Court of Appeal

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a physical altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, causing the victim to lose consciousness and hit his head.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions on consent were inadequate and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to appellate delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the law of consent, potentially leading the jury to believe the victim had to consent to every specific act for the defence to apply.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, found NCR in 2007, appealed an Ontario Review Board order transferring him from a general forensic unit to a secure forensic unit.

The hospital recommended the transfer because the appellant's repeated breaches of the anti-smoking policy and drug use resulted in the suspension of his indirectly supervised passes, making his detention on the general unit more restrictive due to staffing limitations.

The secure unit offered better access to necessary substance abuse programming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable as it would enhance the appellant's rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his 81-year-old neighbour and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding bad character evidence and post-offence conduct, including the appellant's failure to call the police and his use of the victim's credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed competing inferences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the parole ineligibility period appropriate given the brutality of the murder.

The plaintiff sued his former employer and a disability insurer for long-term disability benefits after suffering a stroke shortly after his termination.

In his reply to the employer's statement of defence, the plaintiff claimed wrongful dismissal.

The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing the reply raised a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the statement of claim's factual matrix provided sufficient notice of the wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, agreeing that the wrongful dismissal claim was not a new cause of action and came as no surprise to the employer.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking cocaine and possessing the proceeds of crime based on circumstantial evidence, including text messages, cell phones, and cash found in their vehicle.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial case strong and the trial judge's minor factual errors immaterial to the reasoning process.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted in absentia of careless driving following a rear-end collision.

His appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed on the basis that he had no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's explanation—that the car in front of him pulled over and then suddenly pulled back into the lane—could provide a defence to the strict liability offence if believed at trial.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants purchased a vehicle with a malfunctioning air conditioner and sued the selling dealer, the supplying dealer, and various individuals for over $400,000.

After settling with the selling dealer for a full refund plus additional compensation, the appellants continued their action against the supplying dealer and its manager.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims, finding no contractual relationship, no evidence of negligence, and that any damages were already fully compensated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed a preservation order requiring him to deliver luxury vehicles or their sale proceeds to the respondent trustee in bankruptcy, and freezing his bank accounts.

The appellant argued he only acquired a beneficial interest in the vehicles when a court declared a trust agreement valid, years after his bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's beneficial interest existed at the time of his bankruptcy pursuant to the trust agreement, and the motion judge made no error in principle in exercising his discretion to make the preservation order.

Following a judgment allowing appeals and cross-appeals in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, ordering Charles Sr. to pay Diana $50,000, Charles Jr. to pay Diana $15,000, Lisa to pay Charles Jr. $15,000, and Ford to pay Lisa $15,000.

All additional requests for costs were dismissed.

The moving party, Economical Insurance Group, brought a motion to extend the time to perfect its appeal after the responding party, State Farm, unreasonably delayed settling the order under appeal.

State Farm refused to approve the draft order in a misguided attempt to thwart Economical's right of appeal, forcing the motion.

Although the extension was ultimately agreed upon, the Court of Appeal strongly criticized State Farm's litigation gamesmanship and awarded Economical $5,000 in partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found during a warrantless search incident to arrest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant based on corroborated information from multiple confidential informants.

The court also agreed with the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis admitting the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed on consent solely to increase the appellant's pre-trial custody credit to a 1.5 ratio in accordance with R. v. Summers, but was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and conspiracy to commit unlawful confinement, as well as his ten-year sentence.

He argued there was insufficient evidence he knew about a firearm in the driver's side door pocket of the car he was driving.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's possession of other weapons and the proximity of the firearm, proved his knowledge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the trial judge properly considered the appellant's prior record for similar violent offences and his poor prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how intoxication relates to planning and deliberation, and unfairly commented on the defence toxicologist's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions contained all essential legal elements and properly directed the jury to consider intoxication separately for intent and for planning and deliberation.

The court also found the trial judge's comments on the expert evidence were supported by the record and not objected to by trial counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting images found on his computer.

A computer repair technician discovered the images and called police, who viewed them without a warrant before seizing the computer.

The trial judge found breaches of section 8 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), noting the reduced expectation of privacy at a repair shop and the high reliability of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

He contended that the trial judge erred by placing too much reliance on the victim's companion, disregarding expert evidence on the victim's blood alcohol level, and unjustifiably discrediting the evidence of the appellant and his companions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was merely inviting the court to re-weigh the evidence, and that the trial judge's treatment of the evidence was perfectly reasonable.

The appellants challenged the refusal to stay an Ontario action arising from contractual arrangements negotiated and signed in Ontario concerning Nigerian oil and gas assets, while parallel proceedings had been commenced in Nigeria.

The Court of Appeal held that comity is not a stand-alone consideration but is embedded in the forum non conveniens analysis, and found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario had jurisdiction and that Nigeria was not clearly the more appropriate forum.

The court also refused to consider proposed fresh evidence consisting of reasons from the Nigerian court because those reasons were available before the motion below and did not satisfy the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents for her role in a mortgage fraud scheme.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge's decision to hear evidence from a Crown witness before ruling on her s. 11(b) Charter application, and the 15-month delay in delivering reasons for that ruling, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

She also appealed the $25,000 restitution order, arguing the trial judge failed to consider her ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no cogent evidence of bias and noting the trial judge explicitly considered the appellant's financial circumstances.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its motion for a declaration that the defendant was in contempt of court for failing to preserve electronic records.

The defendant moved to quash the appeal to the Court of Appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, holding that an order dismissing a contempt motion is interlocutory because the merits of the case remain to be determined, and therefore the appeal lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant commenced a negligence action against the respondent dentists for substandard dental implant procedures.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the discoverability test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was discoverable when the appellant's new dentist explained the nature of the problem and advised he would have conducted the procedure differently, which occurred more than two years before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a 2005 amending agreement to a separation agreement, declaring the respondent the sole owner of a property, and ordering prospective spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed on issues including retroactive support, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's decision to set aside the agreement due to the appellant's significant financial non-disclosure and unconscionability.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The cross-appeal was allowed only to award pre-judgment interest on the retroactive child and spousal support order.