Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant, a former mayoral candidate, appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his application challenging the validity of the Toronto mayoral election.

The original application, brought under the Municipal Elections Act, alleged issues with media coverage, polling, and exclusion from mayoral debates.

The motion judge had dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that even if the complaints were valid, they could not lead to a finding that the election was invalid.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, with no order as to costs.

This appeal concerned the appropriate remedy for a party who deliberately accessed the opposing party's privileged information.

The application judge had struck the appellant's Notice of Appearance, barred them from filing evidence, and ordered the Partition Application to proceed undefended.

The appellant argued that this remedy was unpleaded, unproven, and that lesser remedies were available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found no error in applying the three-part test for unauthorized access to privileged documents, particularly given the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice or propose effective alternative remedies.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the issue of costs.

Due to a lack of agreement between the parties regarding the costs incurred below, the Court of Appeal reserved the determination of costs to the trial judge hearing the second trial.

Mark Couper appealed a judgment ordering him to pay legal fees and disbursements to Rueters LLP.

The appeal was based on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the applications judge, an alleged error in finding Rueters had good reason to withdraw as counsel without court approval, and the invalidity of a compromise compensation agreement (CCA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that Rueters had good reason to withdraw (client caused breakdown, no prejudice, no court approval needed as client agreed), and that the CCA was valid and enforceable (new issue not raised below, and found fair and reasonable).

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay against two respondents under Rule 48.14(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge found the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for a four-year delay, rejecting their "wait and see" approach tied to another delayed action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, affirming the motion judge's discretionary decision and reiterating that failure on the first part of the two-part test (acceptable explanation) is sufficient for dismissal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application.

The Court of Appeal reversed the application decision.

As a result, the costs order awarded to the respondent in the amount of $45,000 was set aside, and costs in the application were awarded to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis in the same amount, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant, a former medical resident, appealed an order striking her conspiracy claim against two individual defendants as time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying the presumption of knowledge under s. 5(2) of the Act before the issue of discoverability was properly developed in the pleadings.

The Court held that a limitation defence should generally be pleaded in a statement of defence, allowing the plaintiff to reply with facts regarding discoverability, rather than being determined on a motion to strike prior to the filing of a defence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action, which was based on a written settlement agreement reached at mediation.

She argued she did not understand the terms and her counsel lacked authority to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding she signed the agreement, accepted benefits, and her counsel had apparent authority.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to enforce the release term of the agreement.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, varying the order to include an absolute bar to subsequent proceedings.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs fixed at $4,000 for the proceedings in the court below and $4,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed a decision of the motion judge granting partial summary judgment to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondents.

The Ontario Federation of Agriculture (OFA), an intervening party in an appeal concerning the constitutional validity of the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, brought a motion for leave to file a factum exceeding thirty pages.

The appellants opposed the motion, while the respondent consented.

The court granted the motion, allowing the OFA to file a factum of up to forty-five pages, noting the significance of the issues for agricultural labour relations and finding that the OFA's perspective would provide added value to the appellate process.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank, which was based on the appellant's criminal conviction for fraud relating to the same transactions.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance by her civil and criminal counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge and concluding that the fresh evidence lacked a credible basis.

The court held that allowing the appeal would permit an abuse of process by relitigating the summary judgment, the criminal conviction, and the criminal trial.

The appellant municipality purchased an abandoned railway line and developed it into a trailway.

When adjoining landowners demanded fencing under the Line Fences Act, the municipality passed a by-law designating the trailway as a public highway to exempt itself from the fencing obligation.

The application judge quashed the by-law, finding it was passed in bad faith to avoid the cost of fencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the municipality's appeal, holding that while courts owe deference to municipal decisions, good faith remains a central foundation for the validity of a by-law, and the record supported the finding of bad faith.

Following an appeal, the successful appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the motion and the appeal.

The costs awarded to two of the appellants were made payable only upon their satisfaction of a prior judgment, while the costs awarded to the third appellant were made payable within thirty days.

The defendants Garan, Lucow, Miller P.C. and Thomas W. Emery succeeded in their motion for a stay and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded them partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,000, payable jointly and severally by the plaintiffs and the co-defendant Kingsway General Insurance Company.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding liability for occupation rent.

The trial judge had found the respondent's parents liable for occupation rent due to their participation in a conspiracy to acquire assets, but found the respondent daughter was not part of the conspiracy and was merely living with her parents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the parents, not the daughter, were liable for the occupation rent until the delivery of possession.

Both appeals were dismissed.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the successful appellants sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded the appellants costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Finding the submitted bill of costs to be excessive, the court fixed the costs at $20,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant borrowed $500,000 from the respondent under an agreement that effectively charged an interest rate exceeding 60 per cent per annum, violating the criminal interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code.

The application judge found the agreement violated the Criminal Code but applied a 'notional severance' to reduce the interest rate to the legal maximum of 60 per cent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that notional severance is not an available remedy.

Instead, the court applied traditional severance principles, striking out the illegal 4 per cent per month interest provision entirely, while leaving the principal repayment and other valid fees intact.