Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The respondent slipped and fell on a wet floor in the vestibule of a department store operated by the appellants, fracturing her kneecap.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act, concluding that the wet floor caused the fall and that the appellants lacked an effective inspection or maintenance system.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to require proof that the wet floor created an unreasonable risk of harm and erred in rejecting expert evidence about the safety of the tile flooring.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the trial judge properly applied the statutory duty of care and reasonably rejected the expert evidence.

The appellant claimed she suffered pregnancy complications after a police officer wrongfully confiscated her car in August 2009.

She pursued a police complaint and was informed of the outcome in November 2012.

She commenced a negligence action in October 2013.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period began to run on the date of the incident, as the appellant knew the material facts giving rise to her claim at that time.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to use expanded fact-finding powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to grant summary judgment and avoid a trial.

They also challenged the partial indemnity costs award of $24,294.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and no basis to interfere with the costs award.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim, arguing it only discovered its loss from a breach of duty to warn when an internal investigation report was disclosed in 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew the goods were stolen and that it had paid storage fees for missing goods by October 2006.

The court noted that knowing the full extent of damages is not required to trigger the limitation period under section 5 of the Limitations Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion for a finding that the respondent was in contempt of court for failing to comply with a disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal held that an order dismissing a motion for contempt is interlocutory, not final, as it is not binding on the trial judge.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, custom kitchen distributors, sued the respondent manufacturer for breach of contract after the respondent closed its business in 2008.

The respondent successfully moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(1)(a) on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired before the claim was issued in July 2011.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the pleadings and particulars established the cause of action arose no later than the end of 2008 and discoverability was not an issue.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim that the respondent's actions caused a corporation to lose its business and deprived him of management fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the corporation was placed in liquidation by consent court order, which required its replacement as general partner.

The loss of business was occasioned by the consent liquidation, not by any actions of the respondent.

The appellant, an Ontario-based domain name registrar, commenced an action for a declaration that it owned the domain name renner.com and had not registered it in bad faith, after the respondent initiated a WIPO dispute resolution proceeding.

The motion judge set aside service ex juris and stayed the action, finding that a domain name was not personal property located in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a domain name is intangible personal property and that the domain name in question was located in Ontario.

The Court found that the appellant's claim for declaratory relief fell within Rule 17.02(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, creating a presumption of a real and substantial connection with Ontario that the respondent failed to rebut.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favour of the respondents, her former solicitors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim was without merit and barred by the principle of res judicata, as a previous action against the same defendants had already been dismissed.

The court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence and declined to award costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining title to certain former railway lands.

The application judge found the respondent had fee simple title to Part 1 and title to Part 15 subject to the appellant's possessory claim, directing a trial on whether the possessory claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's decision to require a trial for the limitation issue due to credibility concerns regarding discoverability, nor in her conclusion that the railway acquired title to Part 1 through legislated powers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement to discontinue his action against the respondent.

The appellant argued the offer to settle had expired and the release was not an agreed-upon part of the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's counsel had expressly extended the time for acceptance, and the appellant's counsel accepted the offer with the draft release in hand.

The motion judge's discretion to enforce the settlement was upheld.

The deceased suffered life-threatening injuries in a tobogganing accident.

A physician requested an air ambulance, but the Medical Air Transport Centre advised of a two-hour delay, leading to the deceased being transported by land ambulance and subsequently dying.

The appellants sued the Province of Ontario in negligence, alleging it failed to follow its own policy to divert a nearby air ambulance carrying a non-urgent patient.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding no private law duty of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable a duty of care existed based on the specific interaction and the government's alleged failure to follow its established operational policy.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the motion judge provided no reasons and the respondent's claim relied on a standard mortgage clause that was not in the material before the court.

The default judgment was set aside on terms that a defence be filed within 30 days, with the writ of seizure and sale remaining in place but enforcement stayed.

The appellants appealed a decision recognizing a U.S. civil judgment against them for over $36 million.

They argued that they were denied a meaningful opportunity to defend the U.S. action because outstanding Canadian criminal charges precluded them from testifying in the U.S. proceeding without incriminating themselves.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants could have testified in the U.S. proceeding and subsequently argued for the exclusion of that evidence in their Canadian criminal trial under the Charter or the trial judge's common-law discretion.

The appellant, Apotex Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision allowing the respondents to amend their claim to substitute two Québec representative plaintiffs in an Ontario class action.

Apotex argued that the action lacked a real and substantial connection to Ontario, that Ontario was not the convenient forum, and that the action was an abuse of process due to parallel Québec proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because Apotex resides and carries on business in Ontario.

The court also held that it was premature to determine forum non conveniens on a motion to amend, and accepted counsel's undertaking that the Québec proceedings would not advance pending the Ontario certification decision, thereby negating the abuse of process claim.

The appellant appealed and the respondent cross-appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

Both the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed on consent without costs.

The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondent to access $370,000 from frozen accounts to fund legal fees for an ongoing reference.

The Court of Appeal held that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to hear the motion, she erred in granting the relief.

The respondent failed to meet the burden of establishing that he had no other assets available to pay his legal fees, particularly given his son's refusal to answer questions about family resources during cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and the underlying motion dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment in favour of the respondent, arguing the trial judge unfairly set aside formal admissions and relied on unpleaded doctrines of frustration and lack of consensus ad idem.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not set aside formal admissions, but rather distinguished between agreeing to purchase shares and actually purchasing them.

While the trial judge erred in referencing the doctrine of frustration, his conclusion was supported by his finding of an implied term governing the respondent's resignation from the partnership before purchasing shares.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice John H. Brockenshire dated June 12, 2000.

On consent, the Court of Appeal ordered that the order go as asked.

In an intended class proceeding arising from investor losses in a fraudulent gold scheme using a lawyer's trust account, the appellants alleged the regulator negligently failed to properly investigate and intervene after receiving a complaint about the lawyer's conduct.

The Court of Appeal applied the Anns/Kamloops framework and held that, even assuming sufficient proximity, statutory and judicial immunity, together with compelling policy considerations, negated any private law duty of care in negligence in relation to the regulator's investigatory and disciplinary functions.

Those functions were characterized as inherently judicial or quasi-judicial, and absent pleaded bad faith or malice no negligence action could lie.

The Rule 21 order striking the claim was upheld, as were the costs orders.