WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Laguerre, 2025 ONCJ 694

DATE: December 29, 2025

COURT FILE No.: Peel Region

998 24 31111966

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

WOOLDY LAGUERRE

Before Justice S. Robichaud

Heard: October 27 to October 31, November 12, 17-25, December 9, 22, 2025.

Reasons for Judgment released on December 29, 2025

Deanna Ida........................................................................................... counsel for the Crown

Stefan Peters.................................................. counsel for the accused Wooldy Laguerre

Table of Contents

Part I – An overview of the pre-trial applications. 4

A. An overview of the evidence. 4

B. The 911 call 5

C. The evidence of attending, arrest, statement, right to counsel, and transport officers 7

i. Evidence of Constable Bolarinho. 7

ii. Evidence of Sergeant Bennewitz. 8

iii. Evidence of Constable Hunt 10

iv. Evidence of Constable Couce. 11

v. Evidence of Constable Thurston.. 13

D. The involvement of Vice Officers. 17

i. Evidence of Detective Constable Brunino. 17

ii. Evidence of Detective Constable Kenaul Douglas. 19

Part III: Analysis of the rights to counsel, reasons for detention, and voluntariness: 20

A. Admissibility of Mr. Laguerre’s Statement: Voluntariness and Charter Rights. 21

i. Informational components under s.10(a) and 10(b) prior to Mr. Laguerre’s booking 22

ii. Implementational component prior to Mr. Laguerre’s booking. 23

iii. The booking of Mr. Laguerre and the deliberate disabling of audio. 24

iv. The impact of disabling the audio of the booking and necessary scrutiny: 25

v. The breach of rights to counsel and voluntariness up to the booking room.. 27

B. Mr. Laguerre’s change in jeopardy to human trafficking offences and delay in advising him of the new charges. 28

i. When the change of jeopardy occurred. 29

ii. The investigative and prosecutorial value to Mr. Laguerre’s admissions. 30

iii. The re-caution on right to silence and right to counsel 32

C. The exclusion of the video statement of Mr. Laguerre under s.24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 34

i. The first Grant factor: the seriousness of state conduct 34

ii. The second Grant factor: the impact of the Charter infringement upon the accused’s interests. 35

iii. The third Grant factor: the societal interest in trying cases on their merits. 36

iv. Grant factors applied results in exclusion.. 36

Part IV: The admissibility of the hearsay utterances of K.L. and N.B. 36

A. An overview of the hearsay application and the legal principles: 36

B. The evidence relating to the hearsay application.. 37

i. The 911 call, the res gestae exception, and considered reliability of the utterances made 38

ii. Admissible elements of the 911 call: 39

iii. Consideration of res gestae as it applies to body-worn camera footage. 41

C. General positions of the parties, applied to the hearsay evidence remaining in dispute: 42

D. The principled “Bradshaw” approach to hearsay applied to the body-worn camera footage capturing the utterances of K.L. and N.B., and the 911 call. 44

i. (Continued) Evidence of Detective Constable Kenaul Douglas (Vice) 45

ii. Evidence of Danielle Dalton.. 52

iii. Necessity. 53

E. Threshold reliability: framework and approach.. 53

i. The procedural reliability of the statements. 54

ii. The substantive reliability of the statements. 56

iii. Corroborative evidence enhancing substantive reliability. 63

iv. Alternative explanations that may diminish substantive reliability. 65

v. The inability to cross-examine and the effect on trial fairness. 94

F. Discretion to exclude on a residual basis: probative versus prejudicial 96

G. Conclusion on the admissibility of the hearsay. 97

Part VI: Conclusion on all rulings: 97

Appendix A – Statement of the Accused – Timeline of Key Events (October 12, 2024) 99

Initial Scene. 99

Transport and Booking. 100

Vice Briefings and Interviews. 100

Notable Durations. 101

Appendix B – CCTV Footage with adjusted times. 102

A. Adjustment calculations. 102

B. Adjusted timeline of events captured on CCTV: 103

ROBICHAUD J.

Part I – An overview of the pre-trial applications

1This ruling is on the admissibility of:

(i) the custodial video-recorded interview[1] of Mr. Laguerre taken at 12 Division, Peel Regional Police;[2]

(ii) hearsay statements attributed to alleged victim #1, “K.L.”; and,

(iii) hearsay statements attributed to alleged victim #2, “N.B.”.

2The issues regarding the accused’s statement are voluntariness at common law and compliance with sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particularly at the point when his legal jeopardy changed from charges of assault and breach of undertaking to human‑trafficking related offences. If a breach is established, exclusion under section 24(2) must be considered.

3The voir dires on these issues proceeded in a blended proceeding to the trial evidence, with the consent of all parties.

4For the reasons set out below, the video statement of Mr. Laguerre is excluded. It was obtained in violation of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter. Further, from the moment he commences the interview with Detective Constable Douglas, to point he was re-cautioned well into the interview on the more serious charges of human trafficking, the statement is inadmissible at common law as involuntary.

5In contrast, I find the hearsay statements of K.L. and N.B. admissible with some minor exceptions. Some aspects meet the traditional exception of res gestae exception, while others satisfy the principled exception to the hearsay rule. With necessity conceded by the defence, the Crown has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the statements are sufficiently reliable to meet the threshold for admissibility under the Bradshaw[3] framework.

A. An overview of the evidence.

6Mr. Laguerre faces allegations of human trafficking related offences, breaching an undertaking, assault, and uttering threats. The complainants, K.L. and N.B., did not attend to testify despite being subpoenaed. The Crown therefore relies on their prior statements and video-recorded interviews, together with corroborative evidence.

7The Crown called Peel Regional Police officers Ben Couce, Daniel Bolarinho, Patricia Hunt, Kenaul Douglas, Giacomo Brunino, Cassidy Thurston, Danielle Dalton, and Sergeant Mark Bennewitz. Through their testimony, the Crown introduced body-worn camera footage, in-car camera recordings, CCTV footage from 12 Division (including visible wall clocks), and video-recorded statements from both Mr. Laguerre and N.B. The 911 call made by K.L. was also filed as an exhibit. The Crown also filed, on consent, an extraction report of a phone alleged to be the “trap phone” of Mr. Laguerre, and photographs of seized property and alleged injuries of the complainants.

8The officers’ evidence outlines the sequence of events on October 12, 2024, beginning with the 911 call placed by K.L. at approximately 4:15 p.m. and continuing through Mr. Laguerre’s arrest, transport to 12 Division, and his interview later that evening. Their testimony provides essential context for the administration of Mr. Laguerre’s rights to counsel and the circumstances surrounding the statement now in issue.

9The evidence also forms the foundation for determining the admissibility of hearsay statements attributed to K.L. and N.B. While there is some overlap, certain officers relate primarily to voluntariness and Charter compliance, whereas others address the reliability and necessity of the complainants’ hearsay statements.

10Every attending officer—Couce, Bennewitz, Hunt, Thurston, and Bolarinho—was equipped with an active body-worn camera capturing both audio and video. This footage, together with in-car transport video, CCTV recordings, and video interviews, documented all material interactions between officers, the accused, and the complainants. These recordings, filed as exhibits, provide a comprehensive, contemporaneous, multi-perspective, and highly reliable evidentiary record for review and commentary during the respective witnesses’ testimony. For some of this footage, corresponding transcripts were filed.

11As explained in detail below, an exception in this timeline occurred when the booking officer, acting under the direction of the staff sergeant, instructed Constable Couce to deactivate his body-worn camera. As a result, only silent CCTV footage is available for the period during which Mr. Laguerre was booked, re-cautioned on his rights to counsel, and afforded the opportunity to implement or waive his right to counsel of choice. This gap is significant because it coincides with a major change in jeopardy and the re-administration of rights under section 10(b).

12A detailed chronology of Mr. Laguerre’s detention, arrest, and statement is set out in Appendix A.

13A detailed chronology of the CCTV footage is set out in Appendix B.

Part II – A detailed review of the evidence

B. The 911 call

14On October 12, 2024, at approximately 4:15 p.m., K.L. placed an emotional 911 call from a gas station connected to the Super 8 Motel at 6625 Kennedy Road in Mississauga.

15The audio recording of this call was filed as an exhibit as was a corresponding transcript.

16K.L. reported that her boyfriend, identified by the caller as “Wooldy Laguerre” (911 call transcript, page 12), had assaulted her moments earlier in Room 408 of the motel. She stated, “my boyfriend keeps hitting me” and “he took my phone.” She explained that she fled wearing only a T-shirt, without pants or personal belongings, and was inside the gas station seeking help.

17K.L. told the operator that the accused struck her with a phone charger cable and punched her repeatedly, leaving her bruised. She confirmed that the assault occurred “just right now.” When asked if she required medical assistance, she declined, stating, “Yeah, I’m not hurt.”

18K.L. repeatedly expressed concern that the accused would leave with her belongings and money if he became aware that police had been called. She stated, “I can’t go back to Montreal.”

19She claimed the accused took her money from her and will leave if he knows she called police. She advised that the money he took from her was from her “work”.

20K.L. confirmed that she, and the other female present in the room, work for him as an escort and they had been staying at the hotel for a couple of days, with a reservation continuing until October 15.

21She alleged that the other female falsely accused her of calling 911, which triggered the assault. K.L. confirmed that both women had been working for him for approximately a year and a half.

22She provided the accused’s name, approximate age (31–32), physical description (heavy build), clothing (black T-shirt and black jeans), and stated that he drove a grey Honda Civic with a Quebec trip permit displayed as a paper document in the rear window, rather than a standard licence plate. She confirmed that she did not believe the other female was in immediate danger.

23At one point, K.L. believed she saw the accused inside the gas station and began to panic, but then stated she was unsure.

24Throughout the call, K.L. was distraught, and the operator repeatedly asked her to slow down due to difficulty understanding her.

25K.L. admitted to using cocaine earlier in the day, along with the other female, but said the accused was sober. Throughout the call, she repeatedly urged police to attend quickly, fearing that Mr. Laguerre would flee with her property.

26When asked if the accused had a weapon, she replied “No, I don’t think so.”

27The call concluded as officers arrived on scene and K.L. left the gas station to meet them. The call lasted approximately 26 minutes.

C. The evidence of attending, arrest, statement, right to counsel, and transport officers

i. Evidence of Constable Bolarinho

28Constable Daniel Bolarinho of Peel Regional Police was on uniform patrol with 12 Division on October 12, 2024. He arrived at the Super 8 Motel at approximately 4:30 p.m. in response to the 911 call. His body-worn camera footage[4] captures the complainant K.L. outside the hotel wearing a black shirt and no pants. She appeared distressed and was pacing. Constable Bolarinho observed visible bruising on her face and marks on her arm. Although upset, she communicated in English and declined medical assistance. He did not detect signs of impairment.

29Acting on information from K.L. that the accused was in Room 408 with another female, officers proceeded to that room. They knocked and announced “police” but received no response. Under what I find were exigent circumstances—concern for the safety of another potential victim and the immediacy of the reported assault—Sergeant Bennewitz obtained a key and officers entered. The room was unoccupied and in disarray, with personal belongings strewn about. No items were searched or seized. Officers exited and continued efforts to locate the accused.

30He and other officers exited the fourth floor via the hotel stairwell. As they were descending, information came over the radio that the person of interest, later to be determined as Wooldy Laguerre, was seen outside the hotel.

31At 4:48:42 p.m., near the adjacent Esso station, officers observed a male in a red shirt with a female in a grey tracksuit, matching descriptions provided by K.L. At 4:49:33 p.m., Mr. Laguerre was detained by Constables Couce and Bennewitz without significant force. He walked calmly and did not attempt to flee. At 4:51 p.m., a pat-down search was conducted, and at 4:51:30 p.m. he was arrested for assault and breach of conditions. He was placed in a police cruiser at 4:52:05 p.m. A beige satchel was searched for identification at 4:52:30 p.m.; cash was located, and the satchel was secured in the front seat.

32Constable Bolarinho did not personally question Mr. Laguerre but was in close proximity and heard no threats, promises, or inducements. He confirmed that Mr. Laguerre appeared coherent and not impaired. At 4:55:30 p.m., Constable Hunt delivered the right to counsel in French. At 5:01:54 p.m., Mr. Laguerre requested to speak with a lawyer, providing the name “Patrick Bouler.” Officers attempted to obtain contact information and later facilitated a private call at the station. Constable Bolarinho emphasized that privacy could not be assured at the scene due to recording equipment and public presence.

33Constable Bolarinho later transported K.L. to 12 Division. The transport video (Exhibit 11) shows her using her phone, eating, and scrolling social media. There were no substantive discussions during transport.

34In cross-examination, Constable Bolarinho acknowledged that he did not hear the original 911 call but received information via dispatch. He confirmed that exigent circumstances justified the entry into room 408, based on the report of domestic violence and the possibility of another victim being present. He stated that he had reasonable and probable grounds to believe Mr. Laguerre was arrestable for assault at 4:48:40 p.m., but he was not the arresting officer.

35Constable Bolarinho testified that he did not turn his mind to human trafficking charges at the time, although he was aware that Sergeant Bennewitz intended to liaise with other bureaus regarding that possibility. He emphasized that privacy in the cruiser could not be guaranteed due to audio and video recording, and that the station was a more appropriate location for facilitating a private conversation with counsel.

ii. Evidence of Sergeant Bennewitz

36Sergeant Mark Bennewitz has served with Peel Regional Police since April 2004. On October 12, 2024, he was working a night shift as a uniform patrol sergeant assigned to 12 Division, C Platoon. At 16:26 hours, he received a radio dispatch reporting that a female had been assaulted by a male at the Super 8 Motel located at 6625 Kennedy Road in Mississauga. The male’s whereabouts were unknown. Sergeant Bennewitz arrived at the motel at approximately 16:37 hours. He was the supervising sergeant on scene.

37His body-worn camera recording, filed as an exhibit, begins at approximately 16:38 and captures the dynamic sequence of events leading to the accused’s detention, arrest, and discussions to facilitate his rights to counsel and caution in French.

38Upon arrival, he observed several officers already on scene and the complainant, K.L., outside speaking with them.

39Sergeant Bennewitz and other officers had blocked a grey Honda Civic believed to be associated with the accused. The recording captures discussion of the vehicle associated with the accused. This was a grey Honda Civic bearing no plates but displaying a Quebec trip permit valid until October 2.

40K.L. identified Room 408 as the location of the assault and advised that she did not believe the accused had any weapons. She appeared disheveled and exhibited visible injuries, including what seemed to be a black eye and bruising. Sergeant Bennewitz noted that she was excitable and possibly intoxicated, though he could not confirm impairment. He did not detect alcohol on her breath.

41Acting on information from K.L. that the accused and another female might still be in Room 408, and concerned for the safety of any additional victims, Sergeant Bennewitz directed officers to remain with the complainant while he and two other officers proceeded to the room.

42After knocking and receiving no response, he returned to the front desk, obtained a key card, and re-entered Room 408 at 16:46 hours. He announced police presence and cleared the room, which was unoccupied and in disarray. No items were searched or seized. He explained that entry without warrant was justified by exigent circumstances: the need to ensure no further victims were present, the immediacy of the reported assault, and the inability to secure the scene fully given limited resources and public safety concerns.

43In cross-examination, he agreed that he did not hear noises or cries for help and that K.L. had said the accused was not armed. He acknowledged that his assumption of risk to the second female was not based on specific information from K.L. but on his experience and the context of the assault. He also confirmed that he did not identify himself as police when initially knocking and gave no thought to securing the room as a crime scene, though he observed white powdery substances inside.

44After clearing Room 408, he exited and continued efforts to locate the male. None of the officers attempted to search the room or personal belongings. Their time spent in the room was brief and purposive to the end of locating the male and female party.

45At 16:48 hours, radio updates indicated that the male was near the Esso station, wearing a red shirt and accompanied by a female in a grey tracksuit. At 16:49 hours, Sergeant Bennewitz approached the accused, later identified as Wooldy Laguerre.

46The body-worn camera recording, filed as Exhibit 28A, begins at 16:38 and captures the sequence of events (along with all other material interactions that day).

47The body-worn camera footage captures in video and audio Sergeant Bennewitz approaching Mr. Laguerre near the hotel and asking to speak with him. Mr. Laguerre agreed. Bennewitz instructed him to keep his hands out of his pockets and asked if he was staying in Room 408, which Mr. Laguerre denied. When Bennewitz confirmed that Mr. Laguerre spoke little English, he directed him to walk toward a police vehicle to discuss the situation. Bennewitz asked if Mr. Laguerre was from Montreal, which he confirmed, and then explained that police had received information suggesting he might have assaulted a woman. Mr. Laguerre denied the allegation and also denied having anything on him that he should not have.

48He testified that utterances did not contribute to his grounds for arrest on the assault and breach, which were established independently and prior to this interaction. None of these utterances are being led as part of the Crown’s case.

49He testified that the accused was not detained until physical contact was made when the officer touched his right arm. He explained that he delayed advising reasons for detention immediately because of safety concerns: the accused was a large male carrying a satchel, wearing loose clothing that could conceal weapons, and was in close proximity to members of the public. He considered it safer to move the accused to an area where additional officers were present before providing full information.

50The accused was compliant, did not attempt to flee and followed directions.

51In cross-examination, Sergeant Bennewitz agreed that he asked questions before providing a caution or advising reasons for detention, including whether the accused was from Room 408, whether he was from Montreal, and whether he had anything on him that he should not have. He acknowledged that these were potentially incriminating questions and that the right to counsel and reasons for detention were not given until later. He maintained that, in his view, the circumstances justified the delay for safety reasons, though he accepted that in ideal conditions these rights should be provided immediately.

52The footage also records officers confirming that Mr. Laguerre was subject to conditions prohibiting contact with K.L. and discussing contacting the Vice Unit, noting his prior involvement in human trafficking investigations. At 16:55 hours, arrangements were made for Constable Hunt to deliver the right to counsel in French, acknowledging Mr. Laguerre’s claim that he would not understand his rights in English.

53After the arrest, Sergeant Bennewitz contacted the Vice Unit because K.L. had indicated she was an escort. He requested Constable Dalton to assist with translation. He testified that he had no grounds to arrest for human trafficking offences and did not inform Mr. Laguerre of any such allegations. He left the scene shortly thereafter and returned to 12 Division to brief Vice officers. The body-worn camera was muted during the Vice call, which he explained was due to telephone use, though he acknowledged current policy requires the camera to remain on. The footage concludes at approximately 00:16 hours with confirmation that Mr. Laguerre was in custody and preparations to liaise with the Vice Unit.

iii. Evidence of Constable Hunt

54Constable Patricia Hunt attended the Super 8 Motel on October 12, 2024, as part of the initial response. At the time, she was in the second phase of field training and paired with her coach officer, Constable Thurston. Hunt is bilingual and was asked to assist with French interpretation during the investigation.

55Her body-worn camera recording, filed as an exhibit, begins at approximately 16:41 and captures her interaction with K.L. near the hotel entrance. Speaking primarily in French, Hunt asked K.L. questions about the nature of her relationship with the accused and the circumstances of the assault. K.L. stated that she had fled the room without pants and confirmed that the assault occurred in Room 408. She reported that the accused struck her with an iPhone charger cord and kicked her multiple times, leaving visible bruises. Hunt observed injuries on K.L.’s face, shoulder, and back, which K.L. attributed to the accused. Hunt confirmed that K.L. appeared anxious but coherent and declined medical assistance.

56During this exchange, K.L. disclosed that she and the accused were intimate partners for approximately a year and a half and that she also engaged in sexual activity for money. Hunt asked clarifying questions about whether the relationship was romantic or transactional, and K.L. confirmed that it was both. K.L. further stated that she and another female, later identified as N.B., had been staying at the motel for several days and that the accused acted as their pimp. Hunt documented these statements and later photographed injuries on both complainants, as well as the hotel telephone identified as the object used in the assault.

57The footage also captures Hunt obtaining identification details from both complainants and discussing their safety concerns. N.B. expressed fear of an individual named “Julian,” alleging that he had been paid to harm her and that he possessed a firearm in Montreal. Hunt reassured both women and explained that protective measures, including referral to a specialized unit, would be arranged. Hunt testified that these statements were unsolicited and made spontaneously during the interaction.

58At approximately 16:55, Hunt delivered the accused’s rights to counsel in French after officers determined that Mr. Laguerre would not understand his rights in English. She read the caution and informational components from her notebook, advising him of his right to retain and instruct counsel without delay, his right to legal aid, and the availability of duty counsel. Mr. Laguerre confirmed understanding and requested to speak with a lawyer immediately. He provided the name of his lawyer in Montreal, “Patrick Boulet,” and indicated that officers could locate the contact information online. Hunt testified that she did not make any threats, promises, or inducements and did not hear any other officer do so. She emphasized that the caution was provided promptly once the scene was secure and that officers acted in good faith to comply with section 10(a) and 10(b) obligations.

59The specific utterances that the Crown seeks to introduce under the hearsay exception, made by K.L. and N.B. during their recorded interaction with Constable Hunt, will be addressed in detail under the analysis section of this ruling. It is sufficient to note at this stage that the transcript accurately reflects the translated conversation captured on Hunt’s body-worn camera and forms part of the evidentiary record.

60Sergeant Bennewitz acknowledged that his body-worn camera was muted during the telephone call to the Vice Unit. He explained that this occurred because he was speaking over the phone and, at the time, believed muting was permissible in such circumstances. He further testified that he was a senior officer who had been slow to adopt body-worn camera technology and that his understanding of policy has evolved. He now applies the current standard requiring continuous recording but clarified that this expectation reflects present policy rather than what he understood to be required on October 12, 2024. He made it clear that now, the policy is that it should be all the time except in rare circumstances (for which he did not elaborate upon or was questioned upon).

iv. Evidence of Constable Couce

61Constable Ben Couce of Peel Regional Police was among the first officers to respond to the 911 call on October 12, 2024 at approximately 16:37, His body-worn camera footage, filed as an exhibit, provides a detailed record of his interactions with the accused and other officers during the arrest and subsequent procedures.

62Couce assisted in locating the accused near the Esso station adjacent to the Super 8 Motel. At approximately 16:49, he and Sergeant Bennewitz detained Mr. Laguerre. The accused was calm, cooperative, and did not attempt to flee. Couce held the accused by the forearms while directing him toward the police cruiser at the front of the hotel where officers first attended. He did this as the front of the hotel was a more controlled environment with more officers present, police vehicles, and to avoid possible escalation and for safety reasons.

63While detained, Mr. Laguerre asked “What’s the problem?” and Bennewitz replied, “We heard a story about you hitting a girl,” to which the accused denied.

64Couce’s footage also captures the search of a beige satchel in the accused’s possession at 16:52:30. The search was limited to identification and safety purposes. No identification was found, but a significant amount of cash was observed. Keys to a vehicle, presumed to be the one of interest, were also seized. The satchel was secured in the front seat of the cruiser. Couce testified that he did not make any threats, promises, or inducements to the accused and did not hear any other officer do so. His footage also captured the vehicle that Mr. Laguerre was allegedly operating along with a trip permit affixed in the rear-view window. A photo of that trip permit sticker was entered as an exhibit.

65At 16:51, a pat-down search was conducted, and at 16:51:30, Mr. Laguerre was formally arrested for assault and breach of conditions. He did not consider human trafficking charges at that stage as he did not then have grounds for these charges. Under re-examination, he also testified that it would be unusual for officers to lay human trafficking offences without first obtaining input or delegating that decision to the Vice Unit.

66At 16:53:50, Couce attempted to deliver the right to counsel in English. The accused indicated that he did not understand and spoke only French. Constable Hunt subsequently provided the caution and informational components in French at 16:55. Constable Hunt was chosen to deliver the caution rather than using an interpreter app because she was on scene and this was considered the most efficient option. He indicated it would leave it to the judgment of Constable Hunt to determine whether she was capable of such a task and language proficiency.

67Constable Couce testified that he deferred implementation of the right to counsel until arrival at the station because privacy could not be assured at the scene. He explained that body-worn cameras are highly sensitive and could capture conversations unintentionally, and that the presence of other officers and members of the public further compromised confidentiality. Constable Couce acknowledged under cross-examination that a call to counsel at the scene was possible, but maintained that a private, soundproof room at the station was the most appropriate setting. On re-examination, he added that he would not have permitted Mr. Laguerre to use his own phone because it contained potential evidence that could be deleted.

68He admitted that he was not aware that the in-car camera was not recording (although his body camera with audio and video remained active). This was an oversight on his part as he returned from CIB work and was not yet familiar with what was relatively new technology to him at the time.

69Mr. Laguerre was transported from the hotel at 5:07 p.m., arriving at 12 Division at 5:17 p.m., and entering the sally port at 5:19 p.m. Prior to arrival, he notified his staff sergeant he had someone in custody and he was bringing him to the station for booking.

70A notable gap in the otherwise comprehensive audio-video record occurred during the booking process.

71The booking officer, acting on the direction of the staff sergeant, instructed Constable Couce to deactivate his body-worn camera. Couce testified that he muted audio briefly when the Staff Sergeant was on the phone and later restored it. As a result, only silent CCTV footage is available for much of this period, which coincides with critical events: Mr. Laguerre was booked, re-cautioned on his rights to counsel, and afforded the opportunity to implement or waive his right to counsel of choice. Constable Couce could not recall the exact words exchanged and could not rule out that WL was told he could not speak to a Quebec lawyer.

72During this exchange with the staff sergeant, the following can be observed on the CCTV footage: Mr. Laguerre yawns, shakes his head “no,” and stands for a pat-down search against the wall. He then sits on the bench, places his head down, and rubs his head and face. At approximately 5:25 p.m., Mr. Laguerre is seen with arms crossed while the Staff Sergeant speaks. Mr. Laguerre appears to listen and nod intermittently. At 5:27 p.m., Mr. Laguerre engages in a back-and-forth with the Staff Sergeant, who does most of the talking. Mr. Laguerre’s posture alternates between arms crossed and head in hands. The interaction continues until approximately 5:37 p.m., when Constable Couce’s notebook indicates that rights to counsel were discussed.

73Constable Couce testified that he could not recall the exact words exchanged but agreed that the Staff Sergeant led the conversation and Mr. Laguerre mostly followed along. Constable Couce could not rule out that Mr. Laguerre was told he could not speak to a Quebec lawyer during this period as he did not recall the specifics of what was said.

74At approximately 5:27 p.m., Couce testified that he attempted to contact Mr. Laguerre’s counsel of choice, identified as Mr. Patrick Boulet. The search terms did not include the proper spelling, asking Mr. Laguerre for the proper spelling, or using the additional search term “Montreal” to enhance the search. During this time, Mr. Laguerre changed his request to duty counsel. Couce stated that neither he nor any other officer suggested this change and that Mr. Laguerre made the request independently. At 5:30 p.m., Couce called duty counsel and asked Mr. Laguerre for his preferred language. Mr. Laguerre responded “English,” which Couce found notable given the earlier request for rights to counsel in French.

75Couce confirmed that no officers made any threats, promises, or inducements to Mr. Laguerre, nor was he compelled to provide a statement. Under cross-examination, he stated that his primary concern throughout was the safety of the complainant and any other potential victims. He acknowledged that the decision to enter Room 408 without a warrant was based on exigent circumstances, specifically the need to ensure no one inside was in immediate danger. Although this rationale was not documented in his notes, he maintained that it was the basis for the entry.

v. Evidence of Constable Thurston

76Cassidy Thurston, a uniform officer, testified that on October 12, 2024, she attended the Super 8 Hotel in Mississauga with Constable Hunt in response to a report of assault. She was acting as a training officer, or “coach”, for Constable Hunt that day.

77As she and Constable Hunt arrived, she noticed a male in a red shirt, later identified as Wooldy Laguerre, and a female in a grey tracksuit near a gas station adjacent to the hotel. She did not engage with these two individuals as her focus was on first speaking to the complainant on the 911 call.

78Except for a brief interruption while speaking to Sergeant Bennewitz, all of Thurston’s activities in this investigation, and importantly during her interactions with the complainants, were captured in video and audio on her body-worn camera. This provides a valuable and reliable record for review. This footage was filed as an exhibit to the proceedings. Her viva voce testimony was inextricable with the body-worn camera that was played into evidence in her presence.

79Thurston also explained her body-worn camera practices. She turned the camera off only when not interacting with the public or the accused, and when discussing investigative techniques, and re‑activated it upon re‑engaging. She agreed the general rule is to keep the camera on.

80Thurston testified that she relied on Constable Hunt to interpret CPIC conditions that appeared in French. Hunt relayed that one condition prohibited contact with K.L., which Thurston understood and recognized by name. No details about duration were conveyed. From her experience, CPIC conditions are typically current, though even if they proved outdated an arrest on breach could be effected and verified thereafter.

81Thurston recognized the male from a prior traffic stop in May 2024 but did not approach him immediately. She met the complainant, K.L., at the front of the hotel. K.L. appeared upset and spoke partly in French, requiring Hunt to assist with translation. Thurston observed a visible mark on K.L.’s leg and later, in the hotel room, whip-like injuries on her shoulder.

82On her body-worn camera, beginning at approximately 16:43, Thurston questioned K.L. about the nature of the relationship between K.L. and Mr. Laguerre, including whether they were intimate and whether the male was her “pimp.” K.L. indicated “yes” to intimacy and, in context, to him being her “pimp,” and further agreed that she did it for money. Some ambiguity on this exchange was raised by defence counsel on what this meant in cross-examination, so it is best to look to the exact wording of what took place from the translated transcript (conceded as accurate) from Constable Hunt’s body-worn camera:

Hunt: Are you intimate with each other?

K.L. Yes

Hunt: Yes. Are you like boyfriend and girlfriend?

K.L: Yes

Hunt: For how long?

K.L: A year and a half.

Hunt: A year and a half? One and a half year They're intimate.

Thurston: They're intimate because he's her pimp?

Hunt: Okay. But you have relations?

K.L: Yes.

Hunt: Yes

Thurston: So she does it because she gets money from him? She gets financial gain?

Hunt: When you fuck, is it for money or is it just like... Are you together?

K.L. Yes

Hunt: Is it for money?

K.L. Also yes.

Hunt: Yes? So both.

Thurston: Start asking... Because we're going to invest [inaudible 00:04:36] domestic now. Start asking your regular domestic stuff.

83Thurston accepted there was some ambiguity in phrasing but understood the answers to refer to escorting rather than mere intimacy. At that time, she did not pursue detailed human‑trafficking questioning. She explained that she first approached the matter as a domestic relationship investigation, with a developing concern when K.L. later stated that the male was holding some of her money.

84She added that at approximately 16:50, when K.L. mentioned that the male was holding her money, this triggered concern but she did not ask where the money came from. K.L. stated that “All the money he has on him, it’s all ours.”[5] At 16:52, Sergeant Bennewitz raised whether Vice should become involved. Thurston agreed, explaining that she had never investigated a human‑trafficking offence before and believed Vice officers could “connect the dots” to establish reasonable and probable grounds if warranted.

85Thurston was aware that N.B. had an outstanding warrant from Sherbrooke for obstruct. Although this gave her some concern about reliability, she emphasized her duty to remain unbiased and to allow N.B. to explain. Based on N.B.’s observed distress, including hysteria upon seeing K.L., she did not believe N.B. was fabricating to avoid arrest. She accepted that N.B. expressed worry about being in Toronto.

86Thurston permitted the complainants to collect belongings in the presence of officers. No steps were taken to determine ownership of a particular bag. Thurston was mindful of possible drug residue after a comment from Sergeant Bennewitz and cautioned her junior officer accordingly. She did not observe drug consumption and said she would have intervened if it had occurred.

87She did not search the complainants on exit and could not say whether they left with drugs or other evidentiary items. Her direction on body-worn camera included, “don’t take everything… just take some stuff.” She did not check the complainants before they left and could not say whether they departed with drugs or other evidentiary items.

88Thurston noted that NB mentioned “speed” and fake identification cards in the room, though she did not observe consumption.

89Thurston said one phone was seized from the accused and no other phone matching the complainant’s description was found. She did not return any device to the complainants. She did not ask K.L. about the source of the money but agreed that the information that the accused was holding K.L.’s money raised concern that she was being trafficked by Mr. Laguerre. In particular, the following exchange took place and captured on body-worn camera footage:

“K.L.: “Am I going to be able to take my money and my phone?”

Hunt: “He has her phone and her money in his property.”[6]

90When she remarked, “How does he expect to pimp you out with those marks?”, she explained, in response to questioning from defence counsel, that this reflected astonishment about visible injuries in the context of exploitation, and did not cause her to doubt that trafficking could be occurring.

91K.L. and N.B. expressed fear that an unknown male (“Julian”) might be on his way to harm them.

92Thurston assisted Hunt in explaining to K.L. and N.B. that any statements they were to provide was their choice and confirming that that were prepared to provide one. She did not hear any threats, promises, or inducements made to either woman towards this end.

93In the hotel room, she assisted Constable Hunt in documenting injuries of K.L. and N.B., and in retrieving their belongings before they left to 12 Division.

94Thurston confirmed that the scene was never fully secure but did not perceive exigent circumstances requiring immediate arrest. She acknowledged asking a question about pimping on her body-worn camera, influenced by prior radio information, but stated she was uncertain about the threshold for human trafficking charges and would ordinarily consult Vice before laying such charges. In her view, Vice should be contacted because they have greater experience with human‑trafficking investigations and could determine whether grounds existed.

95Thurston acknowledged that while rights to counsel can occur at the scene, privacy concerns often make this impractical. She had no specific knowledge of whether any steps were taken at the roadside to implement Mr. Laguerre’s request to speak to counsel.

96Both K.L. and N.B. appeared emotional but coherent, and Thurston described them as receptive to police assistance despite the language barrier.

97Thurston acknowledged that K.L. and N.B. were within earshot at points and that brief exchanges in French occurred. In hindsight, she agreed that separating them earlier for discrete accounts would have been preferable to avoid the possibility of them tainting each other’s evidence or colluding on details. Through body-worn camera footage, there was attention drawn to this in the exchange: ”:

Thurston: OK, so we'll continue to get information from her. We're going to transport them back so they can give statements. Ask her if she's going to talk.

K.L.: Yeah.

Thurston: Yeah? Like, you'll provide a statement of police. [inaudible 00:26:19]

Hunt: Are you going to talk to the police? Can they go together?

Thurston: [inaudible 00:26:20] they are not going to be able to be in the same room but they can stay together while we [inaudible 00:26:22] to [inaudible 00:26:27] down there?

Hunt: Okay, you can’t make a statement together. Since you can’t be in the same room, but you can, we can bring you together.

D. The involvement of Vice Officers

i. Evidence of Detective Constable Brunino

98Detective Constable Giacomo Brunino, a ten‑year member of Peel Regional Police and assigned to the Vice and Human Trafficking Unit for approximately two years, became involved in the investigation on October 12, 2024, following the arrest of Mr. Laguerre and reports from two females alleging that he was acting as their trafficker. He attended 12 Division and received his initial briefing from Constable Couce at 6:23 p.m., followed by additional briefings from other attending officers. These concluded at 7:15 p.m. Brunino explained that such briefings are standard practice when Vice officers were not present at the scene, enabling them to assess evidence collected and determine investigative priorities.

99Detective Constable Brunino’s direct contact with Mr. Laguerre was limited to moving him from cells to the interview room with Constable Douglas. This movement is captured on division CCTV: the “bullpen” hallway clip and the “booking room to interview room” clip. Brunino made no comments to the accused, saw no threats or promises made, and noted no impairment. While there is no audio for these brief interactions with the accused, I find that, unlike the booking video, it has no material probative value to my rulings and accept his evidence that there were no threats, inducements, or promises that might apply to the issues of voluntariness.

100Brunino itemized significant property seized from Mr. Laguerre and lodged it with PRP property:

• Canadian currency $4,100 (various denominations), U.S. currency $100, one cell phone, and one Swiss gold bar; each in separate property bags; lodged at 180 Derry Road. Property tag numbers: currency #1732181, gold bar #1732180, cell phone #1732182.

• A few days later, the currency bag was unsealed and counted at the booking desk, on camera, and the count was documented in the booking system; the accused was present.

• On October 13, 2024, Brunino seized another cell phone described as a white Apple iPhone from K.L. at a hotel “safe place” in Brampton at 3:12 p.m. K.L. indicated it was the device used to communicate with clients.

101Brunino interacted briefly with K.L. between 7:15 p.m. and 7:47 p.m. in a side room at 12 Division. He described her as groggy and intermittently responsive, speaking in broken English. She confirmed that she worked for the accused, used the name “Jessica” in advertisements, and identified herself in Leolist photographs. Brunino did not press for a formal statement and made no threats or promises.

102Brunino later traced Leolist advertisements using the phone number (438) 8XX‑0XX3 and email j[xxxxx].b[xxxxxxxx]@yahoo.ca, confirmed by K.L. On October 15, 2024, Leolist provided associated data, which Brunino downloaded to a USB and lodged as property.

103Brunino conducted the video‑recorded statement of N.B. with the assistance of a bilingual officer (Dalton, badge #4803). The interview commenced at approximately 7:30 p.m. and concluded around 8:30 p.m. Brunino testified that N.B. appeared sad but responsive, with no signs of impairment or coercion. He emphasized that no threats, promises, or inducements were made. Exhibits include the original video (Exhibit 4A) and English translation (Exhibit 4B). This timing is significant to the analysis under section 10(b), as reasonable and probable grounds for human‑trafficking‑related offences crystallized immediately upon the conclusion of N.B.’s interview. [emphasis added]

104Brunino later attended Room 408 at the Super 8 Motel with other officers. Body‑worn camera footage depicts a lived‑in environment with sex paraphernalia, drug paraphernalia (including a spoon, syringe, powder, and scale), and liquor, corroborating the complainants’ accounts. Brunino also identified photographs documenting seized items: USD $100, the white iPhone, Canadian currency, and the Swiss gold bar.

105Brunino confirmed that, based on his briefings, he understood the accused had spoken with duty counsel and that rights to counsel were first attempted in English and then provided in French. He observed no mistreatment of the accused or any threats, promises, or inducements made in his presence.

ii. Evidence of Detective Constable Kenaul Douglas

106Detective Constable Kenaul Douglas of the Peel Regional Police Vice Unit became involved in the investigation later in the evening of October 12, 2024. At the time of initial developments, Douglas was engaged in an unrelated human trafficking investigation in Oakville. He testified that he first learned of this matter at approximately 5:13 p.m. and did not arrive at 12 Division until 7:53 p.m., after the complainant N.B.’s statement had concluded and reasonable and probable grounds for human trafficking related offences had clearly formed within the Peel Regional Police Vice Unit.

107Upon arrival, Douglas received a briefing from Detective Constable Brunino and proceeded to the cell area to prepare for an interview of Mr. Laguerre. At about 8:57 p.m., property previously seized from the accused was processed. Douglas introduced himself to Mr. Laguerre in the cells, explained that they would move to an interview room, and escorted him upstairs with the assistance of Brunino and the booking officer. Douglas testified that he made no threats or promises, observed no mistreatment in his presence, and that Mr. Laguerre was calm, communicative, and did not appear impaired; the accused spoke in English and did not request a French interpreter.

108The interview room recording began at 8:52 p.m. Mr. Laguerre was brought into the room at about 9:00 p.m., left alone, and Douglas returned at 9:23 p.m., identifying himself as “Douglas.” Immediately on re‑entry, Douglas stated he needed to complete a “template” that was “nothing to do with the actual case,” after which Mr. Laguerre asked, “That’s a new charge?” Douglas replied there were “some new charges,” but deferred addressing them and proceeded with the “template.”

109Between approximately 9:24 p.m. and 9:32 p.m., Douglas asked a series of “template” questions that elicited personal and potentially incriminating information, including full name, date of birth, address, phone number for the seized device, employment, social media and email usage, physical descriptors, tattoos, and immigration history. These questions and answers occurred before Mr. Laguerre was advised of the new, more serious charges or re‑advised of his rights to counsel in relation to those charges.

110At 9:32 p.m., Douglas stated on the recording, “now it’s 9:32 p.m. and I’m gonna advise you of the new charges,” first confirming that Mr. Laguerre had already spoken to a lawyer, to which Mr. Laguerre said he had. Douglas then read out the additional charges, including human trafficking (two counts), receiving and deriving a material benefit, exercise of control, advertising sexual services, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats, in addition to the existing assault and fail to comply charges. After reading these charges, Douglas provided a right‑to‑silence caution and asked, “Would you like to speak to your lawyer about the new charges, or…,” and Mr. Laguerre declined, saying, “No, I’m good.” Substantive questioning began immediately thereafter.

111From 9:35 p.m. onward, Douglas questioned Mr. Laguerre about his time in Mississauga, travel from Montreal, relationships with the complainants, and related topics. Douglas also asked about the seized cash, the phone and anticipated search warrant, and the Swiss gold bar. Later in the interview, Douglas served “notices of intention” concerning breach documentation, video surveillance, and text messages, explaining they would be used as evidence; the service occurs around 10:49–10:51 p.m. on the recording. Mr. Laguerre was removed from the interview room at 10:54 p.m., and the recording ends at 11:00 p.m.

112Mr. Laguerre showed signs of fatigue at points; he remained alert and responsive, demonstrated a strong command of English, and answered questions thoughtfully, which supports that he was operating with a clear and functioning mind during the interview.

113Douglas agreed in his testimony that he did not re‑advise Mr. Laguerre of his rights to counsel before commencing the “template” questions, explaining that he “went with the flow” when the accused appeared anxious about “new charges.” He further acknowledged that the information sought on the form, including phone numbers and social media accounts, could be used to locate Leolist advertisements and was investigative in nature, not strictly administrative identification.

Part III: Analysis of the rights to counsel, reasons for detention, and voluntariness:

114The defence submits that Mr. Laguerre’s rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter were breached.

115As it relates to s. 10(a), for approximately six minutes after being restrained, police did not inform Mr. Laguerre of the reasons for his detention. Nor did they disclose investigative elements relating to human trafficking, despite their immediate awareness of that possible connection to the underlying allegations. Mr. Laguerre was not advised of this investigative focus until more than four hours later.

116The defence argues that s. 10(b) was breached through a series of failures affecting both the informational and implementational duties:

(i) an initial delay in advising Mr. Laguerre of his right to counsel;

(ii) no effort to permit a roadside call, with non‑urgent tasks taking priority over his rights; and

(iii) failure to implement his right to counsel of choice and in his preferred language, as he ultimately spoke to duty counsel in English despite requesting a French‑speaking lawyer by name.

117The defence also points to a change in jeopardy when human trafficking charges were formally added by the Vice Unit, without re‑cautioning or providing Mr. Laguerre an immediate opportunity to consult counsel about this development. This occurred during intake questioning, presented as routine pre‑interview inquiries, during which he made several incriminating admissions, thereby violating both s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) of the Charter.

118The defence submits that these cumulative breaches created a serious risk of self-incrimination and prevented Mr. Laguerre from making informed decisions. It asks that his statement be excluded under section 24(2), or, if admitted, that his sentence be reduced under section 24(1).

119In addition to the Charter breaches, the defence submits that Mr. Laguerre’s video-recorded interview statement was not voluntary at common law as he was uninformed his right to silence on the questions posed to him by the Vice Unit in form of intake, or pre-interview questions that related to serious human trafficking allegations.

120The Crown submits that police complied with sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, or that any delay in advising Mr. Laguerre of his reasons for detention or his rights to counsel was brief, justified, and does not warrant exclusion.

121Regarding s. 10(a), the Crown argues that Mr. Laguerre was told the reason for his detention in general terms within about one minute when he asked, “What is this about?”, and that the later advisement of human trafficking charges reflected the evolving nature of the investigation.

122On section 10(b), the Crown argues that the right to counsel was implemented as soon as reasonably practicable, including in French, and that Mr. Laguerre spoke to duty counsel promptly upon arrival at the station. It emphasizes that officers acted diligently, facilitated access to counsel, and offered a second opportunity after the new charges were read.

123The Crown asserts that the interview was voluntary, preceded by a “fresh start,” and that police acted in good faith throughout. If a breach is found, it submits that the statement should still be admitted under section 24(2), given the minimal impact on Charter-protected interests and society’s strong interest in adjudicating serious charges on their merits.

124The Crown submits that the statement was voluntary. It argues that the interview was conversational rather than oppressive and that Mr. Laguerre demonstrated a clear operating mind throughout. It points to his ability to understand and respond thoughtfully, correct himself when uncertain, and decline further legal consultation when offered a second opportunity. The Crown emphasizes that there were no threats, promises, or trickery and that he was reminded of his right to silence before substantive questioning began. It characterizes the interview as a “fresh start” and maintains that voluntariness is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A. Admissibility of Mr. Laguerre’s Statement: Voluntariness and Charter Rights

125The purpose of section 10(a) is to ensure that a person generally understands the jeopardy they face. This right serves two main functions. First, it protects individual liberty by guaranteeing that a person is not required to submit to an arrest or detention without knowing the reasons for it. Second, it supports the right to counsel because an individual can only exercise that right meaningfully if they understand the extent of their jeopardy. To comply with section 10(a), the police must clearly communicate the reason or reasons for the detention and must do so promptly. These requirements are referred to as the informational and temporal components of section 10(a).[7]

126The 10(a) informational component requires police to tell the detainee, in clear and simple language, the reason for the detention. If there are multiple reasons, each must be disclosed, and they must be legally valid. These reasons do not need to be expressed in technical or precise language but must in substance inform the person the reason why they are being restrained.[8] The ultimate question is whether, in all the circumstances, the explanation was sufficient for the detainee to make an informed choice about submitting to the detention and exercising the right to counsel.[9]

127Under section 10(b) of the Charter, further informational and implementational rights exists. Police have a duty to inform a detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel, and a duty to facilitate that right immediately upon detention. Suspensions of s. 10(b) will be lawful where there are a) concerns for officer and public safety, b) where a limit on the relevant right is prescribed by law and justified under s. 1 of the Charter, or c) other exceptional circumstances.[10] Since there are no a) “exceptional circumstances” or a b) “suspension prescribed by law” in this case—the issue is whether any suspension was justified due to c) “officer or public safety concerns.”

i. Informational components under s.10(a) and 10(b) prior to Mr. Laguerre’s booking

128I accept the officers’ evidence that Mr. Laguerre’s rights to counsel, first in English and then in French, were delivered as soon as could be reasonably expected in the circumstances.

129At the time of his detention, the scene was not secure. There were unknowns about officer safety, public safety, and the protection of alleged victims. Officers were also receiving updates about possible human trafficking. Viewed as a whole, the officers acted promptly and provided those rights at the first practical opportunity, as required by the Charter. When Mr. Laguerre asked for his rights in French, this was accommodated promptly because a French-speaking officer was available.

130I further find Mr. Laguerre was sufficiently informed what he was being detained for when he asked Sergeant Bennewitz what this was about. This happened within seconds of his detention. Sgt. Bennewitz explained it was relating to an allegation of an assault and was quickly informed of the additional allegation for breaching an undertaking when that was known to police.

131Any delay before Constable Hunt completed advising Mr. Laguerre of his rights in French caused no meaningful prejudice—especially considering the Crown is not seeking to lead his utterances in reply to Bennewitz. The officers respected his rights and refrained from questioning. To the extent there was a brief suspension of section 10(b) rights, it was justified by concerns for public and officer safety. [11] I also find that it was not feasible for Mr. Laguerre to speak to counsel privately at the scene or in the cruiser. Returning him directly to the station was the most appropriate course of action.[12]

132Defence concedes there is no issue with the informational sufficiency of the translated rights to counsel. Mr. Laguerre was informed of his rights, including the availability of free duty counsel and the option to contact a lawyer of his choosing. These rights were conveyed in accordance with standard procedure and translated in real time by Constable Hunt.

133Mr. Laguerre was not advised that he was being detained for human trafficking at the time of his initial detention, during his first caution, or at booking. However, I find this was entirely reasonable. The officers were responding to a 911 call about an assault, not human trafficking. Their immediate focus was on securing the scene, ensuring safety, and addressing the complaint of violence. A CPIC check revealed a breach of undertaking, which justified arrest for those offences. Alleging human trafficking required a deeper investigation, specialized knowledge, and corroboration beyond the preliminary information available at the scene.

134While there were early indicators of human trafficking—such as the 911 call and on‑scene statements from K.L. and N.B. referencing escort work—reasonable and probable grounds implicating Mr. Laguerre did not crystallize until later that evening after N.B.’s video‑recorded statement. Those grounds were then reinforced by corroborative evidence, including the seizure of cash from Mr. Laguerre, the absence of funds on the complainants, indicia of drug use, sex paraphernalia, false identification documents, and extended hotel stays.

135The initial caution was comprehensive and delivered as soon as reasonably possible. At that time, Mr. Laguerre’s detention related only to assault and breach of an undertaking. The more serious human trafficking allegations arose only after grounds crystallized and required further investigation and corroboration before the scope of jeopardy could properly expand.

ii. Implementational component prior to Mr. Laguerre’s booking

136I accept the officers’ evidence that they acted in good faith in explaining why Mr. Laguerre could not speak to counsel until his return to 12 Division. Their explanation that a conversation in the rear of the police cruiser would not have been sufficiently private for legal advice, given the presence of recording equipment and people nearby, is reasonable.[13]

137I also accept the officers’ evidence that, from the time of detention until his rights were read in the police car, the scene was not secure. There were unknowns, including whether Mr. Laguerre was armed, until a search was completed. Officers were also receiving updates about possible human trafficking. In these circumstances, deferring implementation of the right to counsel until a controlled environment was available was practical and reasonable.

138The time from detention to the delivery of rights to counsel was minimal. During transport, nothing of significance occurred and there was no attempt to delay. Constable Couce confirmed only Mr. Laguerre’s name and advised that he could speak to his lawyer at the station. The route was direct, with mileage logged before and after. There were no threats, promises, inducements, or oppressive circumstances. Body-worn camera footage, though blurred in parts for privacy, confirms respectful handling, including assistance when exiting the vehicle.

139Some delay in providing access to counsel may be justified but the burden is on the Crown to show that the delay in the circumstances was reasonable.[14] I find the Crown has met that burden in the circumstances. The focus was to ensure Mr. Laguerre could speak to his counsel in private, there were public and police safety concerns, there was a possibility of a third party (“Julian”) attending the scene to cause harm to the witnesses, the request for a specific counsel out of Quebec would require some investigation to find him, and the delay was as minimal as possible in achieving these ends by taking him to the 12 Division to speak to counsel there.

140In the transport, any questions asked, such as whether he was on a methadone program, required medication, or had injuries, were directed solely to his health and well-being and not for investigative purposes. The inquiry about methadone was a standard pre-caution to ensure necessary medication. Any answers he made are without any prejudice as the Crown is not seeking to lead them. Arrangements were made to accommodate his booking, demonstrating an active and good faith effort to address Mr. Laguerre promptly and enable him to exercise his right to counsel.

141For ease of reference, the total time from Mr. Laguerre’s initial detention at approximately 16:48 to the completion of his rights to counsel in French at 16:57 was about nine minutes. He was then transported immediately to 12 Division, arriving at 17:17, and spoke to duty counsel at 17:33 following booking. In total, the time from detention to contact with duty counsel was approximately thirty‑nine minutes.

iii. The booking of Mr. Laguerre and the deliberate disabling of audio

142Constable Couce testified that upon entering the booking area at 12 Division, he was directed by the booking officers that the staff sergeant required him to disable the audio on his body-worn camera. He complied and explained that such directions vary among supervisors.

143Although video recording continued through CCTV, the absence of audio created a significant evidentiary gap. This gap complicates the assessment of whether Mr. Laguerre’s rights were properly implemented and whether any influence occurred that undermined his right to counsel or his language of choice.

144The right to counsel is foundational, and deficiencies in its implementation can taint an entire investigation and any resulting statements. An inaudible gap during a critical stage creates substantial challenges in determining whether rights were properly afforded or undermined. If allegations of threats, promises, or inducements arise, the absence of an audible record makes such claims difficult to evaluate. There is no reasonable justification for this gap.

145The booking process is a critical stage in a custodial investigation. At this point, an accused’s ability to exercise constitutional rights is vulnerable, making transparency essential to ensure fairness. The decision to disable audio warrants scrutiny.

146The rationale expressed in R. v. Moore-McFarlane underscores the importance of a reliable record, particularly where recording facilities are available, and avoidance is deliberate. The Ontario Court of Appeal stated:

“That onus may be readily satisfied by the use of audio, or better still, video recording. Indeed, it is my view that where the suspect is in custody, recording facilities are readily available, and the police deliberately set out to interrogate the suspect without giving any thought to the making of a reliable record, the context inevitably makes the resulting non-recorded interrogation suspect. In such cases, it will be a matter for the trial judge on the voir dire to determine whether or not a sufficient substitute for an audio or videotape record has been provided to satisfy the heavy onus on the Crown to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt”[15].

147While the events in the booking area may not constitute an interrogation in the strict sense contemplated by Moore-McFarlane, the underlying principles remain applicable when a deliberate decision is made to disable an audible record of critical evidence. The need for a reliable record is especially pronounced when the booking process directly engages the accused’s right to counsel, language of choice, and the voluntariness of any subsequent statements.

iv. The impact of disabling the audio of the booking and necessary scrutiny:

148Although the change of jeopardy breach, discussed below, renders the video statement inadmissible, the circumstances surrounding the change in counsel is concerning. The absence of an audible record compromised the integrity of the evidence on the right to counsel and silence up to this point, which had otherwise completely transparent with the benefit of body-worn cameras.

149While I found Constable Couce to be forthright and credible, his account of how the change in counsel and language occurred remains unclear. He testified that, upon booking at 12 Division, Mr. Laguerre asked to speak with Patrick Boulis, a French-speaking lawyer in Quebec.

150Constable Couce began searching for contact information for that lawyer on his phone while Mr. Laguerre was seated on a bench. He identified this moment on the CCTV footage, which is consistent with his testimony. During this time, the staff sergeant was speaking with Mr. Laguerre independently of Couce’s actions. Given that Couce was engaged in locating Mr. Boulis, it is unsurprising that his memory of the conversation was vague. The vague exchange described by Couce must be assessed in the context of the CCTV footage.

151Although Couce could provide only limited assistance about the details of the conversation, the CCTV footage he authenticated captured this exchange without audio and at a distance, as the camera was mounted above them.

152Constable Couce stated that he was told by the staff sergeant that Mr. Laguerre now wished to speak with English-speaking duty counsel. Couce then put his phone away to make that call. I accept his evidence that it was not his role to question the change, but that principle only applies if the choice was Mr. Laguerre’s own and fully informed. Couce testified that he did not suggest duty counsel and understood his role to be contacting whichever lawyer Mr. Laguerre requested.

153The staff sergeant and the booking officer did not testify.

154A change from a specific lawyer to duty counsel is significant. Even a brief comment suggesting difficulty in reaching the requested lawyer could influence that decision. Without audio, I am left only with Couce’s account of the outcome: that Mr. Laguerre now wished to speak to duty counsel.

155Something changed Mr. Laguerre’s choice from insisting on a specific French-speaking lawyer at the hotel to accepting English-speaking duty counsel at 12 Division. The difficulty lies in determining what triggered that change.

156The footage shows that the interaction between the staff sergeant and Mr. Laguerre was more than a spontaneous declaration. There was back-and-forth discussion. Mr. Laguerre appears animated and, at times, frustrated. Because there is no audio, the Court cannot determine what was said or whether anything in that conversation influenced the change. This omission is significant given the centrality of the right to counsel in the analysis that follows.

157Constable Couce testified that he did not mention duty counsel to Mr. Laguerre during booking. Any reference to duty counsel must therefore have come from the staff sergeant. At that stage, the only focus should have been on the counsel of choice already expressed. Introducing duty counsel raises an inference of possible influence toward selecting duty counsel over counsel of choice. While this does not mean the staff sergeant should have avoided mentioning the option altogether, in the context of a sudden change and potential influence, the inference cannot be ignored.

158Considering all the above, and the common-sense conclusion that Mr. Laguerre would have preferred to speak to his lawyer of choice in his native French rather than an English-speaking duty counsel he did not know, I find on a balance of probabilities that the change would not have occurred without some degree of influence, whether inadvertent or not, from the staff sergeant.

159The booking room is a location where audio recording should ordinarily occur. When this is not possible, or a good faith mistake is made, or other circumstances justify it, the omission may be excused. That is not the case here. The discretion exercised by the staff sergeant resulted in a gap that has generated extensive litigation. This omission has led to significant expenditure of court time and resources to resolve issues that could have been easily clarified had audio been available. The absence of a complete record has frustrated the Court’s ability to assess what was said and done, particularly in relation to the accused’s right to counsel and the voluntariness of any subsequent statements.

160In my view, this practice should change.[16] It is commendable that officers wear body-worn cameras, which provide significant benefits to investigations, counsel, and the court. However, it makes little sense to have near-complete transparency up to the booking of an accused, followed by an intentional gap during booking directed by a superior officer, and then a return to transparency thereafter.

161As an example of the importance of transparency—and not as a factual finding on what the specific policy may be—in interactions with an accused, Sergeant Bennewitz testified that Peel Regional Police policy now requires body-worn cameras to remain active throughout police interactions with the accused or members of the public, subject only to rare and clearly justified exceptions. He stated, “Now, I understand the policy is they want the camera on all the time. Very few instances you can turn it off. Now they would like it on,” and “I became aware this year of this. At first, I was an older officer who was resistant, but now I understand it needs to be on all the time.” He described this expectation of continuous recording as important. This reflects the basic and fundamental principle that transparency should be maintained during critical stages of police investigations when available.

162Transparency during critical stages of police investigations is essential to ensuring fairness and facilitating judicial scrutiny, particularly where an accused’s rights to counsel, language of choice, and voluntariness are engaged. The mechanisms by which transparency is preserved may vary depending on the circumstances, including body-worn camera footage, video statements, or booking room recordings with audio. While full transparency may not always be possible, where it is available and a deliberate decision is made to disable or avoid it, that choice will likely attract judicial scrutiny and may affect the weight given to the resulting evidence.

163Influence may be subtle, and claims of impropriety are easily made. Where transparency does not compete with operational considerations such as officer safety, police assume a significant risk when they choose to compromise it. Transparency preserves court resources, assists the Crown in proving voluntariness, and enables defence counsel to advise clients effectively on potential Charter breaches. As a matter of practice, it also places police in a stronger position when seemingly minor allegations evolve into serious ones, as occurred in this case.

v. The breach of rights to counsel and voluntariness up to the booking room

164It is more probable than not that Mr. Laguerre did not waive his right to counsel of choice or his language rights. Had Mr. Boulis been available by phone, it is improbable that Mr. Laguerre would have chosen duty counsel instead. A complete evidentiary record would have resolved this issue; in its absence, I must reach my conclusion on what I find to be the more probable explanation.

165As it relates to voluntariness, I find that no threats, promises, inducements, or other improper conduct occurred up to the moment Mr. Laguerre entered the interview room. He had an operating mind and was acting voluntarily. He was also aware of his right to silence in clear terms that he understood.

B. Mr. Laguerre’s change in jeopardy to human trafficking offences and delay in advising him of the new charges.

166Section 10(a) requires police to promptly inform a person, in clear and simple language, of the legally valid reason for their detention. Its purpose is to ensure the person understands the jeopardy they face so they can decide whether to submit to the detention and exercise their right to counsel meaningfully. This obligation concerns what is being investigated, not the investigative steps that may follow. However, because a detainee will not appreciate what investigative steps might ensue or how those steps could incriminate them despite their right to silence, it is all the more important that they receive their right to counsel and the ability to obtain that advice without delay. This is particularly critical when an investigation is already underway in relation to offences for which a change in jeopardy has occurred.

167Knowledge of the purpose of the detention is so important to the informed exercise of the right to counsel that the police are constitutionally required by s. 10(a) of the Charter to promptly inform a detained person of the reasons for her detention. Where there is more than one reason for a detention, they must all be disclosed. "Jeopardy" in this context includes the detained person's risk of self-incrimination. That risk cannot be measured without knowledge of the reason for the detention and the subject matter of the police inquiries. An individual can only exercise his s. 10(b) right in a meaningful way if he knows the extent of his jeopardy and be advised on what sort of investigative steps may be taken so they can evaluate the risk for self-incrimination and make choices based upon that information.[17]

168Section 10(b) of the Charter states that upon arrest or detention, everyone has the right to "retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right". Its purpose is "to support the detainee's right to choose whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not, by giving him access to legal advice on the situation he is facing. This is achieved by requiring that he be informed of the right to consult counsel and, if he so requests, be given an opportunity to consult counsel".[18]

169Police must advise the accused of his or her right to counsel a second time when new circumstances arise indicating that the accused is a suspect for a different, more serious crime than was the case at the time of the first warning.[19]

170This can arise out of several contextual factors, including a new charge that significantly increases moral blameworthiness and potential consequences constitutes a change in jeopardy, even if arising from the same facts.[20]

171A detainee’s request to reconsult standing alone is insufficient. "What is required is a change in circumstances that suggests that the choice face by the accused has been significantly altered, requiring further advice on the new situation, in order to fulfill the purpose of s. 10(b) of providing the accused with legal advice relevant to the choice of whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not"[21]

172A lack of awareness of investigative steps does not, by itself, amount to a change in jeopardy. For example, where further steps are foreseeable in relation to the same charge, no new jeopardy arises.[22]

i. When the change of jeopardy occurred

173While Mr. Laguerre was in police custody in the cruiser, body-worn camera footage captured Officers Bolarinho, Couce, Bennewitz, and Thurston discussing the investigation. Officer Hunt made inquiries over the radio in French regarding a possible human trafficking angle. As previously found, reasonable grounds for Mr. Laguerre’s arrest on human trafficking charges, and therefore the change in his jeopardy, did not arise until N.B. completed her statement describing the offences allegedly committed by Mr. Laguerre.

174Detective Constable Douglas conducted himself professionally and treated Mr. Laguerre with respect and dignity. He did not make threats, inducements, or promises. However, the practice of obtaining information under the guise of “intake” or “identification” extended beyond what was legally required to confirm Mr. Laguerre’s identity for the purposes of detention and release. Any questioning beyond that, whether inadvertent or not, amounted to evidence and intelligence gathering. This related not only to the allegations Mr. Laguerre was facing but also to other investigations of interest to the Vice Unit of the Peel Regional Police.

175The right to counsel assumes heightened importance when an accused faces a change in jeopardy. This principle is well established in law. Police procedures that diminish the significance of this right cannot be tolerated, whether by design or by practice. The value of legal advice is directly tied to the nature of the charges and the seriousness of the jeopardy at the time the advice is given. Competent legal counsel does not offer generic advice to remain silent in all circumstances. Rather, legal advice is tailored, nuanced, and responsive to the specific allegations and practical realities of the case. It is the role of counsel to ensure that a detainee is advised of investigatory steps that police may take and how the detainee might incriminate himself in the process.[23]

176In this case, the change in jeopardy was severe. Mr. Laguerre was initially arrested for common assault and breach of undertaking. These are offences typically prosecuted summarily and often result in non-custodial outcomes. Even if prosecuted by indictment, the maximum penalties are five years for assault and two years for breach of undertaking, with no mandatory minimums. As a practical matter, these charges generally attract legal advice focused on immediate release, bail considerations, and basic procedural rights.

177Once the human trafficking allegations were introduced, the legal landscape shifted entirely. The new charges included human trafficking under the Criminal Code, which carry maximum sentences of fourteen years or life imprisonment and mandatory minimums of four to five years. Additional charges such as receiving a material benefit from trafficking, advertising sexual services, and exercising control over others under the section 286 series further elevated the seriousness of the case. These offences are associated with organized exploitation and carry significant custodial consequences. They place an accused well within the range of mid-level penitentiary sentences, even in the absence of aggravating factors. Proper legal advice on these types of charges would extend well beyond that required of assault and breaching an undertaking. Such advice would focus on the seriousness of the allegations, the way these offences are investigated, the likelihood of warrants and a police interview with a specialized unit, the impact of minor admissions (such as phone numbers or email addresses), and improbability of release from police custody.

178When a change in jeopardy becomes apparent, as it did here, it is not for police to assess whether earlier legal advice remains sufficient. That assessment belongs solely to counsel, and the Charter protects it accordingly. Similarly, apart from the basic identification required to determine who is under arrest or detention, police cannot redefine portions of an interview as administrative intake in a manner that exempts them from constitutional scrutiny or the rules governing voluntariness—particularly when that evidence is then used in the prosecution and not treated as compelled admissions.

179Police officers understand that even seemingly routine information, such as a phone number or social media handle, can be incriminating or serve as a gateway to further investigative steps that would otherwise require judicial authorization. Without the benefit of legal advice or a clear understanding that such information may be withheld, an accused is unlikely to appreciate the consequences of disclosure. Experienced counsel would take these considerations into account and provide advice tailored to the seriousness of the situation.

180Similarly, such questioning cannot be justified based on efficiency or “going with the flow,” as Detective Constable Douglas testified. The right to counsel is a principle of fundamental justice and reflects a commitment to the fair treatment of persons detained by the police, even at the expense of investigative efficiency.[24]

181While police are entitled and encouraged to pursue probative evidence and investigative leads, including intelligence for other cases, these efforts must be conducted in a manner that respects constitutional rights and adheres to the common law principles of voluntariness.

ii. The investigative and prosecutorial value to Mr. Laguerre’s admissions

182Before Mr. Laguerre was re-cautioned regarding his right to silence and right to counsel in relation to the significantly more serious human trafficking charges, Detective Constable Douglas obtained a wide range of personal and potentially incriminating information. This was presented as part of an administrative intake process. Mr. Laguerre disclosed his full name, date of birth, gender, racial origin, home address in Montreal, phone number associated with the seized device, and immigration status, including that he was a former permanent resident awaiting a court decision. He also provided details about his employment as a mechanic for a friend’s rental company, denied having an email or social media accounts, and described his physical characteristics, including height, weight, hair and eye colour, tattoos, and handedness.

183It is worth noting that by the time the interview commenced, police already possessed sufficient information to process Mr. Laguerre, including his identity and health. This information had been obtained through Constable Couce during the booking and transport stages. Accordingly, the questions posed by Detective Constable Douglas at the outset of the interview were not administratively necessary. I find that the purpose of the questions was investigatory, directed toward eliciting information relevant to the more serious offences under investigation, and all of this occurred prior to the re-caution.

184Following the re-caution, which I have found deficient, Mr. Laguerre stated that he had travelled from Montreal to Mississauga three days earlier, that he was staying with a friend rather than at the hotel with the complainants, and that he had sold a Honda Civic for $4,500 earlier that day, which he claimed explained the large amount of cash found on his person. He also confirmed that the seized phone was not his current device. Although these disclosures were framed as routine identification, they extended well beyond what was necessary for administrative processing and entered the realm of evidence gathering. This is particularly concerning given the seriousness of the investigation and the evolving nature of the allegations.

185There are several aspects of this information that are incriminating, particularly Mr. Laguerre’s admission that the phone number associated with the online posting for escort services was his, and that clients would need to contact him to arrange meetings for sexual services. If admitted, this constitutes strong inferential evidence of awareness, control, and receipt of material benefit as charged. In addition, much of this information, if admitted, could be used to support the Crown’s application to admit hearsay statements by bolstering threshold reliability. The nuance and complexity of how this evidence is both detrimental and self-incriminating underscores the importance of Mr. Laguerre’s rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter in these circumstances.

186I am aware of the authority stating that “an answer to an innocuous question asked for a different purpose may prove to be useful to the Crown does not change the character of the questioning.” [25] However, that principle does not assist here. First, the questions put to Mr. Laguerre were not innocuous. They were directed to specifics of this investigation and, arguably, to a broader human‑trafficking inquiry. These were designed to elicit incriminating information. The questions went beyond what might be considered for the “purpose of completing the record of arrest”.[26] It is also worth noting as a relevant factor that this incriminating information obtained from Mr. Laguerre, was not known to police.[27]

187While officers may, in some limited circumstances, ask for basic identifying or questions necessary for booking[28] or urgent health and safety of the detainee or others[29], there is always a risk that such information will later be found involuntary or obtained in breach of sections 10(a) or 10(b) of the Charter. If true exigent concerns justify the questioning, the trade‑off is that those utterances run the risk of being excluded under a 24(2) evaluation where the intent and good faith of officers can be evaluated.

188The difficulty with retroactively labeling questions as “innocuous” is that, by the nature of exclusion applications, no utterance is truly innocuous. All answers are potentially incriminating. Assessing their character only after they become probative imports an artificial test based on hindsight. If officers testify that incrimination was not their intent, that may bear on the section 24(2) analysis under good faith—but it does not negate the existence of a breach.

189Such exceptions create a real potential for abuse when investigatory questions are deliberately front‑loaded under the guise of “booking,” “health and safety,” or “innocuous” inquiries, knowing that the answers will advance the investigation. A common example is asking for phone numbers, social media accounts, or other details that can trigger search warrants or link an accused to incriminating communications. A single admission of this kind may be fatal to a defence. Without the benefit of legal advice to understand these implications, such questioning is entirely at odds with the purpose and value of the rights guaranteed by sections 10(a) and 10(b). This risk is further exacerbated when such questions are presented as necessary for booking or pre‑interview purposes (a fact I find in this case), creating the impression that they are administratively required for processing and/or release.

190Detective Constable Douglas, although attempting to follow the natural flow of the interview, acknowledged that he was aware of the change in jeopardy. Nevertheless, he chose to provide the caution only after obtaining information that was both helpful and incriminating to the investigation. It also likely served as valuable intelligence for further investigations. At best, he was indifferent as to the consequences of potentially incriminating information provided by Mr. Laguerre and waded into constitutionally dangerous areas of questioning.[30]

191Detective Constable Douglas testified,

“Obviously seeing his jeopardy has changed, I gave him his rights to counsel.”

192However, this occurred only after the officer completed the intake form and elicited the information he sought from the accused. Recording incriminating answers on a form does not lessen their seriousness. If anything, it reinforces the impression that the accused was compelled to provide the information as part of routine paperwork, creating a systemic exception to constitutional protection that lacks statutory authority. This impression, that I find happened here, materially impaired Mr. Laguerre’s ability to exercise his right to counsel meaningfully. Officer Douglas agreed on cross‑examination that the accused was not required to answer the questions or provide the information.

iii. The re-caution on right to silence and right to counsel

193In the re-caution, Detective Constable Douglas began by advising Mr. Laguerre of the new charges he was facing. He confirmed that Mr. Laguerre had previously spoken to a lawyer. Douglas then stated:

“You’re not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say may be given in evidence against you. You understand?”

Mr. Laguerre responded affirmatively. Douglas continued:

“If you have spoken to any police officer or to anyone with the authority or if any such person has spoken to you in connection with this case, I want you to understand that I don’t want you to influence. So if you’ve spoken to an officer in regards to this matter, I don’t want to influence our conversation that we have.”

Mr. Laguerre again indicated understanding. Douglas emphasized,

“Whatever you say is basically voluntary on you. I am not forcing you to say anything that you don’t wanna say.”

Mr. Laguerre confirmed his understanding. Douglas then asked;

“Would you like to speak to your lawyer about the new charges, or… do you understand?”

Mr. Laguerre replied,

“No, I’m good.”

Douglas confirmed,

“You good?”

Mr. Laguerre responded:

“I’m good.”

194The re-caution administered by Detective Constable Douglas consisted of two distinct elements. The first related to the right to silence and the voluntariness of any statement made. The second concerned the accused’s rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, specifically the informational and implementational requirements associated with the right to counsel.

195With respect to the first element, I am satisfied that the officer fulfilled his obligations. From that point forward, the statement was voluntary under the common law. Mr. Laguerre was informed of his right to silence, advised of the charges he was facing, and was free from threats, inducements, or promises. He was also operating with an active and informed mind on his right to silence.

196I further find that language posed no barrier for Mr. Laguerre despite his first language being French. He understood the questions and responded with ease. At no point did it appear that he was unaware of what was being asked or that he struggled to answer in English. I find that it was his voluntary choice to proceed in English without the need or request for an interpreter.

197While I am satisfied that the statement was voluntary at common law from the point of the re-caution onward, the required informational and implementational components relating to Mr. Laguerre’s right to counsel persisted.

198With respect to this second element, I find the re-caution deficient. Both the informational and implementational duties were lacking. The officer did not adequately communicate the minimum standards required under section 10(b), nor did he ensure that the accused was provided a meaningful opportunity to exercise that right. This deficiency is further compounded by my earlier finding that Mr. Laguerre’s right to counsel of choice, namely Mr. Boulis, was not respected prior to the commencement of the interview.

199Put simply, had Detective Constable Douglas properly re-cautioned Mr. Laguerre on his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) at the outset of the statement, I would have no difficulty finding the statement admissible under the “fresh start” principle.[31] Without that, I find the opposite. The later caution did not attenuate the breach because it occurred after incriminating information was obtained, failed to address the change in jeopardy, and did not provide a meaningful opportunity to consult counsel. A proper re-caution also would have helped reconcile the issue of what Mr. Laguerre’s intentions were when the audio was unavailable in the booking room and he switched from counsel of choice to duty counsel, as explained above.

200The “fresh start” doctrine is only applicable when premised upon Charter compliance in the re-caution. That did not happen here as it relates to section 10(b). Even if I am wrong in this respect, I find that the initial non-compliance where Mr. Laguerre’s change of jeopardy was not properly advised tainted the entirety of the statement by starting a flow of information that could not be walked back. I therefore find that even following the inadequate re-caution the evidence was obtained in a manner with a sufficient causal, temporal, or contextual connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence to render any recaution (whether adequate or not) as fruitless at this point.[32]

C. The exclusion of the video statement of Mr. Laguerre under s.24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms

201While the public has a strong interest in adjudicating serious criminal charges on their merits, this interest must not override other fundamental considerations[33]. In this case, the impugned conduct was serious and had a substantial impact on Mr. Laguerre’s Charter rights, including his right to silence and his right to legal counsel capable of advising him on the implications of providing information. [34]

202Section 24(2) is concerned with preserving the long-term integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. Its purpose is not to punish police misconduct or compensate the accused, but to address systemic and institutional concerns. The analysis engages three lines of inquiry: the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the impact of the breach on the accused’s protected interests, and society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits. The balancing of these factors is qualitative and not subject to mathematical precision.[35]

i. The first Grant factor: the seriousness of state conduct

203The first Grant factor requires consideration of the seriousness of the state conduct. The Court must situate the impugned conduct on a spectrum of culpability. The more serious the state misconduct, the greater the need to protect the long-term repute of the administration of justice by disassociating the court’s processes from that misconduct.[36] I am also obligated to consider the cumulative seriousness of the Charter breaches.[37]

204Although Detective Constable Douglas treated Mr. Laguerre with respect, I do not accept that the failure to re-caution him earlier was an oversight. Nor was “going with the flow” a legally justifiable approach. The officer was aware that Mr. Laguerre’s jeopardy had changed, and that the information being elicited under the guise of intake was likely to yield probative evidence. This included corroborative links to Leolist postings, and the statements provided by K.L. and N.B.

205I find that this inquiry was driven by a deliberate approach taken by the Vice Unit to gather information about a suspected human trafficker prior to administering a caution. The intake form used by Detective Constable Douglas was prepared in advance, and the list of charges that Mr. Laguerre noticed and asked about was also ready before the re-caution. There was a choice made—or as I find, an intended sequence—by the Vice Unit to proceed with the form first, anticipating that such information might not be as easily obtained once the accused had been properly advised of his rights and had the benefit of legal counsel.

206Detective Constable Douglas’ admission that a change in jeopardy had taken place and proceeded in this order demonstrates that the breach was deliberate, even if there was an attempt to mitigate it by the re-caution.

207This reflects a systemic and serious issue that, whether by design or intent, disregarded the detainee’s right to counsel and his right to be promptly informed of the reasons for detention. It occurred as an independent breach to the preceding one in the booking room, and not as a consequential inevitability. Unlike cases where good faith mitigates seriousness, the conduct here was deliberate and systemic. This compounded the seriousness of the state misconduct and the impact it had upon the accused.[38]

ii. The second Grant factor: the impact of the Charter infringement upon the accused’s interests

208The second Grant factor examines the impact on Charter-protected interests. In this case, the impact on Mr. Laguerre’s Charter-protected interests was significant. He made several incriminating admissions both before and after the deficient re-caution. These included, most notably, the phone number associated with the Leolist advertisements, which corroborates the complainants’ allegations that he exercised control over them, posted ads, and received material benefits.

209Prior to the re-caution, Mr. Laguerre disclosed his middle name “Marc,” occupation, physical descriptors, immigration status, and phone number. These admissions have the potential to incriminate him by linking him to the complainants’ narrative and by undermining his credibility should he testify.

210Following the re-caution, Mr. Laguerre admitted to travelling from Montreal with the complainants, staying with a friend, selling a vehicle for $4,500, and denied involvement in escort services or control over the complainants. He also acknowledged prior convictions for similar offences. These admissions carry similar risks of self-incrimination and corroboration.

iii. The third Grant factor: the societal interest in trying cases on their merits

211The third Grant inquiry typically points toward admission because society has a strong interest in adjudicating cases on their merits. However, this factor is not determinative. Even where the first two inquiries do not both pull with equal force, a serious Charter breach coupled with a significant or even moderate impact on protected interests can justify exclusion. When the first two inquiries together make a strong case for exclusion, the third inquiry “will seldom if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility”[39]

212In assessing society’s interest, courts must look beyond the immediate reliability of the evidence and consider the long-term repute of the justice system. Disrepute may result from excluding relevant evidence, but it may equally result from admitting evidence obtained through conduct that undermines constitutional norms or amounts to judicial condonation of unacceptable practices.[40]

213An adjudication on the merits presupposes a respect for and adherence to fundamental rights. Canadians have a legitimate expectation that police will know and comply with the law, including the Charter, even in dynamic situations. This expectation is central to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.[41]

iv. Grant factors applied results in exclusion

214The first and second factors strongly favor exclusion; the third favors inclusion. Balancing these factors qualitatively, I conclude that exclusion is required to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

215This is conduct from which the Court must dissociate itself. It had a serious impact on the accused’s interests, and despite society’s interest in deciding cases on their merits (the third Grant factor) admitting this evidence would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.[42]

216Given the cumulative seriousness of the breaches and their impact, exclusion is necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

Part IV: The admissibility of the hearsay utterances of K.L. and N.B.

A. An overview of the hearsay application and the legal principles:

217The Crown seeks to introduce several out-of-court statements made by the complainants, including:

(a) the 911 call placed by the complainant referred to as K.L.;

(c) various utterances made by both complainants captured on body-worn camera; and,

(c) the video-recorded statement of the complainant referred to as N.B.;

(d) other evidence obtained during the investigation into Mr. Laguerre.

218These out-of-court utterances and statements are presumptively inadmissible as they are hearsay. The Crown seeks their admission on the principled approach to hearsay, as well as some of the utterances under the res gestae exception.

219The res gestae exception relates to those utterances that, generally, are those to describe a statement of present physical condition, statements of present mental state, and excited utterances.[43]

220Under the principled approach, the party seeking their admission must meet a threshold of necessity and reliability. As the trial judge, I am required to act as gatekeeper in determining whether these criteria are met. Necessity is generally satisfied where the declarant is unavailable to testify despite reasonable efforts to secure their attendance.[44]

221Threshold reliability is assessed through the interplay of procedural and substantive safeguards. The Court must determine whether adequate substitutes exist for the testing mechanisms typically available at trial, such that the trier of fact may properly evaluate the evidence.[45]

222The concern of reliability in hearsay derives from the fact that this type of evidence is not subject to the usual scrutiny and testing that cross-examination may afford and may undermine the court’s “truth-seeking function”.[46] These dangers affecting reliability arise from the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant under oath before the trier of fact and the difficulty of assessing the declarant’s perception, memory, narration, or sincerity.[47]

223In assessing threshold reliability, the trial judge must identify the specific hearsay dangers presented by the statement and consider any means of overcoming them. The dangers relate to the difficulties of assessing the declarant's perception, memory, narration, or sincerity, and should be defined with precision to permit a realistic evaluation of whether they have been overcome.[48]

224Even where necessity and reliability are established, the Court retains a residual discretion to exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.[49]

B. The evidence relating to the hearsay application

225As noted, the evidentiary record on pre-trial motions proceeded in a blended fashion. All counsel agreed that evidence ruled admissible during pre-trial motions would carry over to the trial, and that evidence from one motion could be considered in another where appropriate.

226This approach required care to avoid improper reliance on inadmissible evidence across applications. In particular, and considering my ruling on the accused’s video statement, I have not considered any portion of that statement in assessing the hearsay application. Nor have I considered any utterances made by the accused while detained or made to a person in authority, as the Crown did not seek their admission for this purpose. This exclusion does not apply to utterances outside of those protections where the Charter and principles of voluntariness would not, respectively, apply.

227I have therefore carried over only admissible evidence from other officers in considering the hearsay application below. This does not, however, preclude consideration of utterances allegedly made by Mr. Laguerre where those statements were not made to a person in authority and/or while detained and subject to Charter protections. In particular, the statements he allegedly made to the complainants may be properly considered as part of the cumulative record on the hearsay application with the need for proof of voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

228For the sake of organization, I have isolated or bifurcated the evidence of certain officers whose testimony relates primarily to the hearsay application. This evidence is presented below to frame and amplify the issues now alive for consideration. It is in addition to the admissible evidence summarized earlier.

i. The 911 call, the res gestae exception, and considered reliability of the utterances made

229The evidence regarding the 911 call is summarized above at paragraphs 13-26.

230The call demonstrates K.L. was emotionally distraught and provided a detailed account of the events that had just occurred, including the location and her relationship to the alleged assailant, Wooldy Laguerre. The caller’s emotional state is best conveyed through the audio recording; any written summary cannot fully capture the tone, urgency, and panic reflected in her voice.

231When police arrived, body‑worn camera footage corroborated the emotional state heard in the 911 call, together with other factors such as K.L.’s location, lack of belongings or money, and her state of dress.

232The Crown seeks to admit the 911 call under the traditional res gestae exception to hearsay and under the principled approach.

233As mentioned, the common law recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule for spontaneous or excited utterances. A statement made while the declarant is under the stress of a startling event may be admitted where the circumstances sufficiently reduce the risk of fabrication. Strict contemporaneity with the event is not required, provided the stress persists and there has been no opportunity for contrivance or misrepresentation.[50] Although timing is relevant, it is not determinative.[51] Where these conditions are satisfied, the statement may meet the threshold of reliability for admission.

234In Canada, res gestae exceptions include "excited utterances," "statements of present physical condition," and "statements of present mental state”;.[52] This spontaneity is presumed to convey a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.[53]

235In applying the principled approach, factors that may diminish reliability must also be considered. These include the inability to cross‑examine the declarant, any motive to fabricate, intoxication, and language barriers. Each of these factors is present and has been considered in this case.

236Conversely, factors that enhance reliability beyond the inherent presumption under the res gestae standard must also be considered. These include the accuracy of the recording, corroboration of the facts stated, absence of any motive to fabricate, and the declarant’s awareness of the importance of truthfulness and the potential consequences of falsehoods.

ii. Admissible elements of the 911 call:

237In this case, I find that the 911 call was made soon after K.L. was allegedly assaulted and threatened by Mr. Laguerre and the stress of the event was ongoing.[54] The 911 call captures her highly elevated emotional state, her sense of panic, and urgency in having police attend. This all enhances the reliability of the utterances as it minimized an ability to concoct an elaborate version of events.

238The facts K.L. conveyed in the 911 call were as follows. She stated that she was at a gas station connected to a Super 8 hotel in Mississauga, specifically in Room 408. She stated that her boyfriend had been hitting her, punching her repeatedly, leaving her bruised, and had struck her with a cable or phone charger. She stated that the assault had happened “just right now.”

239K.L. identified her boyfriend as Wooldy Laguerre, approximately 31 to 32 years old, from Quebec. She stated that she was wearing only a T-shirt, had no pants, and did not have her phone because it had been taken by the accused. She confirmed that she did not need an ambulance. She stated that another female had been in the room and had sided against her. She explained that she worked for Mr. Laguerre as an escort and had done so for about one and a half years, and that the other female was also an escort who had been working for him for the same period. She stated that her belongings, including her phone, keys, and money, were in the hotel room. She advised that she was from Montreal and feared that Mr. Laguerre would leave with her belongings and money.

240She provided a description of Mr. Laguerre as a black male of average height and heavy build, wearing a black T-shirt and black jeans. She initially suspected that he was inside the gas station wearing a hoodie and possibly hiding, but later corrected herself that it was not him. She gave details of the vehicle he was driving: a grey Honda Civic with a Quebec paper plate in the rear window, parked in front of the hotel vestibule entry. She admitted to using cocaine earlier in the day but stated that Mr. Laguerre had not used drugs or alcohol. Throughout the call, she expressed fear, urgency, and concern about police delay. She asked about recovering money taken by her boyfriend and explained that she had no family to contact and was worried about returning to Montreal.

241While utterances made during 911 calls are often admitted under the res gestae exception, their inclusion in such a call does not automatically render them admissible under that exception. The court must still exercise caution to ensure that each hearsay utterance(s) is properly admissible under the res gestae exception, or under the principled approach, and that it is not inadmissible for some other reason such relevance or an outweighed prejudicial effect when compared to its potential probative value.

242The Crown asks that the entirety of the 911 call and the alleged facts uttered within to be entered under the res gestae exception(with the exception of Mr. Laguerre’s drug and alcohol use); or, in the alternative, all utterances and facts contained therein meeting the principled exception to hearsay, principled exception to hearsay, and therefore all alleged facts summarized above meet the threshold for admissibility at trial.

243I intend to address the res gestae elements first and then, if necessary, return to any remaining utterances under the principled approach.

244In applying the res gestae exception, I find the following material utterances meeting the traditional exception under the res gestae rule (as explained above) as either "excited utterances," "statements of present physical condition," or "statements of present mental state” made with sufficient contemporaneity to the event described, and under circumstances that minimize the unreliability of the utterances. I find them as spontaneous statements made under the stress or pressure of a dramatic or startling act or event and relating to such an occasion.[55] I also find the following details were relayed in a spontaneous and unprompted manner where any concerns for concoction are therefore sufficiently minimized to make them inherently reliable:

• K.L. identifies her boyfriend as Wooldy Laguerre, age 31–32, from Quebec. (pp.9, 12, 14)

• K.L. states her boyfriend (WL) keeps hitting her, punched her repeatedly, and left her bruised. (pp.3, 5, and 6)

• K.L states he hit her with a cable/phone charger. (p.5)

• K.L. says the assault happened “just right now”. (p.6)

• K.L. is wearing only a T-shirt, no pants, and has no phone (it was taken by the accused). (pp.3, 4, and 7)

• There was another female in the room at the time of the allegations. (p.6)

• K.L.’s belongings, including phone, keys, and money, are in the hotel room. (pp.7, 11, and 12)

• That money was taken from her by Mr. Laguerre and questions about how she is to recover it. (p.15)

• K.L. advises she is from Montreal as no family to contact and is worried about returning to Montreal. (pp. 11, 12, 17)

• Mr. Laguerre is described as a black male, average height, heavy build. Wearing black T-shirt and black jeans. (p.9)

• Details of the vehicle Mr. Laguerre is driving: grey Honda Civic, Quebec paper plate in rear window and parked in front of the entry of the hotel.(p.16)

• K.L. expresses fear, urgency, and concern about police delay. (pp.5, 13, 15, 17…)

• K.L. admits to using cocaine earlier in the day. (p.10)

• K.L. fears Mr. Laguerre will leave with her belongings and money. (pp.11-12)

245With respect to the remaining utterances mentioned on the 911 call, they will be analyzed under the “principled approach” as they do not fall properly under the res gestae exception. Depending on that principled approach, analysis and other evidentiary rules, the following may or may not be admissible.

• The other female sided against K.L. in the argument. (pp.6, 11)

• K.L. works for Mr. Laguerre as an escort as has been so for 1.5 years. (p.6, 7, 12)

• The other female is also an escort.(p.7)

iii. Consideration of res gestae as it applies to body-worn camera footage

246At the conclusion of the 911 call, police arrived and K.L.’s interactions were captured on body‑worn camera footage, creating a seamless transition from audio to audio‑video recording. Constable Hunt’s body‑worn camera activated at 16:41:15 as she approached K.L., who was visibly distraught, partially unclothed, and injured.

247Under the circumstances, I have assessed whether any of the utterances captured on body‑worn camera by K.L. or N.B. continue this res gestae exception. I conclude that several factors take those utterances outside this traditional exception explained above, and therefore require analysis under the principled approach to determine their admissibility. I base this conclusion on the following factors:

• Constable Thurston was already speaking with K.L., but her camera did not activate until 16:58:05, leaving the initial interactions unrecorded.

• Hunt briefly left to retrieve a lighter, then resumed contact at 16:43:38 and spoke with K.L. in French while Constable Thurston remained with K.L. and without a body-worn camera recording.

• While K.L.’s demeanor remained agitated, her statements were now in response to investigative questions, including the cause of her injuries and whether the assailant was her pimp, to which she agreed.

• Because these statements were elicited through questioning, they cannot be considered spontaneous or fall within any res gestae exception.[56]

• Any utterances made by K.L. or N.B. captured on body-worn camera must therefore be assessed entirely under the principled approach.

C. General positions of the parties, applied to the hearsay evidence remaining in dispute:

248The following summarizes each party’s position on the disputed hearsay at the threshold stage:

Hearsay item

Crown position

Defence response

Body‑worn and in-car camera utterances – K.L.

Full audio/video capture; contemporaneous setting; visible demeanour; on‑scene translation recorded.

Corroboration ties to material aspects: Room 408; client traffic on CCTV; cash seized from accused while complainants lacked funds; trap phone and Leolist; injuries documented.

Dangers (sincerity, narration, translation nuance) are addressed; plausible alternatives ruled out on material points.

Admit under principled approach with limiting instruction.

Statements elicited through questioning, not spontaneous; translation nuance and officer prompts present; possible contamination between complainants on scene; intoxication concerns.

Corroboration said to be equally consistent with alternative explanations and does not eliminate plausible fabrication on control/material benefit.

Threshold reliability not met, or admission only in narrow scope.

Body‑worn and in-car camera utterances – N.B.

Complete audio/video; contemporaneous; responses captured; corroboration targeted: CCTV movement patterns; seized cash; complainants without funds; trap phone and Leolist; room conditions.

Corroboration addresses the specific hearsay danger.

Admit under principled approach.

Vetrovec witness concerns given outstanding warrant; motive to deflect responsibility onto accused; potential cross‑contamination with K.L.; questioning rather than spontaneous narrative.

Corroboration does not specifically tie N.B.’s assertions to accused’s control/material benefit to the “only likely explanation” standard.

Exclude or admit with caution and reduced weight.

Video‑recorded statement – N.B. (French, interpreted)

Complete video in controlled setting; purpose explained; truth‑telling emphasized; breaks honoured; fluent interpretation; agreed transcript.

Material aspects: pimping/control of postings/clients; nightly targets; money retained; dependence; drug facilitation.

Corroboration: Leolist + trap phone; Room 408 surveillance; seized cash; complainants without funds; room instrumentalities.

Threshold reliability met; admit with limiting instruction.

Interpretation nuance and fatigue; no oath; absence of contemporaneous cross‑examination; sincerity danger (self‑interest).

Corroboration said to be general context, not aspect‑specific; does not eliminate plausible alternatives (self‑serving embellishment; interpreter miscommunication).

Threshold reliability not met.

Later utterances – K.L. (DETECTIVE CONSTABLE Douglas notes, Oct 12–13)

Procedural substitutes modest (officer notes), but proximity in time and strong aspect‑specific corroboration: “Jessica” postings; trap phone; surveillance patterns; seized cash/phone; room instrumentalities; complainants without funds.

Limited admission on specific material points with caution on weight.

No audio/video; paraphrase risk; intoxication; sincerity danger. Notes are hearsay‑on‑hearsay and lack procedural safeguards; corroboration allegedly general and not tied tightly to each material aspect; plausible alternatives (embellishment; mis‑paraphrase) not ruled out.

Exclude or admit in very narrow scope with strong caution.

911 call – remaining portions only (res gestae elements already addressed)

Full audio recording preserves tone and urgency; principled portions confined to material aspects not covered by res gestae.

Corroboration: BWC injuries/state of dress; Room 408; vehicle/permit; seized cash; CCTV movements.

Threshold reliability met for principled portions with instruction.

Operator questioning; intoxication admitted; risk of reflective narrative.

Corroboration regarded as general and not eliminating plausible alternatives on certain non‑spontaneous assertions.

Exclude contested portions or admit with caution.

D. The principled “Bradshaw” approach to hearsay applied to the body-worn camera footage capturing the utterances of K.L. and N.B., and the 911 call.

249I now address the remaining hearsay[1] under the principled exception to hearsay. Necessity is conceded. The issue is threshold reliability. The Crown therefore submits the following hearsay is admissible under the principled exception:

250The defence concedes relevance and necessity on material aspects.[57]

• K.L.’s 911 call.

• Body‑worn camera utterances of K.L. and N.B.

• In‑car camera utterances of N.B.

• N.B.’s video‑recorded statement at 12 Division.

• In‑person utterances by K.L. to Detective Constable Brunino, October 12 and 13.

• In‑person utterances by K.L. to Detective Constable Douglas, October 12 and 13.

• Text messages sent by K.L. to Detective Constable Douglas, October 16, 20, and 23.

• Statements describing present physical condition, such as “I hurt everywhere".

251The defence takes no issue with admission of statements of present physical condition for the limited purpose of proving contemporaneous pain; however, it does not concede the cause of that pain.[58]

252The Crown submits that the statements and utterances of K.L. and N.B. are supported by procedural and substantive reliability features sufficient to meet threshold reliability.

253In this assessment, I consider only evidence already ruled or conceded admissible, including the further testimony of Detective Constable Douglas and the evidence of Constable Danielle Dalton, who provided French interpretation during N.B.’s interview.

254Mr. Laguerre’s utterances and statement were excluded or not tendered. I therefore do not take them into account in this assessment.

i. (Continued) Evidence of Detective Constable Kenaul Douglas (Vice)

255Detective Constable Douglas was recalled to address corroboration and reliability for the principled hearsay analysis. His role was to consolidate digital and surveillance evidence, including fourth‑floor Super 8 CCTV, device extractions, and Leolist archives, in order to test the material aspects of the complainants’ accounts on this voir dire.

The hotel surveillance

256On October 15–16, 2024, Douglas tasked Detective Constable Buczkowski to retrieve motion‑activated clips from the hotel’s fourth‑floor cameras. The system produced discrete segments rather than continuous recording. Douglas reviewed the footage, selected relevant segments, and uploaded them to Axon for disclosure.

257Detective Constable Douglas testified that the CCTV displayed times required conversion to real time. Counsel agree that, during the relevant period, the fourth‑floor hallway (4W), the elevator (E4), and the west stairwell (West Stair G) feeds each displayed times approximately thirty‑eight minutes behind real time.

258For accuracy, displayed times on the hallway and elevator feeds are converted to real time by adding about thirty‑eight minutes (approximately +00:38:15), and displayed times on the west stairwell feed are converted by adding approximately +00:38:47. The precise synchronization method and anchor points are reflected in Appendix B with cross‑references to exhibits filed on the voir dire.

259The surveillance corroborates that Room 408 served as the base of operations for the complainants with the accused present over multiple days and shows regular client movements to and from that room. Identification rests on clothing, distinctive features, device handling, and continuity across clips.

260On October 6, 2024, K.L. and N.B. are seen arriving and entering Room 408, followed minutes later by the accused carrying a large duffle bag. Later that evening, the three return together to the room.

261On October 7, 2024, the three leave Room 408 together; separate clips that day show a male client entering and later departing, consistent with commercial activity centered on 408.

262On October 8, 2024, the accused is seen at the elevator handling two phones, one with distinctive rear‑housing damage consistent with the device later produced by K.L. as the “trap phone.”

263On October 9, 2024, footage records the accused counting cash while exiting Room 408 and entering the elevator, with additional clips of the three returning together and of clients arriving and departing around that period.

264On October 10, 2024, clips show two clients entering Room 408 and later leaving with N.B., followed by another male arriving and departing; these sequences reinforce the pattern of client traffic to and from the room.

265On October 12, 2024, at approximately 16:07 real time, K.L. is seen running from Room 408 in a long black T‑shirt with no pants, heading toward the stairwell. Shortly thereafter, the accused exits 408; later clips show him waiting outside the door with a paper bag and handling a phone before returning. Around 16:13, N.B. runs from 408 toward the stairwell and, minutes later, is seen with the accused in the west stairwell as they leave through the emergency exit. These events align with the 911 call and the body‑worn camera chronology.

Sequential absence and presence of injuries

266Detective Constable Douglas observed that the surveillance clips preceding the 911 call did not show visible injuries consistent with those later reported and documented in photographs and on Constable Hunt’s body‑worn camera. This contrast supports the timing of the alleged assaults: the absence of injuries in earlier footage and their presence when N.B. was examined on scene. Constable Hunt’s recording also captures N.B. describing these injuries and pointing them out during her interaction with police, providing a useful comparator.

Utterances of K.L. captured in Detective Constable Douglas’ notes – Evening of complaint

267Douglas first encountered K.L. at 12 Division on October 12, 2024, in the evening. He observed that she appeared lethargic and intermittently incoherent, consistent with recent drug consumption. She made brief utterances captured in his notes, paraphrased as references to “coke” and “speed” used to keep her awake for work, and to advertisements under “Jessica,” but was unable to give a coherent statement and declined to proceed further. She was later transported to a safe location.

Utterance, communications, and property provided by K.L. – post October 12, 2024

268On October 13, 2024, at the safe location, K.L. remained unwilling to provide a formal statement but stated: “I called the police because he chased me and beat the shit out of me,” and not, as Mr. Laguerre suggested, because he had contacted her child’s father and told him she was using drugs.[59]

269During this interaction she produced a damaged white iPhone that she identified as belonging to the accused and described it as a “trap phone” used to communicate with clients and post advertisements for sexual services on Leolist; she distinguished it from his personal phone. She did not know the passcode despite wishing to provide it.

270K.L. acknowledged that she had used the phone occasionally but stated that it was predominantly used by Mr. Laguerre.

271The device was damaged and was later submitted by Douglas for forensic extraction.

Leolist corroboration of devices, numbers, names, and “trap phone” extraction

272Douglas subsequently consolidated Leolist archive data and device‑extraction materials from the phone. The partial extraction tied the damaged device to specific identifiers, images, and screen captures associated with postings and client communications in the relevant period. Where items appeared as screenshots saved in the photo library rather than native message records, Douglas explained provenance issues and relied on date‑and‑time properties and continuity with other evidence.

273In the days that followed, K.L. sent Douglas near‑time photographs of injuries and screenshots of communications (October 16 and 20), together with identifiers she attributed to the accused’s personal and trap lines; on October 23 she indicated she no longer wished to provide a statement and wished to remove past comments. These communications, device artefacts, and surveillance sequences are addressed in the analysis below to the extent they bear on the material aspects.

274Detective Constable Douglas testified that, after K.L. identified “Jessica” advertisements and provided a number for the accused, he emailed Leolist’s legal department on October 15, 2024 to preserve and obtain account data associated with the relevant postings. Leolist responded with archive packages and link data “within 14 days of posting,” including associated phone numbers, emails, IP addresses, and cryptocurrency payment references. Douglas downloaded the material to USB and lodged it in property, then sought and obtained judicial authorization to review the contents. Those materials are set out in detail in Exhibits 94, 100, and 101.

275The principal phone number tied to the Super 8 postings during October 6–12, 2024 was 438‑833‑0530, which Douglas associated to the damaged “trap phone.” A second number, 438‑765‑2591, was also observed in the archive period and reflected in Traffic Jam captures. K.L. later gave Douglas both numbers and described one as the accused’s personal line and the other as the trap line; Douglas treated those attributions cautiously, but used them as search pivots for legal requests and archive matching.

Text communications between K.L. and “wooldy” via the trap phone and other devices

276In her October 16 and 20 messages, K.L. forwarded to Douglas screenshots showing contacts saved as “wooldy,” with the 438‑833‑0530 number, and a second number she identified as his personal line.

277Douglas did not accept attribution on her say‑so; he cross‑checked the “Wooldy” number against:

(i) the device MSISDN from the extraction;

(ii) Traffic Jam/Leolist postings carrying that number; and

(iii) contemporaneous screenshots of client coordination (room directions, pricing, reply confirmations). Those checks were consistent with the trap phone being the live contact device used to coordinate services linked to Room 408:

278The telephone number and related usage were identified by K.L. Although the accused’s statement contains similar information, that statement has been excluded and is not considered in assessing corroboration under the Bradshaw framework.

279The screenshots provided by K.L. were as follows:

PHOTO 1

Translation: TEXT MESSAGES

Yo, you’re kidding or what?

The dude is really there b.

Yo there’s nobody here b.

Swear to God man.

How are you not seeing him?

Call him.

I’m here, the door is open.

Ok, wait.

Ok he says he’s coming.

“Traffic Jam” sex-trade archives from the trap phone

280Using Traffic Jam (the unit’s scraper that archives sex‑trade advertisements), Douglas located and saved Leolist postings for October 6–12, 2024 that matched the phone identifiers above. Those captures were filed as Exhibits 78–92, including entries on October 6 (initial Mississauga posting), October 7–10 (multiple daily reposts and edits), October 11 (late‑evening posting) and October 12 (early‑morning posting). The archived ad bodies and headers show the contact number 438‑833‑0530, consistent across the relevant period, with connected verification imagery and metadata.

281Within the Leolist data and device extraction, Douglas identified verification photos for “Jessica,” time‑stamped during the stay (e.g., September 29 and October 6, 2024), and images that display distinctive tattoos visible on K.L. The Traffic Jam and Leolist packages also reflected internal ad identifiers (issuer and ad IDs) and payment artefacts (Litecoin QR codes) that Douglas tied, by date, to the October 6–12 posting cadence. These materials appear in Exhibits 75–76 and 78–93.

Cellebrite extraction and cross-references to CCTV, Traffic Jam, and Leolist

282From the partial Cellebrite extraction of the damaged device, Douglas recorded the MSISDN for 438‑833‑0530 and observed two Apple IDs associated with the handset: jessica.brunette@icloud.com and jay.thetruth99@icloud.com. He explained that while the extraction was limited (updates corrupted some items), the preserved device information, file properties, and image metadata allowed him to align creation and modification dates with the Traffic Jam/Leolist timelines and with CCTV client‑traffic windows. Exhibits 75–76 document these items.

283Detective Constable Douglas acknowledged that many communications appeared as screenshots saved in the photo library (“syndication” path) rather than native entries from a messages database, limiting sender/recipient attribution. He therefore used a triangulation approach: (i) device continuity (the same damaged handset seen on CCTV and produced by K.L.); (ii) identifier alignment (438‑833‑0530 as the contact number within ad bodies and screenshots); and (iii) temporal correspondence (timestamps in screenshots matching client movements on CCTV and posting times in Traffic Jam/Leolist).

284The frequently observed possession of the distinctive handset on CCTV, the third‑party composition of advertising images, and the complainants’ inability to unlock the device all lead to the only likely explanation that the accused had possession and control of the device, even if it is accepted that K.L. and N.B. had access to it at times.

285Taken together, these factors support operational control by the accused and render the alternative of independent complainant authorship unlikely.

Overall continued evidence as it relates to corroborative elements

286In sum, he testified that the Leolist legal response and Traffic Jam archives, together with device identifiers (MSISDN 438‑833‑0530 and associated Apple IDs), verification imagery, and date/time properties, when tested against CCTV and body‑worn camera chronology, corroborated the functional linkage of 438‑833‑0530 to the damaged handset and to the October 6–12 postings for “Jessica” operating from Room 408.

287He further testified that although 438‑765‑2591 appeared in the archive window, the operational coordination during the Ontario stay was anchored to 438‑833‑0530 and the damaged device (the “trap phone”).

288He also described corroborative features that included sustained Room 408 occupancy with regular client traffic; the accused’s handling of multiple phones including the damaged device later produced by K.L.; contemporaneous cash handling by the accused; near‑time injury images and device screenshots sent by K.L.; and the presence of room instrumentalities consistent with the described assault mechanisms.

ii. Evidence of Danielle Dalton

289Constable Danielle Dalton testified that she has been employed with the Peel Regional Police since December 2023. She is fluent in both French and English, having learned both languages from childhood and attended French-language schools in Ontario through Grade 10.

290On October 12, 2024, she was assigned to assist with French translation during the interview of a complainant conducted by Detective Constable Giacomo Brunino at 12 Division. The interview commenced at approximately 7:49 p.m. and took place in Interview Room #3.

291The interview was conducted in French and subsequently transcribed and translated into English by an independent professional. All parties agree that the resulting transcript is accurate and may be relied upon as the authoritative record of what the complainant said. The video and translation were filed as Exhibits 4A and 4B, respectively, and the transcript is the proper reference point for assessing the content of the statement.

292Constable Dalton’s role was limited to facilitating communication between Detective Constable Brunino and the complainant. She translated questions posed in English into French and conveyed the complainant’s responses back into English. She had no prior involvement in the investigation, was not briefed on its details, and was not responsible for eliciting or interpreting evidence.

293Her function was to assist with language translation only, so that Detective Constable Brunino could conduct the interview in furtherance of his Vice investigation.

294Dalton recalled that the complainant appeared tired and in pain, particularly due to a burn on her tongue. The interview was paused at one point to accommodate her discomfort. Dalton described the complainant as polite and cooperative, and noted that the complainant complimented Dalton’s interpretation during the interview. Dalton did not observe signs of intoxication or cognitive impairment, though she acknowledged the complainant expressed fatigue and moments of confusion.

295Constable Dalton confirmed that she did not observe or participate in any threats or inducements made toward the complainant and stated that no such conduct occurred in her presence. She was not aware of any discussions regarding transportation or financial assistance to return to Quebec.

296She noted that cell phones were provided to the complainants by Peel Police and stated they were left for them while they were asleep; in her view, this would not have influenced their decision to cooperate.

iii. Necessity

297Necessity is conceded.

298Despite reasonable efforts, the complainants did not attend to testify. Their prior statements and captured utterances are therefore the only way to place their accounts before the court for the purposes of the hearsay application.[60]

E. Threshold reliability: framework and approach

299Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible. It may be admitted where necessity and threshold reliability are established. Threshold reliability may be shown by adequate procedural substitutes for the usual trial safeguards or by substantive guarantees of trustworthiness that sufficiently overcome the hearsay dangers of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. [61]

300Threshold reliability relates to the admission of evidence; ultimate reliability relates to the weight afforded to hearsay if admitted as trial evidence. Threshold reliability can be shown by demonstrating that there are:

(1) Adequate substitutes in place to test the truth of the statement ("procedural reliability"); or

(2) Sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy ("substantive reliability").

301Procedural reliability is concerned with whether the record adequately substitutes for oath, presence, and contemporaneous cross‑examination. Complete and contemporaneous audio‑video records, cautions, controlled interview settings, and accurate translations may serve as adequate substitutes where feasible.

302Substantive reliability is concerned with whether the circumstances and corroboration tied to the material aspects substantially negate the risk of untruthfulness or mistake such that contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little. Corroboration must be connected to the particular point the hearsay is tendered to prove and not merely show the case is strong in general.

303I also accept the defence submission and mindful that “the threshold reliability analysis has a constitutional dimension because the difficulties of testing hearsay evidence can threaten the accused’s right to a fair trial.”[62]

304Procedural and substantive reliability do not exist in mutually exclusive silos, but rather work in tandem to overcome hearsay dangers, “Strength in one area, such as substantive reliability, can be compensated for by procedural reliability and the opposite is also true.”[63] Hearsay statements may be admitted either on the basis of their procedural or their substantive reliability. There are “two routes to the same destination…[and] are equivalents in the quest to establish threshold reliability.” If procedural reliability is sufficiently made out, then substantive reliability does not need to be established”[64]

305When evaluating substantive reliability, a four-step analysis is undertaken[65] that assesses corroborative evidence. As described in Bradshaw[66], the trial judge should:

1. Identify the material aspects of the hearsay statement that are tendered for their truth;

2. Identify the specific hearsay dangers raised by those aspects of the statement in the particular circumstances of the case;

3. Based on the circumstances and these dangers, consider alternative, even speculative, explanations for the statement; and

4. Determine whether, given the circumstances of the case, the corroborative evidence led at the voir dire rules out these alternative explanations such that the only remaining likely explanation for the statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement.

306A trial judge must consider the cumulative reliability of combined statements, utterances, or circumstances when assessing the admissibility of hearsay under the principled hearsay exception. However, this is permitted when considered as a whole and in the circumstances of the case, that the only likely explanation for the hearsay statement(s) is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement. If the hearsay danger relates to the declarant’s sincerity, truthfulness will be the issue. If the hearsay danger is memory, narration, or perception, accuracy will be the issue. [67]

307In a case of this complexity, with overlapping statements and multiple sources of video and digital evidence, the assessment proceeds by identifying the material aspects tendered for their truth, isolating the specific hearsay dangers, and evaluating whether the combined procedural and substantive features overcome those dangers to the threshold standard.

i. The procedural reliability of the statements

308Procedural reliability is established where the record provides adequate substitutes for the usual trial safeguards. Since neither declarant testified in court under oath or was subject to contemporaneous cross‑examination, there must be a satisfactory basis to assess the truth and accuracy of the statements.

309Adequate substitutes may include a complete video recording, an oath or affirmation, and an expectation to tell the truth with an understanding of the consequences of lying. Where feasible, some opportunity for cross‑examination (such as testimony at a preliminary hearing) is usually required. [68]

The inability to cross-examine K.L. and N.B.

310Neither K.L. nor N.B. is available for cross‑examination on any material elements of the hearsay utterances and statements. This is a procedural concern at the threshold stage. However, where the Crown establishes that adequate substitutes for the traditional safeguards exist, presumptive inadmissibility may be overcome because the hearsay can be sufficiently trustworthy that contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little on the material aspects. [69] This is the trial judge’s central preoccupation at threshold. [70]

311I will return to this in the final assessment once the corroborative record is set out and the material aspects are analyzed. I note it here to confirm that the inability to test the evidence by cross‑examination is a live issue on procedural reliability.

Body‑worn camera and in‑car recordings

312Without repeating the body‑worn camera evidence detailed above, I make the following observations relevant to procedural reliability for the K.L. and N.B. utterances captured on body‑worn and in‑car cameras

313The court has the benefit of near‑continuous body‑worn camera recordings from several officers and in‑car transport video for relevant periods. These recordings preserve setting, tone, questions and answers, demeanour, and observable context, including injuries, property, and location references.

314Although the complainants did not make these on‑scene statements under oath, the completeness and clarity of the recordings, together with the contemporaneity of the circumstances, provide robust procedural substitutes.

N.B.’s cautioned video statement to police

315N.B.’s interview was conducted in a controlled police interview room, recorded in full on video, with interpretation provided by Constable Dalton in French at the complainant’s request. The interview was cautioned for truthfulness in a manner the complainant understood and proceeded at her pace with breaks as needed.

316The interpretation was performed by a bilingual officer with no investigative role. An independent professional prepared the English translation transcript and all parties agree it is accurate. The interview and translation were filed as Exhibits 4A and 4B.

317While not taken under formal oath or affirmation, the complete recording, truth‑telling caution, controlled setting, and accurate translation function as adequate procedural substitutes permitting a rational evaluation of the truth and accuracy of the material aspects.

318The absence of an oath does not preclude admission under the principled approach; the K.G.B. indicia are optimal, not prerequisites. Other circumstances may serve, for example, as a surrogate or proxy for the oath[71]

319Dalton testified that the recording provides a clear and complete account of the interview. The complainant appeared responsive and coherent. While emotional at points and reporting tongue pain, tiredness, and occasional “blackouts,” Dalton did not observe signs of intoxication or cognitive impairment. The interview was paused to accommodate discomfort, and interpretation was facilitated in French throughout in accordance with the complainant’s preference.

320From a procedural standpoint, the interview was guided by open‑ended questions and proceeded on N.B.’s own terms. Its scope was comprehensive on the material topics the Crown seeks to elicit. This is not to conflate procedural reliability with substantive reliability. [72] I note this only to explain that the manner and circumstances of the interview furnish robust procedural features; whether those features translate into substantive guarantees is assessed separately.

321Therefore, the complete video record, the controlled setting, the truth‑telling caution, and the provision of interpretation in N.B.’s preferred language furnish strong procedural substitutes for the traditional trial safeguards at the threshold stage. Any concern about the absence of a formal oath goes to ultimate weight, not admissibility, given the completeness of the recording; the separate question of substantive reliability is addressed by corroboration tethered to the identified material aspects below.

Officer notes of later utterances by K.L. (October 12–13)

322These utterances appear in officer notes rather than a complete audio or video recording. Procedural safeguards are therefore lacking so the the assessment turns more heavily on substantive guarantees and corroboration tied to the material aspects. I address this below.

ii. The substantive reliability of the statements

323Substantive reliability is established where the statement is inherently trustworthy on its material aspects. The assessment looks to the circumstances in which the statement was made and to evidence that specifically corroborates or conflicts with those material aspects.

324The standard is high, though not absolute certainty: the question is whether, taken as a whole, the statement is so reliable that contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

325Substantive reliability is met when the circumstances substantially negate the possibility of untruthfulness or mistake, a cautious trier would regard the statement as trustworthy, the material aspects are unlikely to change under cross‑examination, and plausible alternative explanations are ruled out so that the only likely explanation is that the statement is true.[73]

Material aspects of the statements and utterances and the intended approach to the four Bradshaw factors.

326Consistent with the guidance in Bradshaw[74], following my ruling on the res gestae exception, I asked the Crown to identify the material aspects of the remaining hearsay it seeks to admit under the principled exception. The Crown did so in supplementary materials and these appear summarized and charted at paragraph 249. For greater clarity, I identify these material aspects as follows:

Reference

Material aspects of hearsay

K.L. body-worn and in-car camera utterances

• Assault in Room 408 by the accused on October 12: struck with a phone-charger cord, punched, and kicked; injuries observed on BWC.

• Deprivation of property: phone, keys, and money taken; “all the money he has on him is ours.”

• Work and control: she was working there; Laguerre acted as her pimp; clients are on “his phone.”

• Flight and fear: left without pants to the adjacent gas station; expressed urgency; sought return of property.

• Identification/linkage: points out the accused’s vehicle and Quebec paper permit; distinguishes her phone from the accused’s; confirms Room 408.

• Present physical condition: “I hurt everywhere.”

N.B. body-worn and in-car camera utterances

• Observation of assault on K.L.: whipping with a phone cord, kicking, and chasing; K.L. “hit everywhere.”

• Own assault and threats: single strike to N.B.; knife-related threat; fear of harm if they spoke to police.

• Trafficking details: nightly targets/quotas; use of K.L.’s photos; control of client communications and retention of money.

• Present physical condition of being in pain.

N.B. video-recorded statement at police station (French, interpreted; agreed transcript)

• Pimping and control: Laguerre controlled postings (Leolist) and client communications; set nightly targets; retained proceeds.

• Violence and threats: extended assault on K.L.; single strike to N.B.; threats to kill; knife threat; statements such as “you are not leaving me.”

• Assault method specifics: telephone cord used to strike or attempt to strangle; hotel phone used to hit N.B.; K.L. beaten for “almost an hour.”

• Residence/timing/work cadence: stay at the Super 8 from October 6; daily work; movements to and from Room 408.

• Aliases and advertising: use of “Marcus;” use of K.L.’s photographs in ads; he pays for ads; he manages communications.

• Consequences/control: if she did not work, he would beat her; inability to leave; minimum nightly quota of about $2,000.

911 call – remaining non-res gestae portions

• Duration and scope of control: K.L. and another female working for Laguerre for about a year and a half.

• Material benefit/control: money taken “from her work;” belongings (phone/keys/money) left in Room 408; intent to recover them; check-out by October 15.

• Vehicle and identity linkage: grey Honda Civic with Quebec paper permit; identification of Laguerre and his origin.

• Intoxication/sobriety context: K.L. used cocaine earlier; she stated the accused did not; the other female not in immediate danger.

K.L. in-person utterances to Brunino and Douglas (October 12–13)

• Reason for calling police: he chased her and beat her.

• Provision of damaged “trap phone” allegedly used by Laguerre to communicate with clients; distinction between trap and personal phone; provision of specific numbers and the “Jessica” email used in ads.

• Work and advertising: she worked for him; ads for “Jessica” identified and confirmed; expectation Laguerre would have $3,000–$4,000 cash.

• Drugs linked to work and alias: that he gave her cocaine and speed to keep her working; instruction to call him “Marcus.”

K.L. text messages to Douglas (October 16, 20, 23)

• Near-time injury images consistent with cable strikes and kicks.

• Provision of the trap-phone number and a personal number; screenshots reflecting communications consistent with client coordination.

• Later messages declining a formal statement or withdrawing past comments.

327In listing the material hearsay above, I have identified only assertions tendered for their truth. Corroborative evidence such as hotel surveillance, seized property, Leolist data, and non‑hearsay body‑worn camera footage is not hearsay. Those items will be addressed in the Bradshaw analysis at steps three and four.

328The excluded statement of the accused is not considered in this hearsay analysis.

329Statements describing present physical condition, such as “I hurt everywhere,” are included for the limited purpose of proving present condition, consistent with the Crown’s approach and the defence concession of the exception (albeit without the cause).

330Similarly, the 911 recording is admissible to show the complainant’s contemporaneous emotional state, fear, and urgency at the time of the call. This non‑hearsay purpose is relevant to context and timing and does not depend on the truth of the assertions. The truth of its contents was already ruled admissible above with narrow exceptions considered below.

331Because the hearsay dangers relevant to substantive reliability (sincerity, memory, perception, and narration) recur across several categories of statements identified above, I set out a single detailed analysis of those dangers and then apply those conclusions, as appropriate, to each hearsay source even if it is not specifically mentioned.

“Identified dangers” #1 – The “unsavory” (Vetrovec) nature of N.B.

332The defence submits that N.B. is, or approximates, a Vetrovec witness.

333They point to the fact that she was reportedly wanted by authorities in Quebec in relation to an alleged Criminal Code offence and suggest this indicates prior dishonesty with police to avoid legal jeopardy. They also note her concern about an outstanding warrant and conditions prohibiting her from attending Toronto.

334I do not accept that submission for the following reasons:

• There is no evidence of the nature of the alleged obstruction or related conditions. It is unknown whether any alleged obstruction was physical, procedural, or administrative; whether it involved a lie to police; or whether it concerned protecting someone else. The information is vague.

• Any criminal matter appears to be pending. N.B. is presumed innocent. Without further evidence, it would be improper to conclude that a person facing unproven charges — including alleged offences of dishonesty — is therefore less worthy of belief or has a general tendency to lie to police.

• She was not under investigation or detained in relation to the allegations against Mr. Laguerre. In these proceedings she was treated first as a witness and then as a victim.

• Peel Police did not state or imply to her that she was in jeopardy. To the contrary, they assured her that even if she had an outstanding warrant in Toronto, she need not worry because this was a different region, and they would not detain her for that reason.

• There is no evidence that she had a motive to lie to police or that any lie would obtain a material benefit for her. Even if she were considered “unsavoury” (which I do not find), there is no identified purpose served by any alleged lie.

• The Court must be cautious about negatively classifying witnesses and alleged victims in human trafficking cases without sufficient evidence. Such individuals may have criminal records or outstanding matters arising from drug dependency or other vulnerabilities that contribute to their exploitation. These factors may also contribute to their unwillingness to testify[75] but this unwillingness should not be a factor towards findings as a Vetrovec categorization.

335I therefore have no basis to conclude that N.B. is of such a character as to inherently undermine her credibility or reliability.

“Identified dangers ” #2 – Alleged motive to fabricate

336As a relevant factor[76], the defence submits that there is a significant risk of deliberate falsehood or motive to fabricate by K.L. and N.B., pointing to their repeated expressions of interest in accessing the money found on Mr. Laguerre.

337They further submit that K.L. and N.B. might have been involved in criminal activity independently of (or in conjunction with) the Respondent, be it in relation to the sex trade, fraud or drug-related offences, and might have wanted to obfuscate that fact and extricate themselves from criminal liability by pointing fingers at Mr. Laguerre.

338I do not accept this submission for the following reasons:

• The money was seized by police from Mr. Laguerre’s satchel. Early in the investigation, both K.L. and N.B. asked about funds they said represented sex‑work earnings. Police made it clear the money could not be returned and it was not returned at any time.

• Any alleged motive tied to obtaining the seized funds dissipated once police advised that the money would not be returned. This occurred early and before nearly all of the hearsay statements bearing on the material issues.

• Whatever claim they believed they had to the money was extinguished by police actions and communications. Any motive to fabricate on that basis would have ended well before: (i) the body‑worn camera interactions; (ii) N.B.’s video‑recorded statement; and (iii) subsequent contacts.

• To the extent police encountered apparent criminal activity connected to drug use, sex work, client interactions, or related proceeds, both K.L. and N.B. were candid about those matters. Their statements and conduct do not reflect attempts to distance themselves from criminal conduct by false attribution to the accused.

339On this record, there is no identified, ongoing incentive that plausibly supports a motive to fabricate on the material aspects tendered for their truth.

“Identified dangers” #3 – The possibility for collusion between K.L. and N.B.

340The defence further submits that there was ample opportunity for deliberate or inadvertent collusion between K.L. and N.B., potentially tainting the hearsay.[77]

341They note that N.B. and K.L. were in each other’s immediate presence before, during, and between several of those utterances, and that they spoke French to one another while most officers were Anglophone.

342The defence also submits that multiple persons had unrestricted access to the “trap phone” and to the hotel room, undermining the reliability and attribution of any corroborative evidence arising from the seized items or information.

343I do not accept these submissions for the following reasons:

• When police arrived, K.L. and N.B were in separate locations; N.B. was found with the accused, Mr. Laguerre while K.L. was outside the hotel panicked.

• From first contact until departure from the hotel in separate vehicles with separate officers, their interactions with each other and police were captured on body‑worn cameras, including the recordings of Constable Hunt (French‑speaking) and Constable Thurston.

• There is no indication that K.L. or N.B. attempted to avoid camera coverage or conceal conversations from attending officers. Each remained on camera throughout the material period, engaged directly with police, and raised queries independent of the other.

• The French utterances were transcribed into English. The accuracy of those transcripts is not in dispute, and they contain the hearsay the Crown seeks to tender.

• The body‑worn camera record permits a detailed review of their interactions and supports the conclusion that there is no evidence of collusion. To the extent overlap may affect ultimate weight at trial, which can be assessed against the full audiovisual record through to their arrival at the police station in separate vehicles.

• Even if there were brief moments when they could have spoken without being heard, the body‑worn camera record captures their interactions and shows no sustained or intensive conversation. Nothing in the footage plausibly supports the kind of sophisticated, layered collusion alleged.

• Although K.L. and N.B. were intermittently together and spoke French, their material interactions with police from first contact through transport were continuously recorded, and the admitted material aspects are corroborated independently.

“Identified dangers” – The state of mind of N.B. and K.L. and influence of fatigue, narcotic, and stimulants (i.e., “intoxication”)

344The defence submits that fatigue and drug use may have affected the accuracy of K.L.’s and N.B.’s accounts. I do not accept that submission on this record. The body‑worn and in‑car recordings show both complainants responsive to questions, coherent in their descriptions, and able to distinguish relevant details.

345Officers Hunt, Thurston, Bolarinho, Brunino, and Dalton consistently described each complainant as communicative and not impaired at the material times. This is supported by their respective body‑worn cameras.

346In particular, K.L. admitted earlier cocaine use, but on scene was responsive and understood what was asked; N.B. reported tongue pain and tiredness at the station, yet remained coherent, paused when needed, and answered questions directly. These observations are captured in the recordings and in the officers’ testimony.

347The defence points to N.B.’s concern that she had “blacked out” and to K.L.’s earlier drug use. On this evidentiary record, these do not translate into confusion about what was happening or delusional behaviour that would undermine the material aspects of their statements.

348The videos show that each complainant was able to correct or limit assertions when appropriate (for example, identifying injuries not attributable to the accused), to differentiate phones and property on scene, and to anchor statements to observable features such as Room 408, the vehicle, and contemporaneous movements. Their measured clarifications are inconsistent with the kind of confusion or distortion the defence suggests.

349I therefore find that neither impairment nor fatigue undermines the reliability of the complainants’ statements in any material way. To the extent either factor was present, its impact can be assessed on the evidentiary record.

350With the discrete exception of K.L.’s brief, unrecorded exchange with Officer Douglas upon arrival at the station, all material interactions are audio‑ and video‑recorded, providing a reliable basis for this assessment.

iii. Corroborative evidence enhancing substantive reliability

351While Bradshaw sequences the consideration of “alternative explanations” as the third step, that order is a matter of form, not substance. In a case of this complexity, the analysis is best served by first setting out the corroborative evidence and then assessing reasonably plausible alternatives in light of that record, which properly tethers the alternatives to the evidence.

352A strict Bradshaw ordering may be preferred where the statement is isolated on a discrete issue (as in R. v. Charles[78]). However, in cases like this one—where the material aspects of the hearsay are widespread and the analysis is prolonged, complex, interconnected, and layered with corroborative evidence and multiple witnesses—in my view it is most sensible to address the alternative‑explanations analysis at the end.

353As the Court of Appeal stated in R. v. McMorris “Karakatsanis J. was describing the trial judge’s anticipated reasoning process, not its culmination.”[79] That is my intent here. What matters is the culmination of the proper application of all applicable principles, not the order in which the steps are approached.

354I do not read Bradshaw, Charles, McMorris, or other authoritative cases as requiring a siloed assessment of each “material aspect” divorced from its context. Plausibility must necessarily be assessed in context and tethered to the specific material aspect at issue. Some material aspects may be discrete (for example, the cause of a particular injury); others are cumulative (for example, the exercise of control). The proper approach is therefore to evaluate plausibility on the totality of the admissible evidence on the voir dire for each material aspect of the hearsay tendered for its truth.

355Charles reiterates Bradshaw’s limits: corroboration must address the specific material assertion in dispute and cannot simply show the case is strong in general. Corroboration that is equally consistent with competing hypotheses is of no assistance at threshold.[80] This assessment of competing hypotheses and the residual worth, if any, of the corroborative evidence, is addressed in “alternative explanations” analysis below.

356The corroborative record (confined to admissible evidence on the voir dire) is substantial and interconnected:

• 911 call: (admitted res gestae portions): identification of the accused by name, age range, and origin; recent assault “just right now”; method of assault (struck with cable/phone charger); caller’s state of dress (T‑shirt, no pants) and loss of phone; presence of another female; belongings (phone, keys, money) left in the room; money taken and fear it will be removed; caller from Montreal with no local supports and anxiety about returning; description of the accused (build, clothing); vehicle details (grey Honda Civic with Quebec paper permit, location at hotel entrance); urgency and fear expressed; admission of earlier cocaine use; concern the accused will leave with her property.

• CCTV (Super 8, fourth floor): repeated client movements to and from Room 408 over several days; K.L. and N.B. using Room 408; the accused accompanying or following them; handling two phones (one damaged and later produced as the trap phone); counting cash; placing a bag in the corridor; movements immediately before and after the 911 call; sequences aligning with the stay and checkout on the fifteenth.

• Digital records (Leolist and device linkage): postings and account data align with the number linked to the trap phone; device managing consistent with coordination of client activity; later extraction ties postings to the number identified in the complainants’ accounts.

• Body‑worn camera observations: the complainant distinguishes her phone from the accused’s; identifies the accused’s vehicle and the temporary Quebec permit; confirms Room 408; interactions with both complainants captured throughout the material period from initial contact through departure in separate vehicles; K.L. clarifies that an eye injury was not attributable to the accused.

• Seized property: cash seized from the accused’s satchel; phones seized and lodged; property processing and later count documented on station video; production of a damaged phone consistent with the device seen on CCTV.

• Cash and gold: USD and the serialized bill “GKU9730776” held by K.L. compared to the money found on Mr. Laguerre in his beige satchel upon arrest.

• Injuries and timing: injuries photographed and recorded on body‑worn camera; their absence in earlier CCTV clips supports timing of the violence alleged.

• Room condition and instrumentalities: room disarray consistent with ongoing commercial activity; sex and drug paraphernalia documented; false identification cards for K.L. and other women found in the room; explanation that the accused made false identification.

• Language and dependence: both complainants spoke limited English while in Ontario; neither had money or phones at the time police arrived; expressions of concern about how to return home without the accused; no vehicle available to them.

• Vehicle and room linkage: identification of the accused’s vehicle and temporary permit on body‑worn camera; the room number provided by the complainant matches Room 408; officer notes and recordings align on these linkages.

• Final text communications (as summarized in Detective Constable Douglas’s continued evidence): late‑stage messages coordinating clients, timing, and movements to and from Room 408; references to availability and pricing consistent with Leolist postings and the trap‑phone number; timing aligned with the CCTV sequences and the body‑worn camera chronology.

• Consistency: apart from the absence of a weapon when police arrived, these strands are internally consistent and align with the narrative captured on video and the digital records.

iv. Alternative explanations that may diminish substantive reliability

357I now consider alternative explanations for the material aspects of the hearsay. Bradshaw permits the trial judge to canvass “alternative, even speculative, explanations” at the identification stage, but only alternatives that remain reasonably plausible on the record carry forward to the final step of the analysis.[81]

358As stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. McMorris:

“Any speculative explanation, in short, must be plausible on a balance of probabilities and any speculative explanation that does not survive such scrutiny is to be rejected. Any explanation left over becomes the plausible candidate for assessment at step four; "the only remaining likely explanation for the statement is the declarant's truthfulness about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement." In other words, not just any speculative explanation or fanciful idea suffices to abort the threshold reliability analysis - only those that are, on reflection, reasonably plausible.”

359At the outset of submissions and prior to receiving written submissions, I asked counsel to identify all reasonably plausible alternatives they contend arise on the record, consistent with the Bradshaw framework. I address those alternatives below and, where appropriate, return to them in the corroborative‑evidence assessment.

360As I am required to do, I have also attempted to identify other alternative and speculative explanations beyond those identified by counsel.

361Those proposed alternative explanations are:

(a) the injuries were caused by an altercation between K.L. and N.B., or by unrelated client interactions;

(b) K.L. and N.B. were independently engaging in sex work, with misattribution of control and material benefit to the accused;

(c) threat allegations (including a knife) were exaggerated or mistaken;

(d) cash found on the accused was unrelated to the complainants’ work and derived from a lawful sale;

(e) the “trap phone” was used by multiple people and the screenshots are of uncertain provenance;

(f) Leolist postings were authored by K.L. or others, not the accused;

(g) references to “Julian” reflect confusion or unrelated third‑party risk; and

(h) later reluctance, disengagement, or recantation dynamics suggest fabrication on material aspects.

The cause of the injuries

362It is suggested that the visible injuries resulted from a physical altercation between K.L. and N.B. The defence says a volatile dynamic is supported by a subsequent physical altercation between K.L. and N.B. in front of police while they were being escorted to the train station, and by K.L.’s 911 statement that N.B. (along with the accused) was “against her.” It is also alleged that inconsistencies in the allegations and in N.B.’s description of the implement (telephone receiver versus phone‑charger cable) undermine reliability.

363Other possibilities considered are that the injuries arose from interactions with clients or by “Julian,” who had pushed N.B. from a moving vehicle on an earlier occasion at a high rate of speed.

364It is submitted that these alternatives raise a plausible alternative explanation that Mr. Laguerre was not responsible for the injuries. The 911 audio[2] captures a contemporaneous description of an assault “just right now” with a cable or phone‑charger and repeated punching. Body‑worn camera preserves K.L.’s demeanour, state of dress, and fresh injuries, with photographs documenting the same.

365Hotel surveillance shows movement sequences immediately preceding the call and K.L. running from Room 408. The mechanism described (cable or phone cord and strikes) is consistent with instrumentalities visible in the room and with images later recorded.

Super 8 CCTV - K.L. running from room at 16:07:XX

366The injuries are fresh. Earlier CCTV captures, in which the relevant areas of skin are clearly exposed, show no injuries. The nature and pattern of the injuries are strongly consistent with the described mechanism of whipping with a phone‑charger cord together with strikes.

367On‑scene video with Officers Hunt and Thurston shows the complainants reacting with shock and appearing to see the injuries for the first time, and the contemporaneous photographs those officers took confirm what is visible on camera.

368For the sake of clarity and to convey how compelling the corroborative evidence is, a photo of N.B.’s injury is included here to illustrate the nature of that evidence.

369For the same purpose, I include the photos relating to K.L.’s injuries.

370Whether the injuries were caused by a phone‑charger cable, a telephone receiver cord, or both, is immaterial; either or both scenarios are consistent with the injuries observed and recorded. N.B. states in her police interview that the accused hit her once on the back with the hotel phone, causing an injury; she also witnessed K.L. being struck by the accused multiple times, “everywhere,” with both a charging cable and the hotel phone.

371The location of the hotel phone when police arrived at the room further corroborates this allegation:

372The body‑worn camera further shows K.L. and N.B. interacting peacefully and supportively when police arrive and appearing surprised at each other’s injuries when they raise their shirts to view them, which is inconsistent with severe mutual violence having just occurred between them. The 911 audio and body‑worn camera align on timing, demeanour, and recent onset.

373Detective Constable Douglas’s description of the argument while they were being escorted to the train station, well after these events, is nowhere close to the level of violence required to cause injuries of this nature. It would be unreasonable to infer from this that either possessed a propensity for violence toward the other sufficient to escalate to such obvious and serious harm on the earlier occasion.

374The specific alternative that the injuries resulted from an altercation between K.L. and N.B., without any connection to Mr. Laguerre, does not remain reasonably plausible when tethered to this corroboration on the material aspects.

375Though not raised by the parties, I have also considered attribution of N.B.’s injuries to “Julian” and, similarly, to unidentified clients. Those explanations do not survive the same corroborative screening on the material points. N.B. clearly delineates which injuries were caused by the accused and which were unrelated. The injuries alleged to by N.B. caused by being thrown out of a vehcile are clealry not recent, especially when compared to those that she alleged just occurred.

376K.L. also made it clear to police that her injured eye had nothing to do with the accused, despite describing other injuries caused by him at or around the same time. This shows comprehension of the question, precision in attributable cause, and consistency throughout her explanations of how the injuries happened.

377Considering these points together, the alternatives advanced by the defence, and the additional possibilities do not remain reasonably plausible on the material aspects tendered for truth. On those points, the only likely explanation is truthfulness or accuracy, and contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

K.L. and N.B. engaged in the sex trade independent of the accused

378The defence submits the complainants may have been engaging in sex work on their own and shifted blame to Mr. Laguerre to avoid liability. It is said that:

• surveillance shows clients coming and going but does not place Mr. Laguerre at Room 408 contemporaneously with those movements in a way that proves control or direction;

• there is no footage of cash exchanges with the accused and clients are often seen interacting only with K.L. or N.B.;

• hotel registration and AMEX were paid by “Jessica Schubring,” with records and extraction materials indicating bookings and ad verification tied to Jessica/Jess, supporting the alternative that K.L. (and possibly N.B.) were operating independently; and

• Leolist linkages tie several ads and contacts to numbers K.L. provided, consistent with non‑accused posting or control.

379On this record, the independent‑operation alternative is not reasonably plausible. The evidence supports active participation, and functional control on the material aspects. The corroboration tied to the material aspects of control of communications, postings, and retention of proceeds rules out the independent‑operation explanation:

• Mr. Laguerre was present from the outset of their stay with his vehicle registered to park at the Super 8.

• They arrived from Quebec, in Mr. Laguerre’s vehicle, at the same time:

Super 8 CCTV - K.L. and N.B arrive – October 6, 2024- 21:25:XX – Exhibit 32

Super 8 CCTV - WL arrives - October 6, 2024: 21:29:XX – Exhibit 24

• The presence of Mr. Laguerre with N.B. and K.L. continues CCTV throughout their stay. CCTV captures a significant amount of these comings and goings. The following screen grabs are only a few examples of the totality of CCTV footage.

Super 8 CCTV - October 6 at 22:45:XX – Exhibit 26

Super 8 CCTV - October 7, 16:56:XX - K.L. and W.L leaving 408 – Exhibit 33

Super 8 CCTV - October 9, 2024: 03:39:XX - W.L. K.L. and N.B. leaving Room 408 – Exhibit 37

Super 8 CCTV – October 9, 2024 – 04:53:XX – K.L., N.B., and W.L. returning to Room 408 – Exhibit 36

• CCTV sequences, even with motion activation and the adjusted time offset, capture the accused handling two phones and counting cash, and show client traffic to and from Room 408 aligned with periods of device activity;

• the defence’s observation that the accused is not always visible at the precise moment of each client’s arrival does not create a plausible alternative where the combined sequences establish control patterns over time.

• The analysis does not require visibility of the accused at the precise moment of each client’s arrival. The following screen captures are selective screen captures and far from exhaustive of this activity. The evidentiary record is extensive on this type of activity that clearly supports clients coming and going.

  Super 8 CCTV – Male entering Room 408 – October 7, 2024 – 16:18:XX – Exhibit 40

  Super 8 CCTV – Two males going to Room 408 – October 10, 2024 – 03:01:XX – Exhibit 38

  Super 8 CCTV – N.B. exits Room 408 with two males – October 10, 2024 – 03:10:XX – Exhibit 39

  Super 8 CCTV – Male attending Room 408 – October 12, 2024 – 01:04:XX – Exhibit 44

• the accused was the only one with a vehicle and was responsible for bringing them to Ontario to engage in sex work; similarly, the accused was their only means of leaving once they completed their stay. The accused’s vehicle was registered to the hotel, which would be unnecessary unless he was staying during that time or, at least, for prolonged periods;

• the accused is seen on CCTV with two phones. One is the distinctive, damaged “trap phone” used for coordinating with clients;

• the “trap phone,” (examined in depth below), the numbers and identifiers provided by the complainants, and disclosure materials tying postings and ad verification to the same identifiers, connect commercial communications to the device seen in the accused’s possession at material times;

• the complainants were without funds and a means home when police attended, while the accused possessed cash; that contrast is contemporaneously documented on body‑worn camera and photographs. In context, this aligns with retention of proceeds by the accused rather than independent operation by the complainants;

• in the hotel, K.L. and N.B. could not find any means of funds or ability to return home. There was no stashed cash, no credit cards, and no indication how they would be able to eat, let alone return home, without the accused’s control;

• the communications and advertisements were in English, whereas N.B. and K.L. were not functionally English‑speaking. This does not, standing alone, assist at threshold. The material aspects are communication control and posting, and those are shown by device continuity, identifier alignment (including Leolist verification), and temporal correspondence with client movements on CCTV. While a translation application could be used for some exchanges (even if less likely for rapid, real‑time messaging), language alone is not a corroborating factor; any effect is a matter of weight;

• use of English in ads and some texts does not undermine threshold reliability where the linkage is by device identifiers and verification records rather than language fluency; interpretation was provided when required;

• hotel booking and AMEX payment under “Jessica Schubring” do not, without more, establish independent operation. The issue is functional control;

• Leolist linkages tie several ads and contacts to numbers K.L. provided, consistent with non‑accused posting or control; and

• the corroboration of device control, postings verification, and cash handling addresses the material aspects and mitigates the need for cross‑examination on those points. Considering these points together, the alternatives advanced do not remain reasonably plausible when tethered to corroboration on the material aspects of postings, communications, and proceeds.

380The only plausible explanation on those points is accuracy of the complainants’ assertions of control and material benefit by the accused. On those material aspects, contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

Threats and weapons

381The defence submits that weapon‑use allegations were exaggerated or mistaken. It is said there was no knife seized, K.L. initially denied the presence of a knife on-scene, and later statements reference a knife, suggesting unreliability on this point.

382The absence of independent corroboration on this issue does not detract from the evident threats and violence occurring in real time as described in the 911 call, which has been ruled admissible.

383I am prepared to accept that, without corroborating evidence, there is a plausible alternative that a knife was not present. In particular, the statement:

“He took a knife out at me: ‘Aren’t you on my side? If not, I’m stabbing you in front of her.’” (Transcript of N.B., p. 8)

is not substantively reliable when considered against other corroborative evidence.

384Therefore, any allegation that the accused threatened either K.L. or N.B. with a knife is not substantively reliable on this record and is excluded. I am mindful of the need to avoid relying on corroboration that is not connected to the material aspect sought to be proved and to confine the analysis to the voir dire record. I find that cross‑examination would likely have a material effect upon this particular allegation.

385To be clear, this is not to conclude it did not happen; it is to conclude that it is not sufficiently reliable under the Bradshaw framework.

386This exclusion does not detract from the considerable corroborative evidence as it relates to the phone‑charger cord and/or telephone‑receiver cord, and their use as a weapon in whipping K.L. by the accused. N.B. describes cord‑based striking in a manner consistent with the 911 call, the CCTV footage, the visible injuries shown on the body‑worn cameras of Thurston and Hunt, the photographic evidence, and the discovery of these items in the hotel room upon police return.

387As noted above, any inconsistency about whether a telephone receiver or a phone‑charger cable was used is peripheral. The injuries’ pattern, the visible instrumentality in the room, and the timing captured on CCTV, 911, and body‑worn camera align with cord‑based striking and recent onset.

388Considering these points together, the alternative that the cord‑based weapon was exaggerated or mistaken does not remain reasonably plausible on the material aspects. On those points, the only likely explanation is accuracy of the complainants’ assertions, and contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

Cash unrelated to sex‑work proceeds

389The defence submits that cash found in the accused’s possession was unrelated to the complainants’ work and derived from a lawful sale or personal funds. It is said that the surveillance does not show cash exchanges with the accused, that clients are often seen interacting only with K.L. or N.B., and that the absence of a direct hand‑to‑hand exchange on camera supports the alternative of non‑control by the accused.

390On this record, that alternative does not remain reasonably plausible on the material points. Corroboration tied to the specific material aspects of retention of proceeds and deprivation of funds rules out the lawful‑sale explanation:

• body‑worn camera and photographs document that neither complainant had any money when police attended. They had no funds in the hotel, no funds on their persons, and no access to the car. By contrast, the accused possessed cash and other value items, including USD and a gold bar;

• a serialized $100 bill (GKU9730776) corresponds to the bill K.L. is shown holding in a photograph, indicating transfer of those funds to the accused. In context, this is connected to retention of proceeds, not general credibility. The defence questions whether the serialized bill can be traced from K.L.’s photo to the currency seized. Given the unique serial number, the linkage is sufficient at threshold as part of the cumulative corroboration of proceeds retention; any residual uncertainty goes to weight.

Photo of K.L. holding the serialized $100 bill found upon Mr. Laguerre upon his arrest (Exhibit 75)

• the extraction report (Exhibit 75) shows that the photo of K.L. holding cash was taken at 10:55:58 a.m. on October 11, 2024. This was during their stay at the Mississauga hotel and just over 24 hours before police responded to the call.

• the revenue‑mismatch critique adds nothing at threshold. Nightly “targets” are variable; gross receipts, competing expenses, and the absence of banking records are immaterial to the dispositive issue of functional retention of proceeds.

• CCTV shows the accused handling two phones and counting cash during the operational period for Room 408. Client‑traffic periods align with device activity and with the timing of the accused’s cash handling. The absence of a single definitive hand‑to‑hand moment on camera does not create a reasonably plausible alternative where the combined sequences establish control patterns over time;

• the complainants’ lack of means, including the absence of travel funds and their stated inability to return to Quebec without the accused’s money, is contemporaneously recorded on scene. In context, this aligns with deprivation of proceeds and functional control by the accused; and,

• the motive‑to‑fabricate critique is speculative and not connected to the material aspects. N.B. and K.L.’s early focus on seized money is equally consistent with deprivation and immediate need; there is no evidence of any benefit promised or obtained from police for making allegations. Further, it was obvious from an early stage and prior to almost all the utterances that they would not receive the money that was seized from the accused upon his arrest.

391The lawful‑sale proposition is not supported by evidence connected to the material aspects. The combined effect of surveillance, device control, serialized‑bill linkage, and the documented absence of funds on the complainants rules out the alternative on a balance of probabilities. Cross-examination would do nothing to undermine this.

Trap phone usage and screenshots

392The defence submits that the “trap phone” was used by multiple people, including K.L. and N.B., and that screenshots are curated or of uncertain provenance. It is said that linkages to postings or client communications may reflect K.L.’s own activity rather than the accused’s control. The defence adds that K.L. had unmonitored possession of the phone for several hours (and possibly up to a day) after the arrest.

393Body-worn cameras of Hunt and Thurston capture K.L. identifying the device on scene as Mr. Laguerre’s phone. She offered to provide it; the officers declined to seize it at that time. It was left in the hotel room and later seized.

394The CCTV shows the accused handling two phones over the operational period for Room 408. One device is clearly the trap phone by its distinct damage, visible on footage and matched to photographs. These strands are tied to the material aspects of communications and posting control.

Super 8 CCTV - W.L. Holding two phones – one identified as “trap phone” - October 8, 2024, at 17:11:26 - Exhibit 34

Super 8 CCTV - W.L. Holding two phones – one identified as “trap phone” - October 8, 2024, at 17:11:27 - Exhibit 34

395The above photo is particularly relevant as it corresponds to the timing of text messages arranging sexual services at almost exactly that time. From the extraction report of the trap phone, we see a screen grab of a text message created at 5:32:52 p.m. as follows:

The content of that message is as follows:

396Similarly, at 6:32 p.m., another conversation takes place shortly after Mr. Laguerre is seen with the phone. The following screenshot was extracted from the “trap phone”:

397The pattern of screenshots sent by Mr. Laguerre from client communications that he was coordinating, to K.L. is corroborated by the screenshots that K.L. forwarded to Detective Constable Douglas. Those images show the same room number used for escort services during the relevant period. Although the number displayed is 409 rather than 408, the practical effect is unchanged because the client would be outside the room. The discrepancy is consistent with either a client mistake or a screening tactic. Detective Constable Douglas testified that the images depict the same Super 8 hotel, identifiable by its distinctive signage and room numbering.

398On October 12, 2024, at approximately 01:24 hours, as K.L. approached a male standing outside room 408, she was holding the “trap phone” and what she described as her pink phone.

Super 8 CCTV - October 12, 2024, at 01:24:33 a.m. – Exhibit 47

Super 8 CCTV - October 12, 2024, at 01:24:44 a.m. – Exhibit 47

399This does not detract from Mr. Laguerre’s possession and control of the phone at other material times. Even if K.L. had possession of the device, the corroborative evidence as a whole supports the material findings: that Mr. Laguerre exercised control over the services of K.L. and N.B., and that he derived benefits from those services.

400Another relevant observation appears at approximately 16:32 hours (CCTV timestamp 15:52:48; Exhibit 53), when the accused is observed holding the “trap phone.” This occurs minutes after K.L. fled the room at approximately 16:07 hours and called 911 at 16:15, and after N.B. fled at approximately 16:13 hours. The device was later recovered inside the room. On this record, it is reasonably inferred that the phone was left or returned to the room before police entry.

Super 8 CCTV - October 12, 2024, at 16:32 – Exhibit 53

401Officers acknowledge that a large volume of media items was not disclosed and that some images appeared via photo‑library “syndication” rather than as messages, making origination and sender identity uncertain. Much of the text content consists of images of messages stored in the photo library rather than records extracted directly from a messages database. Sender and recipient attribution is therefore uncertain, supporting a non‑accused authorship alternative. On this basis, content could have been authored or curated by K.L./N.B. or others, and the phone evidence is equally consistent with non‑accused authorship.

402That alternative does not remain reasonably plausible on the material points.

• the damaged phone provided by K.L. corresponds with the device held by the accused visible on hotel surveillance and later seized.

• K.L. offered the device to Constables Hunt and Thurston when they returned to the room immediately prior to attending the police station; the officers declined to seize it and K.L. and N.B. were indifferent to that refusal.

• K.L. did not know the passcode and could not provide it even when she wished to give the phone to Detective Constable Douglas.

• Her mention of the device on body‑worn camera is spontaneous and matter‑of‑fact.

• if she were operating the device and intending to curate content to implicate the accused or exculpate herself, the plausible course would be to conceal or destroy it; she did neither.

403In addition to these factors, the extraction contains personal identifiers that link the device to Mr. Laguerre. They include a selfie of Mr. Laguerre with a small child, a Quebec identification card in his name (time stamped August 8, 2024), and other photographs and account artefacts associating the device with him. There is also an image (August 8, 2024) in which he appears in the background without clothing, in an intimate context with K.L., who is identifiable by a distinct, visible tattoo. Taken together, these items leave no plausible room to deny his access to, and control over, the phone.

404There are also photographs of identification for K.L. under a fake alias. It is her photo, but a false name. That false name is then used in other banking information and documents found on the phone. There is also a photo of what appears to be a valid ID for K.L. in her own name, expiring in May 2025.

405There is also a photograph of an interaction where Mr. Laguerre was stopped by Peel Regional police (occurrence # PR – 240200324) showing his vehicle at the time, and PRP cars in the background. It is unclear who took the photo but Mr. Laguerre was present at this time and place.

406It contains a photo of the hotel where the allegations took place and where Mr. Laguerre was arrested.

407The extraction contains numerous screen captures of text‑message threads and hotel bookings saved as images in the photo library. Their form and sequence permit a strong inference that these captures were created to be forwarded to K.L. and N.B. as notice of client attendance. On this evidentiary record, the most plausible explanation for the systematic captures is forwarding and coordination.

408While native message metadata is not available for these images, the pattern of capture and the temporal correspondence with CCTV sequences, showing Mr. Laguerre handling the trap phone at times aligned with client arrivals, corroborate that inference.

409As a few examples of this:

410One screen capture supports an inference of forwarding and confirmation. It shows a request for services described as “doing hard,” with the relevant portion circled in red to draw attention for approval. On this record, the most plausible explanation is that the capture was created to forward the request to K.L. and/or N.B. to confirm consent. Such highlighting would be unnecessary if the person using the device were the sex worker already engaged in the conversation.

411The emphasis therefore supports that someone other than the worker was in possession of, and using, the trap phone.

412The extraction also contains multiple advertising images of K.L. and N.B. that are, in the main, not selfies but photographs taken of them by another person; however, the explicit nature of these photographs forbids their inclusion in this judgment. The exhibits speak for themselves on the nature of such images.

413Ad verification appears under the alias “Jess” in postings and photographs. There are numerous explicit photos and screengrabs on the phone that will not be replicated here. The cumulative evidence supports that the phone was used to coordinate the provision of sexual services.

414Many of those images are consistent with, and in some instances identical to, the images used in the Leolist advertisements. The pattern and composition of the images, together with the time and date verification required for Leolist posting, indicate they were created for advertising rather than casual self‑portraiture.

415The phone contains considerable screen grabs of financial information including confirmation of money transfers, Litecoin (used in Leolist payments), and other indicia of control over the payments for sexual services.

416There is a screen grab of what appears to be a FaceTime call between Mr. Laguerre and K.L. (in original but not shown here), which strongly suggests he had control and possession of this device.

417The screenshots and images relied are tied to the same device numbers and contacts. Their dates and times correspond with the client‑traffic chronology observed on CCTV. Officer Douglas’s contemporaneous receipt and recording of the October 16, 20, and 23 materials, together with continuity of contact from K.L., provide procedural substitutes sufficient to rationally evaluate provenance and authorship on these material points.

418The fact that certain messages appear as screenshots saved in the photo library rather than as records extracted from a messages database does not undermine their probative value at threshold. The decisive issues are device continuity, identifier alignment, and temporal correspondence with client traffic; on those points, the materials are sufficient.

419The postings linkage is consistent across sources: the phone number and email used for ad verification match the identifiers associated with the damaged device and with the communications the complainants described. The accused is observed with the device while counting cash, and the complainants were without funds at police attendance. In context, these strands corroborate control of communications and proceeds rather than independent complainant activity. As seen on the CCTV footage dated October 9, 2024:

Super 8 CCTV - October 9, 2024 - 04:45:XX - Counting money – Exhibit 35

420References to undisclosed media volume, photo‑library “syndication,” or screenshot storage do not create a reasonably plausible alternative on the material aspects. At threshold, the decisive features are device continuity, identifier alignment (including Leolist verification), surveillance of the accused handling the device, and the temporal correspondence between that handling and client movements on CCTV. These features speak to functional control during the period in question.

421On this record, the suggestion of multiple‑user authorship or curated screenshots does not remain reasonably plausible. Contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little on those points. The admitted strands are connected to the material aspects of communication control and retention of proceeds, not to general credibility.

The authoring, management, and monetization of Leolist postings

422The defence submits it is a plausible explanation that the Leolist postings were authored by K.L. (and possibly N.B.), and not connected to the accused’s control. It is said that several ads and contacts tie to numbers K.L. provided, and that this is consistent with posting by someone other than the accused or independent operation.

423That alternative does not remain reasonably plausible on the material points.

424Corroboration tied to the material aspects of posting control, ad verification, commercial communications, and monetization rules out complainant‑only authorship:

• the phone numbers and email used for Leolist ad verification match the identifiers associated with the damaged “trap phone” the accused was using, and the communications the complainants described to police; this linkage addresses who controlled postings and derived benefit;

• the damaged device provided by K.L. corresponds with the device connected to the accused as described above, and contains payment artefacts, including Leolist verification records and Litecoin payment information; and

• the dates and times of posting activity and incoming contacts correspond with observed client traffic to and from Room 408 on CCTV, where the accused coordinates attendance and directs the operation.

425I have considered Detective Constable Douglas’s continued evidence on Leolist legal returns, Traffic Jam archives, and the Cellebrite extraction. While some content appears as screenshots stored in the photo library rather than message records, and sender attribution is therefore uncertain, the consistent alignment of device identifiers (including the trap phone number and associated emails), posting timestamps, and client traffic observed on CCTV supports functional control over postings by the accused during the relevant period.

426I also consider these features of the record: the accused is observed handling the distinctive damaged device; K.L. identified it on scene as his phone and later produced it; neither K.L. nor N.B. knew the passcode; most advertising images of K.L. and N.B. were taken by a third party rather than by the complainants; and the device housed payment and verification materials. In context, these features are inconsistent with independent complainant authorship and support functional posting, management, and communication control by the accused during the relevant period.

427The fact that certain ads or contacts tie to numbers K.L. provided does not create a reasonably plausible alternative. The issue is functional control during the period in question. The combined effect of identifier alignment, device continuity, surveillance of phone handling, retention of proceeds, the absence of funds on either complainant, and temporal correspondence with client traffic, considered together with Douglas’s postings analysis, rules out complainant‑only authorship on the material aspects of posting, management, and monetization.

428For clarity, the material aspect is not who physically posted each ad. Some may have been posted by N.B. or K.L. The issue is whether the accused exercised functional control over postings, client management, and monetization, that is, deciding when, how, and for what purpose ads were listed and how payments and proceeds were handled.

References to “Julian”

429It is conceded “Julian” is a real person who resides in Quebec and refers to Mr. Julian STA*********Z of Montreal.

430The defence suggests that references to “Julian” reflect fabrication, exaggeration, confusion, or unrelated third-party risk. I do not accept this as a reasonably plausible explanation. The manner in which he was described, the reason he was said to be coming from Montreal, and the complainants’ expressed fear—each communicated independently and spontaneously to police—support a substantially reliable account of genuine fear. These references were unprompted, and there was no discernible benefit in invoking him beyond conveying concern about his imminent arrival and the accused’s direction.

431When tethered to the corroborative record, including continuous audio and video, the complainants’ observed panic, their urgency to avoid being present when he arrived, and the chronology of departure from Room 408, the only likely explanation is accuracy of the complainants’ assertions of control and recent violence by the accused. On those points, contemporaneous cross examination would add little.

432Notwithstanding, I am not prepared to find that he is a “mafia guy” as expressed by N.B. in her video statement to police. The material aspect relates to the threat and fear said to arise from the accused’s statements, not to Julian’s alleged criminal connections, that he was bringing a firearm, or that he engaged in any violence with N.B.

Reluctance, disengagement, or recantation

433Lastly, the defence submits that later reluctance to provide a formal statement, disengagement, or recantation suggests fabrication of material aspects.

434I do not regard K.L.’s communications to Detective Constable Douglas as a “recantation,” nor as affecting the reliability of any material aspects already considered.

435According to Detective Constable Douglas, K.L. “no longer wants to provide a statement and wants to remove her past comments on the matter” and “would like to retract everything.” He added: “I would not say she had lied, but that she did not want to further pursue a statement, and she wanted to remove everything from before.” These remarks convey a desire not to participate, not an admission of fabrication.

436Such a position may be the product of fear, inconvenience, inability, lack of motivation, or other reasons. These statements do not support a sweeping conclusion of fabrication.

437Considered alongside the corroborative evidence noted above, including body-worn camera evidence of fear and violence, the inconvenience associated with her residing in Quebec, and possible substance use issues, K.L.’s nonparticipation is unsurprising and consistent with those circumstances. Her unwillingness to attend does not permit an inference that she fabricated her prior account.

438To the extent a finding is required on this point, I conclude that her unwillingness to attend is more likely attributable to those circumstances and is consistent with the truthfulness of what occurred to her and N.B., rather than fabrication. There is no evidence of fabrication, and considerable evidence to the contrary.

v. The inability to cross-examine and the effect on trial fairness

439Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible because, in the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination, it is often difficult for the trier of fact to assess its truth. It may nonetheless be admitted under the principled exception where necessity and threshold reliability are established. Threshold reliability is met where there are adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability), or sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy (substantive reliability), such that contemporaneous cross-examination would add little if anything to the process.[82]

440I am alert to the centrality of cross‑examination in our adversarial process and to the caution against speculative predictions about its utility, particularly where non‑attendance may signal reluctance or potential recantation.

441Cross-examination is the traditional safeguard for testing truth and accuracy, including the hearsay dangers of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. Without adequate safeguards, hearsay may compromise trial fairness.[83]

442Threshold reliability may be established by substantive features alone or by a combination of substantive and procedural features. The standard is high but not insurmountable. The question is whether, on the material aspects tendered for proof, the circumstances and any corroboration overcome the specific hearsay dangers so that cross-examination would add little.[84]

443Corroboration is a major consideration in assessing substantive reliability. Its function is to mitigate the need for cross-examination on the particular point the hearsay is tendered to prove. To assist at the threshold stage, corroborative evidence must be connected to the material aspect in issue and, considered with the circumstances, must rule out plausible alternative explanations. Corroboration that is equally consistent with competing hypotheses, or that merely bolsters general credibility or guilt, is of no assistance at this stage.

444In the circumstances of this case, the corroborative strands identified earlier are connected to the material aspects at issue and taken together with the surrounding circumstances, rule out plausible alternative explanations on those points. In those circumstances, contemporaneous cross‑examination would be unlikely to alter those material aspects.

445The threshold inquiry does not assume that the declarant will be untruthful; it asks whether there remain plausible truthful alternatives that cross-examination could realistically elicit on the material aspects. Here, there are no plausible truthful alternatives on those aspects that cross-examination could reveal. The combined effect of the corroboration and circumstances is that the most likely explanation is truthfulness or accuracy on those points.

446I therefore conclude that, on the material aspects identified and for the reasons already given, cross-examination would achieve little in advancing competing truthful explanations or plausible denials.

447As Bradshaw explains, corroborative evidence that is equally consistent with the truthfulness and accuracy[85] of the statement as well as another hypothesis is of no assistance.[86]

448With this emphasis in mind, I do not read Bradshaw, Charles, or the leading authorities on cross‑examination to require accommodating outcomes premised on a witness being untruthful or feigning memory loss.[87]

449The inquiry is whether cross‑examination could realistically elicit alternative outcomes that are consistent with truthful explanations on the material aspects tendered for proof. Here, there is no other plausible truthful outcome on those material aspects that cross‑examination could reveal.

450Even if K.L. or N.B. were to testify and deny aspects of the allegations made in their various hearsay statements, or profess memory loss, the most favourable truthful admissions that cross-examination could elicit would not plausibly overcome the corroborative evidence already canvassed that supports the material aspects of their hearsay statements as truthful.

451I therefore conclude, in considering the evidence as a whole, that the corroborative evidence shows the only “likely explanation” for the hearsay statements is the truthfulness of K.L. and N.B. and the accuracy of the material aspects of their statements. Those material aspects are unlikely to change under cross‑examination, making cross‑examination unnecessary. [88]

452As already noted, the two exceptions to this are whether a knife was present for a threat, and the “mafia” background of Julian, or his possession of an AK-47 firearm. Both of these areas I can reasonably anticipate cross-examination having a material effect that is not necessarily one of falsehood.

F. Discretion to exclude on a residual basis: probative versus prejudicial

453In rare cases, even where necessity and threshold reliability are established, hearsay may be excluded in the exercise of residual discretion if its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value in a way that threatens trial fairness.[89] The gatekeeping role protects the truth‑seeking function and ensures that the voir dire does not overtake the trial.

454Residual discretion also recognizes that, in appropriate circumstances, rules of evidence may be relaxed for the defence to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[90] The exercise of this discretion is case specific. While the hearsay here is tendered by the Crown, the court remains alert to preventing miscarriages of justice and ensuring trial fairness. If there were any reason to conclude there was risk or compromise, my conclusions on admissibility would require reconsideration. On this record, I find neither.

455The potential prejudice is limited. The evidence is confined to the material aspects, does not invite speculation, and does not require a broad collateral inquiry. The voir dire has not overtaken the trial, and the admission will not produce unfairness through misuse or inability to test, given the threshold findings already made. To the extent any hearsay touches collateral matters (for example, a photograph of a firearm found on the trap phone, bad character, substance use, language use, or sensitive images), sitting without a jury, I will disregard them if inadmissible.

456I therefore decline to exclude the hearsay in the exercise of residual discretion.

G. Conclusion on the admissibility of the hearsay

457As noted by the Supreme Court in R. v. Charles, in some circumstances hearsay “presents minimal dangers and its exclusion, rather than its admission, would impede accurate fact‑finding.” [91] I find that to be the case here. With the sole exception of the knife‑threat allegation noted above, the hearsay the Crown seeks to tender is admissible on all material aspects. I find that the hearsay is both necessary and reliable on a balance of probabilities.

458I have considered the combined effect of the procedural and substantive features. Threshold reliability may be established by either route alone; they are not cumulative prerequisites. Procedural and substantive reliability provide two routes to the same destination.[92]

459On the procedural side, the record contains complete audio of the 911 call, body‑worn camera and in‑car camera recordings, and a full video of N.B.’s cautioned police interview in her preferred language with interpretation, all of which furnish adequate substitutes for the ordinary trial safeguards.

460On the substantive side, corroboration is tethered to the specific material aspects: CCTV sequences and timing; device continuity and identifiers; Leolist ad‑verification linkages; seized property including currency and serialized‑bill linkage; the complainants’ absence of funds at the time of police attendance; room instrumentalities; and contemporaneous images of injuries.

461Considered cumulatively, these strands rule out plausible alternative explanations so that the only likely explanation on the material aspects is truthfulness or accuracy, and contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

462Under the Bradshaw framework, the alternative explanations were canvassed and do not remain reasonably plausible when assessed against the evidentiary record. The corroborative evidence is considerable and satisfies me that cross‑examination of a witness, even if confronted with such evidence, would achieve little, leaving minimal hearsay dangers at threshold.

Part VI: Conclusion on all rulings:

463The video recorded statement of Mr. Laguerre is excluded for breaches of sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter and under section 24(2).

464The res gestae portions of K.L.’s 911 call are admitted. Any remaining parts of the 911 call, and all on‑scene utterances captured on body‑worn camera, are admitted only under the principled approach where identified.

465The hearsay of K.L. and N.B. is admitted on all material aspects, except the knife‑threat allegation, which is excluded. On the admitted points, contemporaneous cross‑examination would add little.

466References to “Julian” are admitted as evidence of fear and context only, not for any alleged mafia status, firearm possession, or unrelated criminality.

467Residual discretion to exclude is not engaged. Potential prejudice is limited. Sitting without a jury, I will disregard any collateral matters that are inadmissible.

468Any remaining issues are matters of weight to be assessed against the full trial record and as already conceded in the blended voir dire nature of this proceeding.

Released: December 29, 2025

Justice S. Robichaud

Appendix A – Statement of the Accused – Timeline of Key Events (October 12, 2024)

Initial Scene

Time

Event

16:15

911 call by K.L. from gas station adjacent to Super 8 reporting an assault and identifies male as Wooldy Laguerre, vehicle details).

16:37

Constable Bolarinho body-worn camera (“BWC”) recording commences.

16:41:00

Constable Hunt BWC recording starts.

16:43

Hunt interviews K.L. in French near hotel entrance.

16:45:14

Hunt asks about intimate relationship context—early human trafficking indicators.

16:46:09

Officers Bennewitz, Couce, and Bolarinho enter Room 408 under exigent circumstances, room unoccupied. Exit hotel room to find the suspect and other female and possible victim. Information over radio as they enter hotel stairwell that suspect, wearing a red shirt, is believed to be out front of hotel with another female.

16:48:08

Officers exit stairwell; Esso visible in background on BWC.

16:48:40

WL (Wooldy Laguerre – the accused) and NB observed near gas pumps; match descriptions.

16:48:50

WL and NB are separated by officers. WL asked if he is from room 408; he replies “no”.

16:49:10

WL detained by officers holding his forearms. WL compliant; walks with officers toward front of hotel.

16:51:00

Pat down search commences. WL arrested for assault; handcuffed to rear at approximately 16:51.

16:52:05

WL placed in rear of police cruiser.

16:52:30

Beige satchel searched for ID; cash observed. Satchel placed on front seat of cruiser.

16:53:50

RTC Attempt #1 by Couce in English.

16:55:26

WL asks about “breach;” officers confirm assault and breach.

16:55:48

RTC delivered in French by Hunt from notebook; informational component covered.

16:58:02

WL asks about handcuff tightness (BWC).

16:59:38

Hunt note: no HT discussion yet; scene remains dynamic.

17:01:00–17:01:54

WL provides name of counsel of choice (“Patrick Boulet/Bouler/Boulis” as variably noted).

17:02:25

K.L. states on BWC: “He (WL) has her property and phone.”

17:03:53

K.L. again asks about accessing money.

17:07

WL transported from scene toward 12 Division.

17:12:04

Elevator segment: NB mentions “Julian” and a firearm.

17:14

Injury photographs referenced on BWC.

17:15:56

NB states “I just want to go home.”

Transport and Booking

Time

Event

17:17

WL Arrival at 12 Division.

17:19

Entry to sally port.

17:27

Duty Counsel called (wall clock approx. 5:27 p.m.).

17:31

WL placed in private phone room to speak with Duty Counsel.

17:33

WL briefly exits due to phone issue; call remains active; returned to complete call.

17:35

WL completes Duty Counsel call; signs for property; placed in cell.

17:32:34

NB in-car video remarks she thought K.L. was “dead on the bed.”

17:34:41

K.L. transport video: using phone, texting.

17:35:05

K.L. transport video: texting timestamp.

17:36:15 to 17:39:31

NB transport video asks about her phone; realizes K.L. has it. Asks about conditions, discusses her outstanding warrant.

Vice Briefings and Interviews

Time

Event

18:23

Detective Constable Brunino briefed by Constable Couce at 12 Division.

19:15

Briefings conclude.

19:15–19:47

Window in which Brunino interacts with K.L. inside room; she is groggy and intermittently responsive.

19:53

Detective Constable Douglas arrives at 12 Division.

20:52

WL interview room recording starts (room empty).

20:57

Administrative step: property handling noted by Douglas.

21:00

WL escorted into interview room and left alone.

21:23:30

Douglas re-enters interview room: engagement begins.

21:24:35

WL observes “new charges?”; officer defers.

21:24–21:32

“Intake” identity questions posed and answered.

21:32

New, more serious charges read (HT related); change of jeopardy.

21:33–21:35

Caution and right to silence given; WL declines further call to counsel.

21:35

Substantive questioning begins.

22:13:30

WL statement re K.L. (“I am going to ruin your life …”) noted in transcript.

22:54

WL interview concludes; WL removed from room.

Notable Durations

• From arrest to RTC in English (attempted by Couce): 0h 2m 20s.

• From arrest to RTC in French by Hunt: 0h 4m 18s

• From arrest to call to Duty Counsel: 0h 31m 30s

• From the end of NB’s statement to WL’s re-caution on human trafficking charges: 1h 02m

• From first suspicion of human trafficking to WL’s re-caution on human trafficking charges: 4h 30m

Appendix B – CCTV Footage with adjusted times

A. Adjustment calculations

Source

Adjustment

Notes

“West stair-G” camera (WSG)

Add 00:38:47

Fixed offset derived from body-worn camera anchor at 16:48:00.

“E4” camera

(E4)

Add 00:38:15

Fixed offset derived from paired event with West Stair G plus known descent interval.

“4th west” camera (4W)

Add 00:38:15

Shares camera clock with E4 (same event at 15:28:50 on both feeds); use E4 offset.

Stair descent interval

Add 00:00:40

Apply when linking upper-floor cameras to first appearance on West Stair G.

Tolerance notation 'XX'

Approximately one minute

Conservative tolerance for synchronization and movement variability and accounting for deductive calculations from estimated time of W.L. and N.B.’s descent, compared to that of the 40 seconds it took officers to descend the stairwell.

Anchor Point:

Constable Bolarinho’s body‑worn camera records him exiting the emergency door at 16:48:00 (real time). ^[3] The same event appears on the WSG feed at a displayed time of 16:09:13. This establishes a fixed offset for WSG of +00:38:47. The E4 and 4W feeds are +00:38:15 behind real time and share a clock; when events are linked between E4/4W and WSG, an approximate stair‑descent interval of +00:00:40 is added to account for movement between cameras.

Fixed offsets to convert displayed CCTV times to real time:

• West Stair G (WSG): add +00:38:47.

• Elevator, 4th floor (E4): add +00:38:15.

• 4th floor hallway, west (4W): add +00:38:15 (shares clock with E4).

• Stair descent interval when linking E4/4W events to WSG appearances: add approximately +00:00:40 to account for movement time between cameras.

Tolerance notation:

The 00:00:40 stair‑descent interval is derived from the officers’ descent measured on body‑worn camera and is applied when linking clips between cameras on different floors. Because actual movement times may vary for W.L. and N.B., a conservative 59‑second tolerance is built into the adjusted entries and denoted by “XX” in the seconds

B. Adjusted timeline of events captured on CCTV:

Date / Actual time (+/- 1 minute estimate)

CCTV time stamp / camera source

Event

EX#

October 6, 2024

21:25:XX

20:47:10 4W cam

K.L. and N.B. arriving and entering Room 408.

27

21:29:XX

20:50:50 4W cam

W.L. arriving to Room 408 at the Super 8 Hotel. W.L. wearing red shoes. Carrying large duffle bag. Enters room.

24

22:45:XX

22:06:45 E4 cam

W.L., K.L, and N.B. returning to room 408.

25

October 7, 2024

13:46:XX

13:08:00 E4 cam

W.L., K.L, and N.B. exiting room 408.

26

16:18:XX

15:39:51 E4 cam

Male exits elevator. Knocks. On phone. Waiting. Enters room 408.

40

16:47:XX

16:09:05 E4 cam

Male exiting room of 408. (Same male as Exhibit 40).

41

16:56:XX

16:18:00 E4 cam

W.L., K.L. and N.B. leaving 408 together. K.L. arguing with W.L. – W.L. wearing red Nike shoes. N.B. trails behind to catch elevator.

33

October 8, 2024

17:47:XX

17:09:40 E4 cam

W.L. exiting 408. Carrying two phones. One is identified as the “trap phone” by distinctive broken component to it and colour.

34

October 9, 2024

03:38:XX

03:00:20 E4 cam

W.L., K.L. and N.B. leaving room 408 together. Into elevator.

37

04:53:XX

04:15:00 E4 cam

W.L., K.L., and N.B. return together to room 408 and enter.

36

05:23:XX

04:45:00 E4 cam

W.L. exits 408 alone. Counting considerable sum of money. Wearing red shoes, white shirt, black pants. Beige satchel.

35

October 10, 2024

03:00:XX

02:22:24 E4 cam

Two males going to room 408. One male holding phone as he exits elevator. Enter room 408.

38

03:09:XX

02:31:34 E4 cam

N.B. exits room 408 with two males. Walks them to elevator. Same males as exhibit 38. Enters and goes into elevator with them.

39

03:46:XX

03:08:22 E4 cam

Male exits elevator. Knocks on 408. Pulls out phone. Entering room 408

42

04:16:XX

03:38:00 E4 cam

Same male (exhibit 42) exits room 408 and goes to elevator with N.B. N.B. holding black phone (not trap phone)

43

October 12, 2024

01:04:XX

00:26:00 E4 cam

Male leaves elevator. Phone in hand. Outside of Room 408. Waiting.

44

01:05:XX

00:27:00 E4 cam

Same male (Exhibit 44) still waiting outside 408. On phone texting.

46

01:24:XX

00:46:18 E4 cam

Different male from Exhibit 44 now waiting outside 408. K.L. shows up. Appears to have trap phone in hand (two phones).

47

01:44:XX

01:06:46 E4 cam

Same male as Exhibit 47 – outside Room 408. Appears to knock. Leaves.

48

16:08:XX

15:30:13 E4 cam

W.L. outside room 408. Enters elevator. Holding iPhone. Unlocks it. Goes into elevator.

50

16:07:XX

15:28:50 E4 cam

K.L. seen running from room 408 alone with no pants on – runs past elevator to east stairwell (Same event as exhibit 49). W.L. seen exiting the room and looking towards were K.L. ran 20 seconds later. (N.B. present with him but not on this clip) On telephone. Agitated. Goes back in room.

28

16:07:XX

15:28:50 4W cam

K.L. seen running from room 408 alone no pants on – runs past elevator to east stairwell. W.L. and N.B. exit room. W.L. on telephone. Seen arguing / agitated with N.B. (same event from a different angle as exhibit 28)

49

16:08:XX

15:30:20 E4 cam

W.L. is seen exiting Room 408, speaking into the doorway, then leaving alone wearing black Adidas flip‑flops, a red shirt, and carrying a beige satchel; checks an iPhone; enters the elevator.

50

16:13:XX

15:35:42 E4 cam

N.B. runs out of room 408 – runs towards west stairwell – alone does not return to room in this footage (Same event to Exhibit 57)

55

16:13:XX

16:16:04 4W cam

N.B. seen peering out of 408 – looking down hall ,before running quickly down hall towards stairwell – Exhibit57 – 4th west camera – Exhibit 54 (same event to Exhibit 55)

57

16:15

n/a

K.L. calls 911

23

16:28:XX

15:49:57 E4 cam

W.L. exits elevator - seen holding brown paper bag – holding paper bag etc. - seen returning to room 408 – holding paper bag – wearing flip flops

51

16:29:XX

15:50:35 E4 cam

W.L. waiting outside 408 – holding paper bag etc. – puts bag down in front of 408 – appears to be no response from 408 -– wearing flip flops

52

16:30:XX

15:52:39 E4 cam

W.L. still waiting outside 408 – walking back towards elevators – no longer holding paper bag – holding white iPhone (trap phone) – enters elevator –

53

16:34:XX

15:56:25 E4 cam

W.L. and N.B. exit elevator with W.L. leading – enter room 408 – W.L. reaches into pocket for key to room – W.L. enters first

99

16:37:XX

15:58:25 E4 cam

N.B. runs from 408 – W.L. follows walking – W.L. wearing flip flops - walking towards west stairwell

54

16:38:XX

15:59:28 E4 cam

N.B. and W.L. in stairwell leaving into emergency exit. Both appear uncertain to leave this way. Look to another exit but not available. W.L, points out sign that shows an “alarm will sound” if opened. Decide to leave anyway with N.B. looking out carefully first and W.L. cautiously following. (Exhibit 98)

98

16:48:00

16:09:13West Stair G

Officer Bolarinho exits the motel. Body-worn camera used to cross -reference accuracy at this point to the west stair well CCTV time stamp. Bolarinho exits the emergency door at exactly 16:48:00 (real time). The same footage captured form the CCTV stairwell camera (Exhibit 56) (inaccurate) shows a time difference of +00:38:47

1It should be noted that the rulings on the statement of the accused (inadmissible) paras 125-202 above; and the admissibility of res gestae (admissible with limitations), at paras 230-245 above, were released in advance of the assessment of the remaining “principled approach” hearsay analysis from para 249 onwards.

2Already ruled admissible under the traditional res gestae exception to hearsay.

3It is conceded that all officers’ body-worn cameras are accurate; I use Bolarinho’s for the sake of calculations.

1The statement was taken at 12 Division of the Peel Regional Police, located at 4600 Dixie Road, Mississauga, Ontario, L4W 2R1. The audio‑video recording of this statement was filed as Exhibit 9A. The corresponding transcript was filed as Exhibit 9B. There is no dispute regarding the accuracy of the transcript. The entirety of the statement was played into evidence in open court before the accused. Although the accused had the benefit of a French interpreter throughout the proceedings, he and his counsel, who is fluent in French, waived interpretation during the playback. The interview was conducted in French. I observed no misunderstandings or issues of comprehension during the interview or the playback in court. The accused was advised that he could interrupt the proceedings at any time should he require interpretation or clarification of any aspect.

2For clarity, the Crown seeks only to adduce the video recorded statement made at 12 Division to Officer Douglas and not any other utterances made during the course of his police interactions. To the extent I may refer to other utterances, it is for the purpose of establishing the necessary framework to decide the admissibility of the video statement.

3R v Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 SCR 865

4Constable Bolarinho’s body-worn camera footage, like that of Sergeant Bennewitz and Constables Couce, Thurston, and Hunt, is invaluable in illustrating the dynamic and evolving nature of the investigation as it unfolded on October 12, 2024. The recordings from each of these officers were played in court and filed as exhibits. Available transcripts were also filed, including those for the footage of Sergeant Bennewitz and Constable Hunt, whose transcript included translated portions due to the significant use of French. In addition to documenting key interactions at the scene, the footage provides an evidentiary foundation for assessing the admissibility of the hearsay statements of N.B. and K.L. under both the principled exception and the res gestae doctrine. It also assists in evaluating the voluntariness of Mr. Laguerre’s statement and the timing and adequacy of the administration of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

5Body-worn camera of Thurston & Hunt, also see p. 27 of the transcript of Constable Hunt’s body-worn camera.

6See p.83 of body-worn camera transcript of Constable Hunt.

7R v McGowan-Morris, [2025] OJ No 2048, 2025 ONCA 349, at paras 36-37

8R v Nguyen, [2008] OJ No 219, 2008 ONCA 49

9R v McGowan-Morris, supra, at para 39

10R v McGowan-Morris, supra at para 84-85,

11R v McGowan-Morris, supra, at para 85, in citing: Suberu, at para. 42; R v Strachan, 1988 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, at pp. 998-999; R v Rover, 2018 ONCA 745, 143 O.R. (3d) 135, at para. 33; R v Brown, 2024 ONCA 763, at para. 35; and R v Pileggi, 2021 ONCA 4, 153 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 57-63

12R v Pileggi, 2021 ONCA 4, 153 O.R. (3d) 561, at para 77

13R v Pileggi, supra, at paras 75-77

14R v Samuels, 2025 ONCA 736, at para 63 (quoting R v Rover 2018 ONCA 745 at paras 26-27.

15R v Moore-McFarlane, [2001] OJ No 4646, 56 OR (3d) 737, 152 OAC 120, 160 CCC (3d) 493, 47 CR (5th) 203, 52 WCB (2d) 37, 2001 CarswellOnt 4242, 2001 CanLII 6363, at p. 517

16While this case illustrates systemic concerns regarding audio recording practices, my decision rests on the specific breaches identified.

17R. v Sawatsky 1997 CanLII 511 (ON CA), [1997] OJ No 3561, 35 OR (3d) 767, in citing R v Borden, supra, at p. 165 S.C.R., p. 419 C.C.C.; R v Young (1992), 1992 CanLII 7607 (ON CA), 9 O.R. (3d) 23 at p. 31, 73 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at p. 297 (C.A.).

18R v Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 SCR 310, at para. 32

19R v Evans, 1991 CanLII 98 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para 47

20R v Moore 2016 ONCA 964, at para 10

21R v Sinclair, supra, at para 65

22R v Tahmasebi 2020 ONCA 47, at para 32, also see R v McGowan-Morris, supra, at para 40. Conversely, if Mr. Laguerre had been properly advised of the change in jeopardy and spoke to counsel before police obtained information under the guise of “inventory questions,” there would be no breach; such questioning would fall within permissible investigative techniques. This presumes, however, that sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were first fully complied with.

23R v McGowan-Morris, supra, at para 41.

24R v Clarkson, 1986 CanLII 61 (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 at p. 394, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 207 at pp. 217-18.

25R v Dupe, 2010 ONSC 6594 at para. 24 and 25.

26R v Beals, [2020] OJ No 6140, 2020 ONSC 996, at para 107

27R v Beals, supra,, at para 107

28R v Musara, [2022] O.J. No. 2436, at para 314

29R v Jama, [2024] O.J. No. 1101 at para 69

30R v Beals, , supra, at paras, 107, 109-113

31R v Beaver, 2022 SCC 54, [2022] 3 SCR 435

32R v Beaver , supra, at para. 98-99

33R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, 2017 S.C.C. 59, at para 72

34R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, at para 56

35R v McColman 2023 SCC 8, S.C.J. No. 8

36R v McColman, supra, at para 58

37R v Zacharias, 2023 SCC 30, 431 C.C.C. (3d) 421

38R v Zacharias, supra, para 2, 47-49

39R v Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at paras. 141–142; also R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 202

40R v Le, supra, at para. 158.

41R v Zacharias, supra, at para 43

42R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 SCR 353, and clarified with simplicity more recently in R v Griffith, 2025 ONCA 322

43The Law Of Evidence Paciocco and Stuesser, in The Law of Evidence, 8th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law 2011), p.223

43R v Bernard, 2018 ABCA 396, para 20

44R v B. (K.G.), 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, at p. 796.

45R v Lako, [2025] OJ No 1680, 2025 ONCA 284, at paras 45-46

46R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para 22

47R v Lako, supra, at para 46

48R v Bradshaw, supra, at para 26.

49R v Khelawon, supra, at paras. 2–4, 47, 49; R v Bradshaw, supra, at para. 23; R v Lako, supra, at paras. 43–52

50R v Hartling, 2020 ONCA 243 at para 60

51R v Hartling, supra at para 60

52Paciocco and Stuesser, in The Law of Evidence, 8th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law 2011), p. 223

53R v Bernard, 2018 ABCA 396, para 20

54R v Mullin, 2019 ONCA 890 at para 42

55See R v Nicholas (2004), 2004 CanLII 13008 (ON CA), 70 OR (3d) 1 at paras. 89-92, 182 CCC (3d) 393 (CA

56R v Borel, 2021 ONCA 16 at para 51

57In citing R v Wilsdon, 2024 ONCJ 460, at paras. 1 and 20; R v Sampu, 2012

ONCJ 74 at paras. 15-22.

58Respondent’s Factum” (Volume II, Dated Friday December 19) at para 5

59It is important to note that I do not use Mr. Laguerre’s statement for any purpose other than in reference to the complainant’s rebuttal to a specific alleged motive to fabricate.

60“Respondent’s Factum” (Volume II, Dated Friday December 19) at para 14.

61R v Lako, supra, in citing, R v Charles, 2024 SCC 29, 496 D.L.R. (4th) 581, at para. 43, citing R v Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865, at paras. 1, 19, and 20; and R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 48.

62R v Al-Enzi, supra at para. 123, citing R v Srun, 2019 ONCA 453 at paras. 125-127; R v Bradshaw, supra, at para. 24, citing Khelawon, supra at paras. 3 and 47.

63Her Majesty the Queen v Rowe [Indexed as: R v Rowe], 159 OR (3d) 127, 2021 ONCA 684, 159 OR (3d) 127, at para 45

64R v Mohamad, 2018 ONCA 966, 369 C.C.C. (3d) 211, at para. 115, and R v Budimirovic 2023 ONCA 609 at paras 20-22

65R v Mohamed: 2023 ONCA 104, at para 56

66R v Bradshaw, at para 57

67R v Bradshaw, supra, at para 44

68R v Charles, 2024 SCC 29, at para 46 in citing Bradshaw, supra, at para. 28, citing R v B. (K.G.), 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, at pp. 795‑96

69Bradshaw, supra, at para. 31; R v McMorris, 2020 ONCA 844, 398 C.C.C. (3d) 179, at para. 30; R v Barrett, 2020 NSCA 79, at para. 21.

70Bradshaw, at para. 40; R v. S.S., 2022 ONCA 305, at paras. 48-53. & R v Mohamad ONCA, supra,at para 51

71R v Adjei, [2013] OJ No 3658, 2013 ONCA 512 at para 34 and 45

72As suggested was the case in R v Mohamed, 2023 ONCA 104, at para 57-58

73R v Charles, supra, at para 47

74R v Bradshaw, at para. 57

75See: R v Downey, 1992 CanLII 109 (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 10: In quoting the findings of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (the "Badgley Committee") make particularly sad and disturbing reading:

Many girls who work on the streets believe that a prostitute who gives evidence against a pimp is almost certain to be murdered, if not by her own pimp, then by his fellow pimps. These murders are purported to be extraordinarily brutal and the prostitutes claim that they are accomplished by severe beatings of head and face. Another palpable fear of female prostitutes which suffices to dissuade many of them from giving information about their pimps is that of being ostracized by the other prostitutes in whose company they work. Furthermore, the Committee's survey indicates that many of the young prostitutes either were "in love" with their pimps, or were psychologically dependent upon them to such an extent that they could not conceive of functioning without them. As a result, many girls adopted a highly protective attitude toward their pimps and were unwilling to divulge information which might have proved damaging to them, or which portrayed them in a negative light. (Badgley Committee, vol. 2, at pp. 1057-58.)

76R v Dupe, 2016 ONCA 653 at paras. 54-55.

77R v U. (F.J.), 1995 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764, at paras. 42-43.

78R v Charles, 2024 SCC 29

79R, v. McMorris, supra, at para 33

80R v Charles, supra, at paras 59-60

81R v McMorris, 2020 ONCA 844, at paras 33-34

82R v Bradshaw, supra, at at paras. 20–24, 28, 31.

83R v Bradshaw, supra, at paras. 20–24.

84R v Bradshaw, supra, at paras. 26, 31–32; see also Charles, supra, at para 47

85R v Bradshaw, supra, at para 48-49

86R v Mohamed, [2023] OJ No 715, 2023 ONCA 104, at para 54

87As was the case in R v Jeffers, [2019] O.J. No. 1711, where a witness in a human trafficking case provided a KBG statement and was reluctant to testify. As explained by Justice Feldman, in referencing this case, in R v Buchanan, 2021 ONCJ 256

38“The complainant gave a lengthy, cautioned KGB statement under oath that was recorded. She later provided an unsworn videotaped statement alleging the accused pressured her to swear an affidavit that her first statement was false. She said that as a result she feared for her safety.

39It turned out that the complainant was a reluctant witness. She failed to attend court and was arrested on a warrant. In her testimony, she re-characterized her relationship with the accused as one of friendship and mutual business partnership. Of significance, she said her KGB statements were ‘stretched’, but not false. Her text messages inculpated the accused. In cross-examination, she admitted that which favoured the defence.

40Justice Duncan described the KGB rule as one “designed to advance the truth-seeking function of the courts and also to reduce the potential benefit that could be achieved by witness intimidation or improper influence”[11]. In this case, Justice Duncan viewed the complainant’s KGB statement as a “spontaneous narrative” that was given without prompting or leading. He found her KGB statements to contain “an extraordinary amount of detail” in which the complainant appeared to be “very open and candid”.

41His review of the videotape led him to reject the complainant’s evidence that she gave her “false” statement both because she was under the influence of cocaine and as a result of pressure to please the police. He saw her as “perfectly lucid and sensible throughout”, not restless, distracted or impaired in her thinking. He found the notion of police pressure rebutted by her I-Phone notes.

88R v Mohamed, supra, at para 53

89R v Blackman, [2008] 2 SCR 298, 2008 SCC 37, in adopting the reasoning of Doherty J. in R v Humaid (2006), 2006 CanLII 12287 (ON CA), 208 C.C.C. (3d) 43

90R v McMorris, supra, at para 43

91R v Charles at para 45 in citing Khelawon, at para. 2 (emphasis in original), quoted in Bradshaw, at para. 22

92R v Budimirovic 2023 ONCA 609, para 20-22