Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence arising from historical sexual assault allegations involving two complainants in a family context.

The court held that, although the reasons were capable of appellate review and the correct W.(D.) framework was identified, the trial judge committed reversible errors by misapprehending evidence of animus, misapprehending the appellant's evidence concerning an earlier allegation, and improperly treating a prior disclosure as negating the defence theory of collusion.

The prior disclosure was not sufficiently consistent with the later allegations to function as a prior consistent statement rebutting fabrication.

The curative proviso was unavailable because the convictions were supportable but not inevitable.

A new trial was ordered on all counts, including those previously stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's reasons were insufficient, unreasonable, and failed to properly consider his refusal of medication due to side effects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's chain of analysis clear, its decision reasonable, and noting the appellant's inability to recognize his illness rendered him incapable with respect to all proposed medication.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board had no obligation to make further inquiries beyond the joint position of the parties based on the record.

The Court noted the appellant's progress, the existence of a treatment plan, and concluded that the Board's disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive available.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that concluded he constituted a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered his continued detention without community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to address conflicts and ambiguities in the expert evidence regarding whether the appellant posed a significant threat, particularly given his lack of violent offences since 2003.

The matter was returned to the Board for a fresh determination.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their claim against the respondent bank and granting judgment to the bank on its counterclaim.

The appellants argued their procedural rights were denied because the motions judge did not follow a prior endorsement by another judge regarding a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the parties had agreed to proceed before the motions judge and the prior order was not binding.

The court upheld the finding that there was no genuine issue for trial, as the appellants had defaulted on their line of credit and mortgage loan.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) to the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The Board relied on uncontroverted evidence from CAMH staff that the appellant could no longer be effectively treated there.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's determination was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a committal order made at a preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arguments advanced confused the function of a trial judge with that of a preliminary inquiry judge.

The Superior Court judge properly limited his review to whether the totality of the evidence provided a basis for the committal order.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the circumstances leading to the order were germane to a subsequent proceeding that led to a detention order at Waypoint, which was the subject of a separate appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 10 months.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the parties agreed the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, while noting the original sentence length was otherwise warranted.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a lower court judgment on the basis that the judgment was an interlocutory order.

The lower court had ruled that contempt proceedings against the responding party were not stayed by his filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but adjourned the contempt motion to a later date.

The Court of Appeal held that because the lower court's ruling deprived the responding party of a substantive defence that could have resolved the proceedings, the order was final.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal involving a class action.

Due to divided success and the plaintiffs' failure to produce a rational and workable class definition, which contributed to delays and added costs, the court ordered no costs in either the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for a sexual assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention on a secure forensic unit.

He argued he should be transferred to a general forensic unit or given a hybrid order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's ongoing inappropriate sexual behaviour and the increased risk to others if supervision were decreased.

The appellant buyer appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance and damages arising from an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondent sellers relied on an annulment clause to terminate the agreement after a third party registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation on the property just prior to closing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's correspondence on the closing date amounted to a demand for clear title rather than a request to extend closing, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a conviction and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on evidence that the officer tested the radar device before and after use and was a qualified operator to establish a prima facie case of accuracy.

The court declined to address whether a broader presumption of accuracy should be created for radar guns.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising grounds of appeal including errors in jury instructions regarding police narrative evidence, eyewitness identification, and prior statements, as well as the trial judge's refusal to quash a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Garofoli analysis regarding the search warrant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

Representing himself, he argued through amici curiae that the trial judge erred by refusing to allow him to call three witnesses and by inadequately charging the jury on a potentially exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function regarding the witnesses, as the appellant refused to explain their relevance.

The court also held that the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on the appellant's statement that the first shot was a mistake.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after a 26-month delay between his arrest and trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appellant contended that the 15.5-month delay caused by his efforts to retain counsel of choice, exacerbated by Legal Aid Ontario's refusal to transfer his certificate, should be characterized as institutional or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was part of the inherent time requirements of the case and that a s. 11(b) application is not the proper forum to review the reasonableness of Legal Aid Ontario's decisions.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault offences arising from an incident where police responded to a disconnected 911 call at her residence.

The appellant, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, locked herself in her bedroom and subsequently attacked an officer with a knife when police entered.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the police were trespassing, finding they acted reasonably under their duty to protect life.

The court allowed the appeal only to the extent of staying one count under the Kienapple principle and amending another count to particularize the use of a weapon.