelming degree of confirmation supplied by the objective evidence. The hearsay statements of K.L. and N.B. align in material respects with CCTV footage, the timing and content of the digital artefacts, and the injuries documented shortly after the events in question. This convergence substantially mitigates the residual dangers ordinarily associated with untested hearsay.
324The reliability of the accounts of N.B. and K.L. is further supported by the internal and inter‑complainant consistency of the accounts. K.L. and N.B. provided independent statements, often while physically separated, without evidence of collusion or narrative coordination. Their accounts converge on material points while retaining individual perspective and phrasing, a feature that supports, rather than detracts from, reliability. That convergence is not relied upon as corroboration by repetition, but as a contextual feature assessed alongside and subordinated to independent objective evidence.
325I also consider the body‑worn camera footage capturing K.L. and N.B.’s reactions when they first observe one another’s injuries in the presence of Constables Hunt and Thurston.[10] The footage depicts spontaneous expressions of surprise and concern as each becomes aware of the injuries sustained by the other and by herself. Neither attribute blame to the other for those injuries. Rather, each expresses sympathy and concern. These reactions occur contemporaneously, without prompting, and before any opportunity for reflection, coordination, or narrative shaping.
326I approach post‑event demeanour evidence with appropriate caution. Demeanour, standing alone, is not determinative of truth or reliability, and I do not rely on it to prove the allegations. However, post‑event emotional response may constitute relevant circumstantial evidence where it is assessed contextually and in conjunction with all of the evidence.[14]
327Here, the reactions captured on the body‑worn camera are immediate and visceral responses to newly observed injuries and are logically consistent with the complainants’ earlier accounts of violence inflicted by a third party, rather than by one another.
328Viewed in that limited and contextual manner, the body‑worn camera footage does not raise reliability concerns. Instead, it aligns with and supports the convergence of independent objective evidence already discussed, including documented injuries, CCTV footage, contemporaneous police observations, and digital evidence. I place modest weight on this demeanour evidence as part of the overall evidentiary picture, mindful of its limits and without resort to impermissible generalizations about how complainants “ought” to behave in such a context.
329I also consider that the complainants’ statements included admissions plainly against their own interests, including admissions of drug use, outstanding legal jeopardy, sex trade activity, dependency, and conduct exposing them to stigma or legal scrutiny. These admissions are difficult to reconcile with a fabricated or self‑serving narrative and weigh in favour of reliability.
330I have considered whether the complainants’ emotional state, possible intoxication, or other situational influences could have impaired perception, memory, or narration. There is no evidence that it did so.
331To the contrary, the record demonstrates striking accuracy, including descriptions of injuries and mechanisms of harm before the complainants had any opportunity to observe those injuries directly. Those descriptions were later independently confirmed by photographs, police observations, and CCTV evidence that the complainants themselves never viewed. That level of correspondence is difficult to reconcile with impaired perception or post‑event reconstruction.
332Finally, although the complainants were distressed, tired, and may have been intoxicated to some degree, that presentation is consistent with the circumstances in which the statements were made and does not undermine reliability. Disorganization or distress in expression does not equate to unreliability where, as here, the substance of the accounts is coherently and independently confirmed by objective evidence.
333I am also cognizant of the suggestion that either complainant may have harboured motives undermining their assumed truthfulness, including a desire to obtain the accused’s money for personal gain or drug use. I have considered that possibility carefully. When assessed against the objective record and for reasons already explained, that hypothesis is inconsistent with the evidence and does not plausibly account for the convergence of physical injuries, digital evidence, surveillance footage, and contemporaneous statements.
334In the result, subject to the limited and immaterial inconsistency noted above, I find that the hearsay statements of both K.L. and N.B. are substantially confirmed by reliable independent evidence. Considered cumulatively and with the caution required by law, they are sufficiently reliable to be safely relied upon, together with the other admissible evidence, in reaching findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
335The hearsay evidence is therefore not relied upon in isolation, but as part of an evidentiary matrix in which its material aspects are independently confirmed.
336I specifically do not draw any adverse inference from K.L.’s or N.B.’s failure to attend and testify, absent evidence that their non‑attendance bears on the weight or reliability of the admitted hearsay. As Justice La Forest stated in R. v. Downey[xi]
“...because of the parasitic and coercive nature of the pimp-prostitute relationship, prostitutes, often young girls, are extremely reluctant to come forward and testify against their pimps; see the Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (the Badgley Committee), Sexual Offences Against Children (1984), vol. 2, at pp. 1057-58.”
Non‑attendance, standing alone, is therefore not probative of unreliability. The assessment of the evidence turns on whether the admitted hearsay is sufficiently confirmed by reliable, independent evidence when examined as a whole.
337Lastly, the defence also relied on evidence elicited through Detective Constable Douglas that, at a later point after the events in issue, he observed K.L. and N.B. arguing in his presence in the context of post‑incident arrangements. I accept that an argument occurred and was observed.
338However, that circumstance has no probative value on the reliability of the complainants’ hearsay statements concerning the central events of October 12, 2024.
339The evidence does not establish what the disagreement concerned or whether it related in any way to the content of either complainant’s statements to police. There is no suggestion in the record that the argument involved coordination of allegations, fabrication, or discussion of what either complainant had reported or intended to report. Nor was there any evidence that the argument was physical or bore any resemblance to the accused’s account of a violent struggle between the complainants.
340Without such context, the existence of a later disagreement between complainants is neutral: it neither explains the injuries documented by police nor undermines the objective corroboration discussed above. I therefore place no weight on this point in assessing the reliability of their core accounts.
341Now that I have assessed the evidence in its entirety, I turn to whether it is sufficient to meet the legal definitions of the offences for which Mr. Laguerre is charged.
VII. Legal Analysis and Application
A. Material Benefit from the Provision of Sexual Services - s. 286.2
342I turn to the offence of materially benefiting from the provision of sexual services contrary to s. 286.2 of the Criminal Code. The provision criminalizes the receipt of a financial or other material benefit knowing that it was obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of an offence under s. 286.1. Parliament has structured the offence to include a statutory presumption, defined exceptions, and further exceptions to those exceptions, reflecting a careful balance between criminalizing parasitic conduct and exempting legitimate arrangements.
343Section 286.2(3) creates a presumption that a person who lives with or is habitually in the company of someone who offers or provides sexual services receives a material benefit from those services, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The evidence demonstrates the accused was not merely intermittently and innocuously associated with K.L. and N.B.
344The accused did not merely associate with K.L. and N.B. He travelled with them from Quebec, checked into the hotel with luggage, had keyed access to their room, kept personal belongings inside, and as reflected in the CCTV evidence, maintained constant proximity while they provided sexual services. On his own evidence, the accused was aware that both K.L. and N.B. were actively engaged in the sex trade during the relevant period. I am satisfied that, in these circumstances, the presumption in s. 286.2(3) of the Criminal Code is engaged.
B. Receipt of material benefits whether the presumption applies or not
345Even absent reliance on the statutory presumption, and on a stronger evidentiary footing than any presumption alone would provide, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused in fact received material benefits derived from the provision of sexual services.
346Those benefits included access to cash generated from the complainants’ work, payment and control of accommodation arranged by the accused, and the continued supply of drugs financed through the proceeds of that work. A material benefit need not amount to profit, nor must it be formally accounted for. Any financial or material advantage flowing from the provision of sexual services is sufficient.
347Courts have consistently rejected attempts to recharacterize exploitative arrangements such as neutral cost‑sharing or reimbursement. The receipt and retention of money derived from sexual services, including money used toward accommodation or drug supply in an exploitative context, constitutes a material benefit even where no accounting profit is shown.[15]
348On the evidence I accept, the accused benefited both directly through the receipt and control of funds generated by the complainants’ work and indirectly using those funds to sustain a drug‑supply arrangement that reinforced their continued dependency and participation in the sex trade.
C. The exclusions under s.286.2(5) apply
349Even if any exception under s. 286.2(4) were arguably engaged, which I do not accept, the evidence establishes that the exclusions set out in s. 286.2(5) apply. The accused used violence and intimidation, abused positions of power arising from drug dependency and emotional attachment, and provided intoxicants in a manner that facilitated the continued provision of sexual services. The evidence further demonstrates conduct that constitutes procuring and human trafficking within the meaning of the Criminal Code. In such circumstances, Parliament has expressly removed the protection otherwise afforded by the exceptions in s. 286.2(4).
350Accordingly, whether through the operation of the statutory presumption under s. 286.2(3), or on the direct evidence of financial and material advantage derived from the complainants’ work, and in light of the inapplicability of any statutory exception, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused materially benefited from the provision of sexual services contrary to s. 286.2 of the Criminal Code.
D. Exploitation under s. 279.04: application of the Sinclair Framework
351The central question on the human trafficking counts is whether, in all the circumstances, the accused engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to cause K.L. or N.B. to believe that their safety, or the safety of a person known to them, would be threatened if they failed to provide sexual services. That question is governed by the statutory definition of exploitation in s. 279.04 of the Criminal Code and the analytical framework articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Sinclair.
352Exploitation under s. 279.04 is assessed on an objective basis. The inquiry does not turn on whether the complainants subjectively expressed fear, nor whether the accused’s conduct succeeded in compelling compliance. Rather, the focus is on whether the accused’s conduct, viewed in its full factual context, could reasonably be expected to have that effect. Actual exploitation, actual fear, or proof that the complainants worked more because of the conduct is not required.
353In Sinclair, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the assessment of exploitation must be contextual and cumulative. No single factor is determinative, and exploitation may be established through a constellation of circumstances that, taken together, reveal coercion, control, or abuse of power. The Court identified a non‑exhaustive list of factors that may inform this analysis, including violence or threats, coercion (physical, emotional, or psychological), abuse of trust or authority, exploitation of vulnerability, isolation, control over movement, finances, or communications, and the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant. These factors are not a checklist but an analytical lens through which the evidence must be assessed as a whole.
354With these principles in mind, I turn to whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted for an exploitative purpose within the meaning of s. 279.04.
E. Purpose and Exploitation
i. Legal meaning of “purpose” and “exploitation”
355The human trafficking offences in ss. 279.01 and 279.011 are structured around purpose. Beyond establishing prohibited conduct, the Crown must prove that the accused acted with the purpose of exploiting the complainant or facilitating their exploitation. The analysis therefore centres on the accused’s intention and the objective meaning of the conduct when assessed in its full factual context.
356As set out above, exploitation is defined in s. 279.04(1) and assessed objectively. The complainant’s subjective perception is relevant but not determinative, and neither actual harm nor completed exploitation is required.
357The jurisprudence has consistently emphasized that actual exploitation is not an essential element of the trafficking offence. What must be proven is that the accused acted with an exploitative purpose. Where exploitation is established on the facts, the inference that the accused acted for the purpose of exploitation will often follow readily. Conversely, even where exploitation is not shown to have fully materialized, the offence may still be made out if the evidence establishes that the accused’s conduct was directed toward that end. Appellate authority confirms that the mens rea of trafficking focuses on what the accused’s conduct was intended to accomplish, not on whether exploitation was completed or successful.[16]
358The purpose analysis is therefore forward‑looking and contextual. It requires the trier of fact to assess what the accused’s conduct was designed to accomplish, viewed objectively and in light of the surrounding circumstances, including the nature of the relationship between the accused and the complainant, any imbalance of power or dependency, and the mechanisms by which the accused sought to influence the complainant’s choices, movements, or services. The inquiry does not turn on whether the complainant continued to provide services or whether the accused succeeded in maximizing benefit, but on whether the accused intentionally engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to cause a person in the complainant’s position to fear adverse consequences if they did not comply.
359Closely related to this inquiry is the statutory direction in s. 279.04(2), which permits the Court to consider, among other factors, whether the accused used or threatened force or another form of coercion, employed deception, or abused a position of trust, power, or authority. These factors are not exhaustive and do not create standalone elements. Rather, they are analytic tools that assist the Court in determining whether the accused’s conduct, assessed as a whole, bears the objective hallmarks of exploitation contemplated by the legislation.
360Finally, consent has no legal relevance to the trafficking analysis. Section 279.01(2) and 279.011(2) expressly provides that no consent to the activity that forms the subject matter of the charge is valid. Parliament has thus made clear that apparent acquiescence, participation in sex work, or even a pre‑existing willingness to engage in sexual services does not negate criminal liability where the Crown proves that the accused acted for an exploitative purpose.
361Under s.279.01(2) and 279.011(2), Parliament has specifically removed consent from the trafficking analysis. The statutory invalidity of consent confirms that apparent acquiescence, cooperation, or prior participation in sex work does not negate liability where the Crown proves prohibited conduct carried out for an exploitative purpose. The focus remains on the accused’s conduct, the surrounding circumstances, and whether the statutory definition of exploitation is met on an objective assessment. [17]
ii. Evidence supporting purposive control:
362The question of whether the accused acted with an exploitative purpose must be assessed in light of the totality of the evidence. In this case, the record discloses multiple, mutually reinforcing strands of evidence pointing to an intentional pattern of control exercised by the accused over the complainants’ movements, activities, and capacity to operate independently. No single factor is determinative. Rather, it is the cumulative effect of the evidence that informs the purposive analysis.
363First, the evidence establishes deliberate transportation and geographic displacement. The accused transported K.L. and N.B. from Quebec to Ontario knowing they would be providing sexual services during that trip. This removed them from their home province and placed them in an unfamiliar environment where they were dependent on the accused for transportation, accommodation, and return travel. That displacement heightened vulnerability and constrained alternatives.
364Closely connected to this is the accused’s control over accommodation. He booked the Super 8 hotel, arranged for the occupancy of Room 408, retained access through a room key, and was repeatedly captured on CCTV entering and exiting the room. The hotel functioned not only as living quarters but as the central operational site from which sexual services were advertised, coordinated, and provided.
365The fact that the room was registered in K.L’s name does not diminish the relevance of the hotel records to the assessment of purposive control or their connection to harbouring under s. 279.01 of the Criminal Code.
366Registration alone does not determine who exercised control over the accommodation or for what purpose it was maintained. The probative value of the records lies instead in the length, continuity, and stability of the lodging arrangement throughout the offence period, particularly when considered alongside the accused’s admissions and his repeated access to the room.
367On his own evidence, Mr. Laguerre acknowledged that he was responsible for booking the room. Although he characterized that booking as a benign effort to assist through fraudulent means in securing a discount, I have rejected that explanation. I am satisfied that the booking was made to facilitate ongoing sex‑trade activity, that the accused retained functional control over the accommodation through possession of a room key and unrestricted access, and that this control operated to structure and regulate the activities of both K.L. and N.B.
368The evidence further demonstrates centralized control over advertising and client communications. Digital artefacts recovered from the trap phone include escort advertisements, payment mechanisms, client communications, and screenshots reflecting live coordination. These materials support the conclusion that advertising and client management were not independently controlled by either complainant but operated through a single device associated with the accused.
369This conclusion is reinforced by evidence relating to possession and operational use of the trap phone. At material times, hotel surveillance captured the accused in physical possession of the device contemporaneous with the creation of digital artefacts reflecting client coordination. By contrast, neither complainant had the phone’s passcode or exercised independent authority over its contents, and both described it as belonging to the accused.
370The directive nature of this coordination is evident from the timing and content of the screenshot artefacts when viewed alongside the CCTV evidence. Together, they reflect real‑time organization of client arrivals, access logistics, and service timing that corresponded with the accused’s proximity and oversight. This is inconsistent with passive involvement and supports the finding of operational control.
371The accused also exercised control over finances. Both complainants stated that the accused took their earnings and retained possession of the cash generated from their work. Neither had control over the money they generated, and both were left without funds at the time of police attendance. That contemporaneous deprivation is reflected in the 911 call and the body‑worn camera footage, in which the complainants expressed concern about how they could return home or recover their property without access to their money. The accused, meanwhile, was found in possession of a significant amount of cash. This financial structure placed the complainants in a position of dependency and materially constrained their ability to disengage.
372In R. v. Antoine[18], which I adopt, LeMay J. held that a drug dealer–addict relationship may give rise to exploitation within the meaning of s. 279.04 where the accused knowingly uses dependency as leverage to induce continued provision of sexual services, even in the absence of overt violence.
373The record further establishes the provision of drugs as a mechanism of control. The accused was the primary supplier of drugs to both complainants and was aware of their substance dependency. Access to drugs was embedded in the broader arrangement governing continued work, reinforcing dependence and compliance rather than autonomy.
374Taken together, these factors produced a state of isolation and material dependency. While in Ontario, the complainants had no independent transportation, no access to their earnings, no alternative accommodation, and no realistic means of disengaging from the accused without immediate hardship. Their basic needs were mediated through him.
375The presence of violence and threats forms an important contextual backdrop. The evidence establishes that the accused engaged in acts of violence toward both complainants, including repeated assaults and the incident precipitating K.L.’s flight from the room. The 911 call and the contemporaneous police observations captured on body‑worn camera reflect active fear, visible injury, and distress occurring in real time. Violence functioned not as an isolated episode but as both punishment and an implied deterrent against resistance or non‑compliance.
376While violence is not a necessary element of exploitation, its presence may materially reinforce the reasonableness of a belief that adverse consequences would follow non‑compliance.[19] I find that is supported and accepted as the context under which K.L. and N.B. operated on this record.
377The accused also exercised psychological and emotional leverage, particularly in relation to K.L. She believed she was in a romantic relationship with him and was emotionally bonded to him. The accused was aware of and benefited from that dynamic, which amplified the power imbalance between them.
378Further, the evidence shows the accused’s awareness of, and reliance upon, K.L.’s children as a point of vulnerability. He knew she was involved in a custody dispute and admitted to communicating with the children’s father about her conduct. That knowledge heightened her dependency and susceptibility to pressure.
379The accused’s continuous proximity and monitoring further support purposive control. He remained physically nearby while clients attended, waiting in hallways or common areas. This pattern aligns with the complainants’ contemporaneous accounts to police, including their expressed belief that the accused was watching or would reappear if they attempted to leave.
380Finally, while the accused bore no burden to prove anything, he elected to testify and advanced an alternative explanation for his presence in Ontario, asserting that it was for unrelated criminal purposes. I have rejected that explanation for reasons already given. It was internally inconsistent and contradicted by the surveillance evidence, the extracted digital evidence, and the consistent contemporaneous accounts of the complainants.
381Taken together, these strands of evidence disclose a sustained and intentional pattern of conduct directed toward maintaining control over the complainants’ movements, resources, and activities, and form the factual foundation for the finding of exploitative purpose that follows.
iii. The Sinclair factors applied
382When the evidence is assessed cumulatively through the lens mandated by Sinclair, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to cause each complainant to believe that her physical or psychological safety would be threatened if she failed to continue providing sexual services. The assessment is not dependent on whether either complainant articulated fear in precisely those terms, nor on whether the accused’s conduct succeeded in every instance in compelling compliance. Rather, the question is whether a reasonable person in the complainants’ position, experiencing the accused’s conduct in its full factual context, would draw that conclusion.
383Here, the accused’s conduct incorporated multiple overlapping mechanisms of control. These included violence and intimidation, the use and threatened use of further harm, control over money and essential resources, exploitation of substance dependency, psychological and emotional leverage arising from intimate relationships, geographic displacement and isolation, centralized control over communications and work conditions, and continuous proximity and monitoring. None of these features, viewed in isolation, would necessarily be determinative. Taken together, however, they form a coherent and sustained pattern of coercive control.
384In those circumstances, a reasonable person in the complainants’ position would understand that refusal to work, attempts to disengage, or efforts to assert independence carried a real risk of violence, deprivation, abandonment, or other serious adverse consequences. That perception of threatened harm need not be articulated, contemporaneous, or consistent across all interactions to satisfy the statutory definition. It is sufficient that the accused’s conduct, viewed objectively, was capable of producing that belief.
385I am therefore satisfied that the Crown has proven exploitation within the meaning of s. 279.04 of the Criminal Code. Given the nature, consistency, and direction of the accused’s conduct, the inference that he acted for the purpose of exploiting the complainants follows inexorably. The conduct was not incidental, reactive, or merely associative. It was purposive, sustained, and directed toward maintaining ongoing control over the provision of sexual services.
386This finding provides the necessary factual foundation for the human trafficking offences that follow and disposes of any suggestion that the accused’s involvement amounted only to association, parallel criminality, or consensual participation absent exploitation.
F. Count‑based synthesis and disposition
387Having considered the whole of the evidence and applied the applicable law, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven all of the essential elements of each of the offences charged.
388In relation to the human trafficking counts contrary to s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code (Counts 3 and 4), I find that the accused recruited, transported, harboured, and exercised control, direction, and influence over the movements of K.L. and N.B. for the purpose of exploiting them within the meaning of s. 279.04. The accused’s conduct, viewed objectively and in its full factual context, was reasonably capable of causing each complainant to believe that her physical or psychological safety would be threatened if she failed to continue providing sexual services. I therefore find the accused guilty on both trafficking counts.
389With respect to the offences under s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Counts 11 and 12), I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised control, direction, and influence over the movements of K.L. and N.B. for the purpose of facilitating the provision of sexual services for consideration. I therefore find the accused guilty on both counts.
390With respect to the offences of receiving a material benefit from human trafficking contrary to s. 279.02(2) of the Criminal Code (Counts 7 and 8), I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused received financial and material benefits knowing they were derived directly or indirectly from the commission of the trafficking offences. I find the accused guilty on both counts.
391With respect to the offences of receiving a material benefit from the provision of sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Counts 9 and 10), and for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused received financial and material benefits derived from the complainants’ provision of sexual services, and that no statutory exception applies. I therefore find the accused guilty on both counts.
392With respect to the offence of knowingly advertising the offer to provide sexual services for consideration contrary to s. 286.4 of the Criminal Code (Count 15), I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly caused or controlled the publication of such advertisements during the Ontario stay. I therefore find the accused guilty on that count.
393With respect to the remaining counts of assault contrary to s. 266, assault with a weapon contrary to s. 267(a), uttering threats contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a), and failure to comply with an undertaking contrary to s. 145(4)(a) of the Criminal Code, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the essential elements of each offence. The use of a weapon, namely a phone and/or phone cord, has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore find the accused guilty on all remaining counts as charged.
Released: May 4, 2026
Signed: Justice S. Robichaud
APPENDIX A
1That ruling is appended to these reasons as Appendix A.
2Released December 29, 2025
3While I mention this as part of Mr. Laguerre’s evidence that he provided in his examination-in-chief, I have specifically turned my mind to avoid using any such evidence towards propensity reasoning.
4Exhibit 1
5Minor variations in seconds do not affect the sequence or inferences drawn.
6While this taken from a translated police statement with paraphrasing of questions, I did not take N.B.’s statement to mean anyone other than the accused or K.L. taking her funds or the funds – “guys” does not refer to some third party outside of the accused or K.L.
7Exhibit 20b
8It is important to reiterate that “creation date” does not necessarily mean the date the photo was taken on the device itself. The creation date is when this image (which may be a product of a text message), was “created” on the phone in the form it was found.
9Exhibit 94
10Exhibits 19a and 30
[xi] R. v. Downey, 1992 CanLII 109 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 10
1R. v. Amdurski, 2023 ONSC 1476 at paras 150, 154-155
2R v. W(D), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742
3R. v. Sinclair, 2020 ONCA 61 at paras. 9–11; R. v. Gallone, 2019 ONCA 663 at paras. 33, 47.
4R. v. Sinclair, supra, at paras. 12–14; R. v. A.A., 2015 ONCA 558 at paras. 82, 85–87; R. v. Gallone, supra at para. 54.
5R. v. Sinclair, supra, at paras. 14, 23–25; R. v. A.A., supra, at paras. 71–73; R. v. Gallone, 2019 supra at paras. 53–54.
6R. v. Sinclair, supra, at paras. 14–15, 23–25; R. v. A.A. supra at paras 71–73; R. v. Gallone, supra at paras. 53–54.
7R. v. Sinclair, supra, at paras. 7–8, 14–15; R. v. Gallone, supra, at paras. 47, 54; R. v. A.A., supra at paras. 85–87.
8R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000
9R. v. Oloko, 2025 ONCA 894 at paras. 52–55
10R. v. C.B., 2019 ONCA 380 at paras. 67–72; R. v. S.M., 2025 ONCA 18 at para. 28
11R. v. Lalji, 2026 ONCA 255 at paras. 33–42.
12R. v. Durigon, 2017 ONSC 7075; R. v. Lira, 2021 ONSC 1766, R. v. Fodor, 2023 ONCJ 315
13R. v. Morin, 2024 ONCA 562 at paras. 20–21
14R. v. J.J.A., 2011 SCC 17, at paras. 39–41, R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, at para. 43, R. v. Mugabo, 2017 ONCA 323, at para. 25, R. v. Rose, 2021 ONCA 408, at para. 22
15R. v. Antoine, 2019 ONSC 3843, R. v. Musara, 2022 ONSC 2835 (Nakatsuru J.)
16R. v. Gallone, supra, R. v. A.A., supra
17R. v. Lucchesi, 2026 ONSC 326 at paras. 15–16
18R. v. Antoine, supra
19R. v. Sinclair, supra; R. v. Crosdale, 2018 ONCJ 800