Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellants, Orllyn Loney and Yvonne Prouty, appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to correctly name the driver and owner of a tractor-trailer (Michael George Alexander Mills and 564242 Ontario Limited, also known as Liftlock) as defendants, replacing "John Doe" and "ABC Corporation".

The motion was brought almost ten years after the accident and over three years after the action was set down for trial.

The motion judge denied leave, finding no sudden change in circumstances and non-compensable prejudice due to the lengthy, unexplained delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her exercise of discretion.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to limitation periods and the actual prejudice caused by the delay, including the loss of timely discovery opportunities for the proposed defendants.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an employee of the appellant who was driving his personal vehicle to a remote job site.

The employee had taken a short detour for coffee when the collision occurred.

The motion judge granted summary judgment finding the employer vicariously liable under the first branch of the Salmond test, as the travel and detour were authorized acts within the course of employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, upholding the finding that the employee was authorized to drive to the job site and take a short break, making the employer vicariously liable.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a judgment dismissing his claims for malicious prosecution, nervous shock, false imprisonment, negligence, and other collateral claims, and an extension of time to appeal that judgment.

He also sought leave to appeal a subsequent costs order of $75,000 and leave to file fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time, no explanation for the delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, which would prejudice the responding parties.

The court also found no error in principle in the trial judge's costs award, noting its reasonableness given the trial length, the moving party's conduct, and unfounded allegations.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal arising from a trial judgment concerning oppression and conspiracy claims related to a condominium corporation.

The appellants (original defendants) challenged the trial judge's findings that claims against one defendant were not statute-barred, the award of punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) cross-appealed the prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all contested issues, including the application of limitation periods, the appropriateness of punitive damages for egregious conduct, and the discretion in awarding substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions within an ongoing appeal: one by the appellants to set aside a prior order for security for judgment and costs, and another by the respondents to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance.

The court granted the appellants' motion in part, setting aside the requirement for security for the judgment amount but affirming the order for security for trial and appeal costs.

The respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal was dismissed as moot.

The court allowed the appellants to retract a previous concession regarding the appeal's frivolousness.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction simpliciter over the respondent's action and that Ontario was not forum non conveniens.

The underlying action involved claims for breach of contract, negligence, and other torts arising from a share purchase agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Van Breda presumptive connecting factors for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with her discretionary decision regarding forum non conveniens.

York University sought security for costs of an appeal brought by Michael Markicevic, who was found at trial to have defrauded York of over $1.8 million and made fraudulent conveyances of property.

Markicevic appealed on two grounds: the validity of a mutual release signed upon his termination and whether York's claims were statute-barred.

The motion judge ordered security for costs of $75,000 under Rule 61.06(1)(c), finding that while the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the unchallenged findings of fraud and asset dissipation constituted compelling "other good reason" to order security despite Markicevic's impecuniosity.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent for an allegedly unfair tender process relating to a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that all four bids in the first tender process were non-compliant and that the respondent was justified in ordering a second round, which the appellant chose not to participate in.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, applying the palpable and overriding error standard to the motion judge's fact-finding under Rule 20, and found no error in the fairness and good faith analysis.

The plaintiff's action arising from a motor vehicle accident was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The status notice and dismissal order were sent to the plaintiff's former counsel due to a court error, despite a notice of change of solicitor having been filed.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal, finding unexplained delay, prejudice to the defendants, and relying on the principle of finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the delay, prejudice, and finality, particularly given the defendants' continued participation in discoveries for a related action.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision to deny him costs after the respondents withdrew all claims against him during closing arguments.

The appellant had made two early offers to settle, which were rejected.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to treat the appellant as prima facie entitled to costs and by ignoring the settlement offers.

The Court awarded partial indemnity costs to the appellant, reduced to reflect some misconduct identified by the trial judge.

The appellant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to stay the declaration of invalidity of s. 96 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations pending the outcome of the appeal.

The appeal had been adjourned pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Fraser v. Ontario (A.G.).

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Court of Appeal granted the stay, expiring 30 days after the release of the Fraser decision.

However, the court imposed conditions requested by the respondents to allow the Associations to communicate with employees using internal systems and property without interference.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for declaratory relief under the Charter and the award of substantial indemnity costs against him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, agreeing with the application judge that the doctrine of collateral attack was a complete answer to the application.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award and allowed that portion of the appeal, finding no basis for substantial indemnity costs.

The costs award was reduced to partial indemnity, and the respondents were awarded $5,000 in costs for the appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary order granting the respondent leave to amend her statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the order and noted that the entirety of the respondent's claim was not governed by the Provincial Offences Act, as damages could not be recovered under that Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The infant plaintiff was severely injured when a fence on the appellant's premises fell on him.

A jury awarded approximately $3 million in damages, apportioning liability 95% to the appellant and 5% to the fence installer.

The appellant appealed the apportionment, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a statement from a deceased employee of the installer and failing to caution the jury on its use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the jury's reasons for liability focused on the appellant's failure to rectify the fence after it had fallen on three prior occasions, without relying on the disputed statement.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing a motion to set aside an ex parte order that struck the appellant's pleading for failing to answer undertakings given on discovery.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondent had made full, fair, and frank disclosure on the ex parte motion.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the undertakings had been answered, finding the provided answers unhelpful and unresponsive.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants moved under Rule 49.09 for judgment in the terms of an alleged settlement agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, stating that he could not determine on the affidavit evidence whether a binding settlement had been reached, but concluded by stating the proceeding would continue as if there had been no accepted offer.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because he did not make a final determination that no settlement existed, but rather found he could not decide the issue on the record before him.

As the order was interlocutory, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The appellant insurer appealed an order appointing an appraiser under s. 128(5) of the Insurance Act, arguing the policy was void due to a material change in risk under Statutory Condition 4.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that liability remained a live issue because the insurer chose not to cross-examine the insured on her affidavit asserting a valid policy.

The court noted that even if a breach occurred, relief from forfeiture might be available, making the appraisal process appropriate for resolving valuation issues.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action following a jury's assessment of his damages at zero.

He argued that the trial judge's comment that the case was 'quite hopeless', made in the absence of the jury, and her refusal to accommodate the scheduling of his medical witnesses created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and concluding that the trial judge's scheduling decisions were reasonable given counsel's failure to subpoena the witnesses.

The respondent sought costs of the appeal on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the appellant's conduct was egregious.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding the appeal was not vexatious or devoid of merit.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $8,500 plus GST.

The plaintiffs in two class actions moved to quash appeals brought by the defendants from an order declaring that the plaintiffs shared a common interest with the Receiver of YBM, and that the Receiver could produce a report to them without waiving privilege.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was procedural and interlocutory, as it did not resolve any substantive issue in the proceedings.

The court rejected the argument that the order was final simply because it involved a non-party (the Receiver), distinguishing prior case law.

The motions to quash were granted.