Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a motion judge's decision striking her amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged breach of confidence arising from the disclosure of a settlement email to the Crown, which led to the withdrawal of criminal sexual assault charges against her former business partner.

The motion judge found the email contained unambiguous impropriety as it offered to withdraw criminal charges in exchange for money, was not protected by settlement privilege, and caused no compensable harm.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The appellants, Brandon Book and his parents, appealed a trial judge's decision dismissing their motion to set aside a 2015 personal injury settlement.

They argued Brandon was under a disability at the time of settlement and that it was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no error in the capacity assessment and that the settlement should not be set aside, even if incapacity had been proven, given the principles of finality of judgments and the circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions brought by the respondent, Maranello Sports Inc. o/a Ferrari of Ontario.

The first motion sought to dismiss or stay an underlying appeal and set aside or vary a consent order.

The second motion sought to set aside a Registrar's order that permitted Ronald Hitti to continue the interest of co-appellant 285 Spadina SPV Inc. in the appeal.

The court granted both motions, finding that Hitti lacked authority to act on behalf of 285 Spadina SPV Inc. due to a prior Superior Court order.

Consequently, the appeal was deemed moot and without merit.

The consent order was set aside under Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure due to Hitti's fraudulent concealment of the February 2023 Order.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld the dismissal of their action for delay.

The Court of Appeal applied the "justice of the case" test, considering the appellants' intention to appeal, the length and explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and the merits of the proposed appeal.

The court found that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence for their delay or health claims, and critically, the proposed appeal did not raise an arguable question of law or public importance.

Consequently, the motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing the bank's motion for summary judgment while also dismissing the appellant's motion to strike the statement of claim, as well as a costs award and a case management order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeals, finding that the orders appealed were not final orders as they did not dispose of the action or finally dispose of an issue or defence.

The court held that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court and that the absence of a motion to quash did not afford jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against their insurer.

The trial judge found that the insurer had fully met its contractual obligations to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact, noting that while the appellants framed the issue as one of fairness and family wellbeing, the case was fundamentally about the nature of the insurer's obligations under the insurance contract and whether those obligations were met.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision to dismiss the application without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring an action.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application for mandamus requiring Hydro One to deliver his hydro bills by courier.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the decision was made under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and therefore required leave to appeal under s. 6(4).

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that because the appellant had not obtained leave, the appeal was not properly before the court and must be quashed.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application to assess two legal accounts from the respondent, delivered in 1999 and 2008.

The appellant also moved to introduce fresh evidence to seek a new assessment hearing for all accounts.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasons, noting a 2001 consent agreement covering the 1999 account and a lack of special circumstances for the 2008 account.

The motion to introduce fresh evidence was denied, as the appellant only sought assessment after deciding his wife's legal bills were too high.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought leave to amend their statement of claim in an action arising from a neighbour dispute over a right-of-entry permit and property excavation.

The motion judge denied leave to add claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty against the municipality and its by-law officer, and struck portions of the claim as a collateral attack on a prior injunction order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims, finding no special relationship or reliance.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding collateral attack, holding that the appellants were seeking damages for the respondents' actions rather than attempting to invalidate the prior order.

The appellant slipped and fell on a grape in the produce department of a grocery store owned by the respondent.

A jury found the respondent had taken reasonable care and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard of care and causation, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the standard of reasonableness under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and that there was sufficient evidence of the respondent's floor maintenance program to support the jury's verdict.

Following an appeal in which the respondent was largely successful, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent.

The costs were fixed at $3,500, inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.

The appellant sought to alter the costs award made by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the parties' submissions and found no basis to alter the trial judge's costs award.

The appellant suffered a serious brain injury in a single-car accident after drinking at a tavern with the defendant driver.

At trial, the defendants admitted 100% liability for causing the accident, but the jury was only asked to assess the appellant's contributory negligence for not wearing a seatbelt and riding with an impaired driver.

The jury was not asked to apportion fault to the tavern for over-serving the appellant and failing to ensure his safe passage home.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to instruct the jury to apportion fault among all parties as required by the Negligence Act was an error of law.

To avoid the cost of a new trial, the Court of Appeal invited submissions to apportion fault itself.

The Crown appealed a trial judgment that apportioned liability equally between the Crown and the respondents for a 1974 helicopter crash caused by a cracked rotor blade.

The Crown argued that the respondents' negligence in inspecting the blade severed any causal link to the Crown's prior negligence, and challenged the trial judge's quantification of damages.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the Crown should bear most of the responsibility, and appealed the awards for prejudgment interest and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in apportioning liability 50/50, assessing damages, or exercising discretion on costs and interest.

The appellant insurance company appealed a trial judgment finding that its long-term disability policy provided benefit payments to age 65.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the policy clearly and unambiguously limited the maximum benefit period to two years.

The trial judge erred by confusing provisions dealing with coverage with those dealing with the payment of benefits.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant insurers appealed an order finding they had a duty to contribute to the defence costs of the defendant in a property damage action.

The underlying claim alleged that damage by pyrolisis commenced when a fireplace was first used in 1988 and continued until actual combustion in 1997, after the relevant insurance policies had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was a possibility of coverage based on the pleadings, as consequential losses manifesting after a policy expires may still be covered if the damage occurred during the coverage period.

The court also rejected the argument that the pleadings were manipulated to trigger the duty to defend.

The appellant, Lloyd's Underwriters, appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for reasons given in the related appeal C40338.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an employee manual could not eliminate the respondent's entitlement to reasonable notice for the 10 years of employment preceding its introduction.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's objective assessment of repudiation and found no palpable and overriding error in the findings of fact regarding mitigation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for inducing breach of contract on a motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge correctly applied the governing principles for summary judgment and that the plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.