Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, which sought to dismiss a counterclaim brought against them by the respondents.

The motion judge found that the appellants' expression did not relate to a matter of public interest, failing the initial threshold for an anti-SLAPP motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that the appellants' expressions were primarily concerned with private property interests (e.g., tree protection, fencing, sightlines) related to an adjacent retirement facility development, rather than broader public concerns, despite the development itself having public interest aspects.

The court affirmed the deferential standard of review for a motion judge's finding on whether an expression relates to public interest and confirmed that the motion judge did not err by considering the context of the expressions without impermissibly assessing motivations.

The defendants/appellants brought a motion for a stay of a writ of possession pending appeal, following previous unsuccessful attempts to challenge a judgment granting judgment on a second mortgage and striking their defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the underlying appeal meritless and that the balance of convenience favored the respondents.

The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting concerns about multiple counsel representing parties with identical interests.

The appellant, a judgment creditor, appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration of fraudulent conveyance and damages for unlawful conduct conspiracy against the respondents.

The appellant alleged that the transfer of shares by the debtor to Capital Dentistry Group Limited was a fraudulent conveyance and part of an unlawful conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no fraudulent intent, noting that the transaction was initiated by an arm's length party, structured consistently with past deals, and occurred as part of a larger acquisition.

As fraudulent intent was not established, the essential element of unlawful conduct for the conspiracy claim failed.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought to appeal a lower court judgment that recognized two Florida judgments requiring him to pay the respondent approximately $1.6 million (Canadian).

The sole issue on appeal was whether the application judge erred in declining the appellant’s request to adjourn the hearing, which was made nine days after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the application judge's decision, noting that the appellant's previous counsel had already filed an application record and factum, and the judge ensured all grounds were addressed.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant, Antonio Duscio, appealed a 16-month imprisonment sentence for contempt of court, which was imposed shortly after a previous 12-month contempt sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's analysis of relevant legal principles or extensive factual findings.

The court noted that the appellant could secure early release by purging his contempt or providing a complete accounting of dissipated funds and assets.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a dermatological clinic, appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against a respondent who posted negative online reviews claiming the laser resurfacing treatments caused volume loss to her face.

The motion judge dismissed the action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that while the appellant met the threshold under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could view the respondent's claims as factual statements rather than protected opinion, the appellant failed to satisfy the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) by not establishing that the harm suffered was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the respondent's expression.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant had signed a Voluntary Recognition Agreement on behalf of his company with the respondent union in 2008.

He subsequently challenged the validity of the agreement before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, claiming he lacked capacity due to health issues.

The OLRB upheld the agreement's validity, and the Divisional Court dismissed his judicial review application.

The appellant then commenced a Superior Court action seeking damages, alleging misrepresentations by the union.

The motion judge struck out the claim as an abuse of process, finding that the OLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the validity of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's careful and clear analysis of the issues.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the tortfeasors, their insurer, and her own insurer under an OPCF 44R endorsement.

The tortfeasors' insurer took an off-coverage position and settled with the appellant for the $200,000 statutory minimum.

The appellant's insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the tortfeasors' policy limits were never legally reduced and the release barred the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an insurer's off-coverage position and settlement do not reduce liability limits 'by operation of law' without a legal determination.

However, the appellant's action against her own insurer could proceed, wherein she would bear the burden of proving the tortfeasors' policy breach.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favour of the respondents, her former solicitors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was without merit and barred by the principle of res judicata, as a previous action against the same defendants had already been dismissed.

The court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence and declined to award costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to section 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting a mandatory injunction requiring them to remove a retaining wall that encroached on the respondent's adjacent commercial property.

The original encroachment was permitted under a 1973 settlement agreement, which stipulated that consent would be rescinded if further encroachment occurred.

The trial judge found that the wall had moved significantly, rescinding the consent and rendering the encroachment a trespass.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the encroachment constituted a trespass, that the appellants had not acquired title by adverse possession because their possession was consensual, and that a mandatory injunction was the appropriate remedy given the significant and ongoing interference with the respondent's property rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing two guarantees they provided for the indebtedness of their corporation.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the motion judge, concluding there was no triable issue regarding an enforceable agreement between the respondents and the corporation, nor any indication that such a contract was a term of the guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court Judge, which had struck his appeal from a Master's order on the basis that the Master's order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, confirming that the Master's order was interlocutory and that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against the respondents.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that deputy judges are immune from civil liability, the action constituted a collateral attack and abuse of process, and the claim disclosed no cause of action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that allowed the respondent's claim for $164,444.27, representing 33 per cent of a tax credit figure in a SRED submission prepared by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons given the absence of contrary evidence from the appellants.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an insurance claim for economic loss following a fire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to reject a financial planner's letter and his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove economic loss for the period beyond the policy coverage based on tax returns.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the allegations in the statement of claim to be confusing, difficult to follow, and legally untenable, with some relating to the Federal Crown and decades-old criminal dispositions.

Finding no error in the motion judge's reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order allowing the plaintiffs to substitute Dr. Petrasek for a 'John Doe' defendant under Rule 26.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim did not point the 'litigating finger' at Dr. Petrasek, as there was no evidence he was responsible for the positioning of the plaintiff for surgery.

The motion to substitute was dismissed.