Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The respondents were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident in Minnesota caused by a state-owned truck operated by a state employee.

Due to Minnesota's statutory damage cap under the Tort Claims Act, they recovered only US$500,000 (inclusive of legal fees), despite damages exceeding that amount.

They sought the shortfall from their Canadian insurer under an underinsured motorist endorsement (OPCF 44R).

The insurer refused, arguing Minnesota was not "inadequately insured" and that legal fees were not recoverable.

The motion judge found in favor of the respondents on both issues.

On appeal, the court held that Minnesota was an inadequately insured motorist despite being self-insured and having statutory immunity, but reversed the finding that legal fees could be claimed as special damages.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from a 2009 fire.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the statement of claim was issued in September 2013, outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the discoverability principle did not assist the appellant as he was aware of his psychological difficulties by July 2011.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment to the Court of Appeal, arguing that a finding of law in the motion judge's reasons regarding relief from forfeiture constituted a final order.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory and that, following recent jurisprudence, an order must contain any finding of law intended to be final to confer jurisdiction on the court.

The court concluded the order was not final and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants, who were subjects of a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) investigation, sued the CRA, the Attorney General, and various investigators for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence after criminal charges against them were discharged or stayed.

The motion judge struck most of the claims for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the malicious prosecution and Family Law Act claims, but reinstated the claims for abuse of process and negligence against the CRA investigators, finding it was not plain and obvious that CRA investigators do not owe a duty of care to suspects under investigation.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal from an order dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment, arguing the appeal lay to the Divisional Court because the monetary judgment was under $50,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that because the default judgment also included an order to deliver up personal property, the appeal properly lay to the Court of Appeal, as the Divisional Court's jurisdiction under s. 19 of the Courts of Justice Act is strictly monetary and does not extend to the recovery of personal property.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously set aside an order finding a violation of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal held that under sections 11(2) and 15 of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, the decision of the Divisional Court is final and there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was quashed.

The appellants sued the respondents for defamation and abuse of public office after the Competition Bureau announced bid-rigging charges against them in a press release and to the media.

The motion judge struck the defamation claim under Rule 21.01(1), finding the statements were a fair characterization of the charges and incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that whether the statements were a fair characterization was a factual issue for trial, but struck the portion of the claim relating to Ontario media publications because the appellants failed to provide the required notice under section 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding them liable for defamation and awarding the respondent $50,000 in general damages and $25,000 in punitive damages arising from articles published in a newspaper.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, noting the appellants admitted to publishing the articles in their statement of defence.

The court also upheld the general damages award, finding it generous but within the acceptable range for mental suffering.

However, the court set aside the punitive damages award, concluding that malice was neither pleaded nor proven, and the lack of an apology alone did not justify punitive damages.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a noting in default and striking his amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the pleading failed to accord with the rules, failed to plead essential elements, and had no possible chance of success.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant law firm appealed an order allowing the respondent client to assess a paid account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that under s. 3 of the Solicitors Act, a client may apply for the assessment of a delivered account upon requisition from the registrar within 30 days of delivery, regardless of whether the account has been paid.

The court clarified that ss. 3 and 11 of the Act can both apply to paid accounts, with the 30-day period serving as the dividing line for when an assessment can be directed by the Registrar.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement to address the costs of an appeal that was previously allowed.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal and the application below at $10,500, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the respondents to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering the repayment of a shareholder's loan.

The trial judge found that the loan, which had no fixed term, was payable within a reasonable period of time after a demand for payment was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence, including the directors' intentions, financial statements, and the hybrid character of the loan.

A cross-appeal regarding the date from which pre-judgment interest runs was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion under Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside forfeiture orders made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The forfeiture orders were granted after the appellants failed to comply with a peremptory timetable to respond to the Attorney General's application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants' failure to obtain necessary bank documentation did not constitute 'facts arising or discovered' after the order was made, and thus Rule 59.06(2) did not apply.

The appellant appealed the order of a motion judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the amount of $5,000.

The defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The motion judge had found the defendants moved expeditiously and adequately explained their default, but dismissed the motion solely because the defence was not adequately fleshed out in the affidavit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by treating the principles for setting aside default judgments as rigid preconditions and failing to consider the balance of prejudice between the parties.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the underlying contract, and therefore the arbitration clause, had terminated.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred, as the arbitration clause survived the termination of the contract and the question of termination was itself subject to arbitration.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the appellant, acting in his personal capacity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement between the respondent and the corporation.

The plaintiff was involved in multiple motor vehicle accidents between 1989 and 1997, resulting in a chronic pain disorder and total disability.

Three separate actions were tried together.

The trial judge discharged the jury due to the complexity of the medical evidence, overlapping injuries, and different statutory regimes.

The trial judge assessed damages globally and apportioned liability among the defendants, holding the defendants from the 1989 accident solely responsible for past and future income loss and future care costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury, the apportionment of damages, or the quantum of damages awarded.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a fiduciary duty to a joint venture corporation.

The appellants managed a real estate development for the joint venture and allowed the property to go into power of sale, subsequently purchasing it for themselves.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed and that the appellants breached their duty to avoid conflicts of interest.

The appeal was dismissed and the imposition of a constructive trust was affirmed.

The appellants appealed an order confirming a deputy registrar's findings regarding the accounting of clinic funds, including OHIP billings and bank loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deputy registrar's conclusions were supported by the evidence and authorized by the clarification order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its negligent misrepresentation action arising from purchases of Confederation Life commercial paper through the respondent bank.

The court held that, in the context of dealings between sophisticated commercial parties, the bank's duty of care was limited to accurately supplying the specific information requested in the quoting exercise, not broader investment-related information.

The court further held that stating the D.B.R.S. rating as R1 low was not inaccurate or misleading merely because the rating had been placed under review with negative implications.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.